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EDITOR'S NOTE
This issue of the Water Law Review tells a story. With a dynamic cast
of characters and a timeline spanning over a century, one is able to
catch a glimpse of the history and development of water law in the
West. Beginning with a tribute to Delphus Emory Carpenter, Mr.
Tyler provides insight into the life of the man, without whom this issue
could not exist. Delph Carpenter was instrumental in the creation of
several interstate compacts to which Colorado is a party.
The first three articles, the Rio Grande Compact, by Mr. Paddock,
the Arkansas River Compact, by Mr. Montgomery and Mr. Robbins,
and the La Plata River Compact, by Mr. Knox, trace the history of the
creation of each compact. In addition to Delph Carpenter, several
other historical characters come to life, including M.C. Hinderlider,
Ralph Meeker, RJ. Tipton, and others. One can imagine those who
were involved in the creation of the compacts meeting in places like
Bishop's Lodge in New Mexico, where the Colorado River Compact
was negotiated, to work out the details of each of these important
documents. The three articles bring to life the struggle between the
states, as well as the personal accounts of those involved in the
compact negotiations. Although this issue only covers three of the
compacts to which Colorado is a party, future issues of the Review will
address the remaining compacts.
The next two articles, although appearing dissimilar, continue the
story. In order for the West's water law system to continue to operate
successfully, justices throughout the region must understand the past
as well as the present. In State Water Politics Versus and Independent
Judiciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, Justice Gregory J. Hobbs,
Jr. takes the reader through an account of how the past is able to
repeat itself, and yet, how we can learn from those experiences. Next,
Ms. Harrison provides an insightful history of water law in Nevada, the
driest state in the nation. Ms. Harrison's article delves into the
personal history of Francis G. Newlands, giving the reader new insight
into the formation of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (sometimes
referred to as the "Newlands Act"), the act providing the fundamental
basis for reclamation in the West.
The next three articles bring the reader to the present, where we
are now working to reconcile over one hundred years of common and
statutory law with modern issues such as endangered species. After
decades of building dams, Mr. Whitworth's article discusses the
possibility of removing a controversial dam in Oregon, which has
nearly destroyed an Oregon fishery. Mr. Bromley provides an overview
of changing political and moral views in the West, and the role this
change has played in modern water politics. Finally, Mr. Tarlock
summarizes the recent World Commission on Dams, which describes
how the West's, the United States', and the World's views on water and
water management are changing.
After reading this issue one realizes the vastness of western water
law. These articles provide only a portion of the issues, politics, and
people who have made, and continue to make, water law what it is
today.
Rebekah King
Editor-in-Chief

IN TRIBUTE

DELPHUS EMORY CARPENTER

DELPHUS EMORY CARPENTER

"THE SILVER Fox OF THE ROCKIES"
DANIEL TYLERt
When the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1938 that vested
water rights in the states were subject to the terms and conditions
agreed to in interstate water compacts,' engineer Ralph I. Meeker,
wrote to congratulate Delph Carpenter in a letter in which he referred
to his long time friend as the Silver Fox of the Rockies. Meeker liked
to call himself the lone wolf. The two men had worked together on
many interstate compacts, and they respected each other's talents.
Meeker knew that the Court's decision validated Carpenter's interstate
compact work, laying to rest future challenges by private interests who
believed their water rights could not be qualified by interstate
agreements.
By 1938, Carpenter had been bed ridden for four years with
symptoms of Parkinson's disease. It is not completely clear how he
contracted the disease that wracked his body, but his diaries indicate
that he began to suffer from influenza-like symptoms in 1918 when the
"Spanish Flu" was taking its toll on hundreds of thousands of
Americans across the country. He first referred to his malady as a kind
of muscular neuritis, causing pains in his neck and shoulders. Later
he developed a hand tremor that became visible in his signature after
1922. By the early 1930s, he was having difficulty feeding himself. His
throat tightened up, preventing all but whispered speech. His wife,
Dot, served as his amanuensis, taking dictation so Carpenter could
respond to the many queries he received about new compacts and the
proper interpretation of those already approved by Congress. When
the Parkinsonian symptoms were especially severe, Carpenter could
only communicate with Dot by winking his eyes to spell letters.
Through such efforts, Carpenter managed to stay in touch with the
western water community. Speaking for many who came to appreciate
his contributions, Colorado Congressman Edward T. Taylor sent a
personal photograph and signed it to Delph Carpenter, "the father of
interstate water compacts."
The phrase was certainly an accurate and just reflection of
Carpenter's contribution to the West. Having grown up in a pioneer
family that came to the Union Colony of Greeley in 1872, Carpenter
soon became aware of the need to comprehend the nature of water
rights as he worked on his father's irrigated farm north of Greeley.
After graduation from Greeley High School, he attended the
University of Denver to earn a law degree. His father, Leroy, told him
that if he wanted knowledge of water law, he would have to write his
own books, but Carpenter had already learned by experience that the
I Daniel Tyler is Professor Emeritus at Colorado State University.
author of
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doctrine of prior appropriation was sacred to the farmers in his area.
When he became the first native born Coloradan elected to the
Colorado Senate, he brought with him a determination to defend the
prior appropriation system at all costs. Because of his oratorical skills
and his knowledge about water, the Colorado Assembly asked him to
complete a report on the state's water supply. Many in state
government had been shaken by the United States Supreme Court
decision in Kansas v. Colorado.2 The Court's ruling had suggested that
contrary to traditional beliefs, Colorado and other basin of origin
states might not own all the water flowing in their rivers. Instead, said
the Court, a doctrine of "equitable apportionment" should prevail
between states sharing the same surface water. Carpenter's report,
delivered to the Assembly in 1911, emphasized the importance of
defending the priority doctrine and establishing a "Defense Fund" to
withstand expected interstate litigation.
But in the moment of his most unbending commitment to prior
appropriation, Carpenter's thoughts on water changed. To his
everlasting credit, he saw the Kansas v. Colorado decision as a "firebell
in the night." If the Court was saying that Upper Basin states of origin
would have to share their water with neighbors, and if there was an
implication that states operating under the prior appropriation
doctrine would have to honor the first-in-time, first-in-right principle
in their relations with one another, Colorado would be forever
weighed down by the "servitude," or obligation, to provide water to
neighboring states who had earlier priority dates and who most
probably had the potential to expand economically much faster than
Colorado.
Kansas v. Colorado called for an imaginative response. Carpenter, a
student of the Constitution with a philosophical opposition to the
federal government's expanding powers after World War I,
interpreted the Court's decision as encouragement to the states to
make treaties on interstate streams, so long as such agreements were
submitted to Congress for approval.' The worst thing that could
happen, he believed, was for Colorado to do nothing and let the Court
impose the principle of priority across state lines. Consequently, while
he continued to maintain a resolute commitment to prior
appropriation as the most equitable principle in intra-state water
matters, he embraced the compact theory as a way to (1) enable
western states to settle their own conflicts; (2) maintain state control of
their water; and (3) keep the federal government at a safe distance
until compacts were written and approved by Congress. Only at that
time, Carpenter believed, should the Bureau of Reclamation and Army
Corps of Engineers begin construction of their projects, thus avoiding
the kind of problems that had occurred on the North Platte in 1909
and the Rio Grande in 1916.
Both these rivers originate in Colorado. Construction downstream
of Pathfinder Reservoir in Wyoming on the North Platte and Elephant
Butte Dam downstream on the Rio Grande in New Mexico had placed
Colorado in the position of having to provide water to federal projects
in neighboring states before any discussion of Colorado's future needs.
2.
3.

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.

The Elephant Butte project was especially galling, because its
authorization came with an embargo on additional development of
Rio Grande waters in Colorado's San Luis Valley, a prohibition that
remained in force until 1925. Carpenter could clearly see that if this
pattern were to continue on the South Platte, La Plata, Republican,
Arkansas, Colorado, and other interstate streams, Colorado would be
presented with a fait accompli: a huge burden to provide water to
other states that had established prescriptive claims through diversion
and beneficial use. Under this scenario, Colorado would be forever in
court defending its rights and expending large sums of money in a
"war" that might have been avoided by compact negotiation. Although
he may have exaggerated the situation, Carpenter saw that Colorado
would be under constant attack. He equated the compact process to
the diplomatic efforts to which civilized nations subscribe as a first step
in their efforts to avoid war.
With this commitment to negotiation, and as Colorado's duly
appointed interstate streams commissioner, Carpenter first tried out
his compact approach in 1916 when Nebraska sued Colorado for a
guaranteed supply of water from the South Platte River. Although his
life was complicated by Wyoming's challenge to Colorado on the
Laramie River,4 where he served as lead counsel, Carpenter poured
himself into research on the South Platte. He found a Nebraska
historian who could help him locate living pioneers who remembered
the South Platte as a much more unreliable stream prior to the
beginning of irrigation upstream in Colorado. He interviewed dozens
of these freighters, hunters, and soldiers. With affidavits in hand, he
overcame Nebraska's political bias against Colorado and negotiated a
compact, signed in 1923, that allocated a division of water between
upper and lower basins. It was an important principle used to even
greater benefit in later negotiations on the Colorado River.
1922 was the year of the Colorado River Compact, for which
Carpenter is best known, it is also the year of decision in Wyoming v.
Colorado.' Five months prior to meetings of the Colorado River
Compact Commission in Santa Fe, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that if two states recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation,
that doctrine should apply across state boundaries in a dispute over
interstate water. The decision was a crushing blow to Carpenter, but
he viewed it in a positive light. After all, the Court had recognized
Colorado's right to an equitable share of water on the Laramie River,
although it found Wyoming's claims to that river senior. The decision
meant, Carpenter argued, that priority by date was not the only
measure of an interstate water right; equity, as emphasized in both the
Kansas and Wyoming decisions, required the recognition of a state's
potential to grow and develop and to do so without feeling the need to
divert water prematurely in a race that would exhaust local treasuries.
It was this interpretation of Wyoming v. Colorado that he took with
him to Santa Fe in the fall of 1922 when he met with commissioners of
the Colorado River Basin states and the federal representative, Herbert
Hoover. At Bishop's Lodge, adjacent to the home and chapel of New
Mexico's first Catholic Bishop Jean Baptiste Lamy, the seven
4. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
5. Id.

commissioners, under Carpenter's leadership, and with considerable
help from Hoover, negotiated the Colorado River Compact. After
failing in their attempt to divide the river according to estimates of
each state's maximum irrigable acreage, Carpenter drew up a plan
based on a fifty-fifty division of the river at Lee's Ferry. Because the
Colorado River received most of its flow above Lee's Ferry, it seemed
to him that the Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada)
should be willing to accept a compact based on the Upper Basin states'
(Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico) obligation to deliver a
certain amount of water to Lee's Ferry over a ten year period. The big
question was, how much water? Heated discussions ensued, but the
commissioners eventually adopted the fifty-fifty idea. The Upper Basin
agreed to deliver 75,000,000 acre-feet over a ten year period,
calculated using a running average.
Experts who advised the
commissioners believed the Colorado River flowed at an average
annual rate of 20,000,000 acre-feet, about one-third more than its
proven average. When Arizona showed signs of backing out, it was
agreed that the Lower Basin could divert an extra 1,000,000 acre-feet
annually, a recognition, in fact, that Arizona had already diverted for
consumptive use all the water in the Gila River. The Colorado River
Compact was signed by all seven commissioners on November 24,
1922, at the old Spanish Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe. Three
days later, again as a result of Carpenter's work, New Mexico and
Colorado signed a compact governing allocations of the La Plata River.
Because the political winds shifted in Arizona during negotiation
of the Colorado River Compact, the Arizona legislature refused to
ratify the document its commissioner had negotiated in good faith.
Additional ratification problems developed, especially in California
where Congressman Phil Swing wanted a guarantee of a dam on the
lower river before California would ratify. Carpenter played an
important role in the six year long ratification squabble among the
states, all of whom recognized that Congress would not authorize
construction of a dam at Boulder (or Black) Canyon until the sates
had completed the ratification process. Because he believed Arizona
needed time to put its political house in order, Carpenter suggested
the compact go into effect with six, rather than seven, ratifications.
The states approved this change. Early in President Herbert Hoover's
first year in office, and under authority of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, Congress approved funds to begin construction of Hoover Dam.
Construction began in 1931 and ended in 1935. One of the
greatest engineering projects of the United States would not have
happened without the Colorado River Compact. California's Imperial
Valley was protected from future floods, and hydroelectric power
generated at the dam site contributed significantly to the success of
war industries in the Southwest and to the post-war growth of this area
after 1945. Carpenter did not end his compact work in Santa Fe. He
provided much of the groundwork leading to the 1938 Rio Grande
Compact, and he contributed to compact discussions on the Arkansas
River, the North Platte, and the Upper Colorado River Basin. In 1933,
however, with Democratic Governor Edwin C. Johnson in office,
Republican Carpenter was seen as an expense the state could ill afford.
Johnson fired his interstate streams commissioner and assigned
Carpenter's duties to state engineer Michael C. Hinderlider. The

state's budgetary constraints were such that his removal came with
little warning and without a pension. Debilitated physically by his
disease, and emotionally drained by Johnson' precipitous act,
Carpenter retired to his home in Greeley, depressed by a fear that his
accomplishments would be relegated to the trash heaps of history.
He was wrong. His colleagues wrote constantly to thank him for
his pioneering work in interstate water compacts. Even Governor
Johnson underwent a "burning bush" experience following his
election to the United States Senate. As a member of the committee
on irrigation and reclamation, he spoke out on Carpenter's important
achievements, and became a strong advocate of the states' rights views
of his one-time interstate streams commissioner.
The National
Reclamation Association provided a tribute to Carpenter in 1943, and
the University of Colorado awarded Carpenter its medal of service for
work on interstate compacts.
Indeed, Carpenter left a proud legacy for the modern West. His
work on the Colorado River Compact made it possible for Colorado
and the other Upper Basin states to develop economically at their own
pace. His opposition to federal agencies interested in constructing
water projects to meet multi-purpose and maximum use goals was
based on his belief that the system of dual government in the United
States-federal and state-was established by the Founding Fathers to
preserve a balance of state sovereignty and national security. If the
federal government took control of the states' natural resources, they
would upset this balance and create a situation that would involve the
states in endless litigation. Far better, he believed, was a federal
government participating in the negotiation process and responsive to
state laws. The federal republic, as set forth in the Constitution, was
sacrosanct. It could not survive if national centralization of power
replaced state sovereignty.
Carpenter was a second-generation pioneer. There were far fewer
virgin lands to open by the time he became an adult, and the
intellectual life appealed more to him than the life of a farmer. That
said, he was also a great proponent of pioneer values: hard work,
individualism, strong family ties, local boosterism, and service to the
state. He believed that society was progressing upward, and he lived
the words of Colorado poet Thomas Hornsby Ferrill, who noted above
the murals of the rotunda in Denver's capitol building, "This is the
land where men shall fashion glaciers into greenness and harvest April
rivers in autumn."
What Hoover wrote to him in 1929, right after Congress agreed to
proceed with construction of Hoover Dam, was probably Carpenter's
most appreciated accolade. "I am not so much interested in my
worries," Hoover said, "as I am in expressing .to you the feeling I have
over the consummation of the Colorado River Compact. That
compact was your conception and your creation, and it was due to
your tenacity that it has succeeded. Sometime I want to be able to say
this and say it emphatically to the people of the West."
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I. INTRODUCTION

Rising in Colorado's San Juan Mountains and flowing south, the
Rio Grande travels 1,800 miles before reaching the Gulf of Mexico.'
Over its course, the River traverses 150 miles through Colorado, 400
miles across New Mexico, and forms the 1,250 mile border between
Texas and the Republic of Mexico. Water usage divides the Rio
Grande into two sections, the Upper Rio Grande Basin ("Upper
Basin"), and the Lower Rio Grande Basin ("Lower Basin"). The
Upper Basin extends 650 miles from its headwaters in Colorado to
Fort Quitman, Texas. Nearly all of the available flows in the Upper
Basin are consumed by irrigation.3 The Lower Basin, supplied with
flows primarily from Mexico, extends from Fort Quitman to the Gulf
of Mexico.
The Upper Basin consists of three distinct sections: (1) the San
Luis Valley in Colorado; (2) the section above San Marcial in New
Mexico ("Middle Rio Grande"); and (3) the Elephant Butte-Fort
Quitman section in southern New Mexico, western Texas, and
northeastern Mexico.5 The Rio Grande Compact of 1938 ("Compact")
apportions the flows of the Upper Basin between these three sections,
a drainage area of 31,100 square miles, excluding the Closed Basin in
the San Luis Valley.
Water allocation controversies in the Upper Basin began with
shortages in El Paso and Juarez in the late 1880s and early 1890s.6 In
an effort to address these shortages, in 1895 the United States imposed
1.
NATURAL RESOURCES COMMriTEE, REGIONAL PLANNING, PART VI-THE RIO
GRANDE JOINT INVESTIGATION IN THE UPPER Rio GRANDE BASIN IN COLORADO, NEW

MEXICO, AND TEXAS, 1936-1937, at 7, 19 (1938) [hereinafterJoiNT INVESTIGATION].

2.

Id.at 7.

3.

Id. at 7,19.

4. Id.at 7.
5. Id.at 7.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
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an embargo on the use of public lands for diversion and storage of
water from the Rio Grande and its tributaries in Colorado and New
In 1905, Congress authorized construction of the Rio
Mexico
Grande Project ("Project") to provide water for existing uses and to
irrigate thousands of additional acres of land in southern New Mexico
and western Texas.8 One year later, the United States entered into a
treaty with Mexico to deliver 60,000 acre-feet of water annually from
Project Storage 9 to the Acequia Madre in Juarez, Mexico.
Throughout the duration of the embargo, water users above San
Marcial, New Mexico, could not construct the reservoirs needed to
make the water supply parallel to the needs of their crops. The
embargo ended in 1925 and planning began for water storage in
Colorado and the Middle Rio Grande in New Mexico. Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas declared a truce in the form of a temporary
study
compact in 1929," and nine years later, after a federally funded
2
of the Upper Basin, the states negotiated the final Compact.
The Compact is unique because it apportions water based largely
on geographic regions, not political boundaries. The geographic
regions are: the San Luis Valley in Colorado; New Mexico above
Elephant Butte Reservoir; and New Mexico and Texas below Elephant
Butte Reservoir. Schedules of deliveries contained in the Compact
establish the apportionment to Colorado and New Mexico. Below
Elephant Butte Reservoir, a project water supply agreement controls
allocation to New Mexico and Texas.
A committee of engineers largely conceived of and structured the
Compact. 3 Those unfamiliar with the engineering studies and intent
of the drafters may find the Compact difficult to understand. Thus,
the purpose of this article is to describe the historical context that gave
rise to the Compact, the objectives of the Compact, the engineering
assumptions that underlie the Compact, and the geographic
apportionment of water supplies effected by the Compact.

7.
8.

See infra pp. 15-17.
See infra p. 17-19.

9.

Rio Grande Compact, CoLo. REv. STAT. art. I(K), § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat.

785, 786.

10. See infra notes 200 to 214 and accompanying text.

For a more detailed

discussion, see William A. Paddock, The Rio GrandeConvention of 1906, A BriefHistory of
an Internationaland Interstate Apportionment of the Rio Grande, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 287
(1999).

11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part VA.
13. See discussion infra Part VC.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIN AND ITS EARLY
DEVELOPMENT
A. THE SAN LuIs VALLEY
The San Luis Valley is a high inter-mountain valley extending
ninety miles from north to south and fifty miles from east to west.
The elevation of the valley floor ranges from 7,440 feet to 8,000 feet
and mountains from 8,000 to 14,390 feet high encircle the valley. 5
The Rio Grande enters the valley from the west near the town of Del
Norte, continues east across the valley, where it passes the town of
Monte Vista and through the city of Alamosa. At Alamosa, it turns
south and runs nearly forty miles before passing through a break in
the San Luis
Hills and entering a deep canyon above the New Mexico
16
state line.

An area known as the Closed Basin occupies the northern part of
the San Luis Valley and contains 2,940 square miles of land that does
not naturally drain to the Rio Grande. 7 A low topographic divide and
a hydrologic divide separate the Closed Basin from the rest of the
valley. The divide extends southeast from near Del Norte to a few
miles north of Alamosa, then to the east side of the San Luis Valley. 8
The princigal tributary of the Rio Grande in Colorado is the
Conejos River. Rising in the southwest mountains of Colorado, the
San Antonio and Los Pifios Rivers join the Conejos before it flows
northeast to its junction with the Rio Grande at Los Sauces. 0 Other
tributaries of the Rio Grande from the west above the Conejos River
include the Alamosa River and La Jara and Rock Creeks. 2' Due to
extensive irrigation development upstream, these latter three
tributaries contribute limited flows to the Rio Grande.22
The southeastern San Luis Valley extends east from the Rio
Grande to the lower slopes of the Culebra Range. 3 The principal
streams in this area, from north to south, are Trinchera, Culebra, and
Costilla Creeks. 4 Costilla Creek, apportioned by the Amended Costilla
Creek Compact, 25 originates in New Mexico, flows northwest for ten
miles through Colorado, then turns south to join the Rio Grande in

14.

JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1, at 19.

JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 19.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 20.

24. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 20.
25. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-68-101 (2001).
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New Mexico. 6 Like the Alamosa, Rock, and La Jara, these streams
contribute limited flows to the Rio Grande due to upstream reservoirs
and extensive irrigation.
The first permanent settlements in San Luis Valley were founded
by Hispanic immigrants along the Conejos River and Culebra and
Costilla Creeks in the 1850s. Between 1850 and 1879, there was a
small, steady migration of settlers to the San Luis Valley. By 1870,
50,000 acres were under irrigation in the valley, and by 1879, this had
increased to about 122,000 acres.2 The Denver and Rio Grande
Railroad reached the San Luis Valley in 1879, prompting a large influx
of settlers. Abundant stream flows between 1880 and 1888 fueled the
building of large canals, including: the Rio Grande Canal (1,699 c.f.s.),
the Monte Vista Canal (340 c.f.s.), the Empire Canal (512 c.f.s.), the
San Luis Valley Canal (575 c.f.s.), the Farmers Union Canal (841
c.f.s.), the Prairie Ditch (367 c.f.s.), and the Costilla Ditch (103 c.f.s.).
By 1889, 1,200 miles of canals supplied irrigation water to more than
300,000 acres, and by 1894 some 400,000 acres were being irrigated. 0
No ditches were constructed on the River below its confluence with
the Conejos River. Consequently, those two stream systems operated
independently.
A prolonged drought, beginning in 1889, led to the realization
that the existing water supply was inadequate to serve all lands
underlying the canals." Thus, by 1892, most large canal construction
ceased and acreage under irrigation was significantly reduced." At this
same time, water users commenced the initial adjudication of water
rights on streams in the valley,3 and by 1896, the priorities and rates of
flow for most existing water rights had been determined.
The Rio Grande's use in Colorado increased marginally from 1896
to 1927, after which depletions held constant." In 1936, shortly before
final Compact negotiations began in earnest, there were
approximately 700,000 acres under irrigation, including 278,000 acres
in the Closed Basin. The predominate form of water consumption in
the San Luis Valley has always been agricultural irrigation. The total
irrigated area remains essentially the same today; the most recent
detailed survey indicates approximately 612,700 acres were irrigated in

26. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supranote 1, at 20.
27. S. Doc. No. 55-229 at 54 (1898) [hereinafter SENATE Doc.]
28. Id. at 99.
29. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 19 (1966); Douglas Robert Littlefield,
Interstate Water Conflicts, Compromises, and Compacts: The Rio Grande, 1880-1938,
at 45 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles)
(on file with the Denver Public Library).
30. Id.
31. SENATE Doc., supra note 27, at 55.
32. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supranote 1, at 69.

33. Colorado became a state in 1876 and, in 1879, adopted its first irrigation laws
and adjudication statutes.
34. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supranote 1, at 13, 75.
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1997."5
B. THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE

The Middle Rio Grande Basin includes the Rio Grande and its
tributaries between the Colorado-New Mexico state line and the San
Marcial Narrows at the head of Elephant Butte Reservoir, a distance of
about 270 miles.3
The Rio Grande enters a canyon in southern
Colorado, which gradually deepens as the river flows through
northern New Mexico, past Taos. The canyon reaches a depth of
more than 1,200 feet at Embudo, seventy miles south of the ColoradoNew Mexico state line.37 The Rio Grande's principal tributaries in this
reach include, from the east: Rio Colorado, Rio Hondo, Rio Taos, and
Embudo Creek.
These streams, rising in the Sangre de Cristo
Mountains, irrigate the mesas above the Rio Grande and contribute
primarily flood and return flows to the Rio Grande."
The Rio Grande emerges into the Espafiola Valley below Embudo,
where the Rio Chamajoins it from the west, and Rio Santa Cruz from
the east." The Rio Chama drains approximately 3,200 square miles.4 °
The Abiquiu Reservoir, built in 1963 as a flood control and storage
reservoir with a capacity of 1.2 million acre-feet, regulates the Rio
Chama. Thirty miles upstream from Abiquiu Reservoir are El Vado
Reservoir, completed in 1935, with a capacity of 185,000 acre-feet, and
Heron Reservoir, completed in 1970, with a capacity of 400,000 acrefeet. El Vado Reservoir serves the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District, 4' and Heron Reservoir is part of the San Juan-Chama Project,
a trans-basin diversion bringing water from the San Juan River Basin
into the Rio Grande Basin. The reach of the Rio Grande from the
Colorado state line to its confluence with the Rio Chama contributes
most of the Rio Grande's water supply in New Mexico.43
Below its confluence with the Rio Chama, the river enters White
Rock Canyon. 44 At the end of the canyon is Cochiti Dam, a 500,000
acre-foot flood control reservoir.4 5 Below Cochiti Dam, the Rio Grande
meanders 150 miles through the Middle Rio Grande Valley, a long,
narrow valley that ends at the San Marcial Narrows.4 6 The San Felipe,
Isleta, and San Acacia Narrows divide the valley, and define the Santo
35. Colo. Water Conservation Board,
System,
Rio Grande Support
http://cdss.state.co.us/overview/rgdss/rgdss.asp
36. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 20.
37. Id. at 20-21.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 21.
42. Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96 (codified at 4 3 U.S.C §
615ii (1994) (text omitted from United States Code)).
43. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 20.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Act ofJuly 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 492-93.
46. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 21.
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Domingo, Albuquerque, Belen, and Socorro subvalleys.47
In the Santo Domingo Valley, the principal tributaries are: the
Santa Fe and Galisteo Creeks, which enter the valley from, and flow
into the Rio Grande from the east; Jemez Creek, which enters from the
west, a few miles below the San Felipe Narrows; and the Rio Puerco
and Rio Salado, which also enter from the west, just above the San
Acacia Narrows. 4'
The Rio Puerco and Rio Salado contribute
meaningful amounts of water to the Rio Grande only during flash
floods. Galisteo Reservoir, completed in 1970, controls the flood flows
of Galisteo Creek. Jemez Canyon Reservoir, a 100,000 acre-foot
reservoir completed in 1953, controls the flood flows ofJemez Creek. "
Irrigation in the Middle Rio Grande began around A.D. 400 with
the first permanent Indian dwellings." The Indians irrigated grains,
squash, gourds, maize, and beans. The precursors of Indian pueblos
appeared by A.D. 850 or A.D. 900,"' and between the twelfth and
seventeenth centuries, the Indian population grew and became
concentrated in larger communites. In the sixteenth century, when
Spanish settlers first encountered the Indians in the Upper Rio
Grande Basin,5 3 there were about 60,000 Indians living in
approximately 130 pueblos. During the first century of Spanish
occupation, however, the population of the pueblos declined
dramatically.54 At that time, it is estimated that the remaining Pueblo
Indians were irrigating more than 30,000 acres.55 The Pueblo Indians
drove the Spanish settlers out of the Middle Rio Grande during the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680. The Spaniards did not reestablish control of
the Middle Rio Grande until 1692. Shortly thereafter, the settlers
founded Bernalillo and Albuquerque.5 6
To provide for irrigation, settlers diverted water from the Rio
Grande and its tributaries through "acequias" or community ditches.
From the establishment of Spanish settlements through the early
1900s, New Mexico had neither working irrigation laws nor 5 a7
territorial engineer or other officials to control water distribution.
Consequently, there was no attempt to systematically distribute water
among different ditches on the same stream. In addition, records
were not kept documenting water use.58 Due to the lack of reliable

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Act ofJuly 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 492-93.
50. Stewart Peckham, The Anazai Culture of the Northern Rio Grande Rift, in Rio
GRANDE RIFr: NORTHERN NEW MEXICO, 275, 276 (W. Scott Baldridge et a]. eds., 1984).
51. John A. Ware, Man on the Rio Grande: Introduction and Overview, in Rio GRANDE
RIFr: NORTHERN NEW MEXICO, 272 (W. Scott Baldridge et al. eds., 1984).
52. Id.
53. SENATE Doc., supra note 27, at 54.
54. Ware, supra note 51, at 272.
55. SENATE Doc., supra note 27, at 54.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 73.
58. Id. at 74.
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records in this early period, it is impossible to accurately determine the
total irrigated area in the Middle Rio Grande. Follett estimated that by
1896, approximately 161,000 acres were under irrigation.59 In 1936,
the Natural Resources Committee estimated that a maximum of
153,000 acres were under irrigation in the Middle Rio Grande. 6' The
Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy District supplied much of that
irrigation water."
C. THE ELEPHANT BUTTE-FORT QUITMAN SECTION
The Elephant Butte-Fort Quitman section of the Upper Rio
Grande Basin covers 250 miles from San Marcial, New Mexico, to Fort
Quitman, Texas.62 In the first sixty-five miles below San Marcial
downstream to the Caballo Narrows, the surrounding hills and mesas
are close to the river and there is little valley land. 6 The eastern side
of this reach includes the 'jornado del Muerto" (Dead Man's March),
a long expanse of high desert where many early settlers perished.64
Elephant Butte Dam now blocks the Rio Grande forty miles below the
San Marcial Narrows.
Just below Elephant Butte Dam, the river enters the Palomas
Valley, at the end of which is the Caballo Narrows, now occupied by
Caballo Dam.65 Caballo Dam, which began partial operations in 1938,
has a capacity of approximately 300,000 acre-feet and impounds flood
water and water released from Elephant Butte Reservoir. Below
Caballo Dam, the river enters the Rincon Valley, which is
approximately thirty miles long and, at most, two miles wide. 66 The
Rincon Valley ends at Selden Canyon, where Mesilla Valley begins. 67
Mesilla Valley is one of the larger sub-valleys, extending fifty-five miles
south to "the Pass," about four miles above El Paso.6 It reaches its
maximum width of about six miles near Las Cruces, New Mexico. 6
Below the Mesilla Valley is the El Paso Valley, which is about ninety
miles long and four to six miles wide, extending south from El Paso to
about ten miles below Fort Quitman, Texas.70 There are no perennial
tributaries to the Rio Grande in the Elephant Butte-Fort Quitman

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 76-88.
JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 14.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-23.
See PAUL HORGAN, GREAT RIVER: THE Rio GRANDE IN NORTH AMERIcAN HISTORY

169-70 (1984).
65. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 23. Caballo Reservoir was built pursuant
to the "Trcaty for Rectification of the Rio Grande, Convention between the United
States and Mexico." 1933, Treaty Series No. 864.
66. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 23.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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section.71 Rather, the tributaries are only dry arroyos subject to flash
floods.
The principal tributaries enter from the west between San
Marcial and the Rincon Valley, and flood and sediment control
reservoirs now regulate most of them.73
The land on the Mexican (west) side of the Rio Grande in this
reach is called the Juarez Valley. The 1906 treaty with Mexico
allocated 60,000 acre-feet of water to irrigate about 24,000 acres in the
Juarez Valley.
The land on the Texas (east) side of the River is
included in the El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 ("El
Paso District") and the Hudspeth County Conservation and
Reclamation District ("Hudspeth District"). The El Paso District was
established to provide irrigation water to some 67,000 acres. The
Hudspeth District typically makes no diversions from the River.
Instead, tail water from the El Paso District, delivered via the District's
Tornillo Drain into the Hudspeth Feeder Canal, supplies the
Hudspeth District's water.
The first Spanish settlers in the Upper Rio Grande Basin above
Fort Quitman arrived near El Paso in April 1598, 75 but did not establish
the first permanent Spanish settlement, a mission dedicated to Our
Lady of Guadalupe of El Paso, until 1659. The settlers located the
Mission on the south side of the Rio Grande in present day Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico. From 1700 to 1800, El Paso del Norte (current day
Juarez) served as the gateway to Spain's northern colonies. By 1700,
the Spanish population at El Paso del Norte was 3,588; it was 4,394 by
1779; and reached approximately 8,000 by 1821.76
Before 1827, there were no houses or cultivated lands east of the
Rio Grande. Thereafter, settlement occurred slowly on the east side of
the Rio Grande until the end of the Mexican-American War in 1846,
when many new settlers began moving to the area. In 1859, U.S. Army
Colonel Anson Mills established El Paso, an American town with a
population of only 300; while across the River, the population in and
around Juarez was approximately 13,000.77
With settlement came irrigation. By 1851, the settlers had
cultivated large areas on both sides of the Rio Grande. 8 Major Emory
reported to President Franklin Pierce that cultivation extended along
the Rio Grande for twenty miles below present day Juarez, an area of
32,000 acres.79 In 1896, Follett estimated that some 40,000 acres were
under irrigation, more than half on the Mexican side of the River.8 °
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74.
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Settlements were also being established upstream in the Mesilla,
Rincon, and Palomas Valleys, which after 1848 were in the United
States Territory of New Mexico."' By the 1870s, the settlers were
irrigating large land areas in the Mesilla Valley, but the recurring cycle
By
of flood and drought made this irrigation difficult to sustain.
1896, the settlers were irrigating about 9,850 acres between San
Marcial and old Fort Seldon (near Leasburg, New Mexico), along with
27,100 acres between old Fort Seldon and The Pass four miles above El
Paso .8

m. TLE RIO GRANDE CONVENTION OF 1906
Snowmelt and late summer rains feed the Rio Grande, so the bulk
of the water supply is available only during the short spring runoff.
Late season flows are typically small unless supplemented by
infrequent rains. Given the nature of the Rio Grande, seasonal water
supply shortages were neither rare nor unexpected, and storage was
essential to a reliable irrigation supply in the Upper Rio Grande Basin.
With the onset of a drought in the late 1880s, the people of both El
Paso and Juarez in the Republic of Mexico began intense complaints
about water shortages. At that time, Colonel Anson Mills proposed
construction of a dam just upstream of El Paso. The dam would store
1.65 million acre-feet of floodwaters and serve both the United States
and Mexico. 4 By 1890, the pressure from Mexico over water shortage
prompted Congress to pass a joint resolution authorizing negotiations
with Mexico for a solution to the water supply problems and the
related boundary issues."'
Not until 1896, however, did Mexico and the United States finally
enter into a protocol calling upon members of the International
Boundary Commission ("I.B.C.") 6 to make an investigation and
prepare a report addressing: (1) the amount of water taken from the
Rio Grande through irrigation canals in the United States; (2) the
average amount of water in the River, year by year, before and after
the construction of those canals; and (3) whether a dam across the
River near El Paso, or elsewhere, would be the best means to regulate
the Rio Grande and secure for the inhabitants of both countries their
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legal and equitable rights and interests to the water. 7
In 1895, the Department of Interior approved the Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Company's ("Rio Grande Company")8 application
for a right-of-way for a proposed dam near Elephant Butte in the New
Mexico Territory. The Rio Grande Company stated it would build the
world's largest artificial lake, impounding 253,370 acre-feet of water
for colonization and irrigation of lands downstream to Fort Quitman."
Mexico promptly protested the proposed dam, requesting the United
States government to suspend all work on it.9° In response, Secretary
of the Interior Olney secured an embargo on any use of public lands
that involved diversion of water from the Rio Grande and its tributaries
in Colorado and in the New Mexico Territory. 9' Since the Department
of Interior had already approved the Rio Grande Company's
application, the suspension did not affect it.
In late 1896, the I.B.C. recommended the construction of an
international reservoir to store some 535,000 acre-feet 92 at a site three
and one-half miles above El Paso. In January of 1897, Mexico asserted
that it had sustained $35 million in damages from increased water
diversions in the United States and demanded the prompt
construction of an international dam at El Paso. Mexico also asserted
that the United States bear all costs in order to compensate for past
damages to Mexico and its citizens.9
The United States then faced two problems. First, if the Rio
Grande Company built the proposed dam at Elephant Butte, a reliable
water supply would not exist for the proposed international dam at El
Paso.
Second, the proposed international dam would flood a
substantial portion of the irrigated land in the Mesilla Valley. In May
of 1897, the United States filed suit against the Rio Grande Company
to prevent the construction of a reservoir near Elephant Butte.94 After
five years of litigation and no construction activity, the United States
canceled the previously issued authorization for the dam. 95 In 1909,
the United States Supreme Court sustained the cancellation.9 6
Meanwhile, with the adoption of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the
newly created Reclamation Service set to work studying the relative
merits of a dam at Elephant Butte versus an international dam at El
Paso.97 The Reclamation Service concluded that a site a near Elephant
87.

I.B.C. PROCEEDINGS, supranote 85, at 275.
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Butte was the preferred location for a large reservoir."
The Reclamation Service's October 1904 report found that a
reservoir at Elephant Butte could store 2,000,000 acre-feet of water
and provide a reliable yield of 600,000 acre-feet during most years;
enough to irrigate 180,000 acres. The report also concluded that a
dam at Elephant Butte could store three or four times more water
than the international dam; spills would claim less water; and the
Elephant Butte project would flood no land in the Mesilla Valley.9
In November 1904, the Reclamation Service presented its storage
plan to the meeting of the Twelfth National Irrigation Congress in El
Paso. After extensive negotiations and compromise, the Texas and
New Mexico delegations fully supported the plan. The plan also
received the qualified support of the Mexican delegation.100 Congress
approved legislation to authorize the construction of the project and
the legislation was signed into law in 1905.'0'
Douglas Littlefield summarized the legislation's effect.
First, when construed with the bill's legislative history, the
Reclamation extension act gave congressional authority to the 1904
National Irrigation Congress compromise to build Elephant Butte
Dam and to water irrigable lands along the Rio Grande below the
dam. Second, the act provided that if the secretary of the interior
determined there were enough lands in New Mexico, and Texas that
would benefit from Elephant Butte Dam and that the cost of building
the dam and irrigation works would be returned to the Reclamation
Fund, he could proceed with the project "should all other conditions

as regards feasibility be found satisfactory." ... The feasibility
requirement also meant that the irrigable lands would have to be

precisely fixed by Reclamation Service surveys, and the specific lands
to be watered would be identified by the secretary of the interior
based on those surveys.
In effect, this created an interstate
apportionment between New Mexico and Texas based on [the
Reclamation Service's] Irrigation Congress proposal....
That
Congress intended to sanction such an apportionment is all the more
apparent from
the legislative debates leading up to the new law's
1
enactment. 02
The federal legislation did not address the allocation of water to
Mexico. 03 Under the compromise reached at the 1904 Irrigation
Congress, however, whatever water was allocated to Mexico would
come directly from the overall allocation to Texas. The United States,
with substantial help and prodding from the people of El Paso, gave
Mexico a proposed treaty calling for the United States to build
Elephant Butte Reservoir and to deliver 60,000 acre-feet annually to
Mexico in the bed of the Rio Grande. Mexico would receive the same
98. Id.
99. Id. at 129-130.
100. Id. at 126-141.

101. Act of Feb. 25, 1905, ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814.
102. Littlefield, supra note 29, at 170-171.
103. Act of Feb. 25, 1905, ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814.
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proportion of irrigation water as deliveries of irrigation water to the El
Paso side of the river, except in the case of drought, when the United
States and Mexico would share equally in any reductions. The
proposed treaty also stated that the delivery of water to Mexico did not
constitute recognition of Mexico's claims, and in exchange for the
water, Mexico waived all claims to damages and all claims to waters of
the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman.' 4
In March of 1906, Mexico replied with two requests: first, the
annual delivery of 75,000 acre-feet, measured at the head of the
Acequia Madre, and second, a guarantee that Mexico would receive
one-half of all reservoir spills, excess releases, and inflow between
Juarez and Fort Quitman.' The United States refused to yield, and by
late May of 1906, the Mexican Ambassador nevertheless
signed the
7
treaty, 0 which the United States then ratified.1
IV. THE TEMPORARY RIO GRANDE COMPACT OF 1929
The ratification of the treaty did not immediately lift the embargo
on the use of any public lands in the Upper Rio Grande Basin for
water development. Rather, the United States selectively modified the
embargo to allow certain small projects to proceed. 8 Colorado and
New Mexico deeply resented this because the embargo effectively
prevented any large reservoir construction.' 9 This, in turn, prevented
any regulation of the Rio Grande above Elephant Butte for either
flood control or water conservation purposes. The embargo served
the Reclamation Service's goal of preventing new upstream depletions.
Upstream water users, however, perceived it as enormously unfair
because it left them at the mercy of the recurrent cycles of flood and
drought while water users below Elephant Butte had a guaranteed
water supply. New Mexico and Colorado's continued complaints led
to slight relaxations of the embargo. By 1907, agreements modifying
the embargo allowed for storage diversions not exceeding 1,000 acrefeet and initiated before March 1, 1903, the date when active work on
the project began."0
Relaxation of the embargo also allowed for some limited reservoir
construction in the San Luis Valley."' Rio Grande Reservoir, with a
51,000 acre-foot capacity, and Santa Maria Reservoir, with a 43,800
acre-foot capacity, constructed in the headwaters of the Rio Grande,
were both a result of the embargo's relaxation." 2 LaJara Reservoir on
LaJara Creek, constructed in 1910, combined with Terrace Reservoir
104. Id. at 193-194.
105. Littlefield, supranote 29, at 194.
106. Id. at 196.
107. H. REP. Doc. No. 59-458 (1907).
108. See 66 CONG. REc. 591 (1924).
109. Id.; see also 70 CONG. REc. 3635 (1924).
110. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supranote 1, at 67.
111. Id.
112. Id. at67-68.
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on the Alamosa River, constructed in 1912, produced a capacity of
32,000 acre-feet."' At about the same time, Trinchera Creek saw the
construction of Mountain Home and Smith Reservoirs, and Culebra
Creek became home to Sanchez Reservoir."'
Relaxation of the
embargo did not result in the construction of any reservoirs of
consequence in the Middle Rio Grande.
In 1925, the federal government lifted the embargo entirely,"' and
did not reimpose it until 1935 to hasten negotiations of a final
compact," 6 In 1928, Continental Reservoir, in the headwaters of the
Rio Grande, with a capacity of approximately 27,000 acre-feet, was
completed." 7 Thereafter, intense opposition from Texas and New
Mexico thwarted further reservoir construction in Colorado.' 8 New
Mexico did not fare much better after 1925. Increased seepage and
water logging of land continued to reduce the irrigated acreage in the
Middle Rio Grande. In 1923, New Mexico adopted a Conservancy Act,
and in 1925 created the Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy
District. The district adopted a plan for flood control, drainage, and
irrigation in the Middle Rio Grande that included construction of the
198,000 acre-foot El Vado Reservoir, completed in 1935.1 °
Authorization and construction of the Rio Grande Project,
coupled with the embargo on use of public lands, caused a continued
deterioration of relationships among Colorado, New Mexico, and
Texas over the Rio Grande. As a result, compact negotiations were
suggested, and in 1923, President Coolidge appointed Commerce
Secretary Herbert Hoover as the United States representative to the
Rio Grande Compact Commission. 2
Each state appointed a
representative: Delph Carpenter for Colorado, Francis C. Wilson for
New Mexico, T. H. McGregor for Texas, and the United States
appointed William J. Donovan as the Commissioner.' Both Colorado
and New Mexico then began engineering investigations to obtain
necessary data for negotiations. Consequently, the states did not
conclude the temporary compact until early 1929 ("1929 Temporary
Compact"). 122
The 1929 Temporary Compact did not apportion the waters of the
Rio Grande. Rather, it was a standstill agreement under which
Colorado and New Mexico agreed not to increase their depletions of
the Rio Grande unless new drainage projects offset any new
depletions.' 3 In addition, the temporary compact entitled Colorado
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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and New Mexico to use, in equal proportions,
the amount of any
T
• 124
estimated spill from Elephant Butte Reservoir.
The 1929 Temporary Compact remained in effect until June 1,
1935, by which time the parties were to agree on a final compact. 5
During the interim, data was collected to support final compact
negotiations

based

upon

1929

river

conditions. 26

The

1929

Temporary Compact criticized the United States for thrusting the
burden of the 1906 Convention with Mexico on New Mexico, Texas,
and Colorado. It also urged that only the United States' construction
of the Closed Basin Drain and a large reservoir on the Rio Grande
near the Colorado-New Mexico state line could alleviate this burden. 7
This complaint, at least from the upstream perspective, seemed
misplaced, because it was the construction of Elephant Butte Reservoir
to a size larger than needed to serve existing demands below San
Marcial that placed the greatest burden on existing upstream water
users.
In the 1929 Temporary Compact, Colorado and New Mexico also
gave their consent to the construction of Caballo Reservoir below
Elephant Butte Dam. This consent was subject to the condition that
the reservoir's use would not be the basis of or give rise to any claim of
appropriation or
prior, preferred, or superior rights to use of the
28

water so stored.

The overriding problem facing the states in 1929 was the lack of
comprehensive data on stream flows and the available water supply. In
addition, both Colorado and New Mexico believed that the Rio
Grande Project wasted as much as 200,000 acre-feet of water that
upstream water users could put to beneficial use.'2 Thus, under the
1929 Temporary Compact, each state was required to establish stream
gauging stations to collect data and to compile and deliver annual
reports to each of the other states.
Additionally, New Mexico and
Texas were required to collect data below Elephant Butte Reservoir to
ascertain releases, flows, distribution, waste, and all other disposition
of water for the Project. All parties agreed to do their best to prevent
the waste of water.

3r

In the view of Delph E. Carpenter:

Raymond A. Hill, Development of the Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 14 NAT. RESOURcESJ.,

163 (1974). This report supports the claims of Texas in Texas v. Colorado, 386 U.S. 901
(1967).
124. Rio Grande Compact of 1929, 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 548, 555, art. 6. Article XI,
made power generation subordinate to all other uses of water. This was done, in part,
because the construction of Caballo Dam would allow year-round hydropower
generation at Elephant Butte Dam without loss of irrigation water. Id. art. 6, at 558.
125. Id. at 556.
126. Id. art. 3, at 553-54.
127. Id. art. 2, at 550.
128. Id. art. 8, at 557.
129. See, e.g., REPORT OF DELPH E. CARPENTER, COMMISSIONER FOR THE STATE OF
COLORADO IN RE Rio GRANDE RIVER COMPACT 4 (1929) [hereinafter REPORT OF DELPH
E. CARPENTER].

130. Rio Grande Compact of 1929, 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 548, 552-55, arts. 3-4.
131. Id. arts. 3, 10, at 552-54, 558.
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The compact concludes a long period of interstate misunderstanding
and threatened strife. It opens the way for an orderly and
comprehensive development of the water resources of the Rio
Grande in all three states without waste and without doing violence to
the rights of either state. It preserves the autonomy of the states by
state control before federal interference.132
The states twice extended the 1929 Temporary Compact, first from
June 1, 1935, to June 1, 1937, and then from June 1, 1937, to October
1, 1937.133 The first extension was made to allow the United States
Natural Resources Committee to assist in compiling the data necessary
for compact negotiations. The second extension was made to allow
completion of negotiations on the final compact.'34
The 1929
Temporary Compact expired, but the negotiations proceeded until
the parties signed the final Rio Grande Compact in Santa Fe, New
Mexico, on March 18, 1938.135
V. THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT OF 1938
A. THE RIO GRANDEJOINT INVESTIGATION

When New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas signed the 1929
Temporary Compact, they only seemed to agree upon the fact that the
Rio Grande lacked sufficient water to allow new depletions without
equal amounts of "new" water added to the system.3 6 Colorado
believed it could develop additional storage to make its water supply
parallel crop needs without injury to downstream states. 137 New
Mexico and Texas feared that any new use in Colorado would create
corresponding shortages for them. 138 At the same time, New Mexico
pressed ahead with the rehabilitation and improvement of irrigation
systems for the Middle Rio Grande Valley, including the proposed
construction of El Vado Reservoir. 139 Texas viewed this latter activity
with great apprehension.' 40 The states thus hoped that the data they
intended to develop before June 1, 1935, along with the construction
of the Closed Basin Drain and a state-line reservoir, would provide a
way around this impasse.
After the signing of the 1929 Temporary Compact, Colorado, New
132. REPORT OF DELPH E. CARPENTER, supra note 129, at 8.
133. Act of Apr. 13, 1935, ch. 188, 1935 Colo. Sess. Laws 983; Act of Apr. 19, 1937,
ch. 228, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 1056.
134. Act of Apr. 13, 1935, ch. 188, 1935 Colo. Sess. Laws 983; Act of Apr. 19, 1937,
ch. 228, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 1056.
135. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-66-101 to 102 (2001), 53 Stat.
785.
136. Rio Grande Compact of 1929, 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws 548, 555-59, arts. 5-6, 12;
see also REPORT OF DELPH E. CARPENTER, supra note 129, at 2.
137. Littlefield, supranote 29, at 274-76.
138. Id. at 274-75.
139. Id. at 293-94.
140. Id.
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Mexico, and various federal agencies independently conducted water
supply investigations. Colorado's investigations largely focused on the
amount of "new" water the drainage from the Closed Basin provided
to the Rio Grande. New Mexico's investigations focused on stream
depletions in Colorado and northern New Mexico. Texas apparently
undertook no studies, and the Compact Administration compiled
stream flow measurements and conducted several seepage studies. "1 '
The United States' studies evaluated the Closed Basin Drain, the
Middle Rio Grande Project, and the canalization of the River below El
Paso.142

Meanwhile, the Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy District
pressed ahead with its rehabilitation and drainage in the Middle Rio
Grande Valley and the construction of El Vado Reservoir. 4 3 The
federal government's Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which
purchased the bonds issued to fund the project, enabled construction
of the reservoir. 44 Texas was concerned that the construction of El
Vado Reservoir would result in increased stream depletions and
decreased water quality. Accordingly, Texas filed suit in 1935 against
New Mexico and the Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy District
for violation of the 1929 Temporary Compact. 4 5 The lawsuit
prompted the United States to recognize the conflicting roles of
various federal agencies on the Rio Grande.
The Bureau of
Reclamation operated the Project to deliver water to irrigators in lower
New Mexico, El Paso, Texas, and Juarez, Mexico.
The State
Department was responsible for implementing the 1906 Treaty with
Mexico. The federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation had a stake
in the success of the Middle Rio Grande Project.4 6 And the United
States had participated in the negotiation of the 1929 Temporary
Compact. The existence of these conflicts, the potential for a federal
violation of the 1929 Temporary Compact, and the stalled negotiations
for a permanent compact prompted the United States to again impose
4 7
a form of embargo on the use of public lands for water development.
In September 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an
executive order prohibiting any federal agency from approving
applications for new projects involving use of waters of the Rio Grande
without first securing 4an
opinion on its advisability from the Natural
8
Resources Committee.

The year 1935 found Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas no closer
to agreement on a permanent allocation of water than they had been
in 1929. The Natural Resources Committee met with the Rio Grande
141. JOINT

INVESTIGATION,

supra note 1, at 9, 193-94; see also Littlefield, supra note 29,

at 280-81.
142. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 9, 193-94.
143.

Littlefield, supranote 29, at 293.

144. Id. at 294.
145.

Texas v. New Mexico, 296 U.S. 547 (1935); Hill, supranote 123, at 167-68.

146. Littlefield, supranote 29 at 294-295.
147. Id.
148. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1, at 7-10.
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Compact Commission ("Compact Commission") to see if it might help
resolve the impasse. 49 In December 1935, the Compact Commission
agreed to an investigation by the Natural Resources Committee into
(1) the water resources of the Rio Grande Basin above Fort Quitman;
(2) past, present, and prospective water use and consumption in the
basin; and (3) opportunities to conserve and augment the basin's
water supply. 50 The study was undertaken to assist the Compact
Commission in establishing a factual basis upon which the states could
equitably apportion the Rio Grande. By late 1937, the Natural
Resources Committee had completed its investigations and prepared a
report commonly known as the Rio Grande Joint Investigation ("Joint
Investigation"). The Joint Investigation is a comprehensive history and
detailed analysis of surface and groundwater supplies and usage,
agricultural water use practices and water demands, water quality, and
opportunities for importation and storage of water throughout the
basin. The Joint Investigation provided the states with complete
information on all significant water uses and water resources in the
basin as of 1937, and with this information, the states were able to
negotiate a permanent compact.
On September 27, 1937, the Compact Commission held its first
meeting after receiving the Joint Investigation.
The meeting
continued until October 1, 1937.5' Between 1929 and the 1937 fall
proceedings, the representatives of all of the parties had changed.
Colorado's Compact Commissioner was now State Engineer M. C.
Hinderlider, and his engineer advisor was Royce J. Tipton. The
Commissioner for New Mexico was State Engineer Thomas M.
McClure and his engineer advisor was John H. Bliss. Attorney Frank B.
Clayton became the Texas Commissioner,' 52 and his engineer advisor
was Raymond A. Hill. Finally, S. 0. Harper represented the United
States and the United States' engineer advisor was E. B. Debler.
B. THE STATES' OPENING POSITIONS AT THE COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS

The Joint Investigation confirmed that the normal water supply of
the basin was fully appropriated. The only means by which water use
could increase were drainage, importation of water, or capture of
flood flows that would otherwise spill from the Project. The Joint
Investigation also concluded that the reservoir development in
Colorado, creating a water supply that paralleled crop water demands,
would benefit the entire basin. It concluded that (1) Colorado would
149. See Proceedings of the Rio Grande Compact Commission held in Santa Fe, New Mexico,
Mar. 3 and 4, 1937, at 1 (on file with the United States Archives); see also Sixth Annual
Report of the Rio Grande Compact Committee, (1936) (on file with the Denver Public
Library).
150. JOINT INVESTIGATION, supra note 1 at 10.
151. Proceedings of the Meeting of the Rio Grande Compact Commission held in Santa Fe,
New Mexico, Sept. 27 to Oct. 1, 1937 [hereinafter 1937 Fall Proceedings] (on file with the
United States Archives).
152. Frank Clayton was also the attorney representing the State of Texas in Texas v.
New Mexico. Hill, supra note 123, at 173.
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use less water; (2) increased return flows from Colorado would
enhance water supplies in New Mexico;
53 and (3) such storage would
Project.
the
on
impact
adverse
no
have
At the first meeting, each state set forth its basic position on the
terms for the permanent compact."' Colorado's position was that the
water supplies in the basin were adequate, if properly regulated, to
15
meet the requirements of the existing irrigation development.
Colorado also believed that the facilities in place in both the Middle
Rio Grande and the Elephant Butte to Fort Quitman section were able
to provide a perfect irrigation supply except during prolonged
droughts.1 6 Since periods of prolonged drought were infrequent,
Colorado asserted that it was uneconomical to provide additional
storage for such droughts.'
The embargo, on the other hand, had
denied Colorado the opportunity to construct reservoirs that would
make its water supply parallel irrigation water demands. 5 Thus,
Colorado maintained that any compact must permit it to construct
reservoirs in order to place its water users on an equal footing with
those in the Middle Rio Grande and those under the Project. 59
Colorado also maintained that such reservoir development would
improve the water supply in the Middle Rio Grande and leave the
Project's water supply unaffected 6
New Mexico, for its part, was willing to permit increased storage in
Colorado on the conditions that; (1) the compact protected New
Mexico water uses; and (2) the San Juan-Chama transmountain
diversion project was completed at the same time as new storage in
Colorado. r6 New Mexico was willing to negotiate with Texas to protect
Texas citizens the Project served by fixing the amount of water the
Project could receive, provided that Mexico was limited to 60,000 acrefeet annually upon construction of the American canal.' 62 New Mexico
also required that (1) the Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy
District could irrigate 123,000 acres; (2) Colorado and Texas
recognize and assure an adequate supply for all existing water users in
New Mexico; and (3) the compact provide New Mexico the right to
construct any and all flood protection works necessary to safeguard
property in New Mexico.'
Apart from the latter demand, .New
Mexico made no specific requests for its Project lands.
For its part, Texas was willing to forego any benefit from efforts to
augment the supplies of the River on two conditions; (1) that
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

JOINT INvFsTIGATION, supra note 1, at 17-18.

1937 FallProceedings, supranote 151, at 54-65.
Id. at 10, 54.
Id. at 11, 54.
Id.
Id.
1937Fal Proceedings,supranote 151, at 11, 56.
Id. at 10-11, 55.
Id. at 12, 59.
Id.
Id. at 12-13, 63.
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Colorado and New Mexico deliver sufficient water at San Marcial to
provide 800,000 acre-feet annually for the Project; and (2) that the
quality of the water so delivered not decline below the average quality
during the preceding ten years.64 Texas did not seek to separate its
rights from the water delivered to Project lands in New Mexico and
Texas.
After the states presented their preliminary positions, each state
then submitted its proposal for the basis of a compact. Colorado
proposed a schedule of deliveries at the state line based on the
relationship of the combined inflow of the River at Del Norte and the
Conejos River at Mogote and the resulting outflow at Lobatos (near
the state line) occurring during 1928-1937 ("Compact Study
Period") . 6' The proposed schedule did not require specific amounts
on an annual basis, but rather permitted credits and debits to accrue
over a period of years subject to certain conditions. 166 The conditions
included, among others, (1) any accrued debits in excess of unfilled
Project Storage be "written-off'; (2) accumulated credits be reduced by
the amount of spills from Project Storage; (3) the mean annual release
from Project Storage would be 750,000 acre-feet; (4) Colorado's
accrued debits be reduced by the amount that releases from Project
Storage exceeded 750,000 acre-feet annually; (5) when Project Storage
was less than 300,000 acre-feet, Colorado would release water equal to
its debit from reservoirs constructed after completion of the final
compact; and (6) new reservoirs would not impair the flow at Lobatos
when the flow at Otowi Bridge (near San Ildefonso, New Mexico) was
insufficient to supply the needs of the Middle Rio Grande Water
Conservancy District as defined in the Joint Investigation. 67
In addition, Colorado wanted to deduct from the recorded flow at
Del Norte or Mogote any water imported into those areas after
October 1, 1937.'
Colorado also sought a share of any water
imported into the Rio Grande in New Mexico from streams in
Colorado in the form of a credit to its scheduled state line delivery."'
Finally, Colorado asked that its scheduled state line delivery not
become effective until the new storage in Colorado was fully
operative. 70
New Mexico proposed a schedule for Colorado's state line
deliveries based solely upon measured inflow at Del Norte and
corresponding outflows at Lobatos. 7' It proposed that deliveries be
computed on a sixty-month running average, and that Colorado's
deliveries at Lobatos could not fall below 25 percent of the inflow at

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

1937FallProceedings,supra note 151, at 13.
Id. at 31-33, 61.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
1937 FallProceedings,supra note 151, at 33.
Id.
Id. at 63.
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Del Norte in any consecutive twelve months.172 New Mexico also
proposed that Colorado's deliveries between June 15 and September
15 never drop below 100 c.f.s, and that Colorado's schedule of
deliveries exclude any drainage from the Closed Basin.173
Texas did not propose state line deliveries by Colorado, choosing
instead to rely upon New Mexico's proposal. Texas did, however,
propose a schedule of deliveries to Elephant Butte Reservoir based
upon an inflow-outflow relationship using the natural runoff at Otowi
originating in New Mexico over sixty consecutive months. 7 4 The Texas
schedule assumed that as natural inflow from New Mexico increased,
total inflow at Otowi would increase as well.

75

Thus, for all five-year

cumulative flows of 2,000,000 acre-feet or less, New Mexico would
deliver to San Marcial an amount equal to the Otowi inflow. When
five-year cumulative inflows at Otowi exceeded 2,000,000 acre-feet,
required deliveries at San Marcial exceeded Otowi inflow by an
increasing percentage of Otowi inflow. 76 Texas proposed no time
frame for delivery, but did seek to prohibit upstream storage from
exceeding 30 percent of Project Storage at any given time. 7 Texas
also proposed to increase the scheduled deliveries by 5 percent for
each 10 percent increase above 0.7 tons per acre-foot average dissolved
solids in the water delivered. Finally, Texas proposed that the sixty
consecutive months for calculation of deliveries end whenever all
reservoirs on the Rio Grande between San Marcial and Fort Quitman
were filled.' 78 The next sixty-month period would begin when water
users once again withdrew from those reservoirs for irrigation. 79
After lengthy discussions of the respective states' proposals, the
Compact Commission referred the proposals to its Committee of
Engineers ("Engineer Advisors") composed of the engineering
consultant for each state (Royce J. Tipton for Colorado, John H. Bliss
for New Mexico, Raymond A. Hill for Texas and E. B. Debler for the
United States). The Compact Commission directed the Engineer
Advisors to reconcile differences in basic data, attempt to develop a
technical basis for a compact, and endeavor to work out delivery
schedules. 80 The Compact Commission also instructed the Engineer
Advisors that their work was to be guided by the principle that present
legitimate uses in each part of the basin were to be protected against
any injury from development in other parts of the basin because the
usable water supply was no more than needed to satisfy the present
uses. 181
172.
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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF ENGINEERS

(THE "FIRST REPORT")

The Engineer Advisors met in November and December of 1937.
They first devoted their attention to the factors affecting discharge of
the Rio Grande at the Colorado-New Mexico state line and the delivery
of water into Elephant Butte Reservoir. Second, they addressed the
development of definite delivery schedules. 82 The Engineer Advisors
based the proposed Colorado delivery schedule on a mathematical
curve representing the relationship between the combined inflows of
the Rio Grande and the Conejos (including the San Antonio and Los
Pifios Rivers) and the outflow of the Rio Grande at Lobatos.'83 Noting

that future reservoir construction could disturb the relationship
between inflow and outflow, the Engineer Advisors prepared separate
delivery schedules for the Rio Grande and the Conejos Rivers. This
was done to automatically account for variations in the discharge of
the two streams, and to allow San Luis Valley water users to apportion
among themselves their relative responsibility for meeting the
Colorado obligation.8 5
The Conejos River's proposed annual index (inflow) supply was
the sum of the Conejos River's inflow measured at Mogote and the Los
Pifios and San Antonio Rivers' inflow measured near Ortiz, New
Mexico.'
The Conejos River's confluence with the Rio Grande near
Los Sauces was to serve as the measuring point for the Conejos River's
scheduled deliveries.' 7 As inflow increased, the amount of delivered
water required at Los Sauces also increased, with the difference
between inflow and scheduled delivery being the allowable depletions.
Thus, when inflow measured less than 100,000 acre-feet, the Conejos
River had no scheduled delivery, while an index flow of 350,000 acrefeet resulted in a scheduled delivery of 150,000 acre-feet.'
The
Conejos River's index supply ended at 700,000 acre-feet for which the
scheduled delivery was 480,000 acre-feet. 9
The Engineer Advisors constructed the proposed schedule for the
Rio Grande in a similar fashion, calling for a scheduled delivery of
60,000 acre-feet on an index flow of 200,000 acre-feet. When index
flows reached 700,000 acre-feet, the scheduled delivery increased to
204,000 acre-feet. 90 The Rio Grande's allowable depletions reached a
maximum of 570,000 acre-feet on index flows of 1,000,000 acre-feet
GRANDE COMPACr COMMIssIONERS (1937) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT OF ENGINEER
ADvIsORs] (on file with the United States Archives).
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and at greater index flows, allowable depletions declined to 560,000
acre-feet. 9' The Rio Grande's actual deliveries were to be computed as
the flow of the Rio Grande at Lobatos, less the flow of the Conejos
River at Los Sauces. 92 The Engineer Advisors also proposed that
Colorado index flows be adjusted to account for both water imported
above the
inflow index stations and new depletions above these
93
stations.

The consistent relationship the Engineer Advisors found between
inflows at upper index stations and outflows at lower index stations in
Colorado did not hold true in New Mexico. This was primarily due to
erratic tributary inflow, 194 resulting from summer thunderstorms. Only
by eliminating the months of July, August, and September could the
Engineer Advisors find a reasonable relationship between the stream
flow at Otowi Bridge and the inflow to Elephant Butte Reservoir.9
The Engineer Advisors believed that no practical location for a
gauging station above Elephant Butte Reservoir existed, so they
adjusted the curve to compensate for stream losses between San
Marcial and Elephant Butte Reservoir. 96 Then, the curve was
"arbitrarily shifted to compensate for increased salinity of the Elephant
Butte supply."'97 The result was a nine month schedule of deliveries
requiring a certain quantity of water to reach Elephant Butte Reservoir
for any given quantity of measured inflow at Otowi.' Thus, an inflow
of 100,000 acre-feet at Otowi required 12,000 acre-feet to reach
Elephant Butte Reservoir.!
New Mexico's allowable depletions to
Otowi inflow increased to 375,000 acre-feet on inflows of 1,200,000
acre-feet, but declined at higher inflows such that an index flow of
2,200,000 acre-feet at Otowi required a delivery of all inflow plus an
additional

24,000 acre-feet to Elephant Butte Reservoir.29

The

deliveries to Elephant Butte Reservoir, the "Elephant Butte Effective
Supply," was computed as all releases from the reservoir, plus any gain
in storage, minus any draft on storage during the same time period.'
The Engineer Advisors recognized that natural variations would
occur in the relationships underlying both the Colorado and the New
Mexico delivery schedules. Furthermore, reservoir construction could
cause departures from the scheduled deliveries.9 2 To account for the
natural variations, the Engineer Advisors proposed to allow Colorado
191.

The allowable depletion is the difference between the inflow measured at the

upper index station and the scheduled delivery at the lower index station.
192.
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to accrue debits of up to 100,000 acre-feet and New Mexico to accrue

debits of up to 200,000 acre-feet.2 3 The states could not accrue debits
in excess of those amounts unless caused by water carried over in
reservoirs, and an amount of water equal to the additional debit was
retained in storage. 2 " For Colorado, the additional debit was for water
stored in reservoirs constructed above Lobatos after 1937, and in the
case of New Mexico, it applied to all reservoirs constructed after 1929,
205
so as to include El Vado Reservoir.
The First Report then turned to other protections of the Project
from the effect of new upstream storage and the protection of
upstream users against waste or enlarged use of Project water. Thus,
the First Report defined and limited the quantity of Project Storage to
2,638,860 acre-feet. In addition, it limited the geographic location of
Project Storage to Elephant Butte Reservoir and all other downstream
reservoirs available to store Project water above Courchesne (just
upstream of El Paso) 206 The Engineer Advisors set the normal release
of Project water at 800,000 acre-feet, including the 60,000 acre-foot
treaty obligation to Mexico. °7
In 1937, the El Paso District diverted its water from the Rio Grande
both above and below the Acequia Madre, where Mexico diverted its
60,000 acre-feet. 2 8 Since this allowed unauthorized diversions by
Mexico below the Acequia Madre, diversions serving Project lands
below that point required additional releases from Project Storage to
meet irrigation demands. 9 Mexico's
unauthorized diversions were as
2 10
much as 70,000 acre-feet annually.
To account for changes in Mexico's unauthorized diversions, the
Engineer Advisors proposed to increase or decrease the 800,000 acrefeet normal release by two-thirds of any change in aggregate diversions
or loss to Mexico between Courchesne and the lowest point of
diversion to Project lands. 211 The basis for the future adjustments was
the average loss due unauthorized diversions by Mexico from 1928
through 1937.212 In other words, Project Storage carried the burden or
benefit of changes in Mexico's unauthorized diversions. The burden
was not passed upstream to Colorado or New Mexico in the form of an
increased or decreased delivery requirement. Mexico's changes in
unauthorized diversion did, however, affect Colorado and New
Mexico. The Engineer Advisors went on to recommend that if a
change in the "normal release" was made due to a change in
unauthorized diversions by Mexico, then Colorado and New Mexico
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
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would share equally therein."3 To do so, the accrued credits or debits
of each state were to be adjusted in proportion the change in
unauthorized diversions or loss to Mexico.
The predicate of the Compact negotiations was that new upstream
uses would be possible only to the extent that (1) new water was
introduced into the Rio Grande; or (2) by the upstream storage of
water that otherwise would have spilled from Project Storage and
would not have been diverted by Project water users. To this end, the
Engineer Advisors defined "usable water" as all water in Project
Storage available for release in accordance with irrigation demand,
including the 1906 Treaty obligation to Mexico.2 5 They defined an
"unusable spill" as the amount of water spilled from Elephant Butte
Reservoir for flood control in excess of the current irrigation demand
of Project lands and not stored in another reservoir for subsequent
release to meet such irrigation demands.216 An unusable spill
eliminated all debits of Colorado and New Mexico, thus allowing those
states free use of so called "debit water" previously stored in reservoirs
constructed after 1929.17
In order to protect Colorado and New Mexico against the effect of
actual releases from Project Storage in excess of 800,000 acre-feet
annually, the Engineer Advisors proposed to adjust the time of
occurrence of an unusable spill by the difference between the total
actual releases and the accrued normal release. 2181 In other words, if
total actual releases exceeded the quantity of the normal releases
during the time since the last spill of Project Storage, excess releases,
combined with the contents of Project Storage, would be used to
determine the occurrence of unusable spills. This way Project water
users could not benefit from overuse of Project water.
To implement the upstream use of all water that otherwise would
have spilled from Project Storage, the Engineer Advisors
recommended a reduction in the accrued debits of Colorado and New
Mexico whenever those debits exceeded the unfilled capacity of
Project Storage.2 19 The rationale for this provision is the fact that an
unusable spill of Project Storage would have occurred had Colorado
and New Mexico not incurred the debits. Thus, the First Report
recommended proportional reduction of Colorado and New Mexico's
debits when their combined debits exceeded the unfilled capacity of
Project Storage.22 This allowed the upstream states the free use of
such debit water stored in post-1929 reservoirs that otherwise would
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have spilled from Project Storage."'
The First Report also recognized that in some years, Colorado and
New Mexico would deliver greater quantities than required due to
natural variations in stream flow, and those states should receive credit
for the over-deliveries." Texas, however, was concerned that large
annual credits would threaten Project water supplies. Accordingly, the
Engineer Advisors recommended that Colorado not accrue credits in
excess of 100,000 acre-feet unless the larger accruals offset debits
caused by storage in post-1929 reservoirs.
The Engineer Advisors
recommended limiting New Mexico's accrued credits to 200,000 acrefeet.22 4 In computing accrued credits or debits, they recommended
limiting both Colorado and New Mexico to a maximum annual credit
of 150,000 acre-feet even if the actual credit was greater.225 The latter
provision had the effect of limiting both states' ability to accrue large
debits in the expectation of using large annual credits in flood years to
eliminate accrued debits.
To protect the Project, the Engineer Advisors recommended that
at times of an unusable spill, the aggregate credits of Colorado and
New Mexico be reduced by the amount of the spill in proportion to
their respective credits. 2 26 Additionally, the First Report recommended

that the states could not accrue credits in a year when a spill occurred.
This resulted in credit water being the first to spill, leaving Project
water unimpaired.
The timing and quantity of upstream storage could directly affect
the quantity of water stored in Elephant Butte Reservoir. To ensure
Elephant Butte Reservoir contained sufficient water for Project needs,
the Engineer Advisors recommended prohibiting Colorado and New
Mexico from increasing storage in reservoirs constructed after 1929
when Project Storage was less than 400,000 acre-feet.22 7 If Project
Storage declined to that minimum by January 1 of any year, Colorado
and New Mexico could be required to release, at the greatest practical
rate, all water from reservoirs
equal to the total debit of each caused by
28
the storage of such water.
The First Report largely ignored questions of water quality and
Texas' demand to reduce delivery credits as total dissolved solids in
the water increased. The Engineer Advisors did, however, suggest
minimum quality requirements of any water added to the Rio Grande
from the Closed Basin in Colorado. In order for Colorado to receive
credit for such water, the portion of sodium ions had to be less than 45
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percent of the total positive ions in the water.!
The Engineer Advisors recommended that the First Report be the
basis for an apportionment of the Rio Grande among Colorado, New
Mexico above Elephant Butte Reservoir, and New Mexico and Texas
from Elephant Butte Reservoir to Fort Quitman.23 The First Report,
with some important modifications, did provide the fundamental
framework for further negotiation of the Rio Grande Compact.
D. COLORADO'S ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST REPORT

In February 1938, Royce Tipton submitted to M.C. Hinderlider his
report titled "Analysis of Report of Committee of Engineers to Rio
Grande Compact Commission, Dated December 27, 1937. ,231 The
report contained Tipton's analysis of the effect of a compact
containing the Engineer Advisor's recommendations on present and
prospective water use in the San Luis Valley. Tipton concluded that if
his recommended modifications were also included in the proposed
compact, then a compact based upon the First Report:
[W] ould not interfere with present use of water in the San Luis Valley
and would permit practically free operation of reservoirs, with
present drainage facilities. With more adequate drainage, water users
in the San Luis Valley would be free to increase water
2 2 uses to the
maximum extent physically and economically feasible. 3
Tipton noted that the First Report closely followed Colorado's

compact proposal in Santa Fe on October 1, 1937. That report
preserved the present use of water and permitted increased diversion
and consumption of water that otherwise would have spilled from
Elephant Butte Reservoir. Using a delivery schedule for Colorado
based upon conditions existing from 1928 to 1937, and a delivery
schedule to Elephant Butte Reservoir based upon the period 1915 to
1937 would accomplish this goal. 3
Tipton felt the Colorado schedule of state line deliveries the
Engineer Advisors proposed was more favorable to Colorado than any
other proposed schedule, and its adoption would not interfere with
Colorado's present water use. He also believed the First Report would
permit the free operation of Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir on the
Upper Rio Grande near Creede, Colorado, to provide an annual
diversion of at least 650,000 acre-feet except in prolonged droughts. 4
This, in turn, allowed the water supply to parallel irrigation demand.
For the Conejos River, Tipton believed diversions could be made
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as in the past, since the schedule for the Conejos River was based upon
actual operations since 1924. He also thought that to provide a wellregulated supply on the Conejos River, very little carry-over storage was
necessary because its annual stream flow did not vary greatly from the
mean. In fact, Tipton believed that reservoir regulation of the Conejos
water supply might actually decrease consumption. 231
Tipton reported that fixing the normal release from Elephant
Butte Reservoir was quite controversial. Colorado felt that 750,000 to
775,000 acre-feet was adequate. He pointed out that the Joint
Investigation fixed the demand at 736,000 acre-feet or 773,000 acrefeet, depending upon the method of analysis. Tipton also noted that
the Rio Grande Joint Investigation concluded that Mexico's diversions
averaged 130,000 acre-feet and, reducing that amount to 60,000 acrefeet, saved 70,000 acre-feet. Under the terms of the First Report, the
normal release, reduced by two-thirds of the 70,000 acre-foot savings
(approximately 46,600 acre-feet), resulted in a normal release of
753,000 acre-feet, very nearly the 750,000 acre-feet Colorado previously
proposed.2 s6 On the other hand, if Mexico's diversions increased, the
normal release would supply one-third of the increase, and water that
otherwise would have spilled from Elephant Butte Reservoir supplied
the balance. 7
Upon further reflection, Tipton no longer agreed with the
Engineer Advisors' recommendation that Colorado and New Mexico
release debit water when Elephant Butte Reservoir storage fell below
400,000 acre-feet. Instead, he felt that a release of all the water might
serve to increase the next spill of Elephant Butte Reservoir without
Colorado and/or New Mexico having the opportunity to capture the
water in upstream storage. Tipton recommended limiting those
releases to only the amount needed to prevent a shortage to Project
water users. 238
Tipton was also concerned that Colorado's allowable debit of
100,000 acre-feet was too little. While he thought that 100,000 acrefeet was ample based upon stream flows between 1915 and 1937, a
study of stream flows from 1890-1937 showed more might be required.
Tipton concluded that from 1890-1914, the proposed schedule would
have caused Colorado to accrue a debit of 150,000 acre-feet in 1907
and 1908, assuming no spill of Elephant Butte Reservoir. He added
that if a spill had occurred, at least in 1905, it would have eliminated
an accrued debit of 90,000 acre-feet. Tipton, however, was a careful
engineer, and when he eliminated the large water years of 1890 and
1891 from consideration, Colorado's accrued debit reached 210,000
acre-feet in 1907, and would reach 110,000 acre-feet by the end of
1904. Although Tipton thought the allowable debit of 100,000 acrefeet, when coupled with the predicted spill of Elephant Butte
235.
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Reservoir, was ample to protect Colorado's water users, he
recommended increasing Colorado's allowable debit to 200,000 acrefeet. He recommended, however, that an increase in the allowable
debit not result in more use of natural flow than was occurring at the
present time. Rather, the increase of the allowable debit was to
prevent the San Luis Valley from bearing the burden of debits that
would naturally accrue during a succession of high and low water years
comparable to the 1890-1905 period.2 9
Tipton's report also contained an extensive analysis of how the
proposed Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir could operate under the
Engineer Advisor's recommended compact provisions.
Tipton
evaluated the proposed reservoir's operations under six different sets
of assumptions concerning water supply and return flows. 240 Under the
most adverse assumptions, Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir could sustain
annual diversions of 650,000 acre-feet for each year 1905 to 1934 and
could provide 220,000 acre-feet more water in 1934 than the natural
flow in that year. He also noted that with an additional supply of
26,000 acre-feet annually from imported water, increased return flows,
or a reduction in deliveries to Mexico, Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir
could have operated freely through 1937.41
Based upon his analysis, Tipton concluded that the Engineer
Advisor's recommendations would permit construction of Wagon
Wheel Gap Reservoir and its use to make the Rio Grande's water
supply would more nearly parallel to crop water requirements, without
injury to New Mexico or Texas. Tipton was also careful to point out
that even during times when Colorado was unable to store carry-over
water, it would still receive substantial benefit from regulating the
existing water supply to provide better use. Thus, Tipton believed that
notwithstanding the proposed limitations on carry-over storage the
First Report recommended, reservoirs constructed after 1929 could
continue to be used for seasonal regulation of existing water rights,
allowing supply to parallel demand. 4
Tipton did not analyze the impact of the First Report's
recommendations on reservoir construction on the Conejos River,
believing that free operation of reservoirs on the Conejos River would
not disturb the conditions reflected in its schedule of deliveries. He
stated that seasonal regulation through reservoirs was the Conejos
area's principal need, not reservoirs for carry-over storage.
Accordingly, the Conejos River would not accrue larger debits over
several years by withholding substantial amounts of floodwater in
reservoirs.
Tipton concluded his report with a series of recommendations for
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changes to the First Report. 44 Tipton's report and recommendations
were provided to C. L. Patterson, the Chief Engineer for the Colorado
Water Conservation Board, in March 1938. Mr. Patterson then
submitted his comments on the First Report to the Colorado Water
Conservation Board.
Of significance for present purposes is
Patterson's evaluation of the proposed schedules of deliveries for the
Rio Grande and the Conejos River. Patterson agreed that the schedule
of deliveries for the Rio Grande would protect existing levels of use,
and perhaps allow for limited increased usage."' Patterson was not as
sure, however, that the proposed schedule of delivery for the Conejos
River would protect existing levels of use. He pointed out that had the
proposed Conejos schedule been in effect from 1925-1936, the
Conejos River would have incurred an average annual debit of 3,800
acre-feet. 4 6
From this, he concluded that if 1925-1936 was
representative of long-term conditions, then the Conejos would have
exceeded its allowable development, requiring some reduction in
usage. 247 Further, he noted that Conejos stream flows from 1925-1936
were only 95 percent of the forty-eight year average, and that
248
corresponding records of outflow over that period did not exist.
Apparently, Patterson's intended conclusion was that the Conejos
River schedule contained little or no excess. Patterson's analysis did
not include 1937, a comparatively wet year. Adding that year to the
analysis, along with the minor adjustments to the Conejos River's
schedule of deliveries the Engineer Advisors recommended later,
allowed continuation of the 1924-1937 levels of uses.
E. PROCEEDINGS OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, MARCH 3

TO MARCH 18, 1938
The Middle Rio Grande Water Conservancy District immediately
objected to the First Report. In a letter dated January 25, 1938, to U.S.
Representative S. 0. Harper, Thomas McClure, New Mexico's
Compact Commissioner, stated the report was unacceptable as the
basis for further compact negotiations. He objected primarily to the
recommended schedule of deliveries to Elephant Butte Reservoir and
the recommended quantity of normal releases for the Project. He
therefore requested that the Engineer Advisors reconsider their
report.250 objections
The Compact
agreed
to take
up Mr.
McClure's
at theirCommissioners
meeting scheduled
for March
1938.1
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When the Compact Commission convened on March 3, 1938, in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, both the Colorado and Texas Commissioners
indicated their willingness to proceed with negotiations based on the
First Report." 2 In light of New Mexico's unwillingness to do so, the
Commissioners asked New Mexico to provide a written statement of its
objections. 53 New Mexico's statement contained eleven specific
objections that the Compact Commission returned to the Engineer
Advisors. On March 4, 1938, the Engineer Advisors reported that they
were willing to review all but three of the issues New Mexico raised,
and needed two to three days to do so.254 To expedite the review, and
to provide additional information, the engineer for the Middle Rio
Grande Water Conservancy District became an informal participant in
the ensuing discussions.
The issues reviewed by the Engineer Advisors included (1) whether
to base New Mexico's deliveries on the relationship between inflow at
Otowi and outflow at San Marcial; (2) whether to include El Vado
storage in natural flows at Otowi; (3) whether a normal release of
800,000 acre-feet from Project Storage was excessive; (4) New Mexico's
insistence on establishing an exact figure for Mexico's excess
diversions as the basis for determining credit for future savings; (5)
fixing the maximum capacity of Project Storage based upon an
elevation in Elephant Butte Reservoir; (6) retention of credit water
under certain conditions; (7) inclusion of provisions to prevent
premature release of debit water to Project Storage; and (8) inclusion
of releases of water for power generation in the "normal releases" from
the Project 255 The Engineer Advisors left to the Compact Commission
as a whole New Mexico's demands that it not be charged with water
usage by Indian pueblos, that the obligation for fulfilling the treaty
obligation be placed expressly on Texas or the United States, and that
there be no legal interpretation of the 1906 Treaty obligation.
F. SECOND REPORT OF THE ENGINEER ADVISORS
After extensive deliberations, on March 9, 1938, the Engineer
Advisors submitted their revised recommendations for the basis of the
compact ("Second Report"). The Second Report followed the same
language and format of the First Report, varying only when
recommendations changed.256 Since the Engineer Advisors held all of
their meetings off the record, no written documents exist explaining
their bases or reasons for the changes.
The first substantive change was a new schedule of deliveries for
New Mexico based upon inflow at Otowi and outflow at San Marcial
exclusive of July, August, and September. The new Otowi index supply
included an adjustment for upstream storage. This change meant that
252.
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Otowi inflow did not include El Vado water until it was released from
storage, usually between July and September. This new schedule was
subject to adjustment for post-1929 depletions to the natural runoff
above Otowi, and depletions caused by works constructed after 1937
between Otowi and San Marcial. 57
The Engineer Advisors remained quite skeptical about the use of a
gauging station at San Marcial, fearing it would not remain viable.
Thus, they recommended maintaining gauging stations upstream at
San Acacio and downstream below Elephant Butte Reservoir. This
would enable data collection from these stations if it became necessary
to adopt a substitute schedule.2 "
The second substantive change the Engineer Advisors
recommended was reduction of Colorado's state line delivery
obligation at Lobatos by 10,000 acre-feet. 5 9 The Second Report does
not explain the reason for this change. Raymond Hill attributed it to a
dispute between Rio Grande and Conejos River interests in
Colorado.6
Alternatively, C. L. Patterson's concerns about the
tightness of the Conejos River schedule could be a reason for the
change. Yet, neither explains why Project water users would give up
10,000 acre-feet annually to solve an intramural dispute in Colorado.
The answer to the latter question appears to be part of a larger
compromise involving over-diversions by Mexico and the "normal
release" from Project Storage.
The Engineer Advisors had agreed to consider New Mexico's
objections to both the amount of the "normal release" from Project
Storage and the need for greater specificity in allocation among the
states of the savings from Mexico's reduced over-diversions."' In the
Second Report, the Engineer Advisors reduced the "normal release" to
790,000 acre-feet, which included the 60,000 acre-foot treaty
obligation. 62 In addition, they eliminated from the definition of
"normal release from Elephant Butte" any provision for sharing either
in the benefit of Mexico's reduced over-diversions or in the burden of
increased deliveries to Mexico.2 6'
This issue was important to
Colorado. Tipton believed that reducing Mexico's over-diversions
would result in savings up to 70,000 acre-feet, Colorado's share of the
savings being one-third or 23,300 acre-feet. 26 This savings would
reduce the "normal release" to approximately 753,000 acre-feet. 265
Reduced annual releases from Project Storage would then increase the
potential for spills, and thus improve the water supply in Colorado.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 64-65.
1938 Proceedings,supra note 249, at 60.
Hill, supra note 123, at 177.
1938 Proceedings,supra note 249, at 56-57.
See generally id.
Id. at 62-63.
TIPTON, supra note 231, at 47.
Id.

Issue I

THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT

Since this was nearly enough water to allow the free operation of
Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir, Colorado would not readily give up its
share in the reductions of Mexico's over-diversions.
Raymond Hill later testified that the three states could not agree
on how Colorado and New Mexico should share in any savings from
reduced deliveries to Mexico.2 67 According to Mr. Hill, the upper
states said "'If you want to let them [Mexico] have more water, it is
your water and it is your baby, don't bother us with it'." 28 He also
testified that the allocation on the downstream side of Elephant Butte
was 730,000 acre-feet for use in the United States and 60,000 acre-feet
for use in Mexico. If Mexico used more than 60,000 acre-feet, it came
out of the 730,000 acre-feet. 269 Mr. Hill's testimony is consistent with
Article XIV of the Compact, providing that the schedules of deliveries
and quantities of water the Compact allocated shall never increase or
decrease due to any increase or decrease in delivery or loss of water to
Mexico.
The compromise on the Mexican deliveries clarifies why the
Project water users were willing to reduce the normal release by 10,000
acre-feet. The compromise, in effect, gave the Project water users
most of the savings resulting from Mexico's reduced over-diversions.
The American Canal, nearing completion, would reduce Mexico's
over-diversions, thereby increasing the Project water supply. Thus, the
compromise on over-diversions by Mexico is the apparent source of
the 10,000 acre-foot reduction in Colorado's scheduled deliveries.
While Colorado was willing to give up some portion of the savings
from Mexico's reduced over-diversions, it apparently was not willing to
give it all up.
This also helps explain why New Mexico receded from its claim
that the 800,000 acre-feet "normal release" was so unreasonable as to
fail as a basis for negotiations. In effect, the states all agreed that
Project water users would bear the risk of increased water losses to
Mexico, and Colorado received a small reduction in annual scheduled
deliveries as part of the bargain.
The Second Report made a number of other less dramatic changes
to the First Report. It modified the provision for credits and debits to
include assessment of evaporation losses against credit water in Project
Storage. In accordance with Tipton's recommendation, the Second
Report also reduced the requirement for releases of debit water stored
upstream to the amount necessary to increase Project Storage to
600,000 acre-feet by March 1, and maintain that level until April 13.
Finally, recognizing the uncertainty of several factors, the Engineer
Advisors left the effect of changes in salinity of the Elephant Butte
supply since 1930 for future adjustment.
They therefore
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recommended reviewing all provisions of the Compact in five years.270
On March 10, 1938, the Compact Commission met to receive the
Second Report. On March 11, 1938, the Engineer Advisors submitted
two pages of clarifications in response to the Compact Commission's
questions.'
With the clarifications in hand, the Commissioners
appointed a legal committee to prepare a tentative draft of the
Compact. Colorado appointed George Corlett, attorney for the Rio
Grande Water Users Association, and Ralph Carr, attorney for the
Conejos interests. New Mexico appointed Governor Hannett and Fred
Wilson. Texas appointed Major Richard Burgess and Judge Edwin
Mechem. The states concluded all of the subsequent negotiations and
drafting of the Compact off the record 2
Those negotiations
continued from March 11 to March 17, 1938, when the drafting
committee submitted the final draft of the Compact to the Compact
273
Commission.
After a few final changes, the states approved and
signed Compact on March 18, 1938.
During the course of these negotiations, the drafting committee
asked the Engineer Advisors to comment on the various drafts of the
Compact. In their comments on the March 16 draft, the Engineer
Advisors recommended revising the schedule of deliveries for the
Conejos River to correct a slight error in the curve used to determine
the inflow-outflow relationship. 4
The recommended changes
generally reduced the scheduled deliveries of the Conejos River by one
or two thousand acre-feet for any given level of inflow.
VI. THE TERMS OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT
The Compact2 75 signed in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on March 18,

1938, bears little resemblance to the 1929 Temporary Compact.
Rather, it embodies the principles for the equitable allocation of water
contained in the Second Report. The Compact consists of a preamble
and seventeen articles. The preamble states that the purpose of the
Compact is to effect an equitable apportionment of the Rio Grande
above Fort Quitman, Texas, among Colorado, New Mexico, and
Texas.2 16 Article I contains the definition of seventeen
terms crucial to
2 77
understanding and interpreting the Compact.
The important definitions in Article I include "Project Storage,"
defined as "the combined capacity of Elephant Butte Reservoir and all
other reservoirs actually available for the storage of usable water below
Elephant Butte and above the first diversion to lands of the Rio
270.
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27 8
Grande Project, but not more than a total of 2,638,860 acre-feet.
This definition serves to limit the total quantity of Project Storage, and
limits it to the area between Elephant Butte Reservoir and the first
diversion to Project lands.
The Compact defines "Usable Water" as "all water, exclusive of credit
water, which is in project storage and which is available for release in
accordance with irrigation demands, including deliveries to Mexico."279
(Emphasis supplied). The significance of this definition is that it
excludes credit water from the water usable to serve the Project. In
addition, it limits the timing of releases of Project water to those made
in accordance with irrigation demand.
The Compact defines "Credit Water" as "that amount of water in
project storage which is equal to the accrued credit of Colorado, or
New Mexico, or both."8 °
"Actual Spill" is defined as:

[A] 11water which is actually spilled from Elephant Butte reservoir, or
is released therefrom for flood control, in excess of the current
demand on project storage and which does not become usable water
by storage in another reservoir; provided, that actual spill of usable1
water cannot occur until all credit water shall have been spilled.
(Emphasis supplied).

Thus, credit water spills before Project water.
"Hypothetical Spill" is defined as:
[T]he time in any year at which usable water would have spilled from
project storage if 790,000 acre-feet had been released therefrom at
rates proportional to the actual release in every year from the starting
date to the end of the year in which hypothetical spill occurs, in
computing hypothetical spill the initial condition shall be the amount
of usable water in project storage at the beginning of the calendar
year following the effective date of this compact, and thereafter the
initial condition shall be the amount of usable water in project
storage at the beginning of the calendar year following each actual
spill. 2
This provision prevents Project water users from gaining any
benefit from excessive releases that otherwise prevent a spill from
occurring.

Article II identifies the twelve stream gauging stations necessary for
administration

of the

Compact

and

requires

installation

and

maintenance of gauging stations below any reservoir constructed after
1929, and at such other points as are necessary for carrying out the
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Compact.!"3
Article III contains Colorado's delivery obligation at the ColoradoNew Mexico state line." 4 The first schedule of deliveries is that of the
Conejos River and the second schedule of deliveries is that of the Rio
Grande."' The combination of these two schedules, less than 10,000
acre-feet, comprises Colorado's annual delivery schedule. 80 While not
stated in the Compact, the separate delivery schedules impose separate
obligations on the Rio Grande and the Conejos River to meet their
separate delivery obligations.2 7 Thus, Colorado's Compact obligation
is allocated intrastate based upon the separate delivery schedules, not
through the operation of a unified basin-wide administration under
the priority system. One reason for this is that before the Compact,
the Conejos River and the Rio Grande operated independently of one
another, and the Compact did nothing to alter the historical method
of intrastate administration. 8
Article IV is New Mexico's schedule of deliveries to San Marcial.2 9
Due to persistent concerns about this schedule and the desire to have
a twelve, rather than a nine-month schedule, the Compact
Commission, in 1948, adopted a new, year-round schedule of
deliveries for New Mexico.290 That schedule eliminated use of the San
Marcial gauging station and replaced it with the Elephant Butte
Effective Index Supply. This index supply is defined as the recorded
flow below Elephant Butte Dam during the calendar year, plus the net
gain in storage or minus the net loss in storage during the calendar
year, as the case may be. This is essentially the same standard for
measurement of deliveries recommended in the First Report, except
that it is a twelve-month schedule and based upon a different inflowoutflow relationship (see Appendix II for a comparison of schedules).
Article V is an administrative provision that permits the
Commission, by unanimous action, to abandon unreliable gauging
stations and substitute new stations, provided the new stations supply
substantially the same results. 9 '
Article VI contains the provisions for credits and debits and
limitations
on new storage
in M.
Colorado
and New gave
Mexico.11
In his
report to Governor
Ammons,
C. Hinderlider
the following
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summary of Article VI and Colorado's ability to vary from its scheduled
deliveries:
Such variation in any year by Colorado may amount to as much as
100,000 acre-feet, together with larger debits resulting from holdover
storage, without violating Colorado's obligation to meet its schedule
of deliveries at the stateline. This provision is necessary to permit
future diversions in Colorado in any year by presently decreed
appropriations in the San Luis Valley in substantially the same
manner in which the diversions and uses have been made in past
years. Colorado, however, must always retain in storage reservoirs
sufficient water to repay any debits due from failure to meet the
required schedule of stateline deliveries. It should be noted that this
obligation applies only to reservoirs constructed after 1937, and in no
way affects the rights of present reservoirs in Colorado to store water
within the limits of their present decrees.
This Article also provides that Colorado or New Mexico may not
accumulate annual credits in Elephant Butte reservoir in excess of
150,000 acre-feet of water. This limitation is designed to prevent
unsound expansion of development which otherwise might result
from accumulations of large annual credits, and which also might
reduce the available capacity of that reservoir to regulate the portion
of the river flow to which the lands under the Elephant Butte project
are rightfully entitled.
Paragraph six of Article VI provides that the Commissioners of the
upper states, which have accrued credits in Elephant Reservoir, may
authorize any part of such credits to be used under the Elephant
Butte project, if in their judgment failure to release such credits
would result in "actual spill" from the Elephant Butte Reservoir. This
would permit, at times, a greater use of water under that project for
reduction of salinity in the lands, which, if not used, would pass over
the spillway and be wasted down the river. It should be noted,
however, that such releases of credit water belonging to an upper
state is entirely optional with the Commissioner of the state holding
such credits, and would not be agreed to unless, in his judgment, the
stage of storage in Elephant Butte Reservoir at that time, or the
prospect for an abnormally large runoff from the basin above, would
definitely indicate that such credits would later be floated out over
the spillway, or through the flood release valves of Elephant Butte
Reservoir, of which no beneficial use could be made.
This Article also provides for reduction in the amount of credit
water held in Elephant Butte storage, and debit water held in
reservoirs in upper New Mexico and Colorado
S 293 constructed after
1929, to compensate for losses due to evaporaton.
Article VII of the Compact,
Hinderlider:

94

again as summarized by M. C.

[P]rohibits increase in storage of water in reservoirs in Colorado and
New Mexico constructed after 1929, whenever there is less than
400,000 acre-feet of usable water in storage in Elephant Butte
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[hereinafter Hinderlider] (on file with the author).
294. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. 7, § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat. 785,
790.

WATER LAW RE VIEW

Volume 5

Reservoir, provided, however, that, if the total releases of usable water
from that reservoir since the effective date of the Compact, or the last
actual spill from the reservoir, have aggregated more than an average
of 790,000 acre-feet per year, including required deliveries to Mexico,
the time and amount of minimum storage in Elephant Butte
Reservoir shall be adjusted for the excess deliveries.
Article VIII implements Royce Tipton's recommendation to retain
as much water in upstream storage as is consistent with a full water
supply for the Project.29 6 As summarized by Hinderlider:
Article VIII provides for the releases of water from storage
reservoirs in Colorado and New Mexico constructed after 1929, to the
extent of accrued debits against those states at "the greatest rate
practicable under the conditions then prevailing", sufficient to bring
the quantity of usable water in Elephant Butte storage to 600,000
acre-feet, and to insure a release from that reservoir of 790,000 acrefeet in such year.
This provision is to prevent shortage under the Elephant Butte
Reservoir due to the withholding of water which would otherwise
have been in storage in that reservoir. The terms of the provisions
are such that the release of the water can be made at a rate to protect
structures and property along the Conejos and Rio Grande against
high stages of flow, and to insure that the releases of reservoir water
may be made in such manner as not to encroach upon the stream
channel capacity to the detriment of the use of such capacity by
Colorado appropriators."'
Article IX addresses importation of water into the Rio Grande
Basin from the San Juan River. 8
Article X assures that such
importation will protect present and future uses in Colorado and
provides that proper credit will be given for the importation of such
water.29
Article XI, in the view of Hinderlider:
[I]s a most important declaration of principle with respect to the
responsibility of an upper state, or citizen thereof, for the quality or
character of the water flowing from an upper state into another state,
and is designed for the protection of the interests of the upper state
and its water users. It will be noted that there is now no question
concerning the quality or character of the waters of the Upper Rio
Grande Basin, but any state may at a later time raise this question in
an action before the Supreme Court of the United States, should it
decide that a change in quality or character of the waters in later

295.
296.
790.
297.
298.
790.
299.

Hinderlider, supra note 293, at 25.
Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. 8, § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat. 785,
Hinderlider, supra note 293, at 25.
Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. 9, § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat. 785,
Id. art. 10, 53 Stat. at 790.
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years justifies such action. 00
Article XII sets up the administrative machinery for the
Compact.30 ' The Rio Grande Compact is the first interstate water
compact to create a permanent commission responsible for overseeing
its provisions. Article XIII permits the Compact Commission to review,
at the end of each five-year period after the effective date of the
Compact, any nonsubstantive provisions that do not affect the basic
principles upon which the Compact is founded.3 2 Any changes the
Compact Commission makes to the Compact must be unanimous and
the legislatures of the several states must ratify such changes and
Congress must consent to the changes. 33
304
Hinderlider
Article XIV addresses deliveries to Mexico.
understood this article as
[D]esigned to protect Colorado and New Mexico against any
increases in future uses of water by Mexico over and above the 60,000
acre-feet recognized by treaty. By the provisions of this Article, any
decrease in uses of water by Mexico would be t the benefit of the
water users under the Elephant Butte Reservoir.
Article XV declares the Rio Grande Compact is based upon
conditions peculiar to the Rio Grande Basin and does not establish any
general principle or precedent applicable to other interstate streams.3
Article XVI recognizes that nothing in the Compact affects the United
States' obligations to Mexico under existing treaties or to Indian
tribes. Nor does the Compact impair the rights of Indian tribes.0 7
Finally, Article XVII provides the Compact will become effective
when ratified by each state and consented to by Congress.0 8 Colorado
ratified the Compact on February 21, 1939; Texas ratified it on March
1, 1939; New Mexico ratified it on March 2, 1939; and the United
States consented to the Compact on May 31, 1939.300
VII. APPORTIONMENT OF THE RIO GRANDE PROJECT WATER
SUPPLY

While the three states were conducting Compact negotiations,
other water users were negotiating allocation of the Project repayment
300. Hinderlider, supra note 293, at 26.
301. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. 12, § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat.
785, 791.
302. Id. art. 13, 53 Stat. at 791-92.
303. Id.
304. Id. art. 14, 53 Stat. at 792.
305. Hinderlider, supra note 293, at 26.
306. Rio Grande Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. 15, § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat.
785, 792.
307. Id. art. 16, 53 Stat. at 792.
308. Id. art. 17, 53 Stat. at 792.
309. Littlefield, supra note 29, at 312.
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obligations and water supply. Recall that in 1904, the fledgling
Reclamation Service's plan for the Project predicted Elephant Butte
Reservoir would provide sufficient water to irrigate 180,000 acres in
the United States and Mexico. The Rio Grande Convention of 1906
allocated 60,000 acre-feet annually to Mexico, a quantity calculated to
serve 25,000 acres. In the 1920s, the Elephant Butte Irrigation District
("EBID") and the El Paso Water Improvement District No. 1 ("El Paso
District") were organized and then entered into contracts to repay the
United States for Project costs. In 1929, shortly after the signing of the
1929 Temporary Compact, EBID and the El Paso District entered into
a contract allocating the Project's irrigated acreage between them.
The percentage allocation of acreage was also the percentage
allocation of the repayment obligation to the United States. Under
that contract, EBID was entitled to irrigate 88,000 acres and the El
Paso District was entitled to irrigate 67,000 acres, for a total of 155,000
acres.31 1 Including the 25,000 acres in Mexico, the total is 180,000
acres, the same number as the Reclamation Service had predicted in
1904, and the basis upon which the 1904 International Irrigation
Congress approved the Project.
Farmers under the Project struggled financially throughout the
1920s and 1930s due to the economy's collapse after World War I, the
stock market crash, and the Great Depression. As a consequence, after
1929, they were forced to seek repayment relief and debt rescheduling
to alleviate the burden of their repayment contracts.3
The
rescheduling and restructuring again forced EBID and the El Paso
District to allocate the repayment obligation. The two districts
believed a new inter-district agreement could provide the basis for
apportioning repayment costs, water deliveries, and the Project
income. Thus, in February of 1938, the two districts agreed to split the
Project costs, income, and water supplies based on 88,000 irrigated
acres or 56.77 percent to EBID and 67,000 irrigated acres or 43.23
percent to the El Paso District. The contract was in effect between the
districts when Compact negotiations resumed in March 1938, and the
Secretary of the Interior formally approved the contract on April 11,
1938. 3' 4
VIII. THE TEXAS RATIFICATION CONTROVERSY
After approving the Compact, the Commissioners for each state
returned home to promote their state's ratification of the Compact.
Controversies ensued over federal funding of projects in Colorado and
New Mexico that impeded this progress."
Those controversies,
310. See Contract Between Elephant Butte Irrigation District and El Paso County Water
Improvement DistrictNo. 1, Feb. 16, 1938 (on file with author).

311.
312.
313.
314.

Littlefield, supra note 29, at 238.
Id.
Id. at 244-52.
Id. at 252.

315. Id. at 301-307.
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however, proved relatively minor compared with the controversy
confronting Texas Commissioner Frank Clayton. The water users on
the Lower Rio Grande between Fort Quitman and the Gulf of Mexico
believed that because Elephant Butte Reservoir served as the
Compact's point of deliveries for Texas, rather than the New MexicoTexas state line, that the Compact did not actually guarantee Texas
any water. 1 16 Moreover, in January of 1938, the Lower Rio Grande
water users had sent representatives to meet with Frank Clayton,
Raymond Hill, and representatives of EBID and the El Paso District to
discuss the First Report of the Engineer Advisors. At that meeting, the
Lower Rio Grande water users requested that the Compact contain a
clause guaranteeing water to their part of Texas. Clayton apparently
dissuaded them from this demand on the basis that neither Colorado
nor New Mexico could control the Compact's final allocation to
Texas.1 7 Charles Clark, Chairman of the Texas Board of Water
Engineers, agreed with Clayton's conclusion and said that water users
above and below Fort Quitman could accomplish an intrastate
allocation agreement after ratification of the Compact.'18
Shortly after the delegates signed the Compact, the Lower Rio
Grande water users renewed their request for an intrastate allocation
and vowed to fight Texas' ratification of the Compact unless an
agreement could assure them 200,000 acre-feet annually at Fort
Quitman. This, of course, was not possible under the Project because
the United States owned the Project's water rights. The Bureau of
Reclamation controlled releases from Elephant Butte Dam, and the El
Paso District was unlikely to agree to aid in Project repayment if it had
to deliver the water to downstream users. In the ensuing controversy,
an attorney for the Lower Rio Grande water users wrote to
Commissioner Clayton pointing out the obvious absence of a specific
allocation of water below Elephant Butte to New Mexico and Texas.
He then asked why the Compact did not expressly address the
respective rights of New Mexico and Texas.319
Clayton replied that the Compact recognized the apportionment
of the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte and that the 1938 interdistrict agreement confirmed the division. Clayton went on to explain
that:
"[T]he question of the division of the water released from Elephant
Butte reservoir is taken care of by contracts between the districts

under the Rio Grande Project and the Bureau of Reclamation. These
contracts provide that the lands within the project have equal water
rights, and the water is allocated according to the areas involved in
the two States. By virtue of the contract recently executed [the 1938
interdistrict agreement], the total area is 'frozen' at the figure
representing the acreage now actually in cultivation: approximately
316.
317.
318.
319.

Littlefield, supranote 29, at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303-304.
Id. at 309-10.
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88,000 acres for the Elephant Butte Irrigation District, and 67,000 for

the El Paso County Water Improvement
District No. 1, with a
'cushion' of three per cent for each figure. 320

This clarification apparently satisfied the Lower Rio Grande water
users and Texas ratified the Compact on March 1, 1939.21

IX. COMPACT PERFORMANCE - 1950 TO 1985
During the 1940s, the Compact operated close to the vision of the
Engineer Advisors. An "actual spill" of "usable water" occurred in
1942.322 Colorado and New Mexico accrued credits and debits, but
stayed within the limits of the Compact. In 1949, Colorado had an
accrued credit of 144,700 acre-feet and New Mexico had a debt of
280,400 acre-feet and had 137,220 acre-feet of water retained in El
Vado Reservoir. 23 And, at the end of 1949, Project Storage was
815,700 acre-feet, including 130,000 acre-feet of credit water.3 24
By the end of 1951, New Mexico's accrued debit had ballooned to
331,800 acre-feet and El Vado Reservoir was empty.32 5 At the same
time, Colorado had consumed its accrued credit and Project Storage
had declined to 26,800 acre-feet.32 6 At this point, Texas sued New
Mexico for violation of the Compact.327 In 1952, Colorado delivered
153,300 acre-feet less than its scheduled delivery,328 this pattern of
under-deliveries continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Likewise,
New Mexico's debits continued to grow, reaching nearly 498,000 acrefeet in 1959. s
The 1950s brought little rain or snow. Rain and snowfall in both
1950 and 1951 was well below normal, although above average the
following year. ° The next four years, 1953 through 1956, are the
driest four consecutive years of record on the Rio Grande.13 ' Holdover
320. Id.at310-11.
321. Littlefield, supra note 29, at 312.
322. See FoURTH ANNUAL REPORT Or THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1942 (on
file with author).
323. ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1949, at
26, 27 (on file with author).
324. Id. at 28.
325.

THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1951, at

28 (on file with author).
326. Id. at 27.
327. Texas v. New Mexico, No. 9, Original (on file with author). The complaint was
dismissed for lack of necessary parties.
328. REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1952-1958, at 27 (on file with
author).
329. REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1959, at 28 (on file with
author).
330. REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1950, at 30; REPORT OF THE
Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1951, at 30; REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT
COMMISSION 1952-1958, at 61 (all on file with author).
331. REPORT OF THE RIo GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1952-1958, at 61. The U.S.
Geological Survey maintains annual stream flow records of the Rio Grande at the
gauging station near Del Norte. A compilation of these records are on file with the
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storage in post-1929 reservoirs was not the cause of Colorado and New
Mexico's departures from scheduled deliveries. Colorado had only
one post-Compact reservoir of any consequence-the 60,000 acre-foot
Platoro Reservoir on the Conejos River, completed in 1951.32 During
the same time, New Mexico did not carry over water in post-1929
reservoirs. 33' Thus, the large under-deliveries in this period give
credence to Tipton's view that Colorado's natural departures would
exceed 100,000 acre-feet during a series of dry years.
New Mexico was able to obtain federal funds for channel
improvements, levies, low-flow conveyance channels, and other works
to help control and reduce its accrued debits. This, in addition to new
structures built pursuant to the Congressional authorization of the
Middle Rio Grande Pro'ect in 1948, 3 ' and the authorizations of
additional works in 1960, aided New Mexico in reducing its accrued
debit by nearly 200,000 acre-feet in 1968.6
Colorado's debit, on the other hand, continued to increase. By
1966, Colorado's accrued debit was 927,300 acre-feet. 37 At that point,
Texas and New Mexico sued Colorado for violation of the Compact.33
39
In 1967, Colorado's debit reached its maximum of 944,400 acre-feet.
In 1968, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas stipulated to a stay of the
pending litigation conditioned upon Colorado meeting its delivery
obligations on an annual basis, without the allowance for annual debits
or credits. The stipulation also required Colorado to employ all
available legal powers, including curtailment of diversions, to assure
annual compliance. 4 °
Colorado thereafter implemented strict administration of surface
3 412
water rights, 41 and imposed a moratorium on new well construction.
As a consequence, Colorado began to slowly reduce its accrued debit.
343
By 1975, Colorado reduced the accrued debit to 725,200 acre-feet,

author.
332. REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1952-1958, at 72 (on file with
author).
333. Id. at 73-75.
334. Act ofJune 30, 1948, ch. 771, § 203, Pub. L. No. 80-858, 62 Stat. 1171.
335. Act ofJuly 14, 1960, §§ 201-203, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 480, 492.
336. S. E. Reynolds & Philip B. Mutz, Water Deliveries Under the Rio GrandeCompact, 14
NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 203 (1974).
337. REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMNSSION 1962, at 27 (on file with
author).
338. Texas v. Colorado, 389 U.S. 1000 (1967).
339. REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACr COMMISSION 1967, at 27 (on file with
author).
340. See Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 919
(Colo. 1984).
341. Id.
342. Personal Communications with Harold D. Simpson, Colorado State Engineer,
and Steven E. Vandiver, Division Engineer, Water Division No. 3, Colorado (Rio
Grande Basin) in Denver, Colo. (November, 1992).
343. REPORT OF THE Ro GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1975, at 27 (on file with
author).
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and in 1980, the accrued debit stood at 674,600 acre-feet. 344 In 1984,

the unfilled capacity of Elephant Butte Reservoir was less than the
combined debits of Colorado and New Mexico. Thus, in accordance
with Article VI of the Compact, Colorado's accrued debit was reduced
to 512,100 acre-feet. 34 5 In 1985, an actual spill of usable water from
Elephant Butte Reservoir occurred for the first time since 1942.46 The
spill eliminated Colorado's accrued debit, and on December 9, 1985,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted Texas and New Mexico's motion to
dismiss their lawsuit against Colorado with prejudice.347 Since 1985,
Colorado has continually complied with its delivery obligations under
the Compact.
X. CONCLUSION
The Rio Grande Compact is unique among interstate water
compacts to which the state of Colorado is a party. It is the only
compact that includes an annual schedule of deliveries, a more or less
objective standard by which to measure compact compliance. It is also
unique in that it apportions water by geographic regions rather than
purely political boundaries. In Colorado's case, its apportionment is
to the San Luis Valley, which corresponds to the state's political
boundary.
In the case of New Mexico, it has two separate
apportionments, one to the area above Elephant Butte Reservoir, and
one to Project lands. The apportionment to Texas is part of the water
supply delivery to Project lands. Furthermore, a contract allocated
Project water between lands in New Mexico and Texas, distributing the
Project water supply between the Elephant Butte Irrigation District in
New Mexico and the El Paso District in Texas.
The Compact and the engineering principles upon which it is
based relied largely on the Rio Grande Joint Investigation. At that
time, there were only about forty-eight years of stream flow records on
the Rio Grande. This limited period does not encompass the variety of
hydrologic conditions on the Rio Grande. Thus, states have not found
the Compact as easy or as painless to comply with as the negotiators
had envisioned.
The Compact apparently did not achieve its stated goal of allowing
existing levels of use to continue in Colorado without curtailment.
The Rio Grande, as well as the Conejos River, requires large
curtailments in most years. While the reasons for the Compact's
apparent failure in this regard are not immediately evident, preCompact water rights regularly feel the effect of these surface water
curtailments.
344. REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1980, at 27 (on file with
author).
345. REPORT OF THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 1984, at 27 (on file with

author).
346. REPORT OF THE Rio GRANDE COMPACT COMMnSSION 1985, at 27-29 (on file with
author).
347. Texas v. Colorado, 474 U.S. 1017 (1985).
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In addition, Colorado has not received the intended benefit of
storage to make its surface water supply parallel crop water needs.
With the exception of Platoro Reservoir, Colorado was unable to
construct any large post-Compact reservoirs. Efforts to provide
drainage from the Closed Basin have also met with limited success. In
1988, the federal Closed Basin Project began operations to deliver
60,000 acre-feet annually to assist Colorado in meeting its Compact
obligations. 48 The Closed Basin Project has not achieved that goal.
Furthermore, although Colorado has not realized many of the
benefits sought by the Compact, it is still better off than before the
Compact. The Compact clearly defines Colorado's share of the water
of the Rio Grande, and the shares apportioned to northern New
Mexico and to Project lands in New Mexico and Texas. The Compact
assures Colorado that Project Storage, not a change in Colorado's
delivery obligation, will be the source of any change in deliveries to
Mexico. Likewise, so long as Colorado meets its delivery obligations, it
is not required to deliver any particular amount of water at any
particular time or rate of flow to the downstream states. Thus, even
though the Compact has not performed as Colorado's Compact
negotiators had envisioned, it does provide certainty to water users in
Colorado.

348. Act of Oct. 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 92-514, 86 Stat. 964, as amended; Act of Oct. 3,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-375, § 6, 94 Stat. 1505, 1507; Act of Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98570, 98 Stat. 2941-42; Act of Oct. 24, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-516, § 22, 102 Stat. 2575-76.
See also Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n. v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734
P.2d 627 (Colo. 1987) (describing the Closed Basin Project).
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XI. APPENDIX I
RIO GRANDE COMPACT
The State of Colorado, the State of New Mexico, and the State of
Texas, desiring to remove all causes of present and future controversy
among these States and between citizens of one of these States and
citizens of another State with respect to the use of the waters of the Rio
Grande above Fort Quitman, Texas, and being moved by
considerations of interstate comity, and for the purpose of effecting an
equitable apportionment of such waters, have resolved to conclude a
Compact for the attainment of these purposes, and to that end,
through their respective Governors, have named as their respective
Commissioners:
For the State of Colorado
M. C. Hinderlider
For the State of New Mexico
Thomas M. McClure
For the State of Texas
Frank B. Clayton
Who, after negotiations participated in by S. 0. Harper, appointed
by the President as the representative of the United States of America,
have agreed upon the following articles, to-wit:
ARTICLE I
(a)
The State of Colorado, the State of New Mexico, the State of
Texas, and the United States of America, are hereinafter designated
"Colorado," "New Mexico," "Texas," and the "United States,"
respectively.
(b)
"The Commission" means the agency created by this
Compact for the administration thereof.
(c)
The term "Rio Grande Basin" means all of the territory
drained by the Rio Grande and its tributaries in Colorado, in New
Mexico, and in Texas above Fort Quitman, including the Closed Basin
in Colorado.
(d)
The "Closed Basin" means that part of the Rio Grande Basin
in Colorado where the streams drain into the San Luis Lakes and
adjacent territory, and do not normally contribute to the flow of the
Rio Grande.
(e)
The term "tributary" means any stream which naturally
contributes to the flow of the Rio Grande.
(f)
"Transmountain Diversion" is water imported into the
drainage basin of the Rio Grande from any stream system outside of
the Rio Grande Basin, exclusive of the Closed Basin.
(g)
"Annual Debits" are the amounts by which actual deliveries
in any calendar year fall below scheduled deliveries.
(h)
"Annual Credits" are the amounts by which actual deliveries
in any calendar year exceed scheduled deliveries.
(i)
"Accrued Debits" are the amounts by which the sum of all
annual debits exceeds the sum of all annual credits over any common
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period of time.
(j)
"Accrued Credits" are the amounts by which the sum of all
annual credits exceeds the sum of all annual debits over any common
period of time.
(k)
"Project Storage" is the combined capacity of Elephant
Butte Reservoir and all other reservoirs actually available for the
storage of usable water below Elephant Butte and above the first
diversion to lands of the Rio Grande Project, but not more than a total
of 2,638,860 acre feet.
(1)
"Usable Water" is all water, exclusive of credit water, which is
in project storage and which is available for release in accordance with
irrigation demands, including deliveries to Mexico.
(m) "Credit Water" is that amount of water in project storage
which is equal to the accrued credit of Colorado, or New Mexico, or
both.
(n)
"Unfilled Capacity" is the difference between the total
physical capacity of project storage and the amount of usable water
then in storage.
(o)
"Actual Release" is the amount of usable water released in
any calendar year from the lowest reservoir comprising project storage.
(p)
"Actual Spill" is all water which is actually spilled from
Elephant Butte Reservoir, or is released therefrom for flood control, in
excess of the current demand on project storage and which does not
become usable water by storage in another reservoir; provided, that
actual spill of usable water cannot occur until all credit water shall
have been spilled.
(q)
"Hypothetical Spill" is the time in any year at which usable
water would have spilled from project storage if 790,000 acre feet had
been released therefrom at rates proportional to the actual release in
every year from the starting date to the end of the year in which
hypothetical spill occurs; in computing hypothetical spill the initial
condition shall be the amount of usable water in project storage at the
beginning of the calendar year following the effective date of this
Compact, and thereafter the initial condition shall be the amount of
usable water in project storage at the beginning of the calendar year
following each actual spill.
ARTICLE II
The Commission shall cause to be maintained and operated a
stream gauging station equipped with an automatic water stage
recorder at each of the following points, to-wit:
(a)
On the Rio Grande near Del Norte above the principal
points of diversion to the San Luis Valley;
(b)
On the Conejos River near Mogote;
(c)
On the Los Pinos River near Ortiz;
(d)
On the San Antonio River at Ortiz;
(e)
On the Conejos River at its mouths near Los Sauces;
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(f)
On the Rio Grande near Lobatos;
(g)
On the Rio Chama below El Vado Reservoir;
(h)
On the Rio Grande at Otowi Bridge near San Ildefonso;
(i)
On the Rio Grande near San Acacia;
(j)
On the Rio Grande at San Marcial;
(k)
On the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir;
(1)
On the Rio Grande below Caballo Reservoir.
Similar gauging stations shall be maintained and operated below
any other reservoir constructed after 1929, and at such other points as
may be necessary for the securing of records required for the carrying
out of the Compact; and automatic water stage recorders shall be
maintained and operated on each of the reservoirs mentioned, and on
all others constructed after 1929.
Such gauging stations shall be equipped, maintained and operated
by the Commission directly or in cooperation with an appropriate
Federal or State agency, and the equipment, method and frequency of
measurement at such stations shall be such as to produce reliable
records at all times.
ARTICLE III
The obligation of Colorado to deliver water in the Rio Grande at
the Colorado-New Mexico State Line, measured at or near Lobatos, in
each calendar year, shall be ten thousand acre feet less than the sum
of those quantities set forth in the two following tabulations of
relationship, which correspond to the quantities at the upper index
stations:
DISCHARGE OF CONEJOS RIVER
Quantities in thousand of acre-feet
Conejos Index Supply (1)
Conejos River at Mouths (2)
100
0
150
20
200
45
250
75
300
109
350
147
400
188
450
232
500
278
550
326
600
376
650
426
700
476
Intermediate quantities shall be computed by proportional parts.
(1)
Conejos Index Supply is the natural flow of Conejos River at
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the U.S.G.S. gauging station near Mogote during the calendar year,
plus the natural flow of Los Pifios River at the U.S.G.S. gauging station
near Ortiz and the natural flow of San Antonio River at the U.S.G.S.
gauging station at Ortiz, both during the months of April to October,
inclusive.
(2)
Conejos River at Mouths is the combined discharge of
branches of this river at the U.S.G.S. gauging stations near Los Sauces
during the calendar year.
DISCHARGE OF RIO GRANDE EXCLUSIVE OF CONEJOS
RIVER
Quantities in thousands of acre-feet
Rio Grande at Lobatos less
Rio Grande at Del Norte (3)
Conejos at Mouths (4)
200
60
250
65
300
75
350
86
400
98
450
112
500
127
550
144
600
162
650
182
700
204
750
229
800
257
850
292
900
335
950
380
1,000
430
1,100
540
1,200
640
1,300
740
1,400
840
Intermediate quantities shall be computed by proportional parts.
(3)
Rio Grande at Del Norte is the recorded flow of the Rio
Grande at the U.S.G.S. gauging station near Del Norte during the
calendar year (measured above all principal points of diversion to San
Luis Valley) corrected for the operation of reservoirs constructed after
1937.
(4)
Rio Grande at Lobatos less Conejos at Mouths is the total
flow of the Rio Grande at the U.S.G.S. gauging station near Lobatos,
less the discharge of Conejos River at its Mouths, during the calendar
year.
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The application of these schedules shall be subject to the
provisions hereinafter set forth and appropriate adjustments shall be
made for (a) any change in location of gauging stations; (b) any new
or increased depletion of the runoff above inflow index gauging
stations; and (c) any transmountain diversions into the drainage basin
of the Rio Grande above Lobatos.
In event any works are constructed after 1937 for the purpose of
delivery water into the Rio Grande from the Closed Basin, Colorado
shall not be credited with the amount of such water delivered, unless
the proportion of sodium ions shall be less than forty-five percent of
the total positive ions in that water when the total dissolved solids in
such water exceeds three hundred fifty parts per million.
ARTICLE

IVs49

The obligation of New Mexico to deliver water in the Rio Grande
into Elephant Butte Reservoir during each calendar year shall be
measured by that quantity set forth in the following tabulation of
relationship which corresponds to the quantity at the upper index
station:
DISCHARGE OF RIO GRANDE AT OTOWI BRIDGE
AND ELEPHANT BUTTE EFFECTIVE SUPPLY
Quantities in thousands of acre-feet

Otowi Index Supply (5)
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
1,700

Elephant Butte Effective Supply
Index Supply (6)
57
114
171
228
286
345
406
471
542
621
707
800
897
996
1,095
1,195
1,295

349. Amended Article IV reflecting the Resolution of the Rio Grande Compact
Commission adopted February, 1948 replacing the original schedule of deliveries at
San Marcial with the Elephant Butte Effective Supply.
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1,800
1,395
1,900
1,495
2,000
1,595
2,100
1,695
2,200
1,795
2,300
1,895
2,400
1,995
2,095
2,500
2,600
2,195
2,295
2,700
2,800
2,395
2,900
2,495
3,000
2,595
Intermediate quantities shall be computed by proportional parts.
(5)
The Otowi Index Supply is the recorded flow of the Rio
Grande at the U.S.G.S. gauging station at Otowi Bridge near San
Ildefonso (formerly station near Buckman) during the calendar year,
corrected for the operation of reservoirs constructed after 1929 in the
drainage basin of the Rio Grande between Lobatos and Otowi Bridge.
(6)
Elephant Butte Effective Index Supply is the recorded flow
of the Rio Grande at the gauging station below Elephant Butte Dam
during the calendar year plus the net gain in storage in Elephant Butte
Reservoir during the same year or minus the net loss in storage in said
reservoir, as the case may be.
The application of this schedule shall be subject to the provisions
hereinafter set forth and appropriate adjustments shall be made for
(a) any change in location of gauging stations; (b) depletion after
1929 in New Mexico of the natural runoff at Otowi Bridge, and (c) any
transmountain diversions into the Rio Grande between Lobatos and
Elephant Butte Reservoir.
Concurrent records shall be kept of the flow of the Rio Grande at
San Marcial, near San Acacia, and of the release from Elephant Butte
Reservoir to the end that the records at these three stations may be
correlated." °
ARTICLE V
If at any time it should be the unanimous finding and
determination of the Commission that because of changed physical
conditions, or for any other reason, reliable records are not
obtainable, or cannot be obtained, at any of the stream gauging
stations herein referred to, such stations may, with the unanimous
approval of the Commission, be abandoned, and with such approval
another station, or other stations, shall be established and new
measurements shall be substituted which, in the unanimous opinion of
350. This paragraph of Article TV was not changed by the Resolution of February,
1948.
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the Commission, will result in substantially the same results so far as
the rights and obligations to deliver water are concerned, as would
have existed if such substitution of stations and measurements had not
been so made.
ARTICLE VI
Commencing with the year following the effective date of this
Compact, all credits and debits of Colorado and New Mexico shall be
computed for each calendar year, provided, that in a year of actual
spill no annual credits nor annual debits shall be computed for that
year.
In the case of Colorado, no annual debit nor accrued debit shall
exceed 100,000 acre feet, except as either or both may be caused by
holdover storage of water in reservoirs constructed after 1937 in the
drainage basin of the Rio Grande above Lobatos. Within the physical
limitations of storage capacity in such reservoirs, Colorado shall retain
water in storage at all times to the extent of its accrued debit.
In the case of New Mexico, the accrued debit shall not exceed
200,000 acre feet at any time, except as such debit may be caused by
holdover storage of water in reservoirs constructed after 1929 in the
drainage basin of the Rio Grande between Lobatos and San Marcial.
Within the physical limitations of storage capacity in such reservoirs,
New Mexico shall retain water in storage at all times to the extent of its
accrued debit. In computing the magnitude of accrued credits or
debits, New Mexico shall not be charged with any greater debit in any
one year than the sum of 150,000 acre-feet and all gains in the quantity
of water in storage in such year.
The Commission by unanimous action may authorize the release
from storage of any amount of water which is then being held in
storage by reason of accrued debits of Colorado or New Mexico;
provided, that such water shall be replaced at the first opportunity
thereafter.
In computing the amount of accrued credits and accrued debits of
Colorado or New Mexico, any annual credits in excess of 150,000 acre
feet shall be taken as equal to that amount.
In any year in which actual spill occurs, the accrued credits of
Colorado, or New Mexico, or both, at the beginning of the year shall
be reduced in proportion to their respective credits by the amount of
such actual spill; provided that the amount of actual spill shall be
deemed to be increased by the aggregate gain in the amount of water
in storage, prior to the time of spill, in reservoirs above San Marcial
constructed after 1929; provided, further, that if the Commissioners
for the States having accrued credits authorize the release of part, or
all, of such credits in advance of spill, the amount so released shall be
deemed to constitute actual spill.
In any year in which there is actual spill of usable water, or at the
time of hypothetical spill thereof, all accrued debits of Colorado, or
New Mexico, or both, at the beginning of the year shall be cancelled.
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In any year in which the aggregate of accrued debits of Colorado
and New Mexico exceeds the minimum unfilled capacity of project
storage, such debits shall be reduced proportionally to an aggregate
amount equal to such minimum unfilled capacity.
To the extent that accrued credits are impounded in reservoirs
between San Marcial and Courchesne, and to the extent that accrued
debits are impounded in reservoirs above San Marcial, such credits
and debits shall be reduced annually to compensate for evaporation
losses in the proportion that such credits or debits bore to the total
amount of water in such reservoirs during the year.
ARTICLE VII
Neither Colorado nor New Mexico shall increase the amount of
water in storage in reservoirs constructed after 1929 whenever there is
less than 400,000 acre feet of usable water in project storage; provided,
that if the actual releases of usable water from the beginning of the
calendar year following the effective date of this Compact, or from the
beginning of the calendar year following actual spill, have aggregated
more than an average of 790,000 acre feet per annum, the time at
which such minimum stage is reached shall be adjusted to compensate
for the difference between the total actual release and releases at such
average rate; provided, further, that Colorado, or New Mexico, or
both, may relinquish accrued credits at any time, and Texas may
accept such relinquished water, and in such event the state, or states,
so relinquishing shall be entitled to store water in the amount of the
water so relinquished.
ARTICLE VIII
During the month of January of any year the Commissioner for
Texas may demand of Colorado and New Mexico, and the
Commissioner for New Mexico may demand of Colorado, the release
of water from storage reservoirs constructed after 1929 to the amount
of the accrued debits of Colorado and New Mexico, respectively, and
such releases shall be made by each at the greatest rate practicable
under the conditions then prevailing, and in proportion to the total
debit of each, and in amounts, limited by their accrued debits,
sufficient to bring the quantity of usable water in project storage to
600,000 acre feet by March first and to maintain this quantity in
storage until April thirtieth, to the end that a normal release of
790,000 acre feet may be made from project storage in that year.
ARTICLE IX
Colorado agrees with New Mexico that in event the United States
or the State of New Mexico decides to construct the necessary works
for diverting the waters of the San Juan River, or any of its tributaries,
into the Rio Grande, Colorado hereby consents to the construction of
said works and the diversion of waters from the San Juan River, or the
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tributaries thereof, into the Rio Grande in New Mexico, provided the
present and prospective uses of water in Colorado by other diversions
from the San Juan River, or its tributaries, are protected.
ARTICLE X
In the event water from another drainage basin shall be imported
into the Rio Grande Basin by the United States or Colorado or New
Mexico, or any of them jointly, the State having the right to the use of
such water shall be given proper credit therefor in the application of
the schedules.
ARTICLE XI
New Mexico and Texas agree that upon the effective date of this
Compact all controversies between said States relative to the quantity
or quality of the water of the Rio Grande are composed and settled;
however, nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent recourse by a
signatory state to the Supreme Court of the United States for redress
should the character or quality of the water, at the point of delivery, be
changed hereafter by one signatory state to the injury of another.
Nothing herein shall be constructed as an admission by any signatory
state that the use of water for irrigation causes increase of salinity for
which the user is responsible in law.
ARTICLE XII
To administer the provisions of this Compact there shall be
constituted a Commission composed of one representative from each
state, to be known as the Rio Grande Compact Commission. The State
Engineer of Colorado shall be ex-officio the Rio Grande Compact
Commissioner for Colorado. The State Engineer of New Mexico shall
be ex-officio the Rio Grande Compact Commissioner for New Mexico.
The Rio Grande Compact Commissioner for Texas shall be appointed
by the Governor of Texas. The President of the United States shall be
requested to designate a representative of the United States to sit with
such Commission, and such representative of the United States, if so
designated by the President, shall act as Chairman of the Commission
without vote.
The salaries and personal expenses of the Rio Grande Compact
Commissioners for the three States shall be paid by their respective
States, and all other expenses incident to the administration of this
Compact, not borne by the United States, shall be borne equally by the
three States.
In addition to the powers and duties hereinbefore specifically
conferred upon such Commission, and the members thereof, the
jurisdiction of such Commission shall extend only to the collection,
correlation and presentation of factual data and the maintenance of
records having a bearing upon the administration of this Compact,
and, by unanimous action, to the making of recommendations to the
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respective States upon matters connected with the administration of
this Compact. In connection therewith, the Commission may employ
such engineering and clerical aid as may be reasonably necessary
within the limit of funds provided for that purpose by the respective
States. Annual reports compiled for each calendar year shall be made
by the Commission and transmitted to the Governors of the signatory
States on or before March first following the year covered by the
report. The Commission may, by unanimous action, adopt rules and
regulations consistent with the provisions of this Compact to govern
their proceedings.
The findings of the Commission shall not be conclusive in any
court or tribunal which may be called upon to interpret or enforce this
Compact.
ARTICLE XIII
At the expiration of every five-year period after the effective date of
this Compact, the Commission may, by unanimous consent, review any
provisions hereof which are not substantive in character and which do
not affect the basic principles upon which the Compact is founded,
and shall meet for the consideration of such questions on the request
of any member of the Commission; provided, however, that the
provisions hereof shall remain in full force and effect until changed
and amended within the intent of the Compact by unanimous action
of the Commissioners, and until any changes in this Compact are
ratified by the legislatures of the respective states and consented to by
the Congress, in the same manner as this Compact is required to be
ratified to become effective.
ARTICLE XlV
The schedules herein contained and the quantities of water herein
allocated shall never be increased nor diminished by reason of any
increase or diminution in the delivery or loss of water to Mexico.
ARTICLE XV
The physical and other conditions characteristic of the Rio Grande
and peculiar to the territory drained and served thereby, and to the
development thereof, have actuated this Compact and none of the
signatory states admits that any provisions herein contained establishes
any general principle or precedent applicable to other interstate
streams.
ARTICLE XVI
Nothing in this Compact shall be construed as affecting the
obligations of the United States of America to Mexico under existing
treaties, or to the Indian Tribes, or as impairing the rights of the
Indian Tribes.
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ARTICLE XVII
This Compact shall become effective when ratified by the
legislatures of each of the signatory states and consented to by the
Congress of the United States. Notice of ratification shall be given by
the Governor of each state to the Governors of the other states and to
the President of the United States, and the President of the United
States is requested to give notice to the Governors of each of the
signatory states of the consent of the Congress of the Untied States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Commissioners have signed this
Compact in quadruplicate original, one of which shall be deposited in
the archives of the Department of State of the Untied States of
America and shall be deemed the authoritative original, and of which
a duly certified copy shall be forwarded to the Governor of each of the
signatory States.
Done at the City of Santa Fe, in the State of New Mexico, on the
18th day of March, in the year of our Lord, One Thousand Nine
Hundred and Thirty-eight.
(sgd.)M.C. Hinderlider
(sgd.)Thomas M. McClure
(sgd.)Frank B. Clayton
Approved:
(Sgd.) S.O. Harper
Ratified by:
Colorado, February 21, 1939
New Mexico, March 1, 1939
Texas, March 1, 1939
Passed Congress as Public Act No. 96, 76th Congress,
Approved by the President May 31, 1939
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X1I. APPENDIX II
Comparison of New Mexico Schedules of Deliveries
First Proposal of
Engineer Advisors
Otowi
Index
Supply

Elephant
Butte
Index

Original Compact
Schedule
July. - Sept. excepted)
Otowi
Index
Supply

Supply

_

100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000

12
57
113
173
237
305
378
455
540
630

1100
1200

San
Marcial
Index

1948 Replacement
Schedule
Otowi
Index
Supply

Supply

Elephant
Butte
Effective
Supply

725
825

100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200

0
65
141
219
300
383
469
557
648
742
839
939

100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200

57
114
171
228
286
345
406
471
542
621
707
800

1300

935

1300

1042

1300

897

1400

1052

1400

1148

1400

996

1500

1175

1500

1257

1500

1095

1600

1305

1600

1370

1600

1195

1700

1440

1700

1489

1700

1295

1800

1583

1800

1608

1800

1395

1900

1737

1900

1730

1900

1495

2000
2100
2200
2300

1895
2058
2224
2392

2000
2100
2200
2300

1856
1985
2117
2253

2000
2100
2200
2300
2400

1595
1695
1795
1895
1995

2500

2095

2600

2195

2700

2295

2800

2395

2900

2495

THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT
DAVID W. ROBBINS
DENNIS M. MONTGOMERYt
I.
II.
HI.

IV.

V.
VI.

Introduction ...................................................................... 59
The Arkansas River Basin .................................................
60
History of Irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin ............... 62
A. Irrigation in Colorado .....................................................
62
B. Irrigation in Kansas .........................................................
63
C. John Martin Reservoir .....................................................
64
The Arkansas River Compact ...........................................
65
A. Article I: Purposes of the Compact .................................
70
B. Article II: Factors on Which the Compact Is Based .....
71
1. Physical and Other Conditions Peculiar to the Arkansas
River Basin and the Nature and Location of Irrigated
Areas ...........................................................................
. . 71
2. The Opinion in Colorado v. Kansas ............................. 72
3. Interim Executive Agreements ................................... 76
C. Article V: The Apportionment Article ........................... 79
1. Paragraphs A and B: Periods of Winter and Summer
Storage and Releases of River Flow .............................
80
2. Paragraph C: Releases of Stored Water ..................... 81
3. Paragraph E: Measurement and Conditions Governing
Storage and Releases ...................................................
81
4. Paragraphs D, E, and F: No Calls on Water Users
Upstream from John Martin Dam when There is Water
in the Conservation Pool; Administration when the
Conservation Pool Is Empty; Distrubution Agreements.84
5. Paragraph G: Kansas' Entitlement when Colorado
Reverts to Administration of Decreed Priorities ......
86
6. Paragraph H: Limitations on Transfer of Rights Below
John Martin to Points Above, and on Increase of Ditch
Diversion Rights Below the Reservoir .......................... 86
D. Article IV(D): Future Development ............................... 88
E. Changed Conditions and the 1980 Operating Plan ......
91
Conclusion ........................................................................
92
Appendix: The Arkansas River Compact ........................... 95
t David W. Robbins and Dennis M. Montgomery are officers and shareholders

with the firm of Hill & Robbins, P.C., Denver, Colorado. Mr. Robbins and Mr.
Montgomery are Special Assistant Attorneys General for Colorado in Kansas v.
Colorado, No. 105, Original.

The authors wish to thank Jennifer H. Hunt for her

invaluable assistance in preparing this article.

Issue 1

THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT

I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas River Compact' ("Compact") is the both best
compact that Colorado has entered into and, paradoxically, the worst
compact that Colorado has entered into.' It is the best compact
because it apportions the benefits arising from the construction of
John Martin Reservoir, a large federally built on-stream reservoir,
without placing any restriction on diversions by existing water users in
Colorado (except for a limitation on the improved or prolonged
functioning of existing works). The Compact is also the best for
Colorado because it does not preclude or place a specific limit on
future development in the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado. It is the
worst compact, at least from the standpoint of the state officials
charged with the enforcement of its provisions,' because it provides no
quantitative standard to determine whether future developments,
including improved or prolonged functioning of existing works, are in
compliance with the Compact.
The Compact arose out of a long dispute between Colorado and
Kansas over the use of the waters of the Arkansas River. This article
examines the key provisions of the Compact and the circumstances
that led to its unique apportionment in an attempt to answer this
question: Why did Colorado and Kansas agree to an apportionment of
the Arkansas River that did not apportion its waters on the basis of
beneficial consumptive use and did not impose a delivery obligation
on Colorado?

1. The Arkansas River Compact is an interstate compact between Colorado and
Kansas. Commissioners for Colorado and Kansas signed the Compact on December
14, 1948, and it became effective on May 31, 1949, after it was ratified by each state's
legislature and approved by Congress. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §
37-69-101 (2001), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-520 (1997), 63 Stat. 145. The Colorado and
Kansas Acts ratifying the Compact are printed in the Congressional hearings on the
Compact. Arkansas River Compact: Hearingon S. 1448 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 81st Cong. 8-9, 18-19 (1949) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]; Arkansas
River Compact: Hearing on H.R. 4151 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of
the House Comm. on Public Lands, 81st Cong. 10-11, 31 (1949) [hereinafter House
Hearing].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 states: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State..." In Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907), the U.S. Supreme Court announced the
doctrine of equitable apportionment of the benefits of interstate rivers. Thereafter,
the interstate compact emerged as the primary method to apportion interstate rivers.
See generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925). Colorado has
entered into nine interstate compacts to apportion interstate rivers. See COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to 37-69-101 (2001).
3. Article VIII (H) of the Compact provides that it is the intent of the Compact
that "enforcement of its terms shall be accomplished in general through the State
agencies and officials charged with the administration of water rights." Arkansas River
Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. VIII(H), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat. 145, 151.
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II. THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN

The Arkansas River originates on the eastern slope of the Rocky
Mountains above Leadville, Colorado, just east of the Continental
Divide. The river flows through the mountains until it emerges into
the foothills region near Canon City.' It then flows through a narrow
valley until it reaches the city of Pueblo, where it leaves the foothills
and meanders across the High Plains into Kansas.'
The Arkansas River Valley between Pueblo, Colorado, and Garden
City, Kansas, is semiarid.' Rainfall averages less than twelve inches per
year at Pueblo, and gradually increases to an average of slightly more
than eighteen inches per year at Garden City.' The valley is a fertile
agricultural area, but the water supply available from the Arkansas
River is not adequate to irrigate all of the lands along the river in
Colorado and western Kansas. The Arkansas River is subject to wide
fluctuations in flow, not only from year to year, but also from season to
season and day to day.9
Runoff from mountainous areas above Canon City is more uniform
from year to year and fluctuates less than runoff from plains and
foothills drainage areas." As a result, mountain runoff provides a
more stable source of supply, well suited for irrigation needs in
Colorado."
The flow of the river at Canon City, excluding
transmountain imports, averaged 499,200 acre-feet per year from 1908
to 1984,12 ranging from 217,200 acre-feet in 1940 to 896,600 acre-feet
4. For an excellent description of the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado and
Kansas see BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE UPPER
ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN: COLORADo-KANsAS 5-19 (1969) (hereinafter BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION REPORT] (on file with the author and University of Denver Water Law

Review).
5. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 105 (1907).
6. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, 5. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers has published detailed reports describing the Arkansas River in Colorado
and Kansas. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ARKANSAS RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES
ABOVEJOHN MARTIN DAM, COLORADO (1970); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ARKANSAS
RIVER AND TRIBUTARIES: JOHN MARTIN DAM, COLORADO, TO GRAND BEND, KANSAS (1972)
(on file with the author and University of Denver WaterLaw Review).
7. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supranote 4, at 7. The 100th meridian, which
runs through Dodge City, Kansas, forms the dividing line between the semiarid and
the semi-humid regions of the country where irrigation is unnecessary for crop
cultivation. See WALTER PREScOTr WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 6, 353 (First Bison Book
Printing 1981) (1931).
8. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 7; L.E. DUNLAP ET AL., U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2253, GEOHYDROLOGY AND MODEL ANALYSIS
OF STREAM-AQUIFER SYSTEM ALONG THE ARKANSAS RIVER IN KEARNY AND FINNEY COUNTIES,

SOUTHWESTERN KANSAS 15 (1985).
9. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 13, 34, 69; see also Colorado v.

Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 396 (1943).
10.

INTERIM

REPORT

OF

COMMITTEE

ON

ENGINEERING

DATA

COLORADO-KANsAS ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION 10

AND

(1947)

STUDIES

TO

[hereinafter

INTERIM REPORT].

11.
12.

Id.
DAVID L.

POPE, REPORT TO THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT ADMINISTRATION
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in 1957."3 In contrast, the Purgatoire River, the largest tributary of the
Arkansas River, flows at a lesser rate, averaging 61,659 acre-feet per
year from 1950 to 1985,'1 and varying from 4,571 acre-feet in 1975 to
271,256 acre-feet in 1965.5

According to a report by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
("Bureau"), more than 60 percent of the average annual mainstem
runoff in Colorado occurs between the months of April and July. 6
Lands under a majority of the canals experience moderate to severe
shorta es of surface water after June, when the snowmelt is generally
gone.
The area north of the Arkansas River and east of Pueblo is
characterized by broad rolling plains." Major tributaries from the
north are Fountain, Adobe, Horse, and Big Sandy Creeks." Except for
Fountain Creek, these streams are mostly intermittent and do
not
2i
0
provide a dependable supply to ditches on the Arkansas River. The
area south of the Arkansas River consists of larger drainage systems, of
which the Purgatoire River is the most significant.2 1 Other major
tributaries from the south include the St. Charles, the Huerfano, and
the Apishapa Rivers.22 These streams have an intermittent flow derived
primarily from intense rainstorms during the summer.23
Tributary inflow provides a portion of the water supply to ditches
on the Arkansas River, 4 but, the flows reaching the mainstem of the
river fluctuate widely and are significant only during peak runoff
periods.25 Most of the flood flow above John Martin Reservoir is now
captured in reservoirs in Colorado, but tributaries below John Martin
are mostly unregulated.26

REGARDING ARTICLE VIII(H) INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE ARKANSAS

RIVER COMPACT tbl. 6D2 (1985). During an investigation by the Arkansas River
Compact Administration in 1985, Kansas and Colorado developed adjusted flows of
the Arkansas River at Canon City to exclude transmountain imports and to adjust the
flows for some diversions around the stream flow gage at Canon City.
13. Id.
14. COMPARISON OF FLOW DATA, PURGATOIRE RIVER (Colorado Exh. 836 in Kansas v.
Colorado, Orig. No. 105, United States Supreme Court).

15. Id.
16. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 60.
17. W.W. WHEELER & ASSOCIATES & WOODWARD-CLYDE & ASSOCIATES, VOL. II
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, WATER LEGISLATION INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE ARKANSAS RIVER
BASIN IN COLORADO i (1968) [hereinafter WHEELER REPORT]. Shortages in Colorado
during the late irrigation season are partially alleviated by reservoir releases,
transmountain imports, and groundwater pumping. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 60.
18. WHEELER REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23.

24.
25.
26.

supra note 17, at 5.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 58.
Id.
Id. at 43.
WHEELER REPORT,
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From 1908 to 1942, prior to the construction of John Martin
Reservoir, Stateline 27 flows averaged 280,800 acre-feet per year, which
varied from 30,900 acre-feet in 1940, to 1,342,400 acre-feet in 1942.2
The operation of John Martin Reservoir under the Compact was
expected to reduce total Stateline flows by storing unused flood and
winter flows. 29 After the Compact became effective, Stateline flows
averaged 144,051 acre-feet per year from 1950 to 1985.30 After
adoption of the Compact, it was probable that substantial amounts of
unused water would pass Garden City each year. This water would be
available for future development in the basin. For example, shortly
after the Compact became effective, the Bureau estimated that there
were 48,200 acre-feet per year available for storage in excess of the
requirements of ditches in Colorado and Kansas, at rates limited to
200 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") or less.'
I. HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN
A. IRRIGATION IN COLORADO

Shortly after the Pike's Peak gold rush in 1859, irrigation began in
2 However, large scale irrigation
the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado.3
did not begin until 1874, near Rocky Ford. 3 Some of the water
diverted for irrigation returned to the river from canal seepage and
applied irrigation water. 4 These return flows provided
water for
5
diversion later in the season by ditches downstream.
The major irrigation systems in the Arkansas River Valley in
Colorado were developed primarily during the 1880s.16 From Pueblo
to the Colorado-Kansas Stateline, twenty active ditch systems divert
water from the Arkansas River.3 7 These range in size from the Collier
Ditch, which is about two miles long and irrigates approximately 600
acres in Pueblo County, to the Fort Lyon Canal, which is more than
100 miles long and delivers water to more than 90,000 acres on the
27. The term "Stateline" is spelled variously. We have adopted the spelling
"Stateline," which is used in the Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-69-101
(2001), 63 Stat. 145.
28. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
29.

1 ARTHUR L. LITrLEWORTH, SPECIAL MASTER REPORT, KANSAS v. COLORADO, No.

105 ORIGINAL 54 (1994) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT].
30. Id. at 53.
31. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GRANADA RESERVOIR
RECONNAISSANCE REPORT 3-4, 6 (1953) [hereinafter GRANADA RESERVOIR

PROJECT
PROJECT

RECONNAISSANCE REPORT].

32.

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

33.
34.
35.

Id.

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 8.

supra note 17, at 8-9.
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 397 (1943); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT,
supranote 4, at 58; WHEELER REPORT, supra note 17, at 9.
36. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 89.
37. 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 37. The Special Master's report refers to
twenty-three ditch systems in Colorado, but this number includes systems no longer
servicing irrigation needs.
WHEELER REPORT,
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north side of the river from LaJunta to Lamar."
By 1910, a complex system of private irrigation ditches and
reservoirs existed in Colorado, and irrigated approximately 330,000
acres between Pueblo and the Stateline. 3' The river supply was
inadequate to irrigate this acreage, so by 1935, seven projects had been
constructed to import water, mostly from the Colorado River Basin,
into the Arkansas River Basin.4" These water imports are commonly
referred to as "transmountain diversions." When the Compact was
negotiated, transmountain diversions averaged approximately 43,000
acre-feet per year." Upon the completion of the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project, a federal water project authorized by Congress in 1962, the
Bureau estimated that total diversions from the Colorado River Basin
into the Arkansas River Basin would average 196,000 acre-feet
annually, which is approximately 38 percent of the average annual
Arkansas River flow at Pueblo.
Irrigators in the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado have also used
groundwater for many years, primarily to supplement surface
supplies. 3 According to a 1990 study prepared for Colorado,44 there
are 717 large capacity (100 gallons per minute or greater) irrigation
wells in Colorado along the mainstem of the river with appropriation
dates earlier than 1950. 4' The same study found that in 1985 there
were 2,062 large capacity irrigation wells along 4the mainstem in
Colorado, although not all of these well were active.
B. IRRIGATION IN KANSAS
Irrigation from the Arkansas River in western Kansas began in
1879. 47 Irrigated acreage steadily increased from approximately 15,000
acres in 1895, to 56,000 acres in 1939.48 Irrigated acreage in western
Kansas had increased to about 66,000 acres when Congress considered

38.
39.

See generally BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 89-91, 93-96.
Id. at 8, 58; 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 37.
40. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 8, 83-85; see 1 FIRST REPORT,
supranote 29, at 39, 48-49.
41. 1 FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 49.
42. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. In 1962, the average
annual flow of the Arkansas River at Pueblo was about 514,000 acre-feet per year,
including transmountain imports. Id. at 58. However, not all of the water imported
into the Arkansas River Basin is used in the Arkansas River Valley below Pueblo. 1
FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 48-49. Deliveries of transmountain water below Pueblo
have averaged approximately 120,000 acre-feet in recent years. Id. at 49. For a
description of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, see BUREAU OF RECI.AMATION REPORT,
supranote 4, at 102-07.
43. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 39.
44. 2 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 204.
45. BOYLE ENGINEERING CORPORATION, ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN STUDY, ESTIMATES OF
GROUNDWATER PUMPING IN THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN, PUEBLO DAM TO STATELINE tbl.

A.1 (1990).
46.
47.
48.

Id.
House Hearing,supra note 1, at 31 (statement by George S. Knapp).
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 399 (1943).
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the Compact for approval in 1949.' 9 The ditches in Kansas affected by
the Compact are located in Hamilton, Kearny, and Finney Counties,
and divert water from the Arkansas River upstream from Garden City,
Kansas. 0 Two of the ditches in Kansas (the Alamo and Fort Aubrey
Ditches) no longer operate, although wells continue to irrigate the
lands they formerly servedY
Groundwater use for irrigation in Kansas dates back to about 1890
when irrigators first used windmill powered pumps.
By the late
1930s, many farmers in Kansas supplemented diversions from the river
with irrigation wells, while others used wells exclusively. 5 In 1962, the
Bureau surveyed the irrigation practices under the eight ditches in
Kansas and found that the land irrigated in the area had increased to
an estimated 75,800 acres5 4 Of this acreage, 71 percent (53,839 acres)
used both surface and groundwater, 17 percent (12,846 acres) used
groundwater only, and 12 percent (9,110 acres) used surface water
only. 5
C. JOHN MARTIN RESERVOIR

The John Martin Reservoir project (originally known as the
Caddoa Reservoir Project) was authorized for construction by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in 1936 to provide flood control
and water conservation in Colorado and Kansas.
One factor in
project authorization was the potential usefulness of the reservoir in
facilitating settlement of the long standing controversy between
Colorado and Kansas. 57 General Kramer 58 described the salient
49.

2 FIRST

REPORT,

supra note 29, at 221. The approximate location and extent of

irrigated areas in the Arkansas River Basin in areas of Colorado and Kansas, west of

Dodge City, at the time the states adopted the Compact are shown on a map appended
to a report to Congress on the proposed Compact by Hans Kramer, Brigadier General,
U.S. Army (retired). He was the United States representative to the commission that
negotiated the Compact. H. KRAMER, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE PROPOSED ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT BETWEEN COLORADO AND KANSAS reprintedin
House Hearing,supra note 1, at 37 [hereinafter KRAMER REPORT].

An updated version

of the map is appended to the Special Master's First Report.
50. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 111-14; 1 FIRST REPORT, supra
note 29, at 38. The reason there are no ditches below Garden City is due to the
physical conditions peculiar to the Arkansas River Basin in Colorado and Kansas.
KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 34; see also House Hearing, supra note 1, at 47
(statements of General Hans Kramer and George S. Knapp describing the peculiar
physical characteristics of the Arkansas River).

51. 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 38; see also R. A. BARKER ET AL., U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2200, ANALYSIS AND COMPUTER SIMULATION OF
STREAM-AQuIFER HYDROLOGY, ARKANSAS RIVERVALLEY, SOUTHWESTERN KANSAS 9 (1983).
52. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
53. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 399 (1943).
54. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 130.
55. Id. at 112,130.
56. Act of June 22, 1936, Pub. L. No. 738, ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 701 (1970)); see Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT art.
III(D) § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat. 145, 146.
57. KRAMER REPORT, supranote 49, at 37.
58.

President Truman appointed General Kramer to participate in the Compact
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features of the project in his report to Congress on the proposed
Compact:
This project, located on the main stem of the Arkansas River near
Caddoa, Colo., about 58 miles upstream from the Colorado-Kansas
State line, was authorized for construction by the Corps of Engineers
in the Flood Control Act ofJune 22, 1936....
Construction of the John Martin Reservoir project was initiated in
1939, suspended during the war years, and substantially completed in
1948.
The resulting reservoir has a total storage capacity of

approximately 700,000 acre-feet of which the upper 280,000 acre-feet
(above elevation 3851) has been initially allocated to flood control,
and the lower 420,000 acre-feet (below elevation 3851) have been
initially allocated to water conservation....
By the fact of its existence, the John Martin Reservoir project,
though not affecting the equities of apportionment of water between
Colorado and Kansas, actually constitutes the key structure in the
implementation of any plan of apportionment.

In 1933, both states signed a stipulation in the pending case of
Colorado v. Kansas° agreeing that the reservoir construction and
operation would "not 'disturb the status quo of the diversion of water
for beneficial uses from said Arkansas River by the ditches and canals'"
then operating in Colorado and Kansas.6 ' The 1933 stipulation was
only effective pending the outcome of Colorado v. Kansas. Although
Colorado sought an apportionment of water stored in John Martin
Reservoir in Colorado v. Kansas, the Supreme Court declined to make
such an apportionment. Thus, allocation of the benefits arising from
construction of John Martin
62 Reservoir was left to the commissioners
who drafted the Compact.
IV. THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT
In December 1948, after three years of negotiations,
commissioners for Colorado and Kansas signed the Arkansas River
Compact, which became effective on May 31, 1949, after ratification by
the legislature of each state and consent of Congress.63
The Compact did not apportion the waters of the Arkansas River
between Colorado and Kansas on the basis of beneficial consumptive
64
use or a delivery obligation, as in many other interstate compacts.
negotiations as representative of the United States. Minutes, Record of the First
Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 1-3 to 1-4
(January 7, 1946) (on file with the authors and University of Denver Water Law Review).
59. Id. at 37-38.
60.

61.
62.

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
1 FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 79.
Congress passed an act consenting to the negotiation of a compact between

Colorado and Kansas for an equitable apportionment of the waters of the Arkansas
River in 1945. Act of April 19, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-34, 59 Stat. 53 (1945).
63. See supra note 2.
64. See JEROME C. MuYs, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTs: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT 11-12 (1971)

for a discussion of apportionments
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Instead, it provided a flexible apportionment based on the right of
both states to make demands for releases from John Martin Reservoir
at the times and the rates specified in the Compact. Notably, releases
of stored water and river flow to Colorado and Kansas are measured at
different points. Releases made upon demand by Colorado are
measured atJohn Martin Reservoir Dam; therefore, conveyance losses
between the dam and the points of diversion reduce the releases to
water users in Colorado. Releases made upon demand by Kansas are
satisfied by "an equivalent in Stateline flow," which means that all
accretions and return flows at the Stateline are included in
determining releases to Kansas.
"The general principle of this Compact," as stated by the Colorado
Commissioners,
[I]s the division of the benefits of the reservoir storage on the basis of
the maximum rates of flow, 750 c.f.s. (cubic feet per second) or 60%
to Colorado and 500 c.f.s. or 40% to Kansas, out of available storage
water in the Reservoir, with Colorado having the substantial
advantage of using all accretions and return65 flow at the State line to
make up Kansas' 40% share at the state line.
This is not a fixed ratio for stored water division, however, as the
Colorado Commissioners made clear in their report on the Compact:
In other words, if Kansas called for 500 c.f.s. of release of stored water
and there was 250 c.f.s. of other water crossing the State line, then
only a sufficient flow necessary to develop a flow of 500 c.f.s. need be
released from the Reservoir. Thus, if each State continued to call for

their maximum releases at the same time, Colorado would always
have the advantage of such return flow and accretions at the State
line, which would result in the actual division of the water in the
Reservoir being much more than 60% to Colorado and much less
than 40% to Kansas.6
In addition to the apportionment of the benefits arising from John
Martin Reservoir, the Compact was not intended to impede or prevent
future beneficial development of the Arkansas River Basin in either
State, "[p] rovided, that the waters of the Arkansas River, as defined in

article III, shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or
availability for use to the water users in Colorado and Kansas
under
67
this Compact by such future development or construction."
From the foregoing description of the Compact, the question

posed at the outset of this article naturally arises: Why did Colorado
and Kansas agree to the unique apportionment in the Compact, which
made in interstate water compacts.
65.

REPORT AND SUBMISSION BY THE COMMISSIONERS FOR COLORADO OF THE ARKANSAS

RIVER COMPACT 8 (1948) [hereinafter REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS].

66. Id.
67. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(D), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 147.
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does not apportion beneficial consumptive use of the water supply of
the Arkansas River to Colorado and Kansas and does not impose a
delivery obligation on Colorado?6 The answer to that question lies in
the background to the Compact.
Kansas and Colorado negotiated the Arkansas River Compact after
a long dispute over the use of waters of the Arkansas River beginning
with Kansas v. Colorado, decided in 1907,69 and culminating in the 1943
decision of Colorado v. Kansas." Kansas filed suit against Colorado in
1901, alleging that Colorado and various Colorado corporations
unlawfully appropriated waters from the Arkansas that should have
flowed across the Stateline for the benefit of riparian landowners in
Kansas. 71 Colorado answered that the Arkansas River was, in essence,
two rivers separated by a dry sandy stretch of land in western Kansas. 2
Further, the state claimed that its water users appropriated only the
Colorado portion of the Arkansas River.73 Colorado additionally
argued that, as a practical matter, its diversions from the Arkansas did
not injure the water users of Kansas.74
The Supreme Court rejected Colorado's "broken river" argument
and agreed with Kansas' contention that the diminution of the flow of
the Arkansas River by Colorado irrigation practices resulted in some
injury to Kansas. 75 However, it ultimately found that the small amount
of injury was far outweighed by "the great benefit which has obviously
resulted to the counties in Colorado," and that the "equality of right
and equity between the two states forbids any interference with the76
present withdrawal of water in Colorado for purposes of irrigation.,
Therefore, the Court determined that Kansas was not entitled to a
decree apportioning the waters of the river, but that:
[I]f the depletion of the waters of the river by Colorado continue[d]

68.

See 1 FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 71.

The compact makes no specific quantitative allocation of river flows, either in
amounts or in terms of shares in the supply. It does not specify how flows
had been divided and used in the past. Nor does it make specific reference
to the pumping of tributary ground water from wells.

Id.
69. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
70.

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943), provides an excellent summary of the

background of the Compact. See also 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 71-89.
The meaning of the Arkansas River Compact cannot be fully understood
apart from the rich history of controversy over the river, and the early efforts
to apportion its waters between the two states. Nor can its meaning be
divorced from the views of the men in both states who fought the
apportionment issues for more than a decade before taking seats on the
compact commission to undertake formal compact negotiations.
Id. at 71.
71. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1907).
72. Id. at 53-54.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 54.
75. Id. at 113-14.
76. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114 (1907).
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to increase there will come a time when Kansas may justly say that
there is no longer an equitable division of benefits and may rightfully
call for relief against the action of Colorado, its corporations and
citizens i% appropriating the waters of the Arkansas for irrigation
purposes.
Kansas later claimed that diversions and appropriations in
Colorado had increased, and subsequently sought an apportionment
of the flows of the Arkansas River. The Supreme Court again denied
the request for an apportionment in Kansas v. Colorado, discussed
below. As Jean Breitenstein" noted:
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the two cases
involving Kansas and Colorado did not make any definite
apportionment of water between the two States. The action of the
Court in denying the Kansas claims can be taken as a determination
by the Court that the uses made by Colorado and presented to the
Court did not represent an excess use and, hence, Colorado was
entitled as a minimum to the amount of water covered by such uses.
In the second case, the Court gave no consideration to a division of
the benefit resulting from the construction of the John Martin Dam
and Reservoir and very strongly suggested that the only proper way to
determine the interstate difficulties was by the compact method.
Accordingly, in 1945 [C]ompact negotiations began.
The Arkansas River Compact consists of nine separate articles."' As
a preliminary matter, note that the Compact deals only with the waters
of the Arkansas River," which are defined in Article III as "waters
originating in the natural drainage basin of the Arkansas River,
including its tributaries, upstream from the Stateline, and excluding

77. Id. at 117.
78. Jean Breitenstein served as attorney for the Colorado Water Conservation
Board from approximately 1942 to 1954, when he was appointed as a United States
District Judge for the District of Colorado. He was later appointed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court acknowledged him as an expert in
western water law. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 127 (1987).
79. JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN, THE LAw OF THE ARKANSAS RIVER 9-10 (1954) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter BREITENSTEIN PAPER] (unpublished manuscript on file with The
University of Denver Water Law Review). Breitenstein presented this paper at a
meeting of the Arkansas, White and Red River Basins Inter-Agency Committee, which
President Truman organized to conduct a comprehensive survey of water and land
resources of the Arkansas, White, and Red River Basins, as authorized in the Flood
Control Act of 1950, ch. 188, 64 Stat. 170, 180-81, § 205.
80. See REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 6-10 (providing a
short summary and analysis of each article). This report was submitted to the
Colorado legislature prior to ratification of the Compact and was submitted to
Congress before Congress granted its consent to the Compact. Thus, the report, like
the report of the Kansas Commissioners, also submitted to Congress, is relevant to
construe the Arkansas River Compact. See 3 FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 345; see also
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 568 n.14 (1983); Arizona v. California, 292 U.S.
341, 359-60 (1934).
81. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(A), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 146.
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waters brought into the Arkansas River Basin from other river basins." 2
As General Kramer stated in his report to Congress on the proposed

Compact:
Natural stream flow in the headwaters of the Arkansas River is
augmented by water imported through transmountain diversions

across the Continental Divide from the Colorado River system. These
importations, which have been in operation since before 1908 and
have been averaging approximately 43,000 acre-feet in recent years,
have been developed by private water users....
Colorado's importations of water from the Colorado to the
Arkansas River system may be increased materially above historic
quantities if and when plans for the multiple-purpose GunnisonArkansas transmountain diversion project [later renamed the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project], which are now being drafted by the
Bureau of Reclamation, reach fruition. Under the restrictions of the
Colorado River compact (to which Colorado is, but Kansas is not, a
signatory) such diversions from the Colorado River Basin must be put
to use within the confines of the State of Colorado and are not
available for exportation to Kansas. Accordingly, as in the case of historic
importations, the proposed compact does not concern itself with any prospective
importations inasmuch as they would likewise be foreign waters in which the
State of Kansas would have no legitimateinterest. (Emphasis added)."8

The fact that the Compact has intrastate as well as interstate
aspects is also important to understanding it. The construction of a
large on-stream reservoir on the Arkansas River had the potential for
obvious benefit to water users in Colorado and Kansas downstream
from the reservoir by storing flood waters and regulating existing
supplies.

But, water users in Colorado upstream from the reservoir

also felt they were entitled to benefit from the federal project. As
Colorado Commissioner Henry C. Vidal stated to Congress, "[t]he
negotiations have been most prolonged due to the fact that we were
obliged in a sense to make two compacts, a compact with
4 Kansas and a
compact among our own water interests in Colorado.,
Under the Compact, the conservation pool in John Martin
Reservoir functions as a benefit to water users in Colorado, both
upstream and downstream from John Martin Dam. 5 Physically, water
82. Id. art. Ill(B), 63 Stat. at 146; see REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra
note 65, at 7 ("Attention is particularly directed to paragraph B [of Article Ill], which
excludes from consideration and apportionment any waters brought into the Arkansas
River Basin from any other river basin."); see also House Hearing,supra note 1, at 15

(statement of Henry C. Vidal); id. at 28 (statement of Gail L. Ireland).
83. KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 37. The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project is only
one of a number of "transmountain" diversion projects that imports water into the
Arkansas River Basin. See Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist. v. City of Aurora, 731 P.2d

665, 667 (Colo. 1987) (describing the Homestake Project, a joint development of the
cities of Aurora and Colorado Springs); Twin Lakes Res. & Canal Co. v. City of Aspen,
568 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Colo. 1977) (describing the Independence Pass Transmountain
Diversion System).
84. Senate Hearing,supra note 1, at 11.
85. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. IV(C) (3), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 147.
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cannot be released from John Martin Reservoir to water users
upstream from the dam. The conservation pool benefits upstream
users by removing priority "calls" on such water users when there is
water stored in the conservation pool of the reservoir. As Colorado
Commissioner Gail L. Ireland stated in his testimony to Congress:
Mr. Vidal emphasized the fact that we had a great deal of difficulty in
our own State because of the fact this reservoir was so located that it
radically changed the position in many ways of users above the
reservoir and below the reservoir. We feel that we have equitably
ironed that out by providing that when there is water in the reservoir
the users above the reservoir, who up to this time have had to operate
strictly according to decrees and according to priorities, may have the
advantage of disregarding senior rights below, because those users
below, havin the senior rights, now have the benefit of a controlled
storage, which is much more efficient and valuable. s
This paper will first focus on three articles of the Compact central
to the apportionment of the waters of the Arkansas River made to each
State: Articles 1,11, and V. It will then discuss the provisions of Article
IV(D), which addresses future development.
A. ARTICLE I: PURPOSES OF THE COMPACT

Article I of the Compact states that the major purposes of the
Compact are to:
A. Settle existing disputes and remove causes of future controversy
between the States of Colorado and Kansas, and between citizens of
one and citizens of the other State, concerning the waters of the
Arkansas River and their control, conservation and utilization for
irrigation and other beneficial purposes.
B. Equitably divide and apportion between the States of Colorado
and Kansas the waters of the Arkansas River and their utilization as
well as the benefits arising from the construction, operation and
maintenance by the United States of John Martin Reservoir Project
for water conservation purposes.

This statement of purposes is similar to declarations in other
interstate water compacts.
The drafters substantially completed
86. Senate Hearing,supra note 1, at 16. Commissioner Ireland further explained the
respective benefits to water users upstream and downstream from the dam in his
testimony before the House Committee:
Now, when there is water in that reservoir, the direct flow water above the
water reservoir is open and free. It has been a great benefit to the water users
above the reservoir. By the same token, a controlled storage is a greater
benefit to the water users below the reservoir.
House Hearing,supranote 1, at 29 (statement of Gail L. Ireland).
87. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. I, § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat.
145.
88. See MUYS, supra note 64, at 9-10. But cf. id. at 9 (quoting Colorado River

Compact, art. I) (comparison illustrating that other interstate water compacts set forth
different purposes).
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Article I before full development of the apportionment in Article V of
the Compact;"9 therefore, it is not surprising that this Article is not
particularly revealing about the specific apportionment made to each
state under the Compact.
B. ARTICLE II: FACTORS ON WHICH THE COMPACT IS BASED
Article II of the Compact states that the provisions of the Compact
are based on three factors:
(1) [T]he physical and other conditions peculiar to the Arkansas
River and its natural drainage basin, and the nature and location of
irrigation and other developments and facilities in connection
therewith; (2) the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
entered December 6, 1943, in the case of Colorado v. Kansas (320 U.S.
383) concerning the relative rights of the respective States in and to
the use of waters of the Arkansas River; and (3) the experience
derived under various interim executive agreements between the two
states apportioning the waters released from90 the John Martin
Reservoir as operated by the Corps of Engineers.

1. Physical and Other Conditions Peculiar to the Arkansas River Basin
and the Nature and Location of Irrigated Areas
The first factor on which the Compact provisions are based is the
physical conditions peculiar to the Arkansas River, including the
erratic nature of the flow of the river, which varies from year to year,
season to season, and day to day. 9' As stated by the Supreme Court,
"the main river below Canon City may be almost without water one
day, run a flood the next day, and, on the following day, be in

practically its original condition."9 In addition, the Arkansas River
above Garden City, Kansas, contributes little to its flow in southeastern
Kansas. As General Kramer stated in his report to Congress:
The peculiar physiography of the Arkansas River Basin in western
Kansas prevents that reach of the river from receiving any tributary
inflow of consequence and from contributing materially to the flow of
the lower river through southeastern Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Kansas
Arkansas. In effect, therefore, the Arkansas River of western
93
may be considered as a minor tributary of the lower river.

89. See Minutes, Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas River
Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 13-18 to 13-26 (June 30-July 3, 1948) (revised

draft of the Compact dated February 6, 1948)).
90. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. II, § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat.
145, 145-46.
91. The Supreme Court and General Kramer's report to Congress described the
physical conditions peculiar to the Arkansas River Basin. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 105-17 (1907); KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 37. See also supra text
accompanying notes 3-29.
92. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 396 (1943).
93. KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 39. Additional information is contained in a
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In Colorado, the Arkansas River is "over-appropriated"; during
normal or low flows, many water rights are "out-of-priority" and do not
receive water.94 Robert W. Jesse, former Division Engineer for Water
Division No. 2 in Colorado gives an ironic description of the Arkansas
River:
"Usually, the last people to get water have rights that were established
somewhere in the mid-1880's," says Jesse. "Once in a while, the call
doesn't even get past 1874. What you're dealing with here is a semidesert. We generally
have a long string of dry years followed by a
95
serious drought."
2. The Opinion in Colorado v. Kansas
The Compact provisions are also based on the opinion the
Supreme Court in Colorado v. Kansas16 concerning the relative rights of
the respective states in and to the use of the Arkansas River. It is
therefore helpful to review that opinion to understand the Compact.
In its answer in Colorado v. Kansas, Kansas asserted that Colorado
users had "largely increased their appropriations and diversions [since
the judgment in Kansas v. Colorado,97 ] and threaten[ed to further]
increase them, to the injury of Kansas users."98 Kansas requested:
[T] hat the rights of her citizens and residents to divert water from
the river for irrigation be decreed in second feet and that Colorado,
her officers, agents, and citizens be perpetually enjoined from
diverting any waters from the river or its tributaries in Colorado until
the rights of Kansas, her citizens and residents, are satisfied. 99
The Special Master who was appointed by the Supreme Court
recommended a decree that the "'average annual dependable and
fairly continuous water supply and flow"' be allocated five-sixths to
Colorado and one-sixth to Kansas.'
The proposed decree required
measurement of flow at stream flow gages at Canon City, and at the
report prepared by the engineering committee created by the Compact Commission,
INTERIM REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ENGINEERING DATA AND STUDIES TO COLORADO-

KANSAS ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT COMMISSION (1947), and a report on the Arkansas

River Basin below Garden City prepared for the Compact Commission by George
Knapp, a Kansas Commissioner and the Kansas Chief Engineer. Minutes, Record of
the Fifth Meeting Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River Compact Commission, Topeka,
Kan. 5-39 to 5-42 (Oct. 23-24, 1946) (on file with authors and University of Denver
Water Law Review).
94. 1 FIRST REPORT,supra note 29, at 55.
95. Chris Madson, The Death of a River, AUDUBON MAG., May 1982, at 70, 74

(quoting Bob Jesse, Division Engineer for the State Division of Water Resources in
southeastern Colorado).
96. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
97. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
98. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 388 (1943).
99. Id. at 389.
100. Id.
at 390.
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mouth of the Purgatoire River, and "deliveries to Kansas prorated to
the total of the flows at those points."1' '
After reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded,
"[T] he prayer of Kansas for an apportionment in second feet or acre
feet cannot be granted."
The Court noted that in its earlier decision,
it had ruled that Kansas was not entitled to a specific share of the
waters. 03
There had been no appearance that Colorado had
appropriated more than her equitable share of the flow."' In order to
obtain relief, Kansas had to show "additional takings working serious
injuries to her substantial interests."' 5 The Court then stated:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of

States in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes,
they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated
and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of
conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial
imposition of a hard and fast rule.
Such controversies may
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant
to the compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say of this case,
as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such
mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the
medium of settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory
106
power.

The Court determined that the Master erred when he attempted to
divide the "average annual dependable" Arkansas River water supply in
Colorado and award those amounts to each state respectively.'07 "Such
a controversy as is here presented is not to be determined as if it were
one between two private riparian proprietors or appropriators.""'
In approaching the "vital" question of whether Kansas made a
legitimate claim that "Colorado has, since our prior decision,
increased depletion of the water supply to the material damage of
Kansas' substantial interests,"' the Court stated, "[t]he question must

be answered in the light of the rules of decision appropriate to the
quality of the parties and the nature of the suit. "
description of those rules of decision went as follows:

The Court's

In such disputes as this, the court is conscious of the great and serious
caution with which it is necessary to approach the inquiry whether a
case is proved. Not every matter which would warrant resort to equity
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 391.

103. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 391 (1943).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 391-92.
106. Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 392-93.
108. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1943) (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206

U.S. 46,100 (1907)).
109.

Id.

110. Id.
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by one citizen against another would justify our interference with the
action of a State, for the burden on the complaining State is much
greater than that generally required to be borne by private parties.
Before the court will intervene the case must be of serious magnitude
and fully and clearly proved. And in determining whether one State
is using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share of the
benefits of a stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of
one State or the other must be weighed as of the date when the
controversy is mooted."
On the record before it, the Court held that a decree such as the
Master recommended doubtlessly "would inflict serious damage on
existing agricultural interests in Colorado..' ..2 The Court noted that
the proposed decree would operate to deprive some citizens in
Colorado, to a certain extent, of their means of support, and might
result in citizens abandoning valuable improvements and migrating
from farms."'
Citing the steady growth of Colorado's irrigated
agriculture in the basin during the preceding fifty years, in addition to
the accompanying investment in canals, reservoirs, and farms, the
Court noted "[tihe progress has been open. The facts were of
common knowledge." 14 It further pointed out that "[e]ven if Kansas'
claims of increased depletion and ensuing damage are taken at face
value, it is nevertheless evident that while improvements based upon
irrigation went forward in Colorado for twenty-one years, Kansas took
no action until Colorado filed the instant complaint in 1928." 5 The
court continued, "[t]hese facts might well preclude the award of the
relief Kansas asks. But, in any event, they gravely add to the burden
she would otherwise bear, and must be weighed in estimating the
equities of the case. '
Subsequently, the Court found the Master's report inadequate to
answer the "vital" question in the case, stating:
The Master concludes that there has been a material increase in
depletion by Colorado, a consequent diminution of flow across the
state line, and injury to the substantial interests of Kansas. His report
does not state what he considers material; or the extent of the
diminution of flow; or the interests of Kansas which have been
injured and the extent of the injury. We must, therefore, turn to the

111. Id. at 393-94 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 394.
113. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943).

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citation omitted). Despite similar facts, Kansas still sought to enforce the
Arkansas River Compact in Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687-89 (1995).

After

Colorado entered into a compact and after approval by Congress, the Court placed
the burden on Colorado to prove the elements of the affirmative defense of laches,
including that Kansas had failed to exercise due diligence in asserting its claim. Id.

On the other hand, Kansas' delay in bringing suit was considered in whether an award
of prejudgment interest on damages awarded for violation of the Compact was
appropriate. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001).
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evidence to resolve the issues."'7

The Court began its own review of the evidence by first addressing
Kansas' claim regarding Colorado's alleged increase in its consumptive
use of the water of the Arkansas River by an average of between
300,000 and 400,000 acre-feet annually.118 Based on its review, the
Court concluded that "[t]he records of Colorado's consumption and
ditch diversions, and the Colorado and Kansas exhibits showing the
divertible and usable state line flow, rebut such an increase as Kansas
asserts." 9 The Court pointed out that Kansas' expert witness testified
that the diversion records showed no material change since 1905, and
that if irrigated acreage on the main stem of the river actually
increased in Colorado, "it ha[d] done so because of an improved duty
of water."2 0
Kansas ditches, the Court noted, were capable of diverting water
"only up to 2,000 c.f.s.," and when the water exceeded that amount,
"the excess [could not] be diverted and used.""2 ' Also, the erratic
nature of the water supply brought up the "critical matter" of "the
amount of divertible flow at times when water is most needed for
irrigation."'22 The Court pointed out that the extensive use of
reservoirs for storage of flood waters and winter flows not usable or
needed for irrigation, historically supplemented the dependable
supply of irrigation water in Colorado. In contrast, Kansas could point
to "but one small basin" in the western part of that state constructed
for that purpose. 123 The Court noted that releasing this storage water
to help Colorado irrigators in times of need resulted in stabilization
and improvement of flow at the Stateline through increased seepage
and return flow.'24
Reviewing the evidence of increased acreage in Colorado, the
Court concluded that while, according to census figures, irrigated
acreage in Colorado had increased substantially between 1902 and
1909, there had been only a minor increase thereafter.'2 5 Turning to
the evidence of irrigated acreage in Kansas, it further noted a steady
increase in irrigated acreage in Kansas, and concluded that "[i] t seems
that Colorado cannot have depleted the usable supply passinF into
Kansas if acreage under irrigation is any measure of depletion."
Next, the Court reviewed the findings in the earlier case and the
fact that Colorado had previously authorized diversions in excess of

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1943).
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1943).
Id. at 397.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 398.
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the flow at Canon City. However, the Court noted that due to seepage
and return flow, "an increased quantity of usable water has passed the
state line."" 7 While noting Kansas' insistence that it could successfully
irrigate 414,000 acres in western areas of the state, the Court pointed
out that this land extended many miles from the bed of the river, and
that despite Colorado's alleged increased depletions, "the acreage
under irrigation in western Kansas through existing ditches has
steadily increased, over the period 1895-1939, from approximately
15,000 acres to approximately 56,000."' And, the Court noted:
[T]he arid lands in western Kansas are underlaid at shallow depths
with great quantities of ground water available for irrigation by

pumping at low initial and maintenance cost. There is persuasive
testimony that farmers who could be served from existing ditches
have elected not tor take
water
therefrom but to install pumping
•
129
systems because of lower cost.
Finally, the Court noted that the census figures of population in
western Kansas counties, and the agricultural production within them,
"give no support to a claim that the inhabitants have suffered for lack
of arable and productive land." 3 ' Generally speaking, the population
13
had increased steadily, paralleling agricultural production.
Considering all these factors, the Court concluded that Kansas had not
sustained its allegations that Colorado's use had materially increased,
or that the increase32 had resulted serious detriment to the substantial
interests of Kansas.'

3. Interim Executive Agreements
The experience derived from interim executive agreements
between the two states apportioning water stored in John Martin
Reservoir is the third factor on which the provisions of the Compact
are based.'33 As General Kramer stated in his report to Congress, the
project was "[t]he most important structure affecting the formulation
and future administration of the proposed compact. . .,,13' He
described the interim agreements governing storage prior to adoption
of the Compact:
In the intervening years, 1943-47, the John Martin (Caddoa) project
...reached

a stage of partial completion which permitted the storage

of water for irrigation use up to a volume of 100,000 acre-feet.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 398 (1943).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.at 400.
Id.

132.

Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 400 (1943).

133. See supra textual description of the John Martin Reservoir accompanying notes
50-54.
134. KRAMERREPORT, supra note 49, at 37.
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Impoundment and release of this water was governed by various
interim operating agreements between State officials. The first of
these interim agreements (1943) adopted the formula for allocation
specified in the Stipulation of 1933 [in which both States had agreed
to use their influence to obtain the construction of the Caddoa
project and specified an allocation pending the outcome of the
Supreme Court suit in Colorado v. Kansas]; other formulas were
adopted in subsequent years.
Though none of these interim
arrangements brought complet[e] satisfaction, they were reasonably
satisfactory in enabling beneficial use of limited reservoir storage
during the years of war and postwar emergency. They also served a
good purpose in highlighting the administrative difficulties to be
solved in a permanent compact. In the final analysis, experience with
the various interim operating agreements developed clearly that
differences of interpretation or lack of agreement among the State
officials, or among the water users, ultimately brought the problem
into the lap of the Corps of Engineers whose district engineer is
charged with the responsibility of actual operation of the John Martin
project.'
General Kramer noted that in 1943 the Army Corps operated John
Martin Reservoir based on the Stipulation of 1933, which was intended
to maintain the status quo of existing ditch and canal diversions
pending a decision by the Supreme Court. 36 Implementation of the
stipulation resulted in heated disputes over accounting for water."'
In February 1944, shortly after the opinion in Colorado v. Kansas,
Charles L. Patterson, Chief Engineer of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, developed a plan for the operation of John
Martin Reservoir and for administration of Colorado water rights."8 In
the report, Patterson reviewed the benefits and the complications of
storing undivertible flood flows and unusable winter flows in the
reservoir:
Waters impounded in the irrigation pool will consist of flows of the
Arkansas and Purgatoire Rivers that are undivertible and unusable by
upstream appropriators, but which, with respect to downstream
interests, will consist, in part, of appropriated supplies, or flows which
if not withheld would or might have been diverted and used by
ditches downstream in Colorado and Kansas; and, in part, of
unappropriated waters which, if not withheld,
would or might have
39
been unused and wasted, wholly or partially.
Patterson noted that segregation of waters impounded in the
irrigation pool would require "arbitrary assumptions and large
measures of estimation, and would inevitably become sources of local
135. Id. at 36.
136. 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 87.
137.

See DOUGLAS R. LITrLEFIELD, PH.D., THE HISTORY OF THE ARKANSAS RIVER

COMPACT 66-73 (1990) (Kansas Exh. 129 in Kansas v. Colorado, Orig. No. 105, United
States Supreme Court) (on file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
138. CHARLES L. PATTERSON, PLAN FOR OPERATION OF CADDOA PROJECT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF RIGHTS IN ARKANSAS RIVER (1944).

139.

Id. at 15-16.
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and interstate controversy, and of possible future litigation."'' 0 He also
pointed out that siltation and evaporation would further complicate
accounting with respect to stored water.' At times when the reservoir
held impounded water, the regimen of the downstream river would be
altered, changing the conditions that governed historical diversion
opportunities and operations of ditches.'
This would "disturb the
established relations between the individual ditches along the river43
downstream in Water District 67 and between the two States.'
Additionally, storage of water in the reservoir would affect relations
between appropriators in Colorado upstream and downstream from
14 4
the dam, requiring understandings between these water users as well.
Patterson suggested a plan based on "pre-Caddoa interstate
relations" in terms of "divertible and usable Stateline flows entering
Kansas during the years 1908 to 1942."' The plan proposed to use
water in the John Martin Reservoir irrigation pool, when available, to
maintain Stateline quantities at a specified percentage of ditch
diversions from the Arkansas River in Water Districts 14,4 6 17, and 67,
excluding waters imported into the Arkansas River Basin.
In early 1944, Colorado officials met with Kansas officials to discuss
operations for the following irrigation season. Colorado put the
Patterson Plan into effect beginning April 1, 1944." 7 In June 1944,
Colorado Attorney General Gail L. Ireland transmitted a proposal to
Kansas Attorney General A. B. Mitchell for operation of John Martin
Reservoir and administration of rights in the Arkansas River based on
the Patterson Plan. "8 Rejecting the Patterson Plan, Kansas demanded
one-half of the water stored in John Martin Reservoir. Colorado
acquiesced for a while, but 4at the end of 1945, Colorado water users
insisted upon modifications.

1

Thus, at the start of the Compact negotiations in 1946, very nearly
the first order of business was to negotiate an agreement for storage in
the reservoir."' Harry B. Mendenhall of Colorado and W. E. Leavitt of
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 18.
143.

PArERSON, supra note 138,

at 18.

144. Id. at 18-19.
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id. at 19-33.
147.

See

GAIL L. IRELAND, STATEMENT RE: INTERSTATE RELATIONS UNDER PLAN OF
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(1944) (Kansas Exh. 222 in Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, Original).
148. Id. (cover letter from Gail Ireland to A. B. Mitchell).
149. Minutes, Record of the Second Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River
Compact Commission, Topeka, Kan. 2-3 (Mar. 25-26, 1946) (on file with authors and
the University of Denver Water Law Review).
150. Id.; see also Minutes, Record of the Third Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas
Arkansas River Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 3-3 (July 1-2, 1946) (on file with
authors and the University of Denver Water Law Review); see also Minutes, Record of the
Fourth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River Compact Commission, Denver,
Colo. 4-16 to 4-18 (Aug. 28-29, 1946) (on file with authors and the University of
Denver Water Law Review) (letter from District Engineer of the Corps of Engineers to
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Kansas were appointed to negotiate an agreement."' During the
course of the Compact negotiations, they agreed upon, and the
Governors of the two states approved, interim executive agreements to
govern storage and release of water during the winter and summer
storage seasons. '52 These interim executive agreements were generally
similar to provisions in Article V of the Compact, and were useful "in
appraising the practical benefits of the Reservoir. "1 3 They also
demonstrated the advantages of simplified arrangements that avoided
the detailed accounting
inherent to the Stipulation of 1933 and the
54
Patterson Plan.

Thus, the attempt to implement the Stipulation of 1933 and the
Patterson Plan highlighted the difficulty of developing a workable
formula to divide waters stored in John Martin Reservoir on a
volumetric basis. It also underscored the potential for disputes over
accounting for storage, siltation, evaporation, and releases. Ultimately,
the Compact apportioned the benefits of John Martin Reservoir in a
way designed to avoid such disputes.
C. ARTICLE V: THE APPORTIONMENT ARTICLE

Article V of the Compact apportions the benefits of the John
Martin Reservoir project. It begins with the statement that "Colorado
and Kansas hereby agree upon the following basis of apportionment of
the waters of the Arkansas River" and is followed by eight paragraphs,
lettered A through H.'55 The drafters of the Compact fully understood
thatJohn Martin Reservoir would benefit water users in both states by
regulating existing flows and storing flood flows. As General Kramer
stated in his report to Congress:
Reservoir operations for conservation purposes will permit regulation
of the normal flows of the Arkansas River at Caddoa that previously
were diverted by irrigators downstream in Colorado and Kansas when
the Governor of Colorado noting "continuing critical food situation" and urging

appointment of negotiators to attempt agreement on temporary storage pending
permanent compact); id. at 4-20 (resolution of Compact Commission recommending
appointment of H. B. Mendenhall and W. E. Leavitt to negotiate interim executive

agreement).
151. Minutes, Record bf the Fifth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River
Compact Commission, Topeka, Kan. 5-43 (Oct. 23-24, 1946) (on file with authors and

the University of Denver Water Law Review).
152. Minutes, Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River
Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 6-41 to 6-42 (Nov. 25-26, 1946) (on file with
authors and the University of Denver Water Law Review); see also Minutes, Record of the

Seventh Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River Compact Commission,
Topeka, Kan. 7-22 (Jan. 22-23, 1947) (on file with authors and the University of

Denver Water Law Review).
153. REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 6.
154. See Senate Hearing,supra note 1,at 17 (statement of Gail L. Ireland) (the "system
of trying to keep books [was] practically impossible [because] [n]o two people could

just exactly agree on how much water they were talking about from time to time.").
155. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V, § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat.
145, 147-49.
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and as they occurred, thereby making such flows available for
diversion more nearly when and as needed for the irrigation of crops;
and will enable capture and conservation, for additional diversion
and increased use in both States, of the flood flows of the Arkansas
River at Caddoa (up to the available capacity of the conservation
pool) that wre previously incapable of being diverted or used in
either State. ' 5
The drafters of the Compact also understood that increased
diversions by Colorado users upstream from the reservoir, as permitted
under the Compact, would change the historical diversions and stream
flows upstream from the reservoir, thereby reducing the supply
entering the reservoir. 5 7 The Compact divides this reduced supply
entering the reservoir between Colorado and Kansas based on rates of
flow, with accretions and return flow at the Stateline counting toward
releases to which Kansas is entitled.5 8
1. Paragraphs A and B: Periods of Winter and Summer Storage and
Releases of River Flow
Paragraphs V(A) and V(B) define periods of winter storage and
summer storage in John Martin Reservoir.'5 9 The paragraphs provide
that all water entering the reservoir shall be stored to the limit of the
then available conservation capacity, subject to the exceptions and
releases of water equivalent to river flow provided therein. 6 ' These
provisions specified rates at which Colorado, and in some
circumstances Kansas, may demand releases of water equivalent to
"river flow."'' The Compact defines river flow as "the sum of the flows
of the Arkansas and the Purgatoire Rivers into John Martin Reservoir
as determined
by gauging stations appropriately located above said
62
Reservoir."1
During the summer storage period, Colorado may demand
releases of river flow up to 500 c.f.s., and Kansas may demand releases
of that portion of the river flow between 500 c.f.s. and 750 c.f.s.,
"irrespective of releases demanded by Colorado.", 63 This does not
apply when Colorado water users operate under decreed priorities.
During the winter storage period, only Colorado is permitted to
demand releases of river flow, not to exceed 100 c.f.s.16 Stated another
way, Kansas can only demand a release of river flow during the
summer storage season when the river flow exceeds 500 c.f.s.
156.
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supra note 49, at 38.

157. 1 FRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 75.
158. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(G), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
159.
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Id.
Id.
Id. art. III(H), 63 Stat. at 146.
Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(B), § 37-69-101, 63 Stat. 145,

164. Id. art. V(A), 63 Stat. at 147.

Issue 1

THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT

2. Paragraph C: Releases of Stored Water
Paragraph V(C) specifies the conditions upon which water stored
in the reservoir pursuant to paragraphs V(A) and V(B) shall be
released upon demands by Colorado and Kansas. 65 This provision sets
maximum release rates during the summer storage season at which
either state may demand releases of stored water, either separately or
concurrently.1 66 The maximum release rate depends on whether the
quantity in storage is more or less than 20,000 acre-feet. 67 The
following statement by the Colorado Commissioners helps explain the
rationale for this flexible apportionment:
In considering it [Article V of the Compact] one must keep in mind
the fact that it was the definite intent of the Commissioners that water
must not be wasted and that there must be a flexibility and availability
in use for water users in both States and that such requirements will
not necessarily arise at the same time, dependent on weather
conditions in different areas.
Furthermore, it must not be
overlooked that the principal beneficial purpose of the Reservoir is to
conserve water which previously has been unusable and wasted

because
of lack of a storage facility in which to conserve it for future
168
use.
3. Paragraph E: Measurement and Conditions Governing Storage and
Releases
Paragraph V(E) contains additional provisions concerning the
measurement and administration of storage and releases. Section
V(E) (1) provides that "[r] eleases of stored water and releases of river
flow may be made simultaneously upon the demands of either or both
States."' 9 For example, if the quantity of water stored in the
conservation pool is less than 20,000 acre-feet, a stored water release to
Colorado during the summer storage period cannot exceed 600 c.f.s.
However, Colorado can also demand a release of water equivalent to
the river flow, up to 500 c.f.s.'
Thus, assuming conditions were such
that the water could be applied promptly to beneficial use, Colorado
could demand a simultaneous release of stored water not to exceed
600 c.f.s., and a release of water equivalent to river flow up to 500 c.f.s,
for a total of 1,100 c.f.s., whether or not Kansas made a demand for
release of stored water or river flow. Likewise, in Kansas, assuming
conditions were such that the water could be applied promptly to
beneficial use, Kansas could demand a simultaneous release of stored
water not to exceed 400 c.f.s., and of water equivalent to that portion
165. Id. art. V(C), 63 Stat. at 147.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 7-8.
169. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(E) (1), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.

170. Id. art. V(B), 63 Stat. at 147.
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of the river flow between 500 c.f.s. and 750 c.f.s., for a total of 650 c.f.s.
As noted above, section V(E) (1) expressly states that releases of
stored water and releases of river flow may be made simultaneously
upon the demand of either or both states.
This provision negates
any implication that a demand for release of river flow or stored water
is exclusive and would preclude a demand of release by the other. The
provision also clarifies that either state could make simultaneous
releases of stored water and river flow.
Paragraph (E) (2) provides "Water released upon concurrent or
separate demands shall be applied promptly to beneficial use unless
172
storage thereof downstream is authorized by the Administration."
The drafters intended this provision to prevent either state from
depleting water stored in the available conservation capacity of John
Martin Reservoir by demanding releases for storage downstream.
Paragraph (E) (3) is fundamental to the apportionment
effectuated by Article V. "Releases of river flow and of stored water to
Colorado shall be measured by gauging stations located at or near
John Martin Dam and the releases to which Kansas is entitled shall be
satisfied by an equivalent in Stateline flow." 173 Article III(C) defines
the term "Stateline flow" to mean "the flow of waters of the Arkansas
River as determined by gauging stations located at or near the
Stateline."074 Article VI(B) further provides that water carried across
the Stateline in the Frontier Canal, which diverts water in Colorado for
irrigation
uses in Kansas, shall be considered part of the Stateline
175
flOW.

Paragraph E(4) provides that "When water is released from John
Martin Reservoir appropriate allowances as determined by the
Administration shall be made for the intervals of time required for
such water to arrive at the points of diversion in Colorado and at the
Stateline." 7 6 The drafters recognized that implementation of the
Compact would require expert administration. For example, releases
from the reservoir do not instantaneously result in an increase to
Stateline flow because of the distance between John Martin Dam and
the Stateline. Additionally, the amount of time for releases to arrive at
the Stateline varies depending upon the release rate and the
conditions in the river. Thus, the Compact Administration must
determine periodically throughout the summer storage period,'7 7 "the
171. Id. art. V(E)(1), 63 Stat. at 147-48.
172. Id. art. V(E)(2), 63 Stat. at 148.
173. Id. art. V(E) (3), 63 Stat. at 148.
174. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IlI(C), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 146. Article Ill(C) also states that the flow as determined at the gauging
stations located at or near the Stateline "shall be deemed to be the actual Stateline
flow." Id.
175. See Frontier Ditch Co. v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d
1117 (Colo. 1988) (discussing the Frontier Ditch and article VI(B) of the Compact).
176. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(E) (4), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
177.
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water available at the Colorado-Kansas Stateline for use in Kansas in
order to effectuate the apportionment of water to Kansas as provided
by the Compact.",18 The Administration must then determine the
intervals of time for water released upon demand by Kansas to arrive at
the Stateline so that the releases to which Kansas is entitled are
satisfied by an equivalent share in Stateline flow.'
Paragraph V(E) (5) is one of the more unusual provisions of the
Compact, providing that "[t]here shall be no allowance or
accumulation of credits or debits for or against either State." ' s°
General Kramer felt this provision made the Arkansas River Compact
"boldly progressive.'' Colorado Commissioner Ireland described this
provision during his testimony to Congress on the proposed Compact
as "an innovation and something new in compacts," where "there
would be no books kept and there would be no carry-over one way or
another."' 2 In his report to Congress on the proposed compact,
General Kramer stated that the absence of bookkeeping would put
"administration [of the Compact] on a day-to-day basis unhampered
by the potential problems and wrangles that8 would
arise from periodic
3
adjustment or balancing of water accounts."9

During the Compact Commissioners' deliberations, General
Kramer stated that the intent of this provision was to eliminate "any
accumulations or carry-overs in succeeding seasons,"' 4 as well as vested
rights for postponed deliveries. 5 He continued that "the Compact
ought to clearly state that there would be no carrying forward of any
unbalance;
that otherwise there would be claims and possibly law
' 86
suits. s

While the drafters of the Compact believed that not accounting for
credits or debits would reduce the potential for lawsuits, they failed to
recognize that treating the conservation pool in John Martin Reservoir
as a common pool, against which both states could demand releases,
2(a) (4) (1950) [hereinafter ARCA RuLES AND REGULATIONS]. Article VIII (B) (1) of the
Compact authorizes the Administration to adopt rules and regulations. The
Administration adopted Rules and Regulations effective April 15, 1950, which have
been amended from time to time.
178. Id.
179. The Administration must also anticipate times when John Martin Reservoir
becomes empty and provide notice to the Colorado State Engineer "for a change of
administration so that all Colorado water users will switch back to the decreed priority
basis as though the Reservoir had never been constructed." REPORT OF COLORADO
COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 9; see Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art.
V(F), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat. 145, 148.
180. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. V(E) (5), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
181.

KRAMERREPORT, supra note 49, at 38.

182. Senate Hearing,supra note 1 at, 17.
183.

KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 38.

184. Minutes, Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas
River Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 14-80 (July 29-31, 1948) (on file with
authors and the University of Denver Water Law Review).
185. Id. at 14-81.
186. Id. at 14-82.
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would create a disincentive to conserve water. Particularly during
years when there was limited water in storage, as soon as one state
demanded a release of water, the other state made a demand to ensure
that it received its share of water."7 The effect was that the
conservation
pool was often empty by April or early May during dry
188
years.
Section (E)(6) of the Compact provides that "Storage, releases
from storage and releases of river flow authorized in this Article shall
be accomplished pursuant to procedures prescribed by the
Administration under the provisions of Article VIII."" s9 The Compact
created an Administration consisting of three representatives from
each state, responsible for requesting releases upon demand by
Colorado and Kansas, and satisfying demands by Kansas with an
equivalent in Stateline flow.' 90
4. Paragraphs D, E, and F: No Calls on Water Users Upstream From
John Martin Dam when There is Water in the Conservation Pool;
Administration when the Conservation Pool Is Empty; Distribution
Agreements
Paragraph V(D) is best addressed in combination with paragraphs
V(F) and (G). Paragraph (D) of Article V provides that:
Releases authorized by Paragraphs A, B and C of this Article, except
when all Colorado water users are operating under decreed priorities
as provided for in Paragraphs F and G of this Article [i.e., at times
when the conservation pool is exhausted], shall not impose any call
on Colorado water users that divert waters of the Arkansas River
upstream from John Martin Dam.' 9'
Paragraph V(D) is the mechanism by which the conservation pool
187. 2 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 175.
188. Id. at 47.
189. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. V(E) (6), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
190. The Corps of Engineers actually operates John Martin Reservoir to store and
release water. Id. at art. 1V(C) (1), 63 Stat. at 146. The Compact recognizes that the
reservoir operate for flood control storage as well as conservation storage, and that
releases from flood control storage be made at times and rates determined by the
Corps of Engineers "without regard to ditch diversion capacities or requirements in
either or both States." Id. at art. IV(C)(2), 63 Stat. at 146-47. Further, the Compact
recognizes that maintenance may disrupt storage and releases. Id. at art. PV(C) (3). 63
Stat. at 147. While the Corps of Engineers actually operates the dam and reservoir, the
Compact provides that the Chief of Engineers is authorized to operate the
conservation features of the reservoir "in a manner conforming to such Compact with
such exceptions as he and the Administration created pursuant to the Compact may
jointly approve." Id. at art. IX(A), 63 Stat. at 150. Thus, calls for releases are
transmitted to the authorized representative of the Administration, who in turn
requests the Corps of Engineers "to make releases and reduction in releases of
quantities of water required to meet such calls." ARCA RuLES AND REGULATIONS, supra
note 177, Rule 2(a) (3).
191. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. V(D), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat, 145, 147-48.
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in John Martin Reservoir benefits water users upstream from John
Martin Dam.9 By removing calls on Colorado water users upstream
from John Martin Reservoir when there is water in the conservation
pool, those upstream users are permitted to divert additional water at
times when they previously had to forego such diversions to satisfy the
calls of senior water rights in Water District 67.' Thus, the Compact
results in a reduced water supply to John Martin Reservoir, but
provides a better regulated supply for water users in Colorado and
Kansas below the dam. 9
When the conservation pool in John Martin Reservoir is exhausted,
Paragraph V(F) provides:
Colorado shall administer the decreed rights of water users in
Colorado Water District 67 [those who divert downstream from John
Martin Dam] as against each other and as against all rights now or
hereafter decreed to water users diverting upstream from John
Martin dam on the basis of relative priorities in the same manner in
which their respective priority rights were administered by Colorado
before John Martin reservoir began togoperate and as though John
Martin dam had not been constructed.
Paragraph V(F) further provides that such priority administration
continues until water is again available for storage in the conservation
pool. Thus, when the reservoir is empty, Colorado administers water
rights as though the reservoir did not exist. Finally, paragraph V(F)
addresses the administration of diversions in Colorado Water District
67:
Except when administration in Colorado is on a priority basis the
water diversions in Colorado Water District 67 shall be administered
by Colorado in accordance with distribution agreements made from
time to time between the water users in such District and filed with
the Administration and with the State Engineer of Colorado or, in
the absence of such agreement, upon the basis of the respective

priority decrees, as against each other, in said District.!96

Paragraph V(F) is important to the operation of the conservation
pool for the benefit of Colorado water users downstream from John
Martin Dam. Prior to the construction ofJohn Martin Dam, Colorado

192. See id. art. IV(C) (3), 63 Stat. at 147.
193. See House Hearing, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Gail L. Ireland) ("[T]his
Compact also makes it possible now for water users above the reservoir who heretofore
were restricted to the use of that water based on priority of right to ignore senior
rights below which previously they could not do if they had ajunior decree.").
194. Id.
195. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(F), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148. This article also specifies a procedure by which the Administration is to
notify the State Engineer of Colorado that Colorado shall administer the decreed
rights of water users in Colorado Water District 67 as against each other and all rights
now or hereafter acquired on the basis of relative priorities. Id.
196. Id. art. V(F), 63 Stat. at 148.
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administered diversions in Colorado Water District 67 upon the basis
of their relative priorities. The drafters of the Compact recognized
that storage of water in the conservation pool under the Compact
would alter the regimen of the river downstream from the dam and
the conditions that governed the historical diversion opportunities by
water users in Water District 67.197 Therefore, the drafters added this
provision to allow water users in Water District 67 to enter into
distribution agreements governing the administration of diversions in
Water District 67. The Colorado Commissioners noted in their report
that such a distribution agreement was then in effect, "and
satisfactorily so."'98 In the absence of an agreement, the Compact
provides for administration on the basis of prior appropriation.
5. Paragraph G: Kansas' Entitlement when Colorado Reverts to
Administration of Decreed Priorities
Paragraph V(G) defines Kansas' entitlement during periods when
Colorado reverts to administration of decreed priorities (i.e., when the
conservation pool is empty). During such times, Kansas "shall not be
entitled to any portion of the river flow entering John Martin
Reservoir."' 9
Paragraph V(G) then states that "[w]aters of the
Arkansas River originating in Colorado which may flow across the
200
Stateline during such periods are hereby apportioned to Kansas."
These provisions derive from the opinion in Colorado v. Kansas, in
which the Supreme Court declined to make any definite
apportionment of water between the States, or to limit the exercise of
existing water rights in Colorado.0 '
6. Paragraph H: Limitations on Transfer of Rights BelowJohn Martin
to Points Above, and on Increase of Ditch Diversion Rights Below the
Reservoir
Paragraph V(H) is the final paragraph of Article V, entertaining a
limitation on transfers of rights from below John Martin Reservoir to
points above the reservoir. Paragraph V(H) also places a limitation on
increasing ditch diversion rights below the reservoir in Colorado and
Kansas beyond the total present rights of such ditches, "and provides
for a finding by the administrative agency, in respect to material
depletion or adverse effect in respect thereto. 2 2
197.

KRAMER REPORT,

198.

REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 9.

supra note 49, at 38.

199. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(G), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 91-127.
202. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(H), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148-49; REPORT

OF THE

COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 9. The

Colorado Commissioners emphasized, however, that such a finding was not conclusive
and only constitutes prima facie evidence, and that the proper court could still pass on
the question after proper notice to all parties including the Administration. Id.; see
Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. VIII(I), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63 Stat.
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It should be noted that the first limitation in paragraph V(H), on
the transfer of rights from below John Martin Reservoir to points
upstream from John Martin Dam, applies only to ditches in Water
District 67. Return flows from ditches in Water District 67 contribute
to water available at the Stateline where releases for Kansas are
measured.0 3 If a water user changed the point of diversion of a water
right from downstream to upstream from John Martin Dam, it could
change the amount or timing of those return flows. The change in
flows would then affect the amount of releases to satisfy demands by
Kansas and the amount of flow at the Stateline when John Martin
Reservoir is empty. Both states have an obvious interest in any such
change.
The second limitation, on increases of ditch diversion rights,
applies to ditches in Colorado Water District 67 and Kansas ditches
between the Kansas state line and Garden City, Kansas.0 4 The drafters
intended this provision as assurance that the benefits of the John
Martin Reservoir went to the existing ditches in Colorado Water
District 67 and the Kansas ditches between the state line and Garden
City, unless the "usable quantity and availability for use of the waters of
the Arkansas River" to such water users would not be "materially
depleted or adversely affected.2 0 5 George S. Knapp, the Kansas Chief
Engineer and a Kansas Commissioner, testified during the hearings
held by Congress on the proposed Compact that water users "will not
in either State be able to bring more land under irrigation. The water
supply is not adequate. The water users in eastern Colorado and, to a
greater extent, in western Kansas, under these old 20established
canals,
6
have had a very uncertain and erratic water supply."

Knapp further testified:
This [the Compact] will help to stabilize the water supply for those
existing systems. The Arkansas does not produce sufficient water to
enable any expansion whatsoever. All it does is to make a quantity of
water, that hitherto has been winter flow and summer flood waters,
which have gone to waste, usable, and to convert a portion of that
into usable water. That is divided 60 percent to Colorado and 40
percent to Kansas, and will help to stabilize the areas but will provide
no additional
5onstruction [of improvements to bring more
i. water
.
. for
.207
land under irrigation].

145, 151 ("findings of fact made by the Administration shall not be conclusive in any
court or before any agency or tribunal but shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts found.").
203. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(E) (3), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
204. Note that this limitation does not apply to Colorado ditches upstream of John
Martin Reservoir; however, future beneficial development of the Arkansas River Basin
is subject to Article IV(D) of the Compact.
205. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. V(H), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 148.
206. House Hearing,supranote 1, at 32.

207. Id.
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The drafters recognize that there may be instances where the
"useable quantity and availability for use to the waters of the Arkansas
River to water users in Colorado Water District 67 and Kansas" might
not be "materially depleted or adversely affected,""0 8 but paragraph
V(H) imposes a requirement for making findings of fact before the
ditch diversion rights in Colorado Water District 67 and in Kansas
could be increased "beyond the total present rights of said ditches." 09
D. ARTICLE IV(D): FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
While Compact negotiations focused on the apportionment of the
benefits arising from the construction of the John Martin Reservoir
project, the Compact also addressed future development. Article
IV(D) provides:
This Compact is not intended to impede or prevent future beneficial
development of the Arkansas River basin in Colorado and Kansas by
Federal or State agencies, by private enterprise, or by combinations
thereof, which may involve construction of dams, reservoir[s], and
other works for the purposes of water utilization and control, as well
as the improved or prolonged functioning of existing works:
Provided, that the waters of the Arkansas River, as defined in Article
III, shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or availability
for use to the water users in Colorado and Kansas
under this
• 210
Compact by such future development or construction.

It is important to note three things about the proviso of Article
IV(D). First, the proviso is limited to "waters of the Arkansas River, as
defined in Article III.,,211 It does not apply to waters imported into the
Arkansas River Basin from other river basins.
Second, the proviso
applies only to material depletion by future development or
construction, but future development includes "the improved or
prolonged functioning of existing works.20 3 In the 1995 Kansas v.
Colorado case, the Special Master concluded, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that the proviso of Article IV(D) limited groundwater
pumping by wells existing at the time of the Compact to the amount
pumped during the Compact negotiations.2" Third, the proviso limits
only material depletions of the waters of the Arkansas River "in usable
quantity or availability for use to the water users in Colorado and
Kansas under the Compact."2 5 The terms "materially depleted" and
208. Arkansas River Compact, COLO.
Stat. 145, 148.

REv. STAT. art. V(H),

§ 37-69-101 (2001), 63

209. Id., 63 Stat. at 148-49.
Id. art. IV(D), 63 Stat. at 147.
211. Id.
212. 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 257 & n. 99.
213. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(D), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
Stat. 145, 147.
214. 2 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 190-200; see also Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S.
673, 689-91 (1995).
215. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(D), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63
210.

Issue I

THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT

"in usable quantity or availability for use to the water users in Colorado
and Kansas under this Compact" are not defined in the Compact.
However, it was clear that the intent of the proviso was to protect
usable water supplies available to existing water users in Colorado and
Kansas, recognizing that 2 those
water supplies would be altered by
16
operation of the Compact.

General Kramer stated that Article IV(D) was "intended to leave
the door open-as it should be-for beneficial development of the
Arkansas River basin in Colorado and Kansas by any and all proper
ways and means."2 7 However, he went on to state:
[S]uch development, whatever form it may take, must fit into the

framework of the proposed compact; it must not disrupt the
relationships and rights established thereunder and must not affect
adversely the interests of the States and their water users under the
compact. Without these safeguards, the interstate controversy would
soon be revived and the proposed compact would be wasted effort. 21
The framework of the proposed compact was: (1) to conserve
water in John Martin Reservoir that was previously unusable and
wasted; (2) to remove calls on users who divert upstream from John
Martin Dam when there is already water in the conservation pool; and
(3) to divide the benefits resulting from conservation storage in John
Martin Dam Reservoir on the basis of rates of flow, with the "definite
intent

...

that water must not be wasted and that there must be a

flexibility and availability in use for water users in both States."2 9
Although the term "materially depleted" was not defined, the
Colorado v. Kansas opinion certainly gave meaning to the word
"depleted." 220 During the Compact negotiations the Commissioners
added the term "materially" to avoid "an extreme interpretation." 21
The phrase "in usable quantity or availability for use to the water users
in Colorado and Kansas under this Compact" takes on meaning once
one recognizes that even with John Martin Reservoir's operation
under the Compact, not all waters of the Arkansas River would be
usable or available for use by water users in Colorado or Kansas who
Stat. 145, 147.

216. See 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 97-102 for a detailed discussion of the
terms "materially depleted" and "protection of existing uses."
217. KRAMERREPORT, supra note 49, at 41.

218. Id.
219. REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 7-8.
220. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393-99 (1943).

221. Minutes, Record of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas
River Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 17-32 to 17-33 (Dec. 13-14, 1948) (on file
with authors and the University of Denver Water Law Review). The Commissioners
agreed that a long term average would be a reasonable basis to determine whether a
future project had materially depleted the waters of the Arkansas River. See Minutes,

Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River Compact
Commission, Denver, Colo. 13-65 to 13-71 (June 30-July 3, 1948) (on file with authors
and the University of Denver Water Law Review); see also 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29,

at 97-99.
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had rights existing at the time the Compact was negotiated. Shortly
after the Compact's approval, a Bureau study on the feasibility of
constructing another reservoir project near the Colorado-Kansas
Stateline, named the Granada Project, confirms this assertion. 2 The
Bureau based the Granada Project's supply on water that could be
stored below John Martin Reservoir without materially depleting the
usable quantity or availability in Colorado and Kansas.f
A 1955
Report prepared by the Arkansas-White-Red Basins Inter-Agency
Committee summarized the project:
119. Construction of the potential Granada Reservoir, with 30,000
acre-feet capacity, would provide an average annual supplemental
water supply of 19,000 acre-feet for irrigated lands below John Martin
Reservoir in Colorado and Kansas. The reservoir would be operated
in close coordination with, and would complement the operation of,
John Martin Reservoir. It would be operated in accordance with the
provisions of the Arkansas River Compact and would accomplish
three major purposes: (a) replacement storage would be furnished to
offset possible depletions to John Martin Reservoir resulting from
increased use of water on Purgatoire River and other tributaries; (b)
permit the maintenance of a permanent fish pool at John Martin
Reservoir by replacement of depletions arising from evaporation
from such permanent pool; and (c) conserve flows in the Arkansas
River now being lost past Garden City....
153. John Martin Reservoir is located on the Arkansas River in
Colorado, about 57 miles upstream from the Colorado-Kansas State
line. The reservoir is operated in accordance with the terms of the
Arkansas River Compact. The average annual inflow to the reservoir
from the period 1921 to 1950 is estimated at 295,200 acre-feet. The
net average annual stream accretions between the reservoir and the
State line are 109,500 acre-feet, and the estimated average annual
discharge at the State line is 237,100 acre-feet, assuming the reservoir
is in operation. Much of this discharge occurs as flood flows entering
the river below John
Martin Reservoir and cannot be considered
24
completely usable.2

The Granada Project proved infeasible, as did subsequent Kansas
reservoir projects the Corps studied. These studies demonstrated,
however, Colorado's and Kansas' recognition that under the Compact,
some waters in the Arkansas River were not usable or available for use
by the water users in Colorado and Kansas under the Compact.
It should be noted that Article IV(D) applies to future
development or construction in Kansas as well as Colorado, because
Kansas could demand additional water releases from John Martin
Reservoir for new developments. 225 Such releases would reduce the

222. See GRANADA RESERVOIR PROJECT RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 3-4,
6.
223. Id. at 3-4.
224. ARKANSAS-WHITE-RED BASINS INTER-AGENCY COMMiTTEE, PART II, SECTION 6,
37-38, 50 (1955).
225. Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. IV(D), § 37-69-101 (2001), 63

IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

Stat. 145, 147.
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water available to ditches in Colorado Water District 67, hasten the
exhaustion of the conservation pool, and increase calls against
Colorado water users diverting upstream from John Martin Dam.
E.

CHANGED CONDITIONS AND THE 1980 OPERATING PLAN

The Compact's drafters intended Article V's provisions to provide
flexibility and conserve water that had been wasted by non-use." They
understood that under some conditions, Colorado would receive more
than 60 percent of the water stored in the conservation pool of John
Martin Reservoir because Colorado had the "substantial advantage of
using all accretions and return flow at the State line to make up
Kansas' 40% share at the state line." 28 Colorado Commissioner Gail
Ireland testified concerning this matter at Congressional hearings on
the proposed Compact:
It has been mentioned here that the division was roughly 60
percent to Colorado and 40 percent to Kansas. That is true when
qualified with the statement that that is based on rate of flow and not
necessarily volume of water in the reservoir. That was done purposely

in order to provide the greatest flexibility and most economic and
timely use of this water for both States.
The result of this compact might well be that Kansas over a given
period might withdraw far more than her so-called 40 percent, if the
needs and conditions require it; depending on local rains, flash
floods that may appear at different places along the river. And, by

the same token, Colorado might at certain periods benefit to an
extent of more than 60 percent, based on rate of flow. But that was
thoroughly understood by all commissioners, and was done purposely
in order to provide the
229 water users with the very best possible use of
this water at all times.

Unfortunately, by the 197 0s, "rigid adherence to the 60-40
apportionment" replaced what General Kramer described as "this
simplified yet sensible concept of apportionments and administration
...governed by common-sense requirements and some administrative
discretion." 30
To insure they each received their share of the
reservoir's water, each state usually demanded simultaneous releases at

226. See 2 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 226.
227. KRAMER REPORT, supra note 49, at 38. See also Senate Hearing,supra note 1, at 16
(".... users below [the dam] having the senior rights, now have the benefit of a
controlled storage, which is much more efficient and valuable") (statement of Gail L.
Ireland).
228. REPORT OF COLORADO COMMISSIONERS, supra note 65, at 8.
229.

Senate Hearing,supra note 1, at 15.

230. KRAMERREPORT, supra note 49, at 38; see 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 175.
Under the common pool concept provided in the compact, to receive its fully

allowable share, Kansas had to call for water whenever Colorado did, whether or not
Kansas farmers then needed the water. There is evidence that in the early years
Kansas did not always do so, and thus received less than 40 percent.

Id.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

the maximum rates."' Thus, what had been intended as a method to
provide the best possible water use ended up in an undesirable
situation as water was released upon both states' demands, even
though it would have been more beneficial to hold it for later use.
Inefficient water use led the Compact Administration to adopt an
Operating Plan for John Martin Reservoir in 1980.232 The Operating
Plan established reservoir accounts for ditches in Kansas and Colorado
Water District 67.
In effect, Kansas was allocated 40 percent of the
water stored in the conservation pool of John Martin Reservoir, and
Colorado Water District 67 ditches were allocated 60 percent. The
plan also authorized three Colorado ditch companies to store "other"
water in John Martin Reservoir, including water stored under the
Pueblo winter water storage program. In addition, 35 percent of the
water these ditch companies delivered to John Martin Reservoir was
used to create a "transit loss" account to assist in delivering water from
the Kansas account to the Stateline.2 4 Despite Kansas' suggestions that
the account system is ultra vires, the Operating Plan resulted in more
beneficial water use, and although it has since been amended, neither
State has terminated the plan for more than twenty years.2 5
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this paper, we posed the question: Why did
Colorado and Kansas agree to an apportionment of the Arkansas River
that did not apportion its waters on the basis of beneficial consumptive
water use and did not impose a delivery obligation on Colorado? The
answer partly lies in the Supreme Court's Colorado v. Kansas decision,
which denies Kansas' request for an apportionment in second feet or
acre-feet. Colorado won a significant victory in that case, and was
unwilling to bargain away the fruits of that victory to obtain a division
of John Martin Reservoir's storage benefits. Thus, except for the
provisions governing storage in John Martin Reservoir's conservation
pool and releases of stored water and river flow, no limitations were
imposed in the Compact on the exercise of existing rights of
appropriators in Colorado, other than the improved or prolonged
functioning of existing works.
Two documents further explain the Compact's development and
the philosophy guiding its drafters.
The first document is a
memorandum dated April 12, 1946, by Donald C. Bondurant, a Corps
engineer, who assisted General Kramer during the Compact

231. See 1 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 46-47.
232. See 2 FIRST REPORT, supranote 29, at 46-48, 173-77 for a description of the 1980
Operating Plan.

233. See generally People ex reL Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 917 P.2d 1242,

1245 (Colo. 1996); People ex rel Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 893 P.2d 122, 124

(Colo. 1995).
234. 2 FIRST REPORT, supra note 29, at 174.
235. Id. at 172, 175-81.
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negotiations. 36 The Compact Commission's Engineering Committee,
consisting of General Kramer, Charles L. Patterson, Chief Engineer of
the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and George S. Knapp, the
Kansas Chief Engineer, originally intended to prepare a series of
reservoir operations studies as the basis for apportioning the Arkansas
River's waters.23 Bondurant, however, pointed to the fundamental
problem inherent in such studies: John Martin Reservoir's historic
inflow and outflow would change under Colorado's proposal to allow
upstream users to divert without regard to downstream rights, so long
as water remained in the conservation pool.3 8 As a result, Bondurant
noted, a traditional reservoir operations study that fixed inflow would
be difficult.2 9
The second document is a letter from General Kramer to the
Corps of Engineers, explaining why no final engineering report had
been prepared:
[E]ven before the date of the Second Interim Report, the trend of
the negotiations took a decided turn away from the concept of fixed
operating conditions based on firm interstate allocations toward the
more flexible philosophy, best described as "live and let live," which
became the basis of the ultimate Compact. That principle, which was
an outgrowth of the Interim Executive Agreement[s] between
Colorado and Kansas governing the operation of John Martin
Reservoir during the period of compact negotiations, permitted
either State to obtain water from John Martin Reservoir (when stored
water was available) without regard to the other State and without 24the
need for keeping books to balance hypothetical debits and credits. 0
Given the difficulties in reaching agreement on the assumptions of
the operations studies, it is understandable that the Commissioners
adopted "this simplified yet sensible concept of apportionments and
administration." 41 While the "live and let live" philosophy may seem
surprising as a basis for interstate apportionment, the fact remains that
the States agreed to, and Congress consented to, a compact based on a
unique, flexible apportionment, without debits or credits, and without
an apportionment based on beneficial consumptive uses or a delivery
obligation. The Arkansas River Compact is thus the best compact that
Colorado has entered into, and also the worst compact that Colorado
236. Minutes, Record of the Third Meeting of the Colorado-Kansas Arkansas River
Compact Commission, Denver, Colo. 3-3 (July 1-2, 1946) (on file with authors and the

University of Denver Water Law Review).
237. Id. at 3-4.
238. Memorandum From Donald C. Bondurant, to General Hans Kramer 3-4 (April

12, 1946) (Colorado Exh. 646 in Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, Orig., United States

Supreme Court).
239. Id. at 3.

240. Letter from General Hans Kramer, Chairman, Arkansas River Compact
Administration, to Colonel Charles H. McNutt, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 2 (April 10, 1951) (Colorado Exh. 57 in Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, Orig.

United States Supreme Court).
241. KRAMER REPORT, supranote 49, at 38.

94

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 5

has entered into, because it provides no quantitative standard to
determine whether future developments, including the improved or
prolonged functioning of existing works, are in compliance with the
Compact.
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VI. APPENDIX
ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT
The general assembly hereby ratifies the compact between the
state of Colorado and the state of Kansas designated as the "Arkansas
river compact" signed in the city of Denver, state of Colorado, on the
14th day of December, A. D. 1948, by Henry C. Vidal, Gail L. Ireland,
and Harry B. Mendenhall, commissioners for the state of Colorado,
and George S. Knapp, Edward F. Arn, William E. Leavitt, and Roland
H. Tate, commissioners for the state of Kansas, and approved by Hans
Kramer, representative of the United States of America. Said compact
is as follows:
The state of Colorado and the state of Kansas, parties signatory to
this compact (hereinafter referred to as "Colorado" and "Kansas,"
respectively, or individually as a "state," or collectively as the "states")
having resolved to conclude a compact with respect to the waters of
the Arkansas river, and being moved by considerations of interstate
comity, having appointed commissioners as follows:
For the State of Colorado

Henry C. Vidal,
Gail L. Ireland, and
Harry B. Mendenhall
George S. Knapp,
Edward F. Arn,
William E. Leavitt, and
Roland H. Tate

For the State of Kansas

The consent of the Congress of the United States to negotiate and
enter into an interstate compact not later than January 1, 1950, having
been granted by Public Law 34, 79th Congress, 1st Session, and
pursuant thereto the President having designated Hans Kramer as the
representative of the United States, the said commissioners for
Colorado and Kansas, after negotiations participated in by the
representative of the United States, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The major purposes of this compact are to:
A. Settle existing disputes and remove causes of future controversy
between the states of Colorado and Kansas, and between citizens of
one and citizens of the other state, concerning the waters of the
Arkansas river and their control, conservation and utilization for
irrigation and other beneficial purposes.
B. Equitably divide and apportion between the states of Colorado
and Kansas the waters of the Arkansas river and their utilization as well
as the benefits arising from the construction, operation and
maintenance by the United States of John Martin reservoir project for
water conservation purposes.
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ARTICLE II
The provisions of this compact are based on (1) the physical and
other conditions peculiar to the Arkansas river and its natural drainage
basin, and the nature and location of irrigation and other
developments and facilities in connection therewith; (2) the opinion
of the United States supreme court entered December 6, 1943, in the
case of Colorado v. Kansas (320 U. S. 383) concerning the relative
rights of the respective states in and to the use of waters of the
Arkansas river; and (3) the experience derived under various interim
executive agreements between the two states apportioning the waters
released from the John Martin reservoir as operated by the corps of
engineers.
ARTICLE III
As used in this compact:
A. The word "stateline" means the geographical boundary line
between Colorado and Kansas.
B. The term "waters of the Arkansas river" means the waters
originating in the natural drainage basin of the Arkansas river,
including its tributaries, upstream from the stateline, and excluding
waters brought into the Arkansas river basin from other river basins.
C. The term "stateline flow" means the flow of waters of the
Arkansas river as determined by gauging stations located at or near the
stateline. The flow as determined by such stations, whether located in
Colorado or Kansas, shall be deemed to be the actual stateline flow.
D. 'John Martin reservoir project" is the official name of the facility
formerly known as Caddoa reservoir project, authorized by the Flood
Control Act of 1936, as amended, for construction, operation and
maintenance by the war department, corps of engineers, later
designated as the corps of engineers, department of the army, and
herein referred to as the "corps of engineers." 'John Martin reservoir"
is the water storage space created by 'John Martin dam".
E. The "flood control storage" is that portion of the total storage
space in John Martin reservoir allocated to flood control purposes.
F. The "conservation pool" is that portion of the total storage space
in John Martin reservoir lying below the flood control storage.
G. The "ditches of Colorado water district 67" are those ditches
and canals which divert water from the Arkansas river or its tributaries
downstream from John Martin dam for irrigation use in Colorado.
H. The term "river flow" means the sum of the flows of the
Arkansas and the Purgatoire rivers into John Martin reservoir as
determined by gauging stations appropriately located above said
reservoir.
I. The term "the administration" means the Arkansas river compact
administration established under article VIII.

Issue 1

THE ARKANSAS RIVER COMPACT

ARTICLE IV
Both states recognize that:
A. This compact deals only with the waters of the Arkansas river as
defined in article III.
B. This compact is not concerned with the rights, if any, of the
state of New Mexico or its citizens in and to the use in New Mexico of
waters of Trinchera creek or other tributaries of the Purgatoire river, a
tributary of the Arkansas river.
C. (1) John Martin dam will be operated by the corps of engineers
to store and release the waters of the Arkansas river in and from John
Martin reservoir for its authorized purposes.
(2) The bottom of the flood control storage is presently fixed
by the chief of engineers, U. S. Army, at elevation 3,851 feet above
mean sea level. The flood control storage will be operated for flood
control purposes and to those ends will impound or regulate the
streamflow volumes that are in excess of the then available storage
capacity of the conservation pool. Releases from the flood control
storage may be made at times and rates determined by the corps of
engineers to be necessary or advisable without regard to ditch
diversion capacities or requirements in either or both states.
(3) The conservation pool will be operated for the benefit of
water users in Colorado and Kansas, both upstream and downstream
from John Martin dam, as provided in this compact. The maintenance
of John Martin dam and appurtenance works may at times require the
corps of engineers to release waters then impounded in the
conservation pool or to prohibit the storage of water therein until such
maintenance work is completed. Flood control operation may also
involve temporary utilization of conservation storage.
D. This compact is not intended to impede or prevent future
beneficial development of the Arkansas river basin in Colorado and
Kansas by federal or state agencies, by private enterprise, or by
combinations thereof, which may involve construction of dams,
reservoirs and other works for the purposes of water utilization and
control, as well as the improved or prolonged functioning of existing
works: Provided, that the waters of the Arkansas river, as defined in
article III, shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or
availability for use to the water users in Colorado and Kansas under
this compact by such future development or construction.
ARTICLE V
Colorado and Kansas hereby agree upon the following basis of
apportionment of the waters of the Arkansas river:
A. Winter storage in John Martin reservoir shall commence on
November 1st of each year and continue to and include the next
succeeding March 31st. During said period all water entering said
reservoir up to the limit of the then available conservation capacity
shall be stored: Provided, that Colorado may demand releases of water
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equivalent to the river flow, but such releases shall not exceed 100 c.f.s.
(cubic feet per second) and water so released shall be used without
avoidable waste.
B. Summer storage in John Martin reservoir shall commence on
April 1st of each year and continue to and include the next succeeding
October 31st. During said period, except when Colorado water users
are operating under decreed priorities as provided in paragraphs F
and G of this article, all water entering said reservoir up to the limit of
the then available conservation capacity shall be stored: Provided, that
Colorado may demand releases of water equivalent to the river flow up
to 500 c.f.s., and Kansas may demand releases of water equivalent to
that portion of the river flow between 500 c.f.s. and 750 c.f.s.,
irrespective of releases demanded by Colorado.
C. Releases of water stored pursuant to the provisions of
paragraphs A and B of this article shall be made upon demands by
Colorado and Kansas concurrently or separately at any time during the
summer storage period. Unless increases to meet extraordinary
conditions are authorized by the administration, separate releases of
stored water to Colorado shall not exceed 750 c.f.s., separate releases
of stored water to Kansas shall not exceed 500 c.f.s., and concurrent
releases of stored water shall not exceed a total of 1250 c.f.s.: Provided,
that when water stored in the conservation pool is reduced to a
quantity less than 20,000 acre-feet, separate releases of stored water to
Colorado shall not exceed 600 c.f.s., and separate releases of stored
water to Kansas shall not exceed 400 c.f.s., and concurrent releases of
stored water shall not exceed 1,000 c.f.s.
D. Releases authorized by paragraphs A, B, and C of this article,
except when all Colorado water users are operating under decree
priorities as provided in paragraphs F and G of this article, shall not
impose any call on Colorado water users that divert waters of the
Arkansas river upstream from John Martin dam.
E. (1) Releases of stored water and releases of river flow may be
made simultaneously upon the demands of either or both states.
(2) Water released upon concurrent or separate demands shall
be applied promptly to beneficial use unless storage thereof
downstream is authorized by the administration.
(3) Releases of river flow and of stored water to Colorado shall
be measured by gauging stations located at or near John Martin dam
and the releases to which Kansas is entitled shall be satisfied by an
equivalent in state line flow.
(4) When water is released from John Martin reservoir
appropriate allowances as determined by the administration shall be
made for the intervals of time required for such water to arrive at the
points of diversion in Colorado and at the state line.
(5) There shall be no allowance or accumulation of credits or
debits for or against either state.
(6) Storage, releases from storage and releases of river flow
authorized in this article shall be accomplished pursuant to
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procedures prescribed by the administration under the provisions of
article VIII.
F. In the event the administration finds that within a period of
fourteen days the water in the conservation pool will be or is liable to
be exhausted, the administration shall forthwith notify the state
engineer of Colorado, or his duly authorized representative, that
commencing upon a day certain within said fourteen day period,
unless a change of conditions justifies cancellation or modification of
such notice, Colorado shall administer the decreed rights of water
users in Colorado water district 67 as against each other and as against
all rights now or hereafter decreed to water users diverting upstream
from John Martin dam on the basis of relative priorities in the same
manner in which their respective priority rights were administered by
Colorado before John Martin reservoir began to operate and as
though John Martin dam had not been constructed. Such priority
administration by Colorado shall be continued until the
administration finds that water is again available in the conservation
pool for release as provided in this compact, and timely notice of such
finding shall be given by the administration to the state engineer of
Colorado or his duly authorized representative; provided, that except
as controlled by the operation of the preceding provisions of this
paragraph and other applicable provisions of this compact, when there
is water in the conservation pool the water users upstream from John
Martin reservoir shall not be affected by the decrees to the ditches in
Colorado water district 67. Except when administration in Colorado is
on a priority basis the water diversions in Colorado water district 67
shall be administered by Colorado in accordance with distribution
agreements made from time to time between the water users in such
district and filed with the administration and with the state engineer of
Colorado or, in the absence of such agreement, upon the basis of the
respective priority decrees, as against each other, in said district.
G. During periods when Colorado reverts to administration of
decree priorities, Kansas shall not be entitled to any portion of the
river flow entering John Martin reservoir. Waters of the Arkansas river
originating in Colorado which may flow across the state line during
such periods are hereby apportioned to Kansas.
H. If the usable quantity and availability for use of the waters of the
Arkansas river to water users in Colorado water district 67 and Kansas
will be thereby materially depleted or adversely affected, (1) priority
rights now decreed to the ditches of Colorado water district 67 shall
not hereafter be transferred to other water districts in Colorado or to
points of diversion or places of use upstream from John Martin dam;
and (2) the ditch diversion rights from the Arkansas river in Colorado
water district 67 and of Kansas ditches between the state line and
Garden City shall not hereafter be increased beyond the total present
rights of said ditches, without the administration, in either case (1) or
(2), making findings of fact that no such depletion or adverse effect
will result from such proposed transfer or increase. Notice of legal
proceedings for any such proposed transfer or increase shall be given
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to the administration in the manner and within the time provided by
the laws of Colorado or Kansas in such cases.
ARTICLE VI
A. (1) Nothing in this compact shall be construed as impairing
the jurisdiction of Kansas over the waters of the Arkansas river that
originate in Kansas and over the waters that flow from Colorado across
the state line into Kansas.
(2) Except as otherwise provided, nothing in this compact shall
be construed as supplanting the administration by Colorado of the
rights of appropriators of waters of the Arkansas river in said state as
decreed to said appropriators by the courts of Colorado, nor as
interfering with the distribution among said appropriators by
Colorado, nor as curtailing the diversion and use for irrigation and
other beneficial purposes in Colorado of the waters of the Arkansas
river.
B. Inasmuch as the Frontier canal diverts waters of the Arkansas
river in Colorado west of the state line for irrigation uses in Kansas
only, Colorado concedes to Kansas and Kansas hereby assumes
exclusive administrative control over the operation of the Frontier
canal and its headworks for such purposes, to the same extent as
though said works were located entirely within the state of Kansas.
Water carried across the state line in Frontier canal or any other
similarly situated canal shall be considered to be part of the state line
flow.
ARTICLE VII
A. Each state shall be subject to the terms of this compact. Where
the name of the state or the term "state" is used in this compact these
shall be construed to include any person or entity of any nature
whatsoever using, claiming or in any manner asserting any right to the
use of the waters of the Arkansas river under the authority of that state.
B. This compact establishes no general principle or precedent with
respect to any other interstate stream.
C. Wherever any state or federal official agency is referred to in
this compact such reference shall apply to the comparable official or
agency succeeding to their duties and functions.
ARTICLE VIII
A. To administer the provisions of this compact there is hereby
created an interstate agency to be known as the Arkansas river
compact administration herein designated as "the administration".
B. The administration shall have power to:
(1) Adopt, amend and revoke by-laws, rules and regulations
consistent with the provisions of this compact;
(2) Prescribe procedures for the administration of this
compact: Provided, that where such procedures involve the operation
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ofJohn Martin reservoir project they shall be subject to the approval of
the district engineer in charge of said project;
(3) Perform all functions required to implement this compact
and to do all things necessary, proper or convenient in the
performance of its duties.
C. The membership of the administration shall consist of three
representatives from each state who shall be appointed by the
respective governors for a term not to exceed four years. One
Colorado representative shall be a resident of and water right owner in
water districts 14 or 17, one Colorado representative shall be a resident
of and water right owner in water district 67, and one Colorado
representative shall be the director of the Colorado water conservation
board. Two Kansas representatives shall be residents of and water right
owners in the counties of Finney, Kearny or Hamilton, and one Kansas
representative shall be the chief state official charged with the
administration of water rights in Kansas. The President of the United
States is hereby requested to designate a representative of the United
States, and if a representative is so designated he shall be an ex officio
member and act as chairman of the administration without vote.
D. The state representatives shall be appointed by the respective
governors within thirty days after the effective date of this compact.
The administration shall meet and organize within sixty days after such
effective date. A quorum for any meeting shall consist of four members
of the administration: Provided, that at least two members are present
from each state. Each state shall have but one vote in the
administration and every decision, authorization or other action shall
require unanimous vote. In case of a divided vote on any matter within
the purview of the administration, the administration may, by
subsequent unanimous vote, refer the matter for arbitration to the
representative of the United States or other arbitrator or arbitrators, in
which event the decision made by such arbitrator or arbitrators shall
be binding upon the administration.
E. (1) The salaries, if any, and the personal expenses of each
member shall be paid by the government which he represents. All
other expenses incident to the administration of this compact which
are not paid by the United States shall be borne by the states on the
basis of 60 per cent by Colorado and 40 per cent by Kansas.
(2) In each even numbered year the administration shall adopt
and transmit to the governor of each state its budget covering
anticipated expenses for the forthcoming biennium and the amount
thereof payable by each state. Each state shall appropriate and pay the
amount due by it to the administration.
(3) The administration shall keep accurate accounts of all
receipts and disbursements and shall include a statement thereof,
together with a certificate of audit by a certified public accountant, in
its annual report. Each state shall have the right to make an
examination and audit of the accounts of the administration at any
time.
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F. Each state shall provide such available facilities, equipment and
other assistance as the administration may need to carry out its duties.
To supplement such available assistance the administration may
employ engineering, legal, clerical and other aid as in its judgment
may be necessary for the performance of its functions. Such employees
shall be paid by and be responsible to the administration, and shall not
be considered to be employees of either state.
G. (1) The administration shall co-operate with the chief official
of each state charged with the administration of water rights and with
federal agencies in the systematic determination and correlation of the
facts as to the flow and diversion of the waters of the Arkansas river
and as to the operation and siltation of John Martin reservoir and
other related structures. The administration shall co-operate in the
procurement, interchange, compilation and publication of all factual
data bearing upon the administration of this compact without, in
general, duplicating measurements, observations or publications made
by state or federal agencies. State officials shall furnish pertinent
factual data to the administration upon its request. The administration
shall, with the collaboration of the appropriate federal and state
agencies, determine as may be necessary from time to time, the
location of gauging stations required for the proper administration of
this compact and shall designate the official records of such stations
for its official use.
(2) The director, U. S. geological survey, the commissioner of
reclamation and the chief of engineers, U. S. Army, are hereby
requested to collaborate with the administration and with appropriate
state officials in the systematic determination and correlation of data
referred to in paragraph G (1) of this article and in the execution of
other duties of such officials which may be necessary for the proper
administration of this compact.
(3) If deemed necessary for the administration of this compact,
the administration may require the installation and maintenance, at
the expense of water users, of measuring devices of approved type in
any ditch or group of ditches diverting water from the Arkansas river
in Colorado or Kansas. The chief official of each state charged with the
administration of water rights shall supervise the execution of the
administration's requirements for such installations.
H. Violation of any of the provisions of this compact or other
actions prejudicial thereto which come to the attention of the
administration shall be promptly investigated by it. When deemed
advisable as the result of such investigation, the administration may
report its findings and recommendations to the state official who is
charged with the administration of water rights for appropriate action,
it being the intent of this compact that enforcement of its terms shall
be accomplished in general through the state agencies and officials
charged with the administration of water rights.
I. Findings of fact made by the administration shall not be
conclusive in any court or before any agency or tribunal but shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts found.
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J. The administration shall report annually to the governors of the
states and to the President of the United States as to matters within its
purview.
ARTICLE IX
A. This compact shall become effective when ratified by the
legislature of each state and when consented to by the congress of the
United States by legislation providing substantially, among other
things, as follows:
Nothing contained in this act or in the compact herein consented
to shall be construed as impairing or affecting the sovereignty of the
United States or any of its rights or jurisdiction in and over the area or
waters which are the subject of such compact: Provided, that the chief
of engineers is hereby authorized to operate the conservation features
of the John Martin reservoir project in a manner conforming to such
compact with such exceptions as he and the administration created
pursuant to the compact mayjoindy approve.
B. This compact shall remain in effect until modified or
terminated by unanimous action of the states and in the event of
modification or termination all rights then established or recognized
by this compact shall continue unimpaired.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the commissioners have signed this
compact in triplicate original, one of which shall be forwarded to the
secretary of state of the United States of America and one of which
shall be forwarded to the governor of each signatory state.
Done in the city and county of Denver, in the state of Colorado, on
the fourteenth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand
nine hundred and forty-eight.
Henry C. Vidal,
Gail L. Ireland,
Harry B. Mendenhall,
Commissioners for Colorado.
Attest:
Warden L. Noe, Secretary.
George S. Knapp,
Edward F. Arn,
William E. Leavitt,
Roland H. Tate,
Commissioners for Kansas.
Approved:
Hans Kramer,
Representative of the United States.
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I. HISTORY

The Rio de la Plata, now known as the La Plata River, is borne in
the imposing La Plata Mountains of Colorado and descends quickly
into the arid deserts of southwestern Colorado and northern New
Mexico. The first known inhabitants of this mountainous region were
the mobile hunter-gatherers in the Archaic Period (5500 B.C. to A.D. 1)
who made frequent travels from the protected river valley into the
mesa and alpine areas in pursuit of game animals.'
The Anasazi, or "Ancient Ones," followed the Archaic people and
are the most well known prehistoric inhabitants of the region. A
predominantly farming culture, the Anasazi lived in the region until
A.D. 1300.2
Although archeological evidence indicates they
t Kenneth W. Knox is Assistant State Engineer for the Colorado Division of
Water Resources, where he is responsible for the water supply, litigation, and
groundwater well permitting. Mr. Knox serves as the Compact Coordinator and
Engineer Advisor to the State Engineer for all interstate river compacts. From 1994 to
1998, he was the Division IV Engineer for the Gunnison and San Miguel River Basins.
Mr. Knox received his B.S. from Colorado State University in chemical engineering
and his Masters degree in Civil Engineering. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at
Colorado State University in the engineering department with emphasis in Water
Resources Planning and Management and is a registered professional engineer in
Colorado.
1.

THE WESTERN SAN JUAN MOUNTAINs: THEIR GEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AND HUMAN

HISTORY 194 (Rob Blair et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Blair].
2. Id. at 201-03.
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established their early communities on top of the local mesas, the
Anasazi are most notably associated with the exquisite masonry
dwellings constructed in cliff alcoves throughout the region, including
present-day Mesa Verde National Park.
Subsequent native inhabitants of the region were the nomadic Ute
Tribes. The Utes organized their society in loosely defined groups that
coalesced into social units comprised of ten to forty extended family
members.3 Their range of travel extended from the protected canyon
valleys during the inclement winter months to the high country during
the summer, where they sought new hunting opportunities and cooler
temperatures. 4
Upon introduction of the horse with the arrival of the Spanish in
New Mexico, the Utes began to exchange food and animal skins for
these marvelous new animals. Soon they were able to amass their own
large herds of horses. This allowed the once pedestrian Utes to greatly
expand their mobility and allowed their hunting parties to search a
much larger area for game animals. The horse helped to transform
this once family dominated culture into large bands that were able to
hunt buffalo on the Great Plains and trade with other cultures.5
Trade with the Spanish began sometime in the early eighteenth
century. The earliest forms of commerce were not recorded since the
Spanish traders entering southwest Colorado were legally barred from
trading with the natives. In 1712, the Spanish governor reiterated the
royal order that outlawed trade among the New Mexican Spanish and
the native people.6 Juan Maria de Rivera led the first documented
Spanish trade expedition into southwestern Colorado in 1765. 7 The
account of this trading expedition lacks detail, but evidence suggests
that Rivera and his forces followed the La Plata River valley and the
Dolores River toward its confluence with the San Miguel River near the
present locale of Naturita, Colorado. They traveled northeast and
crossed the Uncompahgre Plateau before descending into the lower
Gunnison River valley west of the present day town of Delta, Colorado.
The return trip retraced the route back to its origin.8
One of the earliest explorations sponsored by the United States
government into the new western frontier was the 1859 Macomb
expedition.9 One of its members, geologistJ. S. Newberry, became so
enamored with the La Plata valley that he devoted an entire page to it
in his diary:

3. Id. at 225-33.
4. Id. Since the Utes were nomadic, they established many trails throughout the
La Plata River Basin and the southwest that have been replaced with modern highways.
See i.d. at 226.
5. Id.
6. Blair, supra note 1, at 216.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 216-17.
9. C. GREGORY CRAMPTON & STEVEN K. MADSEN, IN SEARCH OF THE SPANISH TRAIL:
SANTAFE TO Los ANGELES, 1829-1848, at 29-31 (1994) [hereinafter CRAMyTON].
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[...t]he Rio de la Plata is a beautifully clear, cold, mountain-brook
•.. well-stocked with trout. The valley in which it flows, as it issues
from the mountains, is exceedingly beautiful, and our camp, one of
the most delightful imaginable. Our tents are pitched in the shade of
a cluster of gigantic pines, such as are scattered, here and there,
singly or in groups, over the surface of the valley, separated by
meadows thickly coated with the finest gramma grass. Stretching off
southward, a wall of verdure, tinted with the fresh and vivid green of
cottonwoods and willows, marks, while it conceals, the course of the
sparkling stream whose murmuring flow comes softly to the ear. On
either side of the valley rise picturesque wooded hills, which bound
the view both east and west; between these on the south an open vista
reveals, far in the distance, the blue chains of the Sierra del Carriso
and Tunecha [Carrizo and Chuska mountains]. On the north the
bold and lofty summits of the Sierra de la Plata look down upon us in
this pure atmosphere with an apparent proximity almost startling.
The headwaters of the La Plata River rise 13,000 feet above sea
level at Cumberland Peak in the La Plata Mountains about fourteen
miles northwest of Durango, Colorado.
The river meanders
approximately thirty-seven miles in a generally southern direction until
reaching the Colorado-New Mexico state line at an elevation of 6,000

feet. The La Plata River drainage basin encompasses 331 square miles
in Colorado." From January 1920 to present, the average annual yield2
at the state line streamflow gaging station has been 25,970 acre-feet.
Within Colorado, the natural streamflows from the La Plata River, its
major tributary Cherry Creek, and lesser tributary streams, provide the
principle source of water to irrigate approximately 11,000 acres of
land.' Red Mesa Reservoir, the only irrigation reservoir within the
watershed, is an on-channel irrigation storage vessel located on the
Hay Gulch tributary to the La Plata River. The reservoir has an active
storage capacity of 1,100 acre-feet and provides supplemental water to
irrigate croplands on Red Mesa when the natural streamfiow from
snowmelt recedes. South of the Colorado-New Mexico state line, the
La Plata River continues for another twenty-one miles before joining
the San Juan River near Farmington, New Mexico. In 2000, the New
Mexico Interstate Stream Commission estimated that this lower reach
of the river provides enough water to irrigate 2,700 acres of land in the
state."
10.

Id. at 29-30; J.S.

NEWBERRY, REPORT OF THE EXPLORING EXPEDITION FROM SANTA

FE, NEW MEXICO, TO THE JUNCION OF THE GRAND AND GREEN RIVERS OF THE GREAT
COLORADO OF THE WEST 81 (1876).
11. 2 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA: COLORADO: WATER YEAR

2000, at 401 (2000) [hereinafter USGS].

12. Id. An acre-foot of water is equal to the volume of water covering one acre, or
43,560 square feet, to a depth of one foot.
13.

KEN BEEGLES, COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES: WATER Div. VII ANNUAL

REPORT 61 (1999-2000).
14.

COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, DAM STRUCTURE AND SAFETY FILE FOR

RED MESA RESERVOIR (2001) (on

file with author).

15. E-mail from Patricia Turney, Staff, Interstate Stream Commission of New
Mexico, to the author (Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
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H. GENESIS OF THE LA PLATA RIVER COMPACT
Construction
of irrigation
ditches
commenced
almost
simultaneously in Colorado and New Mexico. The first recognized
ditch construction began in 1879 in New Mexico and continued at a
vigorous pace to serve all land then under cultivation.1 6 Nascent water
irrigation in Colorado along the La Plata River coincided with the
United States Army's establishment of an Indian agency at Fort Lewis
in 1880, near present day Durango, Colorado.'
Development of
irrigated farmlands in Colorado was delayed until 1896 when a portion
of the unallocated land in the eastern part of the Ute reservation (now
known as the Southern Ute Reservation) became available to white
settlers.' 8 By the turn of the century, Colorado had 19,000 acres of
irrigated land. 9 Unfortunately, the limited streamflow did not provide
an adequate water supply to all irrigable lands.
The land area in the La Plata River watershed predominantly
consists of table mesas at approximately 7,000 feet in elevation that
provide minimal runoff or tributary flows supplementing limited
spring runoff from high altitude snowmelt. The La Plata River
typically will enjoy its peak runoff in late April to early May. 20 However,
the descending limb of the hydrograph, or the rate of flow after the
peak, diminishes drastically. A review of the streamflow records
indicates the mean daily flows in the La Plata River often decline
approximately 85 to 90 percent within thirty days from their high flows
of spring runoff. 2' Further, during periods of moderate to severe
drought, it is not uncommon for the streambed to become completely
dry for miles in the lower reaches of the river for extended periods
after the first week in July.
During periods of drought in the early twentieth century, upstream
Colorado water users diverted all available supplies. This practice
effectively deprived downstream New Mexico ditches of any water
during the late irrigation season, except for marginal return flows
from irrigated lands in Colorado and the occasional streamflow from
prolonged rainfall or flash floods. The water supply in the La Plata
River became so distressingly low in 1902 and 1903 that New Mexico
water users brought the severity of the situation to the attention of the
newly authorized United States Reclamation Service. 2

The Reclamation Service subsequently dispatched engineers in

16. RALPH I. MEEKER, PERTINENT INFORMATION ON THE BACKGROUND AND
NEGOTIATION OF THE LA PLATA RIVER COMPAcr: COLORADO AND NEW MEXIco 2 (1954).
Report prepared by Ralph I. Meeker, an irrigation engineer employed by the state of
Colorado to conduct an investigation and survey of the ditches and irrigated lands in
both New Mexico and Colorado during the 1919 irrigation season.
17. CRAMPTON, supra note 9, at 29.
18. Blair, supranote 1, at 230.
19. MEEKER, supra note 16.
20. USGS, supra note 11.
21. See id.
22. MEEKER, supra note 16, at 3.
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1904 to survey the area and make recommendations for
improvement.2' Recognizing that the Animas River, located just to the
east of the La Plata River, had ample supplies, the supervising
engineer, M. C. Hinderlider, surveyed a 40,000 acre project area in
New Mexico that the Animas River could supplement.24 The proposed
transbasin water was to be carried through a thirty-two mile canal that
would divert water from the Animas River near Durango, Colorado,
and then through a three mile tunnel that would penetrate the
Animas-La Plata divide for subsequent delivery to the La Plata River.2 5
The estimated project cost was $3,000,000 or $61 per acre reclaimed.
Since this was not cost effective, the Reclamation Service abandoned
the project."
Periodic drought conditions continued to plague the La Plata
River watershed. For example, during the week of October 13, 1917,
the mean daily flow at the upper streamflow river gaging station at
Hesperus, Colorado was only 1.9 cubic feet per second, the lowest
seven day minimum daily flow in the record. The drought extended
into the following spring and summer of 1918. The total recorded
flow of the La Plata River was 19,000 acre-feet at the Hesperus
streamflow gaging station and only 6,800 acre-feet at the gaging station
near the state line, with many reaches of the river dry during the late
summer months.28
Because of the drought and because upstream water users were
fully appropriating the marginal water supplies of this ephemeral river,
the state of New Mexico took action to protect its users. In March of
1919, New Mexico officials notified the Attorney General of Colorado
of its intent to seek relief in the United States Supreme Court over the
La Plata River.29 This action provided the impetus for Colorado to
employ Mr. Ralph I. Meeker to identify, quantify, and map the ditches
and irrigated lands in Colorado during the 1919 irrigation season. 0 In
a similar fashion, the State of New Mexico retained Mr. George McNeil
to perform the same services for the La Plata River in New Mexico."
Both Colorado and New Mexico continued engineering and
hydrologic analyses for the next three years. To represent Colorado's
interests, Governor Oliver H. Shoup appointed Mr. Delph E.
Carpenter as commissioner for negotiating a potential interstate river
compact, with technical assistance provided by Mr. Meeker. 32 In a
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See USGS, supra note 11, at 400.
MEEKER, supra note 16, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.

32. DELPH E. CARPENTER, REPORT OF DELPH E. CARPENTER, COMMISSIONER OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO IN RE LA PLATA RIVER COMPACT (1922).
Mr. Carpenter was

appointed La Plata River Compact Commissioner by Governor Shoup under authority
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similar fashion, Mr. Stephen B. Davis represented New Mexico as
commissioner and Mr. Charles A. May provided technical expertise.33
Along with site-specific and technical efforts taking place in the La
Plata River Basin, it is important to recognize two United States
Supreme Court decisions that provided legal guidance to the
negotiating parties. The first case, Kansas v. Colorado,4 involved a
controversy over the Arkansas River that retained two striking
similarities to the ongoing issues in the La Plata River basin. First,
neither the La Plata River nor the Arkansas River provides sufficient
streamflows to satisfy the consumptive water use demands in either
state. Second, Colorado water users asserted the right to use all
available Arkansas River waters without any delivery obligation to
Kansas as the downstream state. 5 The Court's decision, articulated by
Justice Brewer, centered upon the cardinal rule of equality among
states, which he applied to the allocation of interstate waters.
The
Court recognized the amount of beneficial use in each state and
provided the means to protect those existing uses and inherent values
through the principle of equitable apportionment.3 7 Essentially, the
Court's enunciation of the principle of equitable apportionment
provided cogent direction that unregulated diversions and use of water
in an upstream state cannot occur to the detriment of the interests of
downstream states.38
Additional guidance in the construction of an interstate river
allocation system for the La Plata River came from the 1922 United
States Supreme Court decision in Wyoming v. Colorado.39 Again,
Colorado asserted it was entitled to full use of the Laramie River,40
which originates in the mountains of northern Colorado and flows
approximately twenty-seven miles before entering Wyoming. At the
time of the proceeding, both states administered their water rights
within their respective boundaries in accord with the doctrine of prior
appropriation, or the priority system.4 ' The central issue before the
Court was how to equitably apportion these interstate waters-should
the Court apply the doctrine of prior appropriation, or some other
mechanism that would provide the requisite equity?4 In its decision,
of Chapter 244, Session Laws of 1921. 1921 Colo. Sess. Laws 803. Mr. Carpenter also
served as lead negotiator and Compact Commissioner for the Colorado River
Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2001), and the
South Platte River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-65-101 (2001), 44 Stat. 195.
33. MEEKER, supra note 16, at 2.
34. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
35. Id. at 98. The state of Colorado argued, in part, it had a right to fully
appropriate the available water supplies and develop irrigable lands for increasing the
value of lands and its inherent prosperity within its boundaries. Id.
36. Id. at 113-14.
37. Id. at 118.
38. Id. at 117-18.
39. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
40. Id. at 466.
41. Id. at 465.
42. Id. at 467.
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the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of prior appropriation, holding that
the priority of an appropriation provides the superiority of one water
right over another."
Further, the Court found the doctrine's
allocation of water no less applicable to interstate streams and
controversies than to others." In a concluding statement, Justice Van
Devanter, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated in reference
to the doctrine and central issue that "its application to such a
controversy as is here presented cannot be other than eminently just
and equitable to all concerned.", 5 F

For those parties contemplating the creation of an interstate
compact in the La Plata River basin in 1922, the Court had just
provided two guiding legal principles. First, the allocation system of
water between Colorado and New Mexico should equitably satisfy the
demands of water users in both states based upon existing needs at
that time. Second, the priority of water rights across state boundaries
must be taken into consideration.
It was within this context of legal, physical, and hydrologic
parameters that the appointed state representatives negotiated the
terms and conditions of an interstate compact at Bishop's Lodge near
Santa Fe, New Mexico.46 The success of their efforts culminated in the
acceptance and signature of the La Plata River Compact on November
27, 1922. The drafters' goals were to provide a tangible and effective
mechanism that would remove all present and future controversies in
the La Plata River basin, to equitably distribute water, and to promote
interstate comity between Colorado and New Mexico.48
Although the essence of these three noble precepts is embodied
within the context of several other interstate river compacts, the
proximity and relationship among its water users is rather unique to
the La Plata River basin. Irrigated land ownership is not based upon
location north or south of the Colorado-New Mexico state line, and
many water users rely upon ditches in both states to serve their
individual farms and ranches.
For example, the Pioneer and
Enterprise Ditches are interstate water conveyance structures that
divert water from the La Plata River in Colorado but serve
approximately equal areas in both states." Therefore, in addition to
the other physical, hydrologic, and legal parameters that warranted
43. Id. at 496.
44. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 424 (1922).
45. Id. at 470.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The most definitive treatise on the Compact
Clause is Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
47. La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-63-101 (2001), 43 Stat. 796.
48. Id.
49. See Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REV. STAT. § 3761-101 (2001); South Platte River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-65-101 (2001), 44
Stat. 195; Rio Grande River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-66-101 (2001), 53 Stat.
785; Republican River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-67-101 (2001), 57 Stat. 86.
50. See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. I, § 37-63-101 (2001), 43 Stat.
796, 796.
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attention during their deliberations, the La Plata River Compact
negotiators needed to consider the integrated use of ditches to serve
lands on both sides of the border and represent water users with dual
state interests.

m.

WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEM

The water allocation system for the La Plata River Compact is
based upon an index supply measured at two permanent streamflow
gaging stations, one at Hesperus, Colorado, and the other thirty-one
miles downstream at the state line, known as the Interstate Station.5
Both stations are equipped with streamflow recorders that provide a
continuous record of the gage height of the river, which is used to
calculate the La Plata River streamflows at all times. 5 Article II of the
Compact, which equitably apportions the La Plata River between
Colorado and New Mexico, states:
1. At all times between the first day of December and the fifteenth
day of the succeeding February, each State shall have the unrestricted
right to use of all water which may flow within its boundaries.
2. By reason of the usual annual rise and fall, the flow of said river
between the fifteenth day of February and the first day of December
of each year, shall be apportioned between the States in the following
manner:
(a) Each State shall have the unrestricted right to use all the
waters within its boundaries on each day when the mean daily flow at
the Interstate Station is one hundred cubic feet per second, or more.
(b) On all other days the State of Colorado shall deliver at the
Interstate Station a quantity of water equivalent to one-half of the
mean flow at the Hesperus Station for the preceding day, but not to
exceed one hundred cubic feet per second.
3. Whenever the flow of the river is so low that in the judgment of
the State Engineers of the States, the greatest beneficial use of its
waters may be secured by distributing all of its waters successively to
the land in each State in alternating periods, in lieu of delivery of
water as provided in the second paragraph of this article the use of
the waters may be so rotated between the two States in such manner
for such periods, and to continue for such time as the State Engineers
mayjointly determine.
4. The State of New Mexico shall not at any time be entitled to
receive nor shall the State of Colorado be required to deliver any
water not then necessary for beneficial use in the State of New
Mexico.
5. A substantial delivery of water under the terms of this Article
shall be deemed a compliance with its provisions and minor and
compensating irregularities in flow or delivery shall be disregarded.

51.
52.
53.
797.

Id.
Id.
La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. II, § 37-63-101 (2001), 43 Stat. at
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IV. COMPACT ADMINISTRATION ISSUES
A. COMPETITION WITH THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
Since the inception of the La Plata River Compact in 1922, many
of the issues and concerns that served as the impetus to create a
defined interstate water allocation system have continued to plague
the river system. Foremost among these problems is the limited
amount of water available to serve irrigation demands. This problem
is especially acute after the spring runoff. As indicated by Article II of
the Compact, Colorado must deliver one-half of the measured
streamflow at Hesperus to the state line." Further compounding the
difficulty of providing water to the state line is competition among the
natural elements. The headwaters of the La Plata River reach 13,000
feet in elevation, the river quickly descends 4,900 feet during its six
mile journey to Hesperus, accompanied by a climatic transformation
from alpine to arid-desert conditions.55 The river channel itself is
composed of a consortium of cobbles, gravel, and fine sands that
promote excessive seepage into the shallow alluvium.' 6 Consumptive
use from riparian vegetation also affects the delivery of water through
the river corridor. Within the fifty-two miles the La Plata River flows
from Hesperus to Farmington, New Mexico, there are an estimated
3,580 acres of riparian/wetland plant communities within the one-mile
wide river corridor. 5 The plant species in this area vary in type and
density, but the predominant phreatophyte species include
cottonwood trees and willows, which consume an average of 5.5 feet of
water each year.5 s These natural, physical elements can have a
dramatic effect on the delivery of one-half of the streamflow at
Hesperus to the state line. For example, during dry periods in the
middle to late summer when the streamflows at Hesperus are in the
80-100 cubic feet per second range, the transit losses through the
thirty-one mile river corridor to the state line routinely approach 45-50
percent. 9 As the flows continue their decline to a "benchmark" of
twenty-five cubic feet per second at Hesperus, the La Plata River
streambed often becomes completely dry for intermittent stretches
above the state line. 60

54. Id.
55. See USGS, supra note 11, at 400.
56. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ANIMAS-LA PLATA PROJECr: FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 111-56 (1996).
57. Id.
58. See MORTON. W. BrITINGER & GLEN. E. STRINGHAM, A STUDY OF PHREATOPHYrE
GROWTH IN THE LOWER ARKANSAS RIVER VALLEY OF COLORADO 17 (1963).
59. Report of the La Plata River Compact Administration, prepared by the Division
VII Irrigation Engineer 11 (1954).
60. See id.
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B. WATER ROTATION

The authors of the Compact provided for a water rotation
mechanism for the express intent of maximizing the beneficial use of
limited water supplies in the La Plata River. 61 Review of historic La
Plata River Compact Administration Reports indicate the practice
enjoyed varying degrees of success in terms of increased irrigated
acreage and crop production, particularly to ditches that are junior in
priority. However, mutual agreement by both state engineers as to
the mechanics of the rotation, including: specifics of when each
rotation would begin and end, the length of each rotation (typically
seven, ten, or fourteen days), and which state would be entitled to the
first rotation, was often very difficult to establish. The decision making
process for representatives of both states required an intimate
understanding of the daily physical and hydrologic demands and an
innate ability to forecast water user needs, streamflows, and weather
patterns.
The reports of the La Plata River Compact operations are replete
with examples in which the timing and duration of rotations was
critical. For example, in 1936, Colorado completed a nine-day water
rotation on July 3 that resulted in such a dramatic decline in base
streamflows that the stream channel became dry for several miles and
the only water available to New Mexico during its rotation was minimal
accumulated seepage and return flows from irrigated lands in the
lower part of the basin. 6' Conversely, on May 10, 1955, New Mexico
commenced a fourteen day rotation that provided full water supply to
its users, much to the chagrin of Colorado because the anticipated
increase in flows during spring runoff never materialized and
Colorado water users were left wanting.4 In recent years, Compact
administration officials have not implemented a rotation schedule and
instead have operated in accordance with delivery obligations by
providing one-half of the streamflow at Hesperus to the state line.
Nevertheless, the implementation of a rotation schedule has proven
beneficial for all water users in the La Plata River Basin and its use
under appropriate conditions is anticipated to resume.

61. See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. art. 11(3), § 37-63-101 (2001), 43
Stat. 796, 797.
62. Report of the La Plata River Compact Administration, prepared by the Division
VII Irrigation Engineer 1-5 (1929). The term junior within the priority system implies
subsequent construction of those ditches that diverted water for application to
beneficial use at a later date compared to structures that preceded them.
63. Report of the La Plata River Compact Administration, prepared by the Division
VII Irrigation Engineer 4 (1936).
64. See Report of the La Plata River Compact Administration, prepared by the
Division VII Irrigation Engineer 11 (1955).
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FUTILE CALL

The problems of interstate administration of the La Plata River
become especially acute when the measured streamflows at Hesperus
decline to the threshold amount of twenty five cubic feet per second.
An historic "'working agreement' with the State Engineer's office in
New Mexico when the flow at Hesperus drops to 25 cubic feet per
second that Colorado takes all the water above the confluence of
Cherry Creek and New Mexico takes the flow of water out of Cherry
Creek and Long Hollow."65
At Hesperus, the stream channel typically becomes dry for several
miles at intermittent stream reaches in Colorado." When the La Plata
River streamflows approach this level in which neither an attempted
delivery of one-half of the flow at Hesperus to the state line nor a
rotation schedule flow would provide water to New Mexico, Colorado
water administration officials are usually called upon to conduct a trial
run to attempt delivery.6 7 The trial run requires a closely monitored
attempt to deliver one-half of the flows at Hesperus past all Colorado
diversions for a limited amount of time, typically three to four days. If
the water does not appear at the state line in sufficient quantity to
provide the slightest measure of beneficial use, the Colorado State
Engineer will invoke the futile call doctrine.6 8
Invocation of a futile call is not a pleasing situation to the water
users or compact administration officials in either state because it
indicates drought conditions that harm all La Plata River water users.
This practice does, however, release Colorado from an obligation to
deliver water past upstream diversion headgates and apply the very
limited streamflow to beneficial use, as opposed to letting water
evaporate into the atmosphere or seep through the streambed
unused. 69
D. COMPACT WATER ADMINISTRATION WITHIN A STATE
An oft-repeated adage among water users located in the upper
reaches of a river or stream is "highority is better than priority." For
upstream state water administration officials, a perpetual issue is
shepherding water past diversion structures and water users in the

65. Letter from George E. Barclay, Colorado State Engineer, to A. Ralph Owens,
Colorado State Engineer (Aug. 19, 1967) (on file with author).
66. See Report of the La Plata River Compact Administration, prepared by the
Division VII Irrigation Engineer 9 (1961).
67. See id. tbl. 11.
68. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502 (2001). In its application, the futile
call doctrine allows an upstream junior out-of-priority water diversion to continue
under time and site-specific physical, hydrologic, and climatic conditions. The applied
test is that curtailment of the upstream junior water right would not provide sufficient
water to the downstream senior water for application to beneficial use. Id.
69. See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. 11(4), § 37-63-101 (2001), 43
Stat. 796, 797.
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upper reaches of an interstate river in order to meet the compact
delivery obligations to a downstream state during dry periods. As a
poignant example of this dilemma, on July 5, 1928, the La Plata River
and Cherry Creek Ditch Company ("Ditch Company") filed a lawsuit
in the La Plata County District Court against the Colorado State
Engineer, M. C. Hinderlider. The case ultimately went to the United
States Supreme Court. 0
For a brief historical foundation, the United States Congress
approved the La Plata River Compact on January 25, 1925 and the
President promulgated the Compact four days later on January 29'
During the first two years of operation under the Compact, little water
flowed across the state boundary and New Mexico water officials
threatened to brinq a lawsuit against Colorado for failure to comply
with the Compact.
The water supply improved in 1927 and New
Mexico withdrew its complaint. 3 Unfortunately, drought conditions
returned the next year and in June 1928, the Colorado and New
Mexico State Engineers agreed upon a rotation schedule to effectively
distribute the limited amount of water available at that time in the La
Plata River and maximize the beneficial use in both states in
conformance with Article II, paragraph 3 of the Compact. 4 On June
24, 1928, Colorado water officials curtailed all of the irrigation water in
the ditch to permit the entire flow of the river to pass to New Mexico
75
under the rotation agreement up to the time of filing the complaint.
The consternation felt by shareholders in the La Plata River and
Cherry Creek Ditch was understandable; the structure was Priority No.
6 in the La Plata River system with a June 2, 1890 appropriation date
for 41.5 cubic feet per second, and had never been subject to
curtailment. 76 In its complaint, the Ditch Company put forth two
allegations. First, the actions of the Colorado State Engineer damaged
the crops of the Ditch Company's shareholders. Second, these actions
would cause the Ditch Company irreparable loss if allowed to
continue. The Ditch Company sought a mandatory injunction to
instruct Colorado water officials to administer the La Plata
River in
77
accordance with Colorado water rights and priorities only.
70. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 95
(1938).
71. See MEEKER, supra note 16.
72. Letter from J. R. Williams, Colorado State Engineer to Mr. Price Nelson,
Compact Representative for the State Engineer of New Mexico 2 (May 25, 1956) (on
file with author).
73. Id.
74. See Appellant's Brief at 10, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (No. 588).
75. Id. On June 24, 1928, the streamflow at the Hesperus gaging station was fiftyseven cubic feet per second and the curtailment at the Company's headgate did not
include four cubic feet per second which was allowed to be diverted for domestic and
stockwatering purposes. Id. at 10-11.
76. Defendant's Answer Brief at 12-13, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (No. 588).
77. Appellant's Brief at 11, Hinderlider(No. 588).
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In the ensuing years, the case progressed from the La Plata County
District Court to the Colorado Supreme Court. The supreme court
reversed the lower court and found in favor of the Ditch Company.
The court asserted that the Compact was not a defense and ordered
Colorado water officials to allow the Ditch Company to divert
whenever water was available in the La Plata River that was not subject
to prior appropriations in Colorado. 8
Colorado water officials appealed the decision to the United States
Supreme Court. In rendering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Brandeis reaffirmed the intent of the Compact to equitably apportion
the La
Plata River between the two states for application to beneficial
79
use. The Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court's decision and
found the Compact the binding instrument among both states and
their respective individual water users.80 The central thrust of the
decision was based upon the finding that the priority of the Ditch
Company's water right could only be administered within Colorado's
share of the interstate river, and not New Mexico's portion." The
Court's holding confirmed the position of the Colorado State
Engineer to meet Colorado's Compact obligations, but working with
local upstream water users in drought conditions to deliver water past
their headgates for delivery to a downstream state continues to present
challenges.
E. COORDINATION BETWEEN COLORADO AND NEW MEXICO WATER

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

Effective interstate water administration of the La Plata River
Compact is based upon knowing the amount of water available at the
two index streamflow gaging stations, the amount and location of
ditch diversions, and the travel time between key locations in the
system.
Advancements in water measurement and reporting
technologies aid water officials in the daily administration of this
ephemeral river. For example, the two streamflow gaging stations are
equipped with remote sensing equipment that instantaneously
measures river height at fifteen minute intervals to complement the
continuous streamflow recorders. 2
A satellite transmits this
information at regular intervals. The information is then transformed
into streamflow amounts for viewing by water officials and public water
users in both states. This instant and perpetual source of information
provides an effective tool to monitor and distribute the greatly varying
water supplies to intrastate water users and to meet compact delivery
requirements with the highest level of efficiency and confidence. It
also subjects water administration officials to intense scrutiny by both
78. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 99 (1938).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 103-104.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. I, § 37-63-101 (2001), 43 Stat.

796, 796.
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interstate and intrastate water users who may not have full
appreciation or knowledge of transit losses, the travel times between
key locations, and the changing river call priority.83
Contested issues of water entitlement and delivery often occur over
the infrequent rainstorms that provide a short-term increase in
streamflow within a confined reach of the river.
Water users
throughout the La Plata River Basin justifiably demand incorporation
and administration of these additional streamflows within the priority
system of each state. Similarly, the downstream state water officials
also seek assurance to include and deliver these flows under the
Compact. Unfortunately, it is often impractical to distribute small
increases in streamflow that result from a twenty minute rainsquall that
passes through a small portion of the basin.
The authors of the La Plata River Compact recognized the
intricate balance between maximizing the beneficial use of water and
assuring its equitable apportionment among the states in an
occasionally volatile natural environment.14 For that reason, the
Compact authors instructed state water officials that upon substantial
delivery of water to meet Compact obligations at the state line, they
should disregard the minor and compensating irregularities in flow or
delivery.85
V. CONCLUSION
The average annual streamflow for the La Plata River pales in
comparison with the yield of other major interstate river systems that
originate in the mountains of Colorado.86 Nevertheless, water users in
Colorado and New Mexico who rely upon streamflows in the arid La
Plata River Basin for irrigating their crops or filling their pitchers of
drinking water place no less value and importance on it as a precious
resource. Since the adoption of the La Plata River Compact seventynine years ago, the La Plata watershed has enjoyed a few periods of
abundant water supply and suffered though many droughts. However,
one measure of the success of an interstate compact is whether it has
ever been the subject of interstate litigation. While Hinderliderv. La
Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co.87 tested the weight of interstate
83. The river call priority will often change on a daily basis toward early
appropriation dates in the 1890s for the La Plata River during periods of rapidly
declining streamflows. It is the priority of the ditch or structure exercising its
authority to demand curtailment of junior water rights in time and amount necessary
to provide sufficient water to satisfy its demand.
84. See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. art. II, § 37-63-101 (2001), 43 Stat.

796, 797.
85. See La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV.

STAT. art. 11(5), § 37-63-101 (2001), 43
Stat. at 797.
86. 2 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA: COLORADO: WATER YEAR
1999, at 154, 279, 387, 409, 422 (1999). The average streamflows leaving the State of
Colorado are as follows: La Plata River (26,100 acre-feet), Colorado River (4,632,000
acre-feet), South Platte River (408,900 acre-feet), Arkansas River (163,200 acre-feet),
and the Rio Grande River (328,400 acre-feet). Id.
87. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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compact compliance against intrastate water administration practices,
it was not an action brought by one state against another, like Kansas v.
Colorado and Wyoming v. Colorado. It is therefore a significant tribute to
the designers of the Compact in 1922 and to the state water officials
charged with enforcement of its provisions to date that the La Plata
River Compact has proven viable, effective, and defendable over time.

Issue I

THE LA PLATA RIVER COMPACT

VI. APPENDIX
LA PLATA RIVER COMPACT
The General Assembly hereby approves the compact, designated as
the "La Plata River Compact", signed at the City of Santa Fe, State of
New Mexico, on the 27th day of November, A. D. 1922, by Delph E.
Carpenter as the Commissioner for the State of Colorado, under
authority of and in conformity with the provisions of an Act of the
General Assembly of the State of Colorado, approved April 2, 1921,
entitled "An Act providing for the appointment of a commissioner on
behalf of the State of Colorado to negotiate a compact or agreement
between the States of Colorado and New Mexico respecting the use
and distribution of the waters of the La Plata River and the rights of
said States thereto, and making an appropriation therefor.", the same
being Chapter 244 of the Session Laws of Colorado, 1921, and signed
by Stephen B. Davis, Jr., as the Commissioner for the State of New
Mexico, under legislative authority, which said compact is as follows:
The State of Colorado and the State of New Mexico, desiring to
provide for the equitable distribution of the waters of the La Plata
River and to remove all causes of present and future controversy
between them with respect thereto, and being moved by
considerations of interstate comity, pursuant to Acts of their respective
Legislatures, have resolved to conclude a compact for these purposes
and have named as their commissioners:
For the State of Colorado
For the State of New Mexico

Delph E. Carpenter
Stephen B. Davis,Jr.

Who have agreed upon the following Articles:
ARTICLE I
The State of Colorado, at its own expense, shall establish and
maintain two permanent stream-gauging stations upon the La Plata
River for the purpose of measuring and recording its flow, which shall
be known as the Hesperus Station and the Interstate Station,
respectively.
The Hesperus Station shall be located at some convenient place
near the village of Hesperus, Colorado. Suitable devices for
ascertaining and recording the volume of all diversions from the river
above Hesperus Station, shall be established and maintained (without
expense to the State of New Mexico), and whenever in this compact
reference is made to the flow of the river at Hesperus Station, it shall
be construed to include the amount of the concurrent diversions
above said station.
The Interstate Station shall be located at some convenient place
within one mile of, and above or below, the interstate line. Suitable
devices for ascertaining and recording the volume of water diverted by
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the Enterprise and Pioneer Canals, now serving approximately equal
areas in both States, shall be established and maintained (without
expense to the State of New Mexico), and whenever in this compact
reference is made to the flow of the river at the Interstate Station, it
shall be construed to include one-half the volume of the concurrent
diversions by such canals, and also the volume of any other water
which may hereafter be diverted from said river in Colorado for use in
New Mexico.
Each of said stations shall be equipped with suitable devices for
recording the flow of water in said river at all times between the 15th
day of February and the 1st day of December of each year. The State
Engineers of the signatory States shall make provision for co-operating
gauging at the two stations, for the details of the operation, exchange
of records and data, and publication of the facts.
ARTICLE II
The waters of the La Plata River are hereby equitably apportioned
between the signatory States, including the citizens thereof, as follows:
1. At all times between the first day of December and the fifteenth
day of the succeeding February, each State shall have the unrestricted
right to use of all water which may flow within its boundaries.
2. By reason of the usual annual rise and fall, the flow of said river
between the fifteenth day of February and the first day of December of
each year, shall be apportioned between the States in the following
manner:
(a) Each State shall have the unrestricted right to use all the
waters within its boundaries on each day when the mean daily flow at
the Interstate Station is one hundred cubic feet per second, or more.
(b) On all other days the State of Colorado shall deliver at the
Interstate Station a quantity of water equivalent to one-half of the
mean flow at the Hesperus Station for the preceding day, but not to
exceed one hundred cubic feet per second.
3. Whenever the flow of the river is so low that in the judgment of
the State Engineers of the States, the greatest beneficial use of its
waters may be secured by distributing all of its waters successively to
the land in each State in alternating periods, in lieu of delivery of
water as provided in the second paragraph of this article the use of the
waters may be so rotated between the two States in such manner for
such periods, and to continue for such time as the State Engineers may
jointly determine.
4. The State of New Mexico shall not at any time be entitled to
receive nor shall the State of Colorado be required to deliver any water
not then necessary for beneficial use in the State of New Mexico.
5. A substantial delivery of water under the terms of this Article
shall be deemed a compliance with its provisions and minor and
compensating irregularities in flow or delivery shall be disregarded.
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ARTICLE III
The State Engineers of the States by agreement, from time to time,
may formulate rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of
this compact, which, when signed and promulgated by them, shall be
binding until amended by agreement between them or until
terminated by written notice from one to the other.
ARTICLE IV
Whenever any official of either State is designated to perform any
duty under this compact, such designation shall be interpreted to
include the State official or officials upon whom the duties now
performed by such official may hereafter devolve.
ARTICLE V
The physical and other conditions peculiar to the La Plata River
and the territory drained and served thereby constitute the basis for
this compact, and neither of the signatory States concedes the
establishment of any general principle or precedent by the concluding
of this compact.
ARTICLE VI
This compact may be modified or terminated at any time by
mutual consent of the signatory States and upon such termination all
rights then established hereunder shall continue unimpaired.
ARTICLE VII
This compact shall become operative when approved by the
Legislature of each of the signatory States and by the Congress of the
United States. Notice of approval by the Legislatures shall be given by
the Governor of each State to the Governor of the other State, and the
President of the United States is requested to give notice to the
Governors of the signatory States of approval by the Congress of the
United States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The commissioners have signed this
compact in duplicate originals, one of which shall be deposited with
the Secretary of State of each of the signatory States.
Done at the city of Santa Fe, in the State of New Mexico, this 27th
day of November, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine
Hundred and Twenty-Two.
Delph E. Carpenter, Stephen B. DavisJr.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A great privilege of being a state supreme court justice is the
opportunity to author an important water opinion. It could also be
one's last important opinion. Especially if the case involves a close,
split decision of your court and you are up for reelection in a
contested race.
In May of 2000, Justice Cathy Silak lost reelection to the Idaho
Supreme Court. In November of 1954, Chief Justice Mortimer Stone
lost reelection to the Colorado Supreme Court. The unifying element
of both defeats: each justice authored a decision with a one-votemargin in favor of the United States in a highly contested water case.
Justice Hobbs was appointed by Governor Roy Romer to the Colorado Supreme
Court on April 18, 1996, and was retained for a ten-year term by the Colorado voters in
November of 1998. He has an A.B, in History from the University of Notre Dame.
After graduation with a J.D. from Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, in
1971, he served as law clerk to Tenth CircuitJudge William E. Doyle, then practiced as
an EPA enforcement attorney for two years and a Colorado Assistant Attorney General
for four years. He was a partner with the law firms of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, as well
as Hobbs, Trout & Raley before becoming a justice. For the seventeen years of his
private practice, he represented the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
among other water, environmental, land use, and transportation clients. While in
private practice, he represented the Colorado Water Congress in the wilderness water
rights litigation in Colorado federal courts on behalf of water interests opposing the
Sierra Club's assertions that wilderness area designation creates implied reserved water
rights.
* The Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent
Judiciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 20 QUINNIPiAc L. REv. 669 (2001).
Reprinted by permission of QuinnipiacLaw Review.
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Chief Justice Stone's four-to-three opinion held that the
downstream Colorado-Big Thompson Reclamation Project of the
Bureau of Reclamation on the Blue River had storage rights and direct
flow hydropower rights senior to the Denver Water Board's upstream
municipal diversions on the same river.' Justice Silak's three-to-two
opinion held that congressional designation of three downstream
Idaho wilderness areas included federal reserved water rights with
seniority over upstream agricultural, municipal, and commercial
diversions.2
In both instances, Colorado and Idaho state law provided for
contested elections of supreme court justices. During the campaigns,
media attention focused on assertions that the decision would deprive
present and future state water users who depended on upstream
sources of supply of water. While it does not appear that the litigating
parties or their attorneys orchestrated public reaction to the court
decisions, the cases were still pending before the two supreme courts
as the judicial election contests unfolded. Underlying the press
reports on the rehearing petitions were the suggestions that the
pending election might lead the authoring justice to reconsider, the
concurring justices to reconsider, or that defeat of the authoring
justice would bring in a new justice favorable to reversing the one vote
outcome of the case. This situation created speculation that politics
might have motivated the court's original decisions, and any
reconsideration of them. In both instances, the justices authoring the
majority decisions overwhelmingly lost reelection. Their opponents
assumed office under a cloud of partisan controversy.
In the case of Justice Silak, the court granted a rehearing in which
a member of the court's initial majority switched her vote, so that the
dissenting position became the majority. Justice Silak voted for
rehearing, but on rehearing maintained her earlier position and
became the author of a two member dissent. The court announced its
new decision reversing the old, while she was serving out her term.
It appears from the press attention in both decisions, and to the
election races following them, that each justice lost largely because of
one opinion they authored, despite the many they were responsible for
during their judicial service. Many members of the bar held each

1. See City and County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992 (Colo. 1954).
2. See In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *1 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999),
superseded on reh'gby Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000).
3. In 1966, Colorado voters approved a constitutional amendment requiring the
Governor to appoint judges and justices from a list of two or three nominees
forwarded by the nominating commissions. The appointed judge or justice serves for
two years before standing at the next general election for retention, on a yes or no

basis, for a specified term of years. COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24, 25.
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justice in high regard for his and her prior judicial performance.
Nevertheless, given the initial outcry over the decisions, the public
reaction took on a life of its own, eclipsing the merits of both the
besieged justices and the justices' opponents.
The Colorado and Idaho experiences, forty-five years apart,
invoke the ability and commitment of the western states to provide fair
state proceedings in the ongoing McCarran Amendment4
adjudications.
State commitment to fair judicial proceedings
underpins the exercise of jurisdiction under the McCarran
Amendment.
Through this amendment, Congress waived the
sovereign immunity of the United States to suit in state court for
determination of federal agency and tribal water rights claims. This
article first addresses the landscape of the McCarran proceedings and
the intersection of state water politics as viewed through the Colorado
and Idaho experiences. These experiences illustrate the need for state
judiciaries, the water bar, and state officials to recommit to maintain
the appearance and the reality of fairness in state water proceedings
for all parties, regardless of whether their claims are based on state or
federal law.
H. THE MCCARRAN LANDSCAPE
ASK ME
Some time when the river is ice ask me

mistakes I have made. Ask me whether
what I have done is my life. Others
have come in their slow way into
my thought, and some have tried to help

or to hurt: ask me what difference
their strongest love or hate has made.
I will listen to what you say.
You and I can turn and look
at the silent river and wait. We know

the current is there, hidden; and there
are comings and goings from miles away
that hold the stillness exactly before us.
What the river says, that is what I say.
William Stafford5

4.

43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).

5. William Stafford, Ask Me, in THE WAY IT IS: NEW AND SELECTED POEMS BY WILLIAM
STAFFORD 56 (1998).
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A. CREATION OF USE RIGHTS IN WATER, A PUBLIC RESOURCE
Congress carved the states west of the continental divide out of
the public domain from lands it acquired through the 1803 Louisiana
Purchase, the 1846 Oregon Compromise, and the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.6 While the discovery of gold and silver jumpstarted the entire region's settlement, public land and water have been
the most enduring treasures of the West, along with its magnificent
landforms and vistas. Reducing public land and water to possession
and ownership has been a preoccupation of state and territorial law
from the outset!
Congress created wealth in the western states by making the
public land and water available for ownership and use.
The
Homestead Act of 1862,8 the Railroad Acts of 1862 and 1864,' and
other significant statutes resulted in the disposition of two-thirds of the
West's surface acreage into state and private ownership.'l The other
one-third remains in federal ownership," principally comprised of
lands managed by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management. They include the critical watersheds the states depend
upon for water supply. On them, through them, and from them exist
the reservoirs, rights-of-way, ditches, and pipelines necessary to store
and convey water to farms, cities, and businesses.
Congress early decided to separate legal interests in land and
water. Through federal statutes, it authorized conveyance of patents
to land without interests in water. Water remained a public resource
subject to disposition through the operation of state and federal law.
This was most notable through the 1866 Mining Act" and the 1877
Desert Lands Act.' 4 Congress (1) conceded to the states and territories
jurisdiction to create property interests in the use of all available

LOREN L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW 7-8 (3d ed. 1981).
7. For example, Colorado defined "any right to occupy, possess and enjoy any
portion of the public domain" as "a chattel real possessing the legal characterof realestate."
This was a departure from the common law concept of "naked possession," that the
Colorado Supreme Court termed "remarkable." Gillett v. Gaffney, 3 Colo. 351, 358
(1877); see Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Ass'n, 19 P.3d 1263, 1269 n.8 (Colo. 2001).
8. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
9. Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492, amended by Railroad Act of
1864, ch. 206, § 4, 13 Stat. 356, 358; see McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d
346, 352-53 (Colo. 2000).
10. For a review of the public land laws, see MALL, supra note 6; BENJAMIN HORACE
HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1965).
11. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A

6.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS

27-28 (1970) [hereinafter

ONE THIRD

OF THE NATION'S LAND].

12. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
13. The Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
14. The Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
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unappropriated waters on the public domain, subject to the right of
the government, at anytime in the future, to reserve thenunappropriated waters for federal purposes; and (2) provided for
water users to have occupancy of retained federal land for the purpose
of constructing and maintaining storage and conveyance works
necessary to place the water to use for state and private 'purposes.' 5
The Public Land Law Review Commission, in 1970, reported that
federal lands comprised "the source of most of the water in the
[eleven] coterminous western states, providing approximately 61
percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region.""
Most western states adopted the custom of appropriation-first in
time of use, first in right for the amount of water placed from the
natural streams to beneficial use-to administer their water
resources.17 California, however, recognized pre-existing riparian
rights. 8 Each state adopted its own water allocation mechanism,
confirming uses solely through judicial proceedings, as in Colorado's
instance,' 9 or through a combination of administrative and judicial
proceedings in the other western states.2"
The western states universally recognize waters of the natural
stream as a public resource. Private rights therein arise only by use of
unappropriated waters, in the amount of the appropriation taken at an
identified point of diversion, for a beneficial use, in order of priority
from the available source of supply, subject to the exercise of prior
uses." Primarily, a water right functions to afford legal protection for
its owner to intercept water in priority at the point of the right's
operation, wherever that is in the watershed within the state. Thus, a
senior water right located downstream commands the passage of the
needed water past the upstream junior users. Historically, large
downstream agricultural rights have exercised this control, requiring
municipal and other later evolving demands for water to either take
the risk of shortage or develop alternative sources of supply.
From their inception, the western territories and states proceeded
15. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 16365 (1935).
16. ONETHIRD OF THENATION'S LAND, supra note 11, at 141.
17. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447-49 (1882).
18.

JOSEPH

L.

SAX

ET AL.,

LEGAL CONTROL

OF WATER

RESOURCES:

CASES

AND

MATERIALS 295-97 (3d ed. 2000).

19. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act:
Settling In, 3 U. DENV. WATERL. REv. 1, 19 (1999).
20. SeeJohn E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications:Approaches and Alternatives, 42
ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 22-01, 22-06 to 22-08 (1996); SAX ETAL., supranote 18, at
183-87.
21. See generally SAX ETAL., supra note 18, at 280-309; see, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53-54 (Colo. 1999) (holding that
diversions made pursuant to a decreed water right, when not used for decreed uses, do
not establish historical use for the purposes of a change of water right proceeding).
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without interruption to create property rights in water under
territorial and state law. Four significant events that altered the states'
presumed sole possession of the field occurred at the turn of the
nineteenth century. First, the federal forest reservations came into
being under the 1897 Forest Organic Act, which included a state and
federal water law savings provision." Second, with the passage of the
1902 Reclamation Act, 2 which directed that federal projects obtain

water rights in accordance with state law, the United States began to
construct and manage those projects both for the benefit of state and
local sponsors, and to achieve ancillary federal purposes, such as
recreation, flood control, and power production. Third, in 1907, the
United States Supreme Court, in a case involving a tribal reservation, 4
determined that federal reservations-in the absence of an express
reservation of water-carry with them an implied reservation of
sufficient, unappropriated water necessary to prevent defeat of the
reservation's primary purposes.25 Finally, the Supreme Court, in 1907,
first exercised its original jurisdiction to resolve water allocation
disputes between states, fashioning the law of equitable apportionment
of interstate streams.26 This, in turn, gave rise to a fifth major
occurrence; creation of interstate water compacts, which Congress
approved in the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution in
the 1920s. 7
Hence, from the earliest part of the twentieth century, the states
have known of the existence of retained congressional authority to
reserve unappropriated waters for federal purposes. An 1899 Supreme
Court case presaged the Winters doctrine, 28 and the year before the
enactment of the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Supreme Court applied the
reserved rights doctrine not only to Native American reservations, but
also to certain recreation and wildlife areas, and a national forest as
well. 29 The states themselves encouraged the federal government to
have a significant role concerning intrastate and interstate streams,
primarily to secure federal funding for water projects they could not
22.
23.
24.

National Forest Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1994).
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994).
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

25. Id. at 577.
26. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see e.g., Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess.
Laws 684; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2001) (Boulder Canyon Project Act ratifying
the Colorado River Compact, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
28. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
29. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). See also California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978) ("except where the reserved rights or navigation
servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authority over its
internal waters"); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1955)
(upholding authority of Federal Power Commission to license power projects on
reserved lands, subject to prior vested rights).

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 5

afford or did not choose to finance themselves. In regard to the
reclamation program, the states understood that the Bureau of
Reclamation would hold water rights appropriated under state law,
originally for the benefit of agricultural users, later extended to a
variety of purposes, including municipal, industrial, power production,
flood control, fish and recreation, and water compact deliveries.30 The
tribal rights" and agency rights for the primary purpose of federal
reservations, however, were another matter; these rights arose out of
federal law, in particular congressional exercise of the property
clause."2
B. THE INTEREST OF THE STATES IN ADJUDICATING FEDERAL CLAIMS
The immunity of the United States to compelled appearance in
state court proceedings became an increasing problem as the states
continued to exercise their congressionally conferred and repeatedly
recognized authority to create water rights in unappropriated public
waters. Whether state law based, as with reclamation projects, or
federal law based, as with tribal and federal land reservations, state
forums did not determine the United States' water rights. Whatever
litigation occurred to determine federally held water rights occurred
in federal court, while the states proceeded on a separate track as to
state based claims not owned by the United States government.
The situation became intolerable to the western states. 3 The
security and dependability of water rights turn on the enforceability of
their priority in times of short river supply. 4

The right to divert a

certain amount of water from the available natural stream supply at a
specific location, to the exclusion of all others not then in priority, is
the essence of a water right. The reason for adjudicating a federal
reserved water right is the same as all other rights to the use of waterto realize the value and expectations that enforcement of that right's
priority secure. 5 In times of short supply, water users depend on the
state to exercise its police power to curtail junior uses in favor of senior
uses, regardless of the identity of the owner of the right, state or
federal. To accomplish this, managers must determine the amount
and priority of rights drawing on the watershed.
Because the states could not haul the federal agencies and tribes
30. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325, 32940, 342 (Colo. 2000).
31. Susan M. Williams, The Winters Doctrine On Water Administration, 36 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. §§ 24-1, 24-6 to 24-8 (1990).
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33. Thorson, supra note 20, §§ 22-16 to 22-24.
34. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Assoc. v. Moyer, No. 00SA211, 2001 Colo. LEXIS
1061 (Colo. Dec. 17, 2001).
35. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982).
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into state court, they were unable to secure reliability for state-created
water rights and meet future needs due to uncertainty about the
nature, extent, and priority of federal water rights.
In sum,
administration of rights within the watershed, who gets to divert, and
who does not, cannot occur in the absence of comprehensive
identification and adjudication of all rights, state or federal.
Accordingly, after a prolonged effort and over the resistance of
the Justice Department and federal agencies, Congress passed the
1952 McCarran Amendment permitting state joinder of the United
States and Indian tribes in state court water adjudications 6 In order
to assert this jurisdiction, states relying primarily on administrative
mechanisms commenced comprehensive adjudications to determine
the rights of all users, including federal entities.
Three Colorado cases that the United States Supreme Court
ultimately decided established that federal courts and state courts,
under the McCarran legislation, have concurrent jurisdiction to
determine federal rights. However, when a McCarran proceeding
begins in the state court, the federal court should defer to the state
judicial determination of the federal rights, whether or not the federal
litigation preceded the state litigation.37
Implicit in the refusal of federal courts to exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction is that federal agencies and tribes have equal
access to fair state judicial forums, along with state and private
claimants. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,38 which recognized the
authority of the states to join tribal claims under McCarran:
We emphasize, however, that we do not overlook the heavy obligation
[of the federal courts] to exercise jurisdiction. We need not decide,
for example, whether, despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal
would be warranted if more extensive proceedings had occurred in
the District Court prior to dismissal, if the involvement of state water
rights were less extensive than it is here, or if the state proceeding

were in some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims.3 9

Additionally, when a state joins the United States in a McCarran
proceeding, the United States must assert all federal claims to water
rights; if not, the court may concede the priority of the federal rights,

36. Bennett W. Raley, Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failure to Integrate
FederalEnvironmental Statutes with McCarran Amendment Water Adjudications, 41 Rocay

§§ 24-04 (1995).
37. The Colorado Trilogy: Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 810, 820 (1976); United States v. Dist. Court, 401 U.S. 527, 530 (1971);
MTN. MrN. L. INST.

United States v. Dist. Court, 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971).
38. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
39. Id. at 820.
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including both reserved and appropriative rights, to intervening state
and private junior rights.40 In turn, this has compelled federal
agencies and tribes to participate in litigation they might otherwise
have postponed or foregone entirely.
Congressional adoption of a plethora of environmental laws,
starting in the 1960s, has caused federal agencies to manage their
lands with greater attention to values other than resource extraction,
such as recreation, fish and wildlife, wild and scenic rivers, national
parks, and wilderness area preservation, among others. Members of
the water bar have pointed out that failure of the United States to
claim state or federal appropriative water rights for environmental
purposes, such as endangered species protection, defeats the purposes
of the McCarran Amendment and the federal environmental laws,
since reserved water rights either will not exist or will be uncertain.
The argument is that a secure water right, administered in priority visa-vis other water rights, is the most rational and consistent way to
accommodate important state and federal interests in water. Resorting
to regulatory mechanisms on an ad hoc basis, such as by-pass flows the
Forest Service can impose as a condition for right-of-way permit
renewal, diminishes the yield of pre-existing water rights, undermines
reliability, promotes disorder, intensifies hostility, leads to takings
actions, and generally favors chaos over law.41
In short, whether for a traditional type of consumptive use, such
as agricultural or municipal, a non-consumptive use, such as
hydropower, flood control, or environmental uses, federal officials and
agencies who do not assert federal water rights claims in the McCarran
proceedings may be in dereliction of their congressionally assigned
public duties. When these claims are asserted, state judges must give
them fair consideration and uphold federal ownership of rights that
have a basis in either state or federal law, regardless of political
controversy within the state over the filing, existence, nature, or extent
of the claims.
McCarran adjudications are underway in the state courts of
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, with Texas already having
completed a comprehensive adjudication."
The United States
40. United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
41. Raley, supra note 36, § 24-06. The problem for federal agencies with this
approach is that such claims provoke intense state political reaction and litigation, as
the federal filings in Idaho's Snake River Basin adjudication illustrate. The right of
the United States to obtain appropriative rights under federal law, in contradistinction
to state law, has also been highly controversial and, although the western states, except
for New Mexico, have state law mechanisms for instream flow water rights, they
typically hold these in state ownership and do not allow federal agencies or others to
appropriate or hold them.
42. Thorson, supra note 20, § 22-05. For example, the Arizona proceedings involve
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Constitution vests the authority in state judges to apply both state and
federal law. Pursuant to the supremacy clause, they must uphold
federal law when there is federal preemption. 4 The experiences of
Colorado and Idaho, sparked by the majority opinions of Justices
Stone and Silak, demonstrate the magnitude of the legal and
governmental issues involved, and go straight to the heart of
federalism, separation of powers, and the ability of judges to refrain
from political influence in making decisions.
II. THE COLORADO EXPERIENCE
I tell you, gentlemen, you are piling up
a heritage of conflict and litigation
over water rights, for there is not
sufficient water to supply these lands.
John Wesley Powel

44

In October of 1954, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the Blue River case, pitting Denver's claims for municipal
supply against a United States reclamation project.4 5 At that time,
Colorado law provided for contested election ofjudges. The author of
the four-to-three decision, Chief Justice Mortimer Stone, was up for
reelection in November. He had drawn a ballot challenger.
The case was highly significant. It involved the water right
priorities of the City and County of Denver, the City of Colorado
Springs, seven counties of northeastern Colorado, and fifteen counties
of Colorado's western slope, which encompasses most of Colorado's
future demand for surface water. The principal focus was the relative
priorities of Dillon Reservoir and Green Mountain Reservoir, which is
situated not far downstream from Dillon on the same river.46
Congress had authorized Green Mountain Reservoir as part of the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project ("C-BT").
The Bureau of
Reclamation administered the project, designed to provide 100,000
acre-feet of water per year for future uses on the western slope of
Colorado's continental divide, and 240,000 acre-feet of water per year
77,000 water right claims, and the Idaho Snake River proceedings involve 185,000
claims. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, OFFIcIAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL IRRIGATION
CONGRESS 109, 112 (1893), quoted in DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE
LIFE OFJOHN WESLEY PowELL 529 (2001).

45. See generally City and County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276
P.2d 992, 1012 (Colo. 1954) (holding that, following the Act of 1877, all non-navigable
waters, then a part of the public domain, became publici juris, subject to the plenary
control of designated states).
46. Id. at 995-97.
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to the seven county area of northeastern Colorado for agricultural,
municipal, and industrial uses. The project authorized construction of
a trans-mountain diversion tunnel running west to east under the
surface of Rocky Mountain National Park.47
Green Mountain Reservoir would store an additional 52,000-acre
feet of water to provide replacement water for senior uses on the
western slope drawing on Colorado River water, thereby allowing outof-priority diversions to northeastern Colorado. Power production at
the Green Mountain site would help repay the United States for C-BT
construction costs, along with project power features on the eastern
slope, and the repayment obligations of the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District ("Northern District"), the project's northeastern
Colorado sponsor. The water users of the fifteen county Colorado
River Water Conservation District ("River District")
were the primary
48
Reservoir.
Mountain
Green
of
beneficiaries
The agreement between northeastern Colorado and the western
slope water interests was an elevated achievement. Colorado is the
state of the Great Divide, hydrologically and politically. Eighty percent
of the average annual precipitation arises on the western slope; eighty
percent of the population and much of the irrigable acreage of the
state lies on the eastern slope. The River District and the Northern
District, both established in 1937, safeguard the water interests of their
regions.49 The authorizing legislation for formation of the Northern
District required mitigation to the western slope for trans-mountain
diversions from the natural basin of the Colorado River within the
state. 5° Congressman Ed Taylor of the western slope had successfully
insisted on provisions in the congressional authorization requiring
construction of the Green Mountain Reservoir, the western slope
protective feature, before any of the features designed to benefit the
eastern slope. 5'
The Bureau of Reclamation proceeded with construction of the CBT Project commencing with Green Mountain Reservoir, as Congress
had directed, however, litigation over water rights priorities was
inevitable. 2 The City and County of Denver, proceeding with its own
financial resources and free of any state or federal legislative
provisions, planned on constructing Dillon Reservoir to divert Blue
River waters through its own trans-mountain tunnels for use in the City
47. See generally DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST: THE COLORADOBIG THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERvANCY DISTRICT

(1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52.

TYLER, supra note 47, at 205-15.
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and County and its service areas in the mushrooming metropolitan
53
area.
Although a water right arises only from actual application of water
to a beneficial use, Colorado law allows for relating the priority date of
the water right back to the date when the claimant took its first act
evidencing the intent to appropriate a certain amount of available
unappropriated water at a specific location for beneficial use, provided
that construction of the project proceeds with reasonable diligence. 4
The relation back doctrine thereby permits the appropriator the time
required to engineer, finance, and construct the water works necessary
to use the water.
Relying on an appropriation date of 1935 for the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, the two districts-allied as they were in the
construction and operation of the federal reclamation projectclaimed that Denver had not been diligent in pursuing its Blue River
claims. Denver had asserted a 1921 date for Dillon Reservoir based on
its overall planning for a comprehensive water system along the
eastern and western slope sources.5 ' Refusing to appear in the state
court suit pre-McCarran, the United States filed a parallel suit in the
Colorado Federal District Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision provided a date of 1946
based on Denver starting work on the Montezuma trans-mountain
tunnel that year.56 Concluding that Denver had not been diligent in
pursuing its Blue River claims, the court postponed the City and
County's asserted earlier priority in favor of the federally held priority
for the C-BT Project. The dissent-signed by the only three judges
from the Denver metropolitan area-declared that because of
Denver's work on its comprehensive water system, the City and County
had been diligent and was entitled to the earlier date.58
Denver newspapers proclaimed calamity and sided with the
dissent. Denver faced a dry future because the majority, through
Justice Stone, had turned control of the Blue River over to the United
States. The Denver Post started its coverage on October 19, 1954, in an
article reporting a rumor that the Colorado Supreme Court was close
to ruling against Denver in the proposed Blue River diversion case. 9
The rumored outcome was four-to-three against Denver. The Post said
there were "reports that attempts were being made by the state
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Sieber v. Frink, 2 P. 901, 903 (Colo. 1884).
See generally TYLER, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.

58. Id.

59. Bert Hanna & Nello Cassai, 4-3 Decision Against City, Lawyers Told, DENY. POST,
Oct. 18, 1954, at 1.
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Republican high command to hold up the decision until after the
election because of jolting political aspects." ° Attorneys told the Post
that the decision "means that Denver has no legal right to 177,000
acre-feet of water" sought from the Blue River.6'
The court issued its opinion late in the afternoon of the day the
Post's morning edition had broken the story. The next day, October
20, the Post reported that the priority date awarded to Denver of June
24, 1946, would "entitle Denver only to a little surplus flood water in
wet years."62 Justice Stone had "doomed" Denver's future. A "Denver
spokesman," commenting on the decision, said, "the city will make no
attempt to divert the 788 second-feet permitted, declaring that such
diversion would not be financially feasible., 63 An accompanying
editorial asserted that "[t] he effect of the decision is to award virtually
the entire flow of the Blue [R] iver to Green Mountain reservoir, a part
of the Colorado-Big Thompson project, and to the Green Mountain
hydro plant where the government generates electricity."64
On October 26, the Denver Post endorsed Justice Stone's
opponent, Henry S. Lindsley, stating: 'Justice Stone wrote the recent
majority opinion of the state supreme court which constituted a
serious blow to Denver's plans for increasing its dwindling water
supply by tapping the Blue River." 65 The Post acknowledged that
Discounting
'Justice Stone has been a distinguished jurist... "66
political motivations of its own, the Post nevertheless said that Justice
Stone should go, maintaining that although judges should not base
decisions on politics, "it is important, however, that younger men be
elected to the court whenever younger men of demonstrated
knowledge, understanding and character are offered as candidates." 6'
Justice Stone was seventy-two; his opponent, fifty-one.
Denver filed for rehearing and a series of Post stories and columns
up to election day speculated on the severe damage dealt to Denver
and the chances of a rehearing-and reversal-if Justice Stone's
opponent was elected. Newspapers in northeastern Colorado and on
the western slope countered with articles, columns, and editorials in
favor ofJustice Stone's decision and his retention.
On the first Tuesday of November 1954, a flood of Denver
metropolitan votes took Justice Stone down.68 The Denver Water
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1954,

Id.
Id.
City Failed to Establish Claim, JuristSays, DENV. POST, Oct. 19, 1954, at 2.
Id.
Editorial, The Supreme Court vs. a Growing City, DENV.POST, Oct. 20, 1954, at 16.
Editorial, On SelectingJudges, DENV. POST, Oct. 26, 1954, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Bert Hanna, Denver's Vote Decisive in Supreme Court Race, DENY. POST, Nov. 3,
at 23.
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Board filed successive rehearing petitions, including one after Justice
Lindsley had taken his place on the court. Justice Lindsley refused to
vote for rehearing;69 as a result, Justice Stone's opinion stood.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision produced a settlement in
In return for a power
the federal court case the next year.
interference agreement, that would store and divert water otherwise
required to run through the turbines at Green Mountain dam
downstream of Dillon Reservoir, in 1955, Denver stipulated to the
senior priority of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. Today, Denver
operates Dillon Reservoir as its premier water storage reservoir; the CBT Project has a long record of service to Northeastern Colorado; and
the 100,000 acre-feet of water in Green Mountain Reservoir is fully
subscribed for western slope uses, mainly providing replacement water
for junior out-of-priority diversions on the western slope subject to
curtailment otherwise.70
In 1966, Colorado voters approved a state constitutional
amendment abolishing contested judicial races, in favor of citizencommission nomination of trial court and appellate court candidates,
followed by Gubernatorial appointment, and a retention/nonretention vote for a term of years after two years of service. Upon
Justice Stone's death, the Colorado Supreme Court presided over a
eulogy to his excellence as a justice and the example his reelection
defeat has set for a better way of selecting and retaining judges. Said
Leonard Campbell, a leader of the Colorado Bar Association, on this
occasion:
I listened and remembered well when Alden Hill spoke about the
election of 1954 when Mortimer Stone was defeated, improperly
defeated in the election held that year. Perhaps it's somewhat fitting
as a Denverite born here, somewhat related on occasion to the Water
Department, that we acknowledge what has been acknowledged
countless times, that never was there an election for any judge of this
Supreme Court that was more discussed after the election in which

69. Justice Holland, one of the dissenting justices, explained that he and his fellow
dissenters and the new member of the court, Justice Lindsley, "unhesitatingly
participated in the matter of the denial of the last of the subsequent motions [for
rehearing] as proper procedure to establish finality as is proper in this, as well as other
litigated cases," despite the dissent of the three and the arrival of a new judge who had
not participated in the majority's decision. See City and County of Denver v. N. Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1023 (Colo. 1954) (Holland,J., dissenting).
70. Every one of these water features helps to put Colorado's entitlement under the
Colorado River Compact to use within the state, while serving important recreational
and environmental needs. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 690
(Colo. 2001). Particularly in the headwater counties of Grand, Summit, and Eagle,
home to ski area, summer resort, and residential development, the western slope's
recreational and residential economy is largely possible because of replacement
releases from Green Mountain Reservoir, permitting out-of-priority diversions. In re
Application of Denver, 935 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the judge gained in stature; he gained in stature every time that it was
discussed; and never was it more clearly demonstrated that there was
a deficiency in the elective process that did not return him to office."'
After his defeat, Justice Stone went on to serve as a referee with
the National Railroad Adjustment Board and Mediation Board,
deciding dockets of disputes between railroads and their employees.
He died twenty-four years after his election defeat; he was ninety-five.
IV. THE IDAHO EXPERIENCE
Ideals and actions do not automatically coincide. Given the history of
Idaho's irrigated landscape, a corollary might be added to this basic
observation. A belief that humans should conquer and exploit the
environment does not necessarily mean that they will actually achieve
their objectives. As the irrigated landscape showed, nature often
72
eluded ideals: a conquest myth did not produce a conquered land.
In October 1999, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion on
wilderness water rights in the Snake River Basin McCarran
adjudication." Idaho provides for the contested election ofjudges but
without party identification. If a candidate in the primary does not
obtain a majority vote, a run-off election occurs as part of the general
election. The author of the three-to-two decision, Justice Cathy Silak,
was up for reelection. The controversy over her opinion drew a ballot
opponent who defeated her overwhelmingly.
Inconclusive Colorado litigation had preceded this case. The
Idaho case involved the United States Forest Service's assertion of
implied federal reserved water rights for three wilderness areas,
portions of which were downstream of agricultural, municipal, and
mining water uses. Although the Sierra Club had brought federal
litigation against the Forest Service in Colorado seeking to compel it to
claim wilderness water rights, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to do so, and found the case hypothetical and nonreviewable. 7 4
The Colorado Federal District Court had ruled in favor of the theory
of such rights, but stated its inability to order the Forest Service to
adjudicate them. Instead, it ordered the Forest Service to devise a plan
to protect wilderness water resources in the absence of obtaining water

71. See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Colorado, Friday, April 14, 1978, to
honor the memory of the late Honorable Mortimer Stone as a Justice and Chief
Justice of the Court, in unpaginated preface to 195 Colo. (1978).
72. MARK FIEGE, IRRIGATED EDEN, THE MAKING OF AN AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPE IN
THE AMERICAN WEST 207-08 (1999).

73. See generally In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *1 (Idaho Oct. 1,
1999) (affirming the district court's order granting the United States's reserved water
rights for the Frank Church River of No Return, the Selway-Bitter Root, and the
Gospel-Hump Wilderness Areas).

74. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990).

Issue I

STATE WATER POLITICS

rights for them." Because the Tenth Circuit found the case not ripe
for decision, it vacated the district court's holding.
Colorado water user interests had intervened in the Sierra Club
litigation with an eye towards the proposed designation of downstream
wilderness areas on forest lands in the state. In these instances,
reservation of a wilderness water right could block future upstream
water development on non-wilderness lands.76
In Idaho, the designation of wilderness areas downstream of
developing lands had already occurred. The Forest Service, therefore,
undertook in Idaho's McCarran proceedings to meet its perceived
responsibility for asserting the existence of federal reserved water
rights for wilderness areas, where such rights could make a difference
in protecting wilderness water resources. Namely, for the SelwayBitterroot (designated by Congress in 1964)," 7 the Gospel-Hump
(designated by Congress in 1978) 7' and the Frank Church River of No
Return (designated by Congress in 1980) 79 wilderness areas.
The wilderness water rights claims were highly controversial from
the outset.
Cities, irrigation districts, and mining and timber
companies contested them both in the trial court and on appeal. The
state district court judge, conducting the comprehensive Snake River
Basin Adjudication, ruled in favor of the federal wilderness water
rights claims, as well as those for national recreation areas and wild
and scenic rivers in Idaho.
Idaho water users filed a brief arguing that the doctrine of
implied reserved water rights is an anachronism. They argued that
when Congress raises and debates the water issue, then fails to resolve
it, as with the Wilderness Act, the courts should refuse to act to imply a
reserved water right, for this would violate separation of powers. In
such a circumstance, they asserted, the New Mexico doctrine of
deference to state water law should apply to the case rather than the
Winters doctrine. In United States v. New Mexico,80 the United States
Supreme Court held that instream flows for fish and wildlife,
recreation, and other multiple uses of forest lands, were secondary
purposes of national forest designation, the primary purposes being

75. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1503-04 (D. Colo. 1987); Sierra Club v.
Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866-67 (D. Colo. 1985).
76. The subsequent 1993 Colorado Wilderness Act-mostly headwaters areas, but
including three downstream segments-disclaimed the creation of wilderness reserved
water rights as a result of that particular designation, while preserving any pre-existing
federal rights in the areas. Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, § 8, Pub. L. No. 103-77,
107 Stat. 756, 762-64.
77. See Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890.
78. Act of Feb. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237, 92 Stat. 43.

79.

Act ofJuly 23, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312, 94 Stat. 948.

80.

United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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timber production and water production for western settlers.
Accordingly, the water users contended that implied reserved water
rights do not exist for wilderness designations.
A majority of the Idaho Supreme Court justices agreed with the
adjudication court. Justice Silak's opinion relied on the Winters
doctrine, as other United States Supreme Court decisions have
interpreted it, spelling out the doctrine of implied reserved water
rights to prevent defeat of the primary purposes of federal
reservations."
As Judge John Kane had done in his vacated Colorado Federal
District Court decision, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that
congressional designation of wilderness areas on forest lands is a new
reservation overlaid on an existing one, the primary purpose of which
is to protect the wilderness values existing as of the date of
designation." Because water is an essential attribute of wilderness, a
federal water right is necessary to prevent its impairment. Justice Silak
wrote:
Through the Wilderness Act, Congress established a new category of
federal lands-the national Wilderness Preservation System. Unlike
the MUSYA [Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act], the Wilderness
Act prescribes a unique management scheme that clearly aims to
preserve the wilderness character of the designated lands. The
designation of the Wilderness Areas at issue in this case continued

the withdrawal of these areas from the public domain. Moreover, it is
also clear that the Wilderness Areas were established for the purpose
of wilderness preservation.
Therefore, we conclude that the
congressional designations of the Wilderness Areas are reservations of
land established for the primary purpose of wilderness protection
and preservation."
Citing the opaque language of the 1964 Wilderness Act regarding
water rights, " 'nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or
implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to
exemption from the [s]tate water laws', ,85 the majority concluded that
wilderness designation did not create an express federal reserved water
right.8 6 It then undertook to determine the existence of an implied

81. Id. at 710. Applying New Mexico, the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously
decided in another case that the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960 did not
create an express or implied reservation of water. United States v. City of Challis, 988
P.2d 1199, 1207 (Idaho 1999).
82. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976); Arizona v. California,

373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
83.

InreSRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *19-20 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999).

84. Id.
85. Id. at *20.
86. Id.
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7
reserved water right.1

The majority opinion focused on the central function of Idaho
water law-to provide for the future appropriation of unappropriated,
unreserved water-versus the forceful language of Congress regarding
its intent to preserve the wilderness areas as they were at the time of
their designation:
Idaho law provides that all non-reserved, unappropriated water
within the state is subject to appropriation to further domestic and
economic

development

...

A

review

of

the

Wilderness

Act

demonstrates that the prior appropriation doctrine is inconsistent
with congressional intent to preserve the wilderness character of the

Wilderness Areas."8

The three-member majority determined that the wilderness water
reservation was for all the water:
As discussed above, the appropriation of water from within the
Wilderness Areas would defeat Congress's [sic] primary purpose of
preserving the unimpaired wilderness character of the areas. The
Wilderness Act makes clear Congress' intention that the Wilderness
Areas "be administered ... in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for.., the preservation of their wilderness character." ...
Congress defined wilderness as "an area of undeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed
so as to preserve its natural conditions." ... Water is required to
effectuate the purpose of maintaining wilderness in its pristine
natural condition. Because removing water necessarily impairs the
natural state of the wilderness lands, Congress must have intended to
reserve all unappropriated water.... Therefore, we hold that the
SRBA district court correctly concluded that the entire
unappropriated amount of water within the Wilderness Areas is
necessary to accomplish the purposes of wilderness preservation and
protection."
The majority did not address the water users argument that the
implied reserved water right doctrine is an anachronism and creates
separation of powers problems if applied to wilderness designations.
The separation of powers problem arises because courts cannot
legislate to create a water right when Congress has raised the issue but
has declined to resolve it.
The dissent wrote that implied reserved water rights cannot exist
when it is clear that Congress has taken up the water issue and has not
87. Id. at *20-24.
88. In reSRBA, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *24.
89. Id. at *27-28.
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expressly reserved unappropriated water. 90 The language no claim/no
denial of exemption from state water law, it said, meant Congress
intended no claim for wilderness water rights.9 The dissent also
concluded that wilderness designation is a management directive to
the administering agency, not a reservation overlying an original
Forest reservation.
Reacting to a torrent of immediate and widespread adverse
reaction to the decision across Idaho that took on a life of its own, The
Idaho Statesman editorialized on October 14, 1999, for Justice Silak's
reelection defeat:
Through the hand-wringing over Idaho's water rights, there is one
quick-fix solution available to voters: elect a new Supreme Court

justice. Justice Cathy Silak, who on Oct. 1 wrote the explosive
opinion that turns over water rights in wilderness areas to the federal
government, is up for re-election in May. Hers is the only seat that
will be available. That leaves an opening for anybody who thinks she
was in error in assuming the intent of Congress to give the federal
government rights over Idaho's wilderness water.

The editors went on to opine that Silak "should be well aware"
that not a single Idaho politician in the last thirty-plus years,
"Democrat or Republican," would dare run on a platform allowing the
federal government "to control every drop of water in designated areas
of the state."94 While the editorial said it was too early to tell whether
an opponent could defeat her based on one decision, the
"controversial ruling was approved on a [three-to-two] vote, so all it
takes is one change on the [s]upreme [c]ourt-one individual who
demonstrates a greater
sensitivity to what's at stake, which is Idaho's
9

water sovereignty."

The Statesman said that "[s] ome state leaders warn that thousands
of Idaho water users, including Treasure Valley residents, could lose
their right to use water for drinking, farming, and making microchips.
Farmers are especially worried about their livelihoods coming to an
end and fields turning to sagebrush. 96 The trial attorney for the
United States was reported as saying it was not the government's aim
to claim every drop of water allocated since 1980. The editorial
90. Id. at *38 (Kidwell,J., dissenting).
91. Id. at*41.
92. Id. at *47.
93.

Editorial, Idahoans Could Place Water Rights Issue In Their Hands,

IDAHO

STATESMAN, Oct. 14, 1999, at 6b. The author thanks reporter Dan Popkey of the Idaho
Statesman for the courtesy of providing articles and editorials of that newspaper
appearing over the course of the election controversy.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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concluded that "[i]f Silak wants to help her cause, she could push for a
rehearing on this case and be open to changing her mind. Her future
on the Idaho Supreme Court may depend on what she does on this
issue.""
Shortly after this editorial appeared, the court granted a
rehearing. Justice Silakjoined in the vote to grant rehearing. A state
district judge filed his candidacy to run against her. On March 13,
2000, The Statesman reported that Justice Silak's adversary had recused
himself from further proceedings at the trial court level in a
controversial school finance case because, in his view, the Idaho
Supreme Court had rewritten the Idaho Constitution, and for him to
implement the court's decision would be to violate his oath of office.9
The Statesman also quoted a state republican legislator as saying,
"'Three strikes against this court, and especially against Cathy Silak.
She's out.... We have to send that message. If we can't do it
legislatively, by tying their hands, then we've got to send a message by
replacing her'." 99 The article said, "Critics, including virtually every
elected official in Idaho, contend the court misinterpreted
congressional
intent on reserved water rights in the 1964 Wilderness
" 100
Act.
Justice Silak attempted to respond by pointing to her record. The
Statesman, on April 29, 2000, quoted the Boise attorney chairingJustice
Silak's reelection campaign as saying that the court's five justices
issued unanimous rulings in seventy-four of eighty-eight cases before
them and Justice Silak had filed only three dissents.'
Asked to
respond, Justice Silak's opponent pointed to her vote in the school
funding and water rights decisions as indicative of her disregard for
the law. 02
Within days of the upcoming election, The Statesman-reviewing
the judicial record and statements of both candidates-reversed its
initial editorial suggestion that voters should oust Justice Silak from
office. It endorsed her reelection:

97. Id.
98. Mark Warbis, Tempers Run Hot Over High Court's Recent Rulings, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 13, 2000, at lb.

99. Id. The reference to three strikes was to a case where the Idaho Supreme Court
had overruled a lower-court decision absolving St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
of an employee's molestation of a minor, the public schools case where the court
determined that the state had a constitutional obligation to ensure that students can
attend public schools that provide "a safe environment, conducive to learning," and
the wilderness water rights case. Id.
100. Id.
101. Candidate Takes on Justice Silak's Record of Rulings, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 29,
2000, at lb.
102. Id.
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Silak's record shows no evidence of judicial activism. Last year, she
sided with the court's majority in 93 out of 96 published opinions;
this is hardly the record of a maverick. Silak declined to answer the
same religious questionnaire [her opponent] answered, saying it
would be unethical to discuss her opinion. She's right.'03
The editorial pointed out thatJustice Silak's opponent had:
answered an endorsement questionnaire from a religious group,
where he discussed his evangelism, opposition to abortion and deeply
held belief in creationism and his conviction that the Bible is the
source of our moral law.... Revealing religious and moral views for a
political endorsement leaves the public0 4 to question [his] detachment
and erode confidence in his decisions.
Justice Silak fell to overwhelming defeat on May 23. Although she
attributed her defeat to "partisanship" and not necessarily her water
opinion, 0 The Statesman on May 27, 2000, quoted a political analyst as
saying that her vote in support of federal water rights was the likely

cause. 1 06 "Water rights is the third rail of Idaho politics.... Because of
that decision, most of the focus was on her. Even though there was a
lot of good reporting on [her opponent's] missteps, the focus was on
water rights.' 07 The election campaign cost both candidates a total of
$290,000, with Justice Silak slightly outspending her successful
opponent.0 8
On October 27, 2000, with the election five months behind, the
Idaho Supreme Court reversed directions, determining that no
implied federal reserved water rights existed for the three wilderness
areas.' °9 The lead opinion for the new majority stated that "It]he
language of the Wilderness Act indicates that it sets aside land and
prohibits its development, nothing more.""0
Accordingly, the
wilderness designation has no extraterritorial effect on water
103. Editorial, Justice Silak Has Experience and Judicial Temperament, IDAHO
May 21, 2000, at 10b.
104. Id.
105.

STATESMAN,

Ken Miller, Silak Blames PartisanshipforLoss More than Water Rights Ruling, IDAHO
May 27, 2000, at 6a. Idaho's system of scheduling judicial elections at the

STATESMAN,

time of the party primaries may accentuate former party affiliations, although the
judicial election is theoretically non-partisan. Media coverage regarding the Idaho
election continuously reported that a democratic governor had appointed Justice
Silak, and she had been active in democratic politics before taking office.
Approximately, 86 percent of the total votes cast in the primary election were
Republican.
106. Ken Miller, Politics Under Scrutiny After CourtElection, IDAHO STATESMAN, May 27,
2000, at la.
107. Id.
108. Supreme Court Race was Most Costly Ever, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 23, 2000, at lb.
109. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1266 (Idaho 2000).
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development outside of wilderness boundaries. "A clear indication of
the creation of implied water rights as claimed by the United States
does not exist in the language of the Wilderness Act or in its legislative
history.""'
Specially concurring, the chief justice questioned the continued
viability of the Winters doctrine. "Where, as in this case, Congress has
chosen for whatever reason, not to create an express water right
despite its knowledge of a potential conflict, I believe it can no longer
be inferred that such a right is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation.""2 She said to The Statesman on October 28, 2000, that
"the suggestion that she had made a political rather than legal
decision [was] 'insulting'.""' Acknowledging that, "'You're asking a
question that's fair game'," the chief justice explained that she had
changed her mind based on the briefs and the oral argument on
rehearing, lengthy discussion, and her own lengthy restudy of the
applicable law."'
The Times-News issue of October 28, 2000, quoted Idaho's
Governor as saying the "[slupreme [c]ourt made the right call," and
the Idaho Deputy Attorney General's office as saying the new ruling
"'reaffirmed the long-standing principle of primacy of state water
law'."..
Pointing to the existence of more than 150,000 water rights
claims in thirty-eight counties involved in the pending Snake River
Basin adjudication, the Speaker of Idaho's House of Representatives
proclaimed, "[i] t gets us to where we can, in the negotiations and the
mediations, proceed from a position of strength rather than a
defensive posture.""6
In light of the Idaho experience, The Statesman editorialized on
October 31, 2000, that the state should reexamine its method of
selecting judges through contested elections. "Until there is change in
the system, challengers in [s]upreme
[c]ourt contests will continue to
7
press the political envelope."

V. FEDERALISM, AN ENDURING HERITAGE
That open space that fills your vision and lifts your heart when you
drive across the West is federal open space, most of it. Federally
owned, protected, managed, federally kept open to almost any sort of
reasonable public use. If it brings some irritations from hordes of
tourists, it also fills the local treasury, and it gives a large part of the
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1271.
Rocky Barker, Water Ruling Reversed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 28, 2000, at A 01.
Id.

115.

N.S. Nokkentved, justices Reverse Water Ruling, TIMEs-NEws, Oct. 28, 2000, at Al.

116.

Id.

117.

Editorial, Our View, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 31, 2000, at B 08.
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spaciousness and satisfaction to western living. As for wilderness
areas, if we had had to depend on the states for their protection,
there would pretty clearly be none ... If the West is going to be saved

in anything like its present state, it will not be by the states or the
oligarchs who dominate most western capitals.
It will be
accomplished, if at all, by the greatest cooperation possible between
state and federal, private and federal, private and state, business and
agriculture.
Wallace Stegner"'

The Idaho election result reverberated across the United States.
The Georgetown University Law Center's Environmental Policy Project
urged environmental interests nationwide to take an active role in
future state judicial elections." 9 In light of national news reports,
those interested in preserving judicial independence and resisting
political influences on judges questioned whether the Idaho Supreme
Court, particularly its chief justice, had found itself in a political
firestorm, the intensity of which it had not foreseen and did not
withstand.
The impact of the Idaho experience on western state McCarran
adjudications remains to be seen. Additionally, the states differ in
their methods for selecting state judges and their political climates.
While fed-supplicating and fed-denigrating may be a stock-in-trade of
water politics-raising the fervor and the fever of water lawyers-a
state judge takes an oath of office to uphold the Constitution and the
laws of the United States and the state. In instances of preemptive
conflict, federal law prevails. In addition,judicial ethics require judges
to reach reasoned decisions and not alter the conclusions they reach
based on political considerations.
Evidence that state water politics is poisoning the well of fair
hearings has its remedy in the exercise of federal court concurrent
jurisdiction over the claims of the federal agencies and the tribes. The
split of the Idaho Supreme Court on the issue of wilderness water
rights dramatizes the toll federalism can take on state judges, as they
grapple with strongly advocated, inherently adversarial positions with
political content and implications.
Scholarship, deference to legislative intent, and straightforward
exposition of the court's reasoning-this is the judicial ideal. The
judicial ideal should be the expected norm.
Justice Silak's opinion in favor of wilderness water rights, like
118. WALLACE STEGNER, Land: America's History Teacher, in MARKING THE SPARROW'S
FALL: WALLACE STEGNER'SAMERICAN WEST 274, 276 (Page Stegner ed., 1998).
119. ENVIRONMENTAL POuCY PROJECT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
CHANGING THE RULES BY CHANGING THE PLAYERS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE IN STATE

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 48 (2000).
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Judge Kane's before it in Colorado, was based on the forceful
declarations Congress made in legislation favoring wilderness
preservation. Her opinion was principled, not outlandish. It relied on
the words of the statutes, the evident intent of Congress, leaving to
legislators the evident policy issues.
The dissent to Justice Silak's opinion was also principled. It
pointed out that neither the 1964 Wilderness Act, nor the individual
Idaho wilderness designations created an express reserved water
right.2 The language of no claim/no denial of exemption from state
water law was patently the product of compromise designed to sidestep
the issue. However, because the intent of Congress is determinative
and Congress raised the very issue and then declined to resolve it, any
court could logically conclude that Congress was not concerned with
the creation of reserved water rights for wilderness areas, leaving the
New Mexico doctrine applicable, as opposed to the Winters doctrine.
The Idaho Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinionsboth sets of them-are well joined. The strength of the court's
combined exposition, together with the evident need for final
resolution, would seem to have made the Idaho case a logical
candidate for United States Supreme Court review, but the
government did not pursue a petition for certiorari. Congress and/or
the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the polar opposites of wilderness
water rights advocacy, the not-one-drop-shall-you-take from a
wilderness area position versus the thou-shalt-not-tred-on-me state
water law position.
The dilemma the Idaho Supreme Court faced is a study for other
state supreme courts. Justice Silak's reelection bid, like Justice Stone's
before it, became a political crucible, overshadowing the role of courts
in the separation of powers and the merits of those serving in judicial
office. Unlike Justice Stone's instance, where the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to grant rehearing, the Idaho Supreme Court granted
rehearing and reversed the outcome when the chief justice, who had
concurred with Justice Silak's opinion, agreed with the two dissenters
to deny the wilderness water claims. The rehearing process extended
through Justice Silak's defeat.
While a judge should vote for rehearing if he or she may have
misapprehended the facts or the law of the case, a rehearing and the
substitution of an opposite opinion, is rare, in contrast with modifying
the decision to make corrections while maintaining the same outcome
and denying the rehearing petition. The essence of appellate
deliberation is to test the strength of the proposed opinion,
intellectually and practically. The appellate process is deliberate
120. In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 Idaho LEXIS 119, at *41 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999)
(Kidwell,J., dissenting).
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enough to allow thorough study and consideration before the court's
final vote and release of a majority opinion. Non-authoring justices
have a choice between two proposed opinions-to choose one or the
other, or to author yet a third opinion, for the purpose of gaining a
clearer majority or sharpening the court's analysis.
Significant questions deserve doubled efforts at consensus
building among the justices whenever possible. Because justices must
work in isolation, rather than the consultation in which the officials of
the legislative and executive branches are free to engage in, they
always owe to each other the courtesy of well-expressed critique,
thoughtful insight, and prudent foresight.
The Idaho Supreme Court's switched outcome is likely to be the
source of continued speculation. Did the court engage in politics in
reaching its first decision, in granting the rehearing, in reversing itself
on rehearing amidst a public outcry? Or did the majority justices
simply get it wrong, with the authoring justice bearing the ultimate
responsibility?
Lost in the Idaho controversy is the fact that the Idaho Supreme
Court, despite denying the wilderness water rights claims on
rehearing, nevertheless determined that congressional legislation
designating certain Idaho national recreation areas and wild and
scenic rivers carried with them expressly reserved water rights, the
amount thereof to be quantified on remand."' Idaho water users also
strongly contested the existence of these rights, and the Idaho
Supreme Court decisions in this regard. Others like it, arising from
the McCarran proceedings, are candidates for United States Supreme
Court review as well.
Thus, despite the surrounding political rhetoric of state primacy
and sovereignty in water matters, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme
Court did not take Justice Silak's defeat as a reason to retreat to an
unmitigated application of state water law, in the face of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. And in rulings by the
Arizona Supreme Court in adjudication of tribal water rights,'22
McCarran decisions in Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication bode
well for the ability of western state courts to go about the judicial
business of resolving state and federal water claims.
121.

Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1268-69 (Idaho 2000); Potlatch

Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1256, 1258-59 (Idaho 2000). The court refused to
recognize the reserved water rights claims for certain recreation areas and national
wildlife refuges in the state, applying the New Mexico doctrine. United States v. Idaho,
23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001); State v. United States, 12 P.3d 1284, 1290-91 (Idaho 2000).

122. In re General Adjudication of all Rights to use Water in the Gila River System
and Source, No. WC-90-001-IR, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 205 (Ariz. Nov. 26, 2001); In re
General Adjudication of all Rights to use Water in the Gila River System and Source,
989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999).
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The role of settlement in these complex adjudications is also
important. Subordination of federal claims to present and reasonable
future needs of the state is a possibility, in return for recognition of
enforceable rights for protection of environmental values. Those
committed to absolutist positions on both sides of the equation always
have difficulty with such proposals, but significant differences can
make for significant settlement achievements, accommodating
important interests.
Surely, Congress has delivered severely
contrasting mixed messages through its traditional deference to state
law and its strong environmental protection statutes.
Water users of all stripes, including those favoring environmental
uses, are bound-in the system of water use property rights that
Congress and the states have fostered-to the fundamental precept
that juniors must stand aside while seniors exercise their rights, when
there is not enough to supply all uses. Ignoring this in favor of
passionate commitment to one's own point of view and interest
mistakenly ignores the operative principle that water remains a public
resource committed to disposition and use in priority.
Undoubtedly, the Idaho Water Bar will look both to the
boundaries of its advocacy role and to its role in fostering a
continuously independent and fair judiciary. So will the water bars of
the other western states, in light of the Colorado and Idaho
experiences. Fair judges conducting fair hearings must be the norm.
Judicial political decision-making has no place in the separation of
powers; that would undermine public confidence even more surely
than a handful of controversial decisions.
The media also plays a very important role. Through reporting
and editorializing, it can stand watch on the maturation and well being
of each state's community. Operating in the community requires
good scholarship, common sense, an eye to history, attention to detail,
and well considered premonitions of future possibilities. If judges
must run against opponents for election and raise funds, can they
really focus on the merits of the cases before them? In light of the
recent experience, the Idaho press began to engage in reflective
deliberation on the important issues of government, natural resource
use and preservation, and the federal relationships involved. Such
public inquiry has a way of spilling into public policy.
The two chambers of the western heart, the two lobes of the
western mind, are beneficial use and preservation.
Growth and
glorious natural habitat, this is the heritage of the public domain. Our
rapidly urbanizing western experience-bridled by our love for the
vistas, rivers, and all life, our natural optimism, our need for each
other-in this our western place, so prized by the entire country, shall
carry us forward.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEVADA
WATER LAW
SYLVIA HARRISON*
I.
II.
111.

IV.

V.
VI.

VII.
VIII.

Introduction ........................................................................ 148
A Brief History ....................................................................
150
The Development of the Appropriation Doctrine ................ 153
A. Foundations: The Mining Law of 1866 .............................. 153
B. Foundations: Early Decisions of the Nevada Supreme
Co u rt ....................................................................................
154
Codification of Nevada Water Law ...................................... 160
A. Francis Newlands and the Reclamation Act of 1902 .......... 160
B. The Enactment of Nevada's 1913 Water Law .................... 165
C. Constitutional Challenges to the 1913 Water Law ............. 167
Development of the Law of Groundwater Appropriation ..... 169
Losing Water Rights in Nevada ............................................
173
A. The Short History of Prescriptive Rights in Nevada .......... 173
B. Evolution of the Law of Forfeiture and Abandonment ..... 175
C. Recent Changes in the Laws of Abandonment and
F o rfeitu re .............................................................................
177
Discussion ...........................................................................
179
Conclusion ..........................................................................
182
I. INTRODUCTION

Nevada is the driest state in the Nation.'
Average annual
precipitation is a scant nine inches, with some parts of the state
receiving four inches or less. Bordered on the west by the massive
Sierra Nevada Mountains, the majority of the state lies in a vast rain
shadow, formed when the moisture laden westerlies rain across an
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Montana. Ms. Harrison is a partner in the Reno and Las Vegas, Nevada law firm of
McDonald Carano Wilson McCune Bergin Frankovich & Hicks LLP. She practices
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manuscript.
1. Nevada
Division
of
Water
Planning,
Nevada
Water
Facts,
http://www.state.nv.us/cnr/ndwp/wat-fact/precip.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2001). In
2000, The Nevada Division of Water Planning merged with the Nevada Division of
Water Resources.
The Division of Water Planning's website is not currently
maintained, but it contains a wealth of information regarding Nevada water resources,
including comprehensive historical information regarding several of the state's major
rivers. Id.
2. Id.
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upslope course spanning the range. Although a desert, the state is not
flat. Nevada lies in the "Basin and Range" physiographic province.
More than 160 north-south trending mountain ranges divide the state,
creating dry, isolated valleys.3
Nevada's few rivers would be brooks by eastern standards. The
combined volume of the Carson, Truckee, and Walker Rivers at their
maximum average annual flows is less than 2,000 cubic feet per
second, about a tenth of the volume of the lower reaches of the
Connecticut River. The total length of each measures a few hundred
miles or less. Their abbreviated watercourses rise in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains and plunge down the eastern slopes through steep rocky
canyons and narrow valleys to end in land locked lakes or sinks.5 The
Humboldt, the only sizeable stream that begins and ends within the
state, wanders westward through the maze of mountains and ends in a
vast interior sink. 6 The state's only "river sized" river is the Colorado.
It glances off the southern tip of the state and delivers Nevada's scant
Colorado Compact allocation on its way to serve the requirements of
her neighbors.

The scarcity of Nevada's water is the defining circumstance of its
water laws. Throughout its history, Nevada has confronted the task of
resolving monumental contests over the rights to this critical resource.
This paper tracks the evolution of Nevada's statutes governing the
administration of water use, as the state has struggled to mold a legal
framework to accommodate the physical realities of its harsh and
beautiful lands.
The scope of this paper is limited to a discussion of the evolution
of the common law to form the foundation of Nevada's appropriation
doctrine, and the history of the codification of its laws administering
water rights. The discussions include the development of groundwater
appropriation statutes and the progression of laws governing the loss
No attempt is made to trace the numerous
of water rights.
amendments and modifications of these laws, except where these
changes represent major departures from the basic appropriation
This paper does not consider the several
doctrine framework.
hundred pages of Nevada statutes governing the administration of
irrigation and water conservancy districts, ditch companies, and water
authorities. As discussed in the concluding sections of this paper,
Nevada statutes along with a complex system of federal decrees and
decisions, interstate compacts and contracts govern the administration
of Nevada's water. It would be impossible to do justice to the sagas
3.

RUSSELLR. ELuOTr, HISTORY OF NEVADA 1 (2d ed. 1987).

4. See United States Geological

Survey, Surface Water Data for USA, at

http://water.usgs.gov/nwis/annual (last visited Aug. 12, 2001).
5.

NEVADA WRITERS'

PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROJECT ADMINISTRATION, THE WPA

GUIDE TO 1930s NEVADA 6 (1991).

6. Id.
7. Id. Nevada's allotment of Colorado River water is about 4 percent of the total
allocation to California, Arizona and Nevada. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 342
(1964).
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behind this aspect of Nevada water law in a paper of this length, and
these facets of water allocation and distribution systems are addressed
only to the extent necessary to provide essential context for statutory
developments.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
The national politics of the Civil War era shaped Nevada's early
history. The national political agendas of two of Nevada's most
prominent early citizens, William M. Stewart and Francis G. Newlands,
profoundly influenced the evolution of its water laws.
In 1848, the United States gained possession of the lands that
make up Nevada, California, Utah, and the majority of lands in
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming, through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.8 Unlike California, which had already felt the
impact of two centuries of American and European tradesmen and
missionaries, Nevada was virtually unsettled in the mid-nineteenth
century.
The acquisitions of the Mexican Cession sparked two years of
national debate over how to administer the lands in order to satisfy the
competing interests of the "slave" and "antislavery" states.9 By the
terms of the Compromise of 1850, Congress admitted California as a
free state, and divided the remaining Cession lands into the territories
of Utah and New Mexico, with the stands of these territories on the
issue of slavery to be deferred until statehood.'0
Most of present day Nevada was included within the Utah
Territory, and in the early 1850s Mormon settlers made their way to
the Carson Valley, below the Sierra Nevada on the Territory's western
edge." Despite the early settlers' pleas for a serious commitment to
Nevada's governance, the territorial government more or less ignored
the state. Most of the Mormon settlers returned to the Salt Lake City
area in 1856 and 1857 to assist their brethren in the so-called
"Mormon wars," leaving only a few hundred settlers in the Carson
Valley."
Among the remaining immigrants were prospectors panning for
gold in the area near Dayton, a frequent rest stop on the Carson River
en route to the California gold fields. 3 During the 1850s, prospectors
commonly spent winters mining in California, returning to the Carson
Valley area in the summer. These miners recovered respectable
quantities of gold in the stream placers of Gold Canyon, prompting
exploration for the upstream "mother lode" and leading to the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. 4, 9 Stat. 922.
ELuoTT, supranote 3, at 51.
Id.
Id. at52.
Id. at 56-57.

13.

BECKY WEIMER PURKEY & LARRYJ. GARSIDE, GEOLOGIC AND NATURAL HISTORY

TouRs INTHE RENO ARA 56 (1995) [hereinafter PuREY & GARSIDE].
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discovery of gold on the Comstock fault in 1859.4 Initial efforts by the
miners to concentrate free gold through placer operations were
hampered by blue clay that fouled the equipment. When some
farsighted and forgotten miner assayed the clay, it proved to be an
immensely rich silver ore.1 5 Underground mining operations along
the Comstock fault soon led to the discovery of ore bodies yielding
fabulous quantities of silver and gold. 6
The influx of miners following the discovery of the Comstock lode
added to the area's political chaos and increased the pressure on
Congress for recognition of Nevada as a separate territory. Members
of Congress from southern states opposed territorial status for Nevada,
as these states were struggling to maintain a balance between the slave
and free states. 7 In 1861, however, following the southern states'
secession from the Union and the formation of the Confederacy,8
Nevada.
Congress quickly passed a bill recognizing the territory of
The next three and a half years of Nevada's political history are rife
with stories of intrigue, scandal and corruption, which provided ample
fodder for the Comstock's famous TerritorialEnterpriseand young Mark
Twain.1
National political agendas dominated the development of Nevada's
government. Congress granted Nevada statehood on October 31,
1864, just in time for the new state's citizens to participate in the
November national election and help reelect President Lincoln. In
December, Nevada's new legislature elected two fledgling senators,
James W. Nye and the prominent Comstock attorney, William M.
Stewart. The new senators reached Washington in time to register
their votes favoring the Thirteenth Amendment."
Within a decade of Nevada's statehood, more than 35,000 people
crowded into the dry, mountain towns of the Comstock lode, with
25,000 in Virginia City, and 9,000 to 10,000 in Gold Hill.2' Water
posed a significant problem for the Comstock-too much in the
mines, and too little in the towns. These conditions inspired two
remarkable feats of engineering, the Sutro Tunnel 22 and the Virginia
and Gold Hill Water Company water supply system.25
In 1865, Albert Sutro presented a proposal to the state legislature
to solve the horrendous conditions of hot water and poor ventilation
the underground miners faced on the Comstock.24 Sutro proposed to
drive a horizontal tunnel, about four miles long, into the side of Mt.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 58.

16. Id.
17.

ELuoTr, supranote 3, at 68.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 84-89.
Id. at 89.
PuRXEY& GARSIDE, supra note 13,

Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 85.

24. Id.

at 62.
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Davidson. The tunnel would provide a deep drain for the mines,
enhance ventilation, and act as a conduit for ore and miners. The
legislature reacted enthusiastically, perhaps because Sutro had
convinced William M. Stewart to act as president of his company.
Sutro and his associates received an exclusive franchise for the
project. 5 Powerful mining interests saw the tunnel as a threat to their
economic domination of the Comstock and successfully obstructed
Sutro's efforts to capitalize the project. 26 William P. Sharon was chief
among Sutro's opponents. 27 Sharon succeeded Stewart as the "boss" of
the Comstock and was a primary figure in the so called "Bank Crowd,"
the group of financiers of the Bank of California, which controlled the
Comstock from 1867 to 1875.8
Construction of the Sutro tunnel did not begin until 1869, after a
fatal fire in one of the mines mobilized support for the venture. 2' The
physical challenge of constructing the tunnel was as daunting as the
financial challenge. The tunnel did not reach completion until 1878,
just as the mines of the Comstock were approaching exhaustion. 0
At the same time construction of the Sutro tunnel was underway,
the Comstock was addressing its needs for a fresh water supply through
construction of a remarkable system of flumes and pipelines to car 7
water from the Carson Range of the Sierra Nevada to Virginia City.
The system captured water from Hobart Creek and Marlette Lake, just
east of Lake Tahoe. The system then carried the water through
flumes, and ditches, and an "inverse siphon"-a high-pressure pipeline
operating by natural hydraulic pressure-to feed the water across
Washoe Valley into the hills above Gold Hill and Virginia City.
Completed in 1873, the water system was more than twenty-one miles
long and capable of delivering more than two million gallons per day.33
The Sutro tunnel and the Comstock water system are described in
detail above because they illustrate so well the fundamental
underpinnings of Nevada water law. For those who would unlock
Nevada's vast mineral wealth and develop its agricultural and
industrial potential, water would have to be managed, manipulated
and moved; those charged with charting Nevada law would ultimately
have to embrace that reality.

25.
26.
27.
28.

ELuoTr, supra note 3, at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.
PuRKEY& GARSIDE, supra note 13, at 61.

29.
30. Id. at 61-62.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-88.
Id.
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M. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
A. FOUNDATIONS: THE MINING LAW OF 1866
The development of the appropriation doctrine was fostered by
the evolution of federal laws governing the appropriation of minerals
from the public domain. 4
Until the California Gold Rush,
unauthorized mining on public lands was an actionable trespass.3 5
Local customs of "first in time, first in right," however, governed the
appropriation of minerals from vacant public lands in the West. When
California entered the Union in 1850, it brought with it asrOwerful
mining lobby, intent on preserving these appropriated rights.
William M. Stewart, who dominated Nevada's early territorial and
state politics, profoundly influenced the development of national
mining policies and indirectly helped establish the appropriation
doctrine. As a United States senator, one of Stewart's first tasks was to
draft a policy addressing the vast mineral wealth of the new western
states. Stewart, who amassed his wealth and power as a spokesman for
large California and Nevada mining interests, had an obvious interest
in preserving the rights of miners to free entry and appropriation of
minerals on the public domain."
The Mining Act of 1866, written principally by Stewart, legalized
existing mining claims on public lands and opened mineral lands of
the public domain to exploration according to local customs. 8
Significantly, for the development of water laws, the Act also provided:
That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
same; and the right of way of the construction of ditches and canals
39
for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged ....
The Act thus recognized the significance of "priority of possession"
and helped limit the boundaries of federal claims to water.

34. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAw 77-80 (2d ed. 1997); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 321-24 (2d ed. 1991).

35. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 120 (1845).
36. Sylvia L. Harrison, Comment, Disposition of the Mineral Estate on United States
PublicLands: A HistoricalPerspective, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 131, 146 (1989).
37. MICHAELW. BowERs, THE SAGEBRUSH STATE 108 (1996).
38. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866).
39. Id.
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B. FOUNDATIONS: EARLY DECISIONS OF THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT
The vast majority of Nevada lands were (and remain) public
domain. ' The proliferation of appropriative water rights on public
lands and the Mining Act of 186 6's validation of those rights
sometimes obscures Nevada's early deference to riparian principles.
In reality, the Nevada Supreme Court did not immediately endorse
wholesale application of the appropriation doctrine, but struggled for
several decades to harmonize the common law with common sense.
The facts of the following cases are described in some detail here to
illustrate the balancing of competing interests and equitable principles
that shaped the foundations of Nevada water law.
As early as its second decision, the Nevada Supreme Court was
confronted with a dispute over water rights. In Geller v. Huffaker,"
Geller sought monetary damages for Huffaker's alleged diversion of
water from Geller's ranch.4 2 The plaintiffs contended they were
entitled to the water of Thomas Creek not only as the riparian owners,
but also by virtue of their prior appropriation.43 A significant issue in
the case was the location of the natural channel of the stream, which
Huffaker contended flowed through his property.4 At trial, plaintiffs
called a witness to testify on their behalf. The witness admitted that
because he owned property upstream from plaintiffs, and on the same
channel plaintiffs contended to he the natural channel, he had an
interest in the action.4' The issue before the court was the alleged
error in allowing this witness to testify.4 6 The court noted the legal
question of the witness' competence did not turn on the application of
either the riparian or appropriative doctrines, acknowledging the
existence of the competing doctrines, but avoiding comment on the
47
issue.
Lobdell v. Simpson 8 was the first Nevada case to squarely consider
the appropriation doctrine. This case is sometimes cited for the
proposition that Nevada had adopted the appropriation doctrine.
Such a reading is too expansive, since riparian rights were not at issue
at all in the case. Neither party in Lobdell was a riparian owner; both
were occupants of public lands.49 The plaintiff diverted water from
Desert Creek through dams and ditches. The alleged error that
brought the case to the Nevada Supreme Court was the district court's

40. Federal lands make up about 86 percent of the area of Nevada. ELLIOTr, supra
note 3, at 342.
41. Gellerv. Huffaker, 1 Nev. 22 (1865).
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gellr, 1 Nev. at 23-24.
47. Id.
48. Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274 (1866).
49. Id. at 278.

Issue I

NEVADA WATER LAW

failure to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs water right was limited to
the amount of water appropriated prior to the defendants' diversion."
The court found that where the right to the use of running water is
based upon appropriation, and not upon an ownership in the soil, the
first appropriator has the superior right as against subsequent
appropriators. That right, however, did not extend to a right to make
new dams or diversions of water to the detriment of the subsequent
appropriator.51 The subsequent appropriator has the right to have the
water continue to flow as it flowed when he made his appropriation. 2
The Lobdell decision established two principles of Nevada water law
that have remained intact ever since. As between appropriators, first
in time is first in right, but even a senior appropriator is not entitled to
change the manner or amount of his water use in derogation of the
rights of subsequent appropriators.
Competing appropriators were also the contestants in the court's
next significant water rights decision, Ophir Silver Mining Co. v.
Carpenter." In 1858, the original appropriator, J.H. Rose, constructed a
ditch to convey water from the Carson River to the town of Dayton."
The ditch, about four and a half miles long, varied in dimensions from
sixteen feet wide at its immediate head to an average of about three
feet wide and two and a half feet deep at its lower end. 5 In 1862, Rose
conveyed the ditch to the defendants below, Shanklin and McConnell,
who immediately began to enlarge the ditch. 6 When Shanklin and
McConnell completed the enlargement in 1865, the ditch was capable
of delivering fifty-seven cubic feet per second. The original ditch had
delivered a volume of approximately four and a half cubic feet per
second.
In 1859, the grantors of the plaintiff below, the Ophir Silver
Mining Company, began to divert water from the Carson River below
the head of the Rose ditch, completing their own ditch and using the
water for "motive capacity.""8
The enlargement and increased

50. Id.
51. Id. at 279.
52. Id.
53. Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534 (1869).
54. Id. at 542.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 542-43.
57. Id. at 543. Fifty-seven cubic feet per second is a substantial portion of the flow
of the Carson River. Today, the annual average flow of the river at Carson City is
about 400 cubic feet per second, but flow rates vary widely from year to year and
season to season. On July 2, 2001, the Carson River was flowing at only ten cubic feet
per second through Carson City.
58. OphirSilver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 543. Although the decision does not elaborate
on the use of the water, it is likely that the plaintiffs used the water from the ditch to
power a stamp mill. The ores of the Comstock lode were difficult to refine compared
to those of California. By 1860, miners had developed the "Washoe process" to refine
the ores. This process required crushing the ores and treating them with mercury. By
the 1870s, water wheel powered stamp mills lined the Carson River near Dayton. See
PuRKEY & GARSIDE, supra note 13, at 75-77.
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diversions through the Rose ditch diminished the water available to
59
the plaintiff, who sought monetary damages and injunctive relief.
The defendants contended their appropriative rights related back to
Rose's original construction of the ditch and should be measured by
the volume of the ditch at its head, on the basis that such volume was
the measure of Rose's intended appropriation. ° The plaintiff argued
the rights of defendants should be limited to the capacity of the
original ditch."
After reiterating the "first in time, first in right" rule governing
appropriations, the court stated the following principle:
When any work is necessary to be done to complete the
appropriation, the law gives the claimant a reasonable time within
which to do it, and although the appropriation is not deemed

complete until the actual diversion or use of the water, still if such

work be prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the right relates to the
time when the first step was taken to secure it. If, however, the work

be not prosecuted with diligence, the right does not so relate, but
generally dates from the time 62when the work is completed or the
appropriation is fully perfected.

The court found there was no evidence justifying the jury
determination that Rose had shown "reasonable diligence," and
ordered a new trial. 3
[I] t is enough to say that the doing of five or six days' work during a
period of sixteen months, that is from the fall of 1859 to the month
of May, 1861, and only three months' labor during a period of two
years and a half, does not exhibit that diligence which the law
requires .... Rose during this time may have dreamed of his canal
completed, seen it with his mind's eye yielding him a great revenue;
he may have indulged the hope of providential interposition in his
favor; but this cannot be called a diligent prosecution of his
enterprise. Surely he could hardly have expected to complete it

durin his natural life by such efforts as were made through this
period. 64isnt
peo

Although the court's incursion into the role of fact finder may
have been suspect, the requirement of reasonable diligence in

completing
diversion works is still a bedrock principle of Nevada water
6
law.

59.

Ophir Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 541-43.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544-50.

64.

OphirSilver Mining Co., 4 Nev. at 546-47.

65. The standards applied today are usually more forgiving than those Justice Lewis

employed. See, e.g., Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835 (Nev. 1997) (involving

more than sixteen separate annual extensions from the state engineer to prove
beneficial use).
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While the Lobdell and Ophir Mining Company decisions were
significant steps in the development of Nevada's appropriation
doctrine, the court's next landmark water rights decision veered
66
sharply off that course. Vansickle v. Haines
was the first Nevada case
where the competition between appropriative and riparian rights was
squarely at issue.
Both the respondent, Vansickle, and appellant, Haines, were the
owners in fee of lands
acquired
by patent from the United States. 7
••
•68
Haines acquired his patent in 1864. Vansickle's ownership predated
Haines', and at the time of Haines' patent, Vansickle had long been
diverting and using waters from the natural channel of the water
course in question, Daggett Creek.6 9 The natural channel of the
stream did not run through Vansickle's property, but it did run
through Haines' property. In 1867, Haines began diverting all or
nearly all of the water of the creek in a flume constructed for running
wood.7' Vansickle then brought an action for damages against Haines,
contending he had established a prior right to the stream waters by
appropriation.72 The district court agreed, finding Vansickle had
established a protectable water right through his prior appropriation.73
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed.74 In a lengthy opinion
issued on a petition for rehearing, Justice Lewis distinguished prior
Nevada and California cases adopting the appropriation doctrine,
correctly noting these had involved occupants of public lands and not
riparian owners. 7' Lewis's opinion stated, "[w]e have shown that a
stream is an incident of the land through which it naturally flows; that
it is in fact, a part of the soil itself; that the right to have it continue to
flow is as sacred a right as that to the soil itself.
,76 The court
reasoned the patent from the United States must have conveyed the
water with the land. To underscore the propriety of the application of
the riparian doctrine, Justice Lewis went so far as to quote as authority
the Napoleonic Code (in French) .
Fundamental to the court's reasoning in Vansickle was its
assumption that the United States retained title to the water of the
stream, regardless of any appropriations. In reaching this conclusion,
it had to explain away the language of section nine of the Mining Law

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vansickle, 7 Nev. at 256.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 289-90 (Lewis, C.J., on petition for rehearing).
Vansickle, 7 Nev. at 284-85.
Id, at 288.
Id. at 249.
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of 1866."9
The Court contended this provision did not affect the 1864 patent
at issue:
The act of Congress of July, 1866, if it shows anything, shows that no
diversion had previously been authorized; for, if it had, whence the
necessity of passing that act.... [T]he answer is, that the policy
began with that act, was never in any way sanctioned or suggested
prior to the time of its passage, and therefore has nothing to do with
this case."
Thus, in Vansickle the court adopted the rule that as between a
non-riparian prior appropriator and a subsequent riparian owner, the
riparian owner had the superior right, even if it meant divesting the
prior appropriator of any interest in the water. The Vansickle opinion
survived in Nevada for thirteen years, and its guidelines provided the
basis for establishing the respective rights of many riparian water users.
In Jones v. Adams," the court had to choose between the
application of riparian principles and the recognition of appropriative
rights in a contest between two riparian owners. The court, bolstered
by a series of United States Supreme Court decisions that undercut
Vansickle, approved the application of the appropriation doctrine."
Jones addressed the respective rights of two riparian owners whose
properties bordered Sierra Creek. The district court apportioned the
rights of the parties according to principles of prior appropriation,
basing the allocation on the amounts of water established through
their original diversions and use. 3
On appeal, the appellant
contended that since both parties were riparian owners, who had
acquired their property in patents from the United States prior to the
Mining Act of 1866, the riparian principles of "reasonable use" should
determine their respective rights."'
The court discussed the Vansickle decision at length, particularly its
contention that the Mining Law of 1866 had no retroactive effect.
Since that decision, the United States Supreme Court had expressly
found to the contrary.85 The Jones court cited three particularly
significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Basey v. Gallagher," Jennison
v. Kirk,87 and Broder v. Water Co.8" Basey and Jennison sustained the
validity of local customs under the 1866 Act. Broder expressly found

79.

Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 280.
Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885).
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 445-46.

86.

Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670 (1874).

87. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
88. Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879).
89. Jennison, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Basey, 87 U.S. 670 (1874).
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the 1866 Act recognized pre-existing rights of possession, rather than
the establishment of a new principle. '
In Jones, the court found the district court did not err in basing its
judgment and decree on principles of appropriation. The court then
overruled Vansickle to the extent the decision was inconsistent with the
court's views expressed in Jones.9"
While the Jones court gave the nod to the particular application of
the appropriation doctrine at issue and dealt with Vansickle as it was
compelled to do by subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions, it stopped short of outright rejection of the riparian
doctrine. It was not until 1889 that the Nevada Supreme Court finally
and squarely confronted the application of riparian rights to Nevada
water law.
In Reno Smelting, Milling and Reduction Works v. Stevenson," the
respondent, the plaintiff below, a corporation engaged in ore
reduction, asserted that as the riparian owner it was entitled to the
natural flow of water on its land 9 The defendants also owned land on
the river but the district court enjoined them from diverting water
from the plaintiff's dam. As appellants, they urged the court to reject
the common law doctrine of riparian rights.f The Reno Smelting
decision discussed the development of the appropriation doctrine in
the western states at length and commented:
[The] inapplicability [of the common law rule] ...applies forcibly to
the state of Nevada. Here the soil is arid, and unfit for cultivation
unless irrigated by the waters of running streams. The general
surface of the state is table land, traversed by parallel mountain
ranges. The great plains of the state afford natural advantages for
conducting water, and lands otherwise waste and valueless become
productive by artificial irrigation. The condition of the country, and
the necessities of the situation, impelled settlers upon the public
lands to resort to the diversion and use of waters. This fact of itself is
a striking illustration, and
95 conclusive evidence of the inapplicability
of the common-law rule.
The court concluded, "the common-law doctrine of riparian rights
is unsuited to the condition of our state, and that this case should have
been determined by the application of the principles of prior
appropriation.
Twenty-five years after statehood, the courts finally

laid the riparian doctrine to rest in Nevada.
Two additional pre-statutory cases merit discussion.
Walsh v.
Wallace considered the relative rights of appropriators on the same
90. Broder, 101 U.S. at 276.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 448 (Nev. 1885).
Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317 (Nev. 1889).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317-22.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.

97. Walsh v. Wallace, 67 P. 914 (Nev. 1902).

WATER LA W RE VIEW

Volume 5

stream and provided important instruction on the basis for an
appropriative right." The court in Walsh v. Wallace held:
[i] n order.., to constitute a valid appropriation of water, within the
meaning of that term as understood by the decisions of this court and
laws of the state, and, as we believe, by the decisions of the courts and

laws of other states in the arid region, there must be an actual
diversion of the same, with the intent to apply it to a beneficial99 use,
followed by an application to such use within a reasonable time."
0 the court considered
In Ennor v. Raine,"'
the plaintiff's appeal of a
verdict in favor of the defendant.
The defendant, as a prior
appropriator, had entered the plaintiffs property to remove dams the
plaintiff had constructed that interfered with the flows to defendant's
property. Defendant's action prompted plaintiff to bring an action for
trespass."' Relying on the Mining Act of 1866, the court explained a
prior appropriator is entitled to a right of way to convey his water
through channels and ditches constructed prior to the time other
rights attached to lands crossed by these conveyances and that all
subsequent0 2 patentees, owners, and claimants took subject to that

easement.

The Ennor decision completed a series of decisions in which the
court articulated the major principles of appropriative rights. Over
the next few years, the Nevada legislature codified these doctrines,
which remain essentially unchanged today.
IV. CODIFICATION OF NEVADA WATER LAW
A. FRANCIS NEWLANDS AND THE RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902
Nevada experienced a severe economic depression during the last
two decades of the nineteenth century with the decline of mining on
the Comstock lode.' 9 As efforts to find new mineral resources proved
fruitless, Nevadans turned their efforts to the development of
agriculture. Just as Nevada's adoption of the appropriation doctrine
evolved in conjunction with mineral development and the federal
statutes governing mineral rights, the next major step in Nevada water
law, its codification, evolved as a result of the state's new emphasis on
agricultural development and the need for federal legislation to
promote it.
Serious agricultural development in the arid climates of the West
depended on irrigation, and serious irrigation projects required
98. Id.
99. Id. at 917 (citing California, Washington, Oregon, and Colorado cases)
(citations omitted).
100. Ennor v. Raine, 74 P. 1 (Nev. 1903).
101. Id. at 1.

102. Id. at 2.
103.

ELLuorr, supra note 3, at 170.
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federal support. William M. Stewart, returning to the United States
Senate in 1887 after a twelve year absence, once again promoted
federal legislation to further Nevada's interests, he proposed the
creation of a Senate Committee on Irrigation and supporting
hydrographic surveys under the supervision of John Wesley Powell.'
More significantly, Stewart took under his wing Francis G. Newlands,
introducing him to the Nevada political arena, and fostering
Newlands' interest in an issue that was to become both his passion and
steppingstone into national prominence, irrigation.' 5
Newlands, an ambitious young attorney from an impoverished
immigrant family, rose to power in San Francisco after marrying the
daughter of William Sharon. He inherited the task of defending the
Sharon estate against extensive litigation, including the legendary
divorce action against Sharon initiated by Sharon's mistress. 0 6 William
Stewart, who defended the divorce litigation, recognized Newlands as a
potential political ally in his battle to restore the United States' silver
standard monetary system. At Stewart's urging, Newlands became a
resident of Nevada, in part to protect the diversity of citizenship
necessary to keep federal jurisdiction over the divorce case, and in part
to find new ground to pursue his political ambitions after defeats in
California.'
Newlands moved to Carson City in 1888, occupying
Stewart's mansion rent-free.'
Stewart, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Irrigation,
invited Newlands to tour the West to study potential irrigation projects.
Aware of the importance of irrigation as a political issue to Nevadans,
Newlands worked to become an expert on the subject."'9
Newlands' move to Nevada coincided with rapidly escalating
conflicts among water users and the legislature's first attempts to bring
order to Nevada water law. At Newlands' urging, in 1889 the state
legislature enacted an ambitious law"" that created irrigation2
districts,"' authorized the governor to appoint water commissioners,
required the recording of water rights with the county recorders," 3 and
declared unappropriated water of "natural streams" public property,
"and the same dedicated to the use of the people. . . .""s Water users
immediately challenged the constitutionality of the law and filed suit
with the district court in Winnemucca."' In 1890, the district court
104. Id. at 174.
105. WnULJM D. RowLEY, RECLAIMING THE ARID WEST: THE CAREER OF FRANcIS G.
NEWLANDS 40-45 (1996).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 43-44.
108. Id. at 44.
109. Id. at 45-48.
110. Act of Mar. 19, 1889, ch. 113, 1889 Nev. Stat. 107 (repealed 1893).
111. I&§1.

112. Id..§2.
113.
114.
115.

Id.§9.
Id. § 13.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 51-52.
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found the law unconstitutional in that it delegated too much legislative
power to the governor and threatened vested rights." 6 The Nevada
legislature repealed the statute in 1893."'
At the same time the failure of the new law threw the state's efforts
to administer water rights into chaos, tensions between agriculturists
and miners over water use reached a new peak when large ranching
interests on the Carson River diverted virtually the entire stream to
their use, depriving the downstream mills near Dayton of water to
power their ore crushing stamps. Thirty years of litigation on the
Carson River culminated in Union Mill and Mining Co. v. Dangberg."8 In
this case, mill owners sought to enjoin the upstream ranchers from
impairing their use of the water."9 Both sides asserted superior rights
to the water by virtue of riparian ownership and appropriative rights.'20
Like the failure of the 1889 Irrigation Act, this case was a political
embarrassment for Newlands, who was a major stockholder in the
Union Mill and Mining Company, but was at that time attempting to
portray himself as an appropriate representative of all of the state's
citizens. 2' The lawsuit was also a personal inconvenience, since
Stewart was then arranging the purchase of thousands of acres in the
Lahontan Valley at the terminus of the Carson River, which he hoped
to place under irrigation.'22
The ranching interests ultimately achieved victory in the Union Mill
litigation in 1897.2' After recognizing the riparian rights of the parties
established under the rule of Vansickle, the court lamented the
prevalence of ineffectual court decrees and the absence of state
legislation clarifying Nevada water rights:
It is easy enough for the courts to say that each riparian proprietor is
only entitled to use, for the purpose of irrigating his own land, that
portion of the water of the stream which is in excess over the amount
thereof to which all the other proprietors are equally entitled for the
purpose of making a like beneficial use of the water. This rule is
sound enough andjust enough, if there is water enough to go round.
But what is to be done when there is no excess? If the legislature of
the state fails to act, are the courts compelled to simply declare the

rule, and let the parties act under their own interpretation of it?... A
court of equity ought to have power by its decree to reach the ends of
justice.
The court then entered a detailed decree, viewed as a victory by
the ranchers, allocating water between the competing interests and
116.

Id. at 52.

117. Act of Feb. 3, 1893, ch. 127, § 1, 1893 Nev. Stat. 131.
118. Union Mill & Mining Co. v.Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
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specifying allowed seasons of use."'
Despite political setbacks, Newlands continued to champion
irrigation development.
During his successful bid for a Congressional seat in 1892, he made
26
it a central campaign issue, along with remonetization of silver.
Bitter political struggles within the fledgling Silver Party, however,
sidetracked Newlands' efforts to foster federal interest in reclamation
projects. The Silver Party reached its peak in 1899 when Newlands'
unsuccessful challenge for Stewart's Senate seat led to his expulsion
from the party and the final break with his old mentor,1 27 Reelected to
Congress as a democrat in 1900, Newlands renewed his fight for
federal support for irrigation projects, and introduced a national
irrigation bill in 19018 Battle lines in Congress emerged not on the
question of whether the arid lands should be irrigated, but whether
the states or the federal government should implement these projects.
Not surprisingly, given Newlands' experiences in Nevada, a central
theme of his bill was the necessity 12for federal funding, management,
and control of reclamation projects. 1
President McKinley, who strongly opposed federal reclamation
projects, impeded Newlands' efforts for a federal irrigation bill. After
McKinley's assassination in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt actively
supported dam construction and reclamation projects as a national
undertaking. Roosevelt's labors were critical in securing congressional
support for the enactment of Newlands' reclamation bill.2 ° Although
his Republican opponents disparaged Newlands' role in the passage of
the Reclamation Act of 1902,'' the act became popularly known as the
"Newlands Act." This far reaching act directed the Secretary of the
Interior to conduct studies and locate and construct irrigation works
for storage and diversion of water.2 2 It also provided for federal
management of the projects and for entry upon the newly irrigated
lands in conjunction with the homestead laws.n'
The Reclamation Act required Nevada to finally bring order to its
water laws, since sound state water administration of existing rights was
a prerequisite to the initiation of federal projects.
Newlands again
urged the state legislature to consider enacting a comprehensive water
law to complement the federal Reclamation Act. "' 5 The legislature

125.
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132.
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ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 70-71.
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Id. at 95-98.
Id. at 98-101.
Id. at 100-104.
ROWLEY, supra note 105, at 103.
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 1, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
§ 391 (1994)).
Id. § 3.
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responded by enacting the Irrigation Law of 1903.36
The Act's preamble emphasized the primary focus of the
legislation: to provide for the state's cooperation with the Secretary of
the Interior in implementing the federal Reclamation Act of 1902. ",
The preamble quoted estimates from the United States Geological
Survey suggesting that irrigation of the Truckee, Carson, Walker and
Humboldt Rivers could be trebled by "conservation and economical
use," vastly increasing Nevada's population and wealth.'38
The
preamble described the reclamation projects envisioned by federal law
and concluded "every inducement should be held out to the Secretary
of the Interior" to begin construction of the irrigation projects in
Nevada.'
Although the Irrigation Law focused on reclamation
projects, its first section embodied principles that laid the broad
foundation of subsequent water laws:
All natural water courses and natural lakes, and the waters thereof
which are not held in private ownership, belong to the public, and
are subject to appropriation for a beneficial use, and the right to the
use of water so appropriated for irrigation shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right....

The Act provided for the appointment of the "state engineer,"
whose considerable duties included cooperation with the Secretary of
Interior in reclamation projects, inventory of all appropriations on
each stream in the state, and conducting hydrologic surveys of the
streams.14 ' The Act also provided for the state engineer's certification
4
of existing appropriations and forjudicial review of his decisions. 1
Newlands achieved his longtime dream of a Senate seat in 1903
and made sure Nevada claimed the first project constructed under the
new federal Reclamation Act of 1902, the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
Project. Later renamed the Newlands Project, the venture entailed the
construction of a dam and diversion canal that delivered water from
the lower reaches of the Truckee River to the Lower Carson River
Basin and Lahontan Valley. The federal reclamation engineers
completed the project in 1905. 3
Francis Newlands profoundly altered the landscape of Nevada in a
very literal way. The Newlands Project resulted in the irrigation of
136. Act of Feb. 16, 1903, ch. 4, 1903 Nev. Stat. 18 (repealed 1907).

137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 22-23.
139. Id. at 24.
140. Id. § 1. This language echoes language in the Reclamation Act of 1902, which
in section eight provides in pertinent part "[t]hat the right to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated,

and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390.
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142. Id. §§ 13-14.
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approximately 60,000 acres in the Lahontan Valley and created an
agricultural community in western Nevada that has thrived for a
century. On the other hand, the damming of the lower Carson and
diversions from the lower Truckee River have had serious
environmental consequences, including the disappearance of vast
wedands and the dramatic lowering of the level of Pyramid Lake, thus
preventing the famous Lahontan cutthroat trout and the Pyramid
Tribe's sacred cui-ui fish from sgawning, and leading to the threatened
extinction of the fisheries.
Newlands viewed himself as a
conservationist;1 6 it is hard to know how he would view the
consequences of his most famous legacy today.4 7 Ironically, Newlands
is rarely credited with his significant role in the codification of
Nevada's water laws. Newlands' efforts to bring order to the disarray of
Nevada water rights, and his insistence on federal management of
irrigation projects, have had an impact on Nevada water law equal to
his legacy of concrete and canals.
B. THE ENACTMENT OF NEVADA'S 1913 WATER LAW

In 1905, the Nevada legislature amended the 1903 Irrigation
Law. 148
The amended law added a permit system for new
appropriations requiring a potential appropriator to apply to the state
engineer, provided for public notice of the intended appropriation,
and allowed protests of applications. " 9 The 1905 act provided that
"[i] f there is unappropriated water in the source of supply named and
the appropriation is not detrimental to the public welfare, the [sitate
[e]ngineer shall approve" the application.'
Upon proof of the
"perfected" appropriation, the state engineer would issue a certificate
of the appropriation. Under the act, both the count of appropriation
and the county of use held records of the certificate.
The Nevada legislature repealed the 1903 and 1905 acts in 1907,
replacing them with a consolidated and reorganized act.' Although
there were few substantive differences between the old acts and the
new law, the legislature modified section one to provide all waters of
144. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir.
1989). For overviews of the environmental impacts of the Newlands Project see U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, WATER RIGHTS

AcQuIsITON FOR LAHONTAN VALLEY WETLANDS (1995) [hereinafter DRAFT EIS].
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natural lakes and watercourses "not held in private ownership, belong
to the State.. . .""' The 1907 act also added the provision that a right

to use the unappropriated waters of natural watercourses and natural
lakes could be "acquired in the manner provided in this Act, and not
otherwise." I"4
In 1913, the legislature once again made a fresh start, repealing
the 1907 act, 55 and replacing it with comprehensive legislation that
refined the permit system for applications, and most significantly,
included new, detailed procedures for the adjudication of existing
water rights.'56 Section one of the 1913 Water Law ("Water Law")
returned water from the "state" to the "public" and for the first time
included a reference to groundwater. "The water of all sources of
water supply within the boundaries of the state, whether above or
beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public." 5 ' Section
two provided: "[s]ubject to existing rights, all water may be
appropriated for beneficial use as provided in this chapter and not
otherwise."'
Echoing the federal Reclamation Law of 1902 and
Nevada's Irrigation Law of 1903, section three stated: " [ b]eneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of
water."'59
The 1913 Water Law provided for the forfeiture of water rights in
the event of continuous non-use for a period of four years 6 ° and for
cancellation of a permit to appropriate if the applicant were not
proceeding in ood faith to complete diversions and put the water to
beneficial use.'
The Water Law thus codified the "use it or lose it"
principle inherent in the appropriation doctrine.
Like the earlier statutes, the 1913 Water Law continued to
expressly protect established uses:
Nothing in this act contained shall impair the vested right of any
person to the use of water, nor shall the right of any person to take
and use water be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this
act where appropriations have been initiated in accordance with law
prior to the approval of this act. Any and all appropriations based
upon applications and permits now on file in the state engineer's
office, shall be perfected in accordance with the laws in force at the
time of their filing.

153. I § 1.
154. Id. § 7.
155. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified as amended at NEv.
REV. STAT. ch. 533 (2000)).
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157. Id. § 1 (codified at NEv. REv. STAT. 533.025 (2000)).
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159. Id § 3 (codified at NEV. REv. STAT. 533.035 (2000)).
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NEV. REV. STAT. 533.060(2) (2000)).
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE

1913 WATER LAW

Although modern practitioners focus on the permit system as the
significant feature of the 1913 Water Law, at the time of its enactment,
its system of adjudication of existing rights had far more immediate
and controversial ramifications. By 1913, most streams were fully
appropriated, and the state's attempts to adjudicate the competing
rights met considerable resistance. Despite the Water Law's express
deference to existing rights, the constitutionality of the provisions
governing adjudications was immediately challenged.
Several
constitutional infirmities were alleged, including a lack of due process
in the adjudication system and an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the state engineer, the contention being that the
determination of relative rights to water was a judicial function, and
only the district court could properly exercise that function.'63 It was
also contended the state engineer would necessarily impair existing
rights in determining "relative rights." 64
In Ormsby County v. Kearney,161 the court considered two
consolidated cases regarding the authority of the state engineer under
the Water Law to determine the relative rights of appropriators.1 66 The
court defended the state's right to administer the water rights system
and held the state engineer could lawfully determine water rights for
administrative purposes.
It is difficult to perceive how there may be any effective regulation
or control over the water rights of a stream system like that of the
Humboldt [R]iver and its tributaries, except through some form of
state supervision. This river extends for a distance of about 300 miles,
is in [five] counties and [three] judicial districts. According to the
brief of counsel for respondents in case No. 2115, there are from 700
to 1,000 water users on the Humboldt River system. Undoubtedly
other claimants are constantly applying for water rights on this
system. The state at large is not only interested in protecting prior
appropriators in their rights, but is interested in the conservation of
the waters of the stream system to the end that the largest possible
amount of land may be brought under cultivation through an
economical diversion and use of such waters. To accomplish this
beneficent object, the state has a right to exercise a superintending
control over the entire river system. It is not to be assumed that so
great and so important an undertaking cannot be fairly and
intelligently administered. If so administered, it would seem
that it
167

ought to be particularly advantageous to prior appropriators.

Although the court generally upheld the constitutionality of the
Water Law, it acknowledged that certain provisions of the law could

render a state engineer's decision a final adjudication of property
163. See Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 806 (Nev. 1914).
164. See id. at 806, 819-20 (McCarran,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914).
166. Id. at 803, 806.
167. Id. at 805-06.
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rights, thereby constituting an unconstitutional delegation of authority
to an administrator.'" The principal defect in the law was that the
state engineer's final determination was subject only to appeal to the
district courts. Since the state's constitution did not confer appellate
jurisdiction on the district courts, the appellate process provided for
was essentially void, which had the effect of rendering the state
engineer's determination conclusive. 69
The legislature repealed the offending sections in 1915, and
modified the adjudication procedures to require the state engineer to
bring an order of determination to the district court, where
proceedings could continue until the court entered a final decree. 7 °
Again, water users along the Humboldt River challenged the
constitutionality of the law, this time in federal court.' The federal
court affirmed the constitutionality of the law. The court found "[t]he
power exercised in the ascertainment of water rights for administrative
purposes only is not judicial power in the constitutional sense; nor, in
so far as the engineer is authorized to take evidence and determine
water rights ... is he vested with judicial powers.
merely preliminary....,

What he does is

The constitutionality of the Water Law as amended in 1915 was
again brought to the Nevada Supreme Court in Vineyard Land and Stock
Co. v. District Court.17

The majority upheld the constitutionality of the

statute, finding little new to consider.
Both Ormsby County and Vineyard Land and Stock Company were split
decisions, each prompting long, articulate, and impassioned dissents
by Justice McCarran 7 5 In both decisions, McCarran was chiefly
concerned with the constitutional problems of allowing an
administrative official to adjudicate real property rights. McCarran's
dissents are interesting reading today, particularly in view of
McCarran's prescient grasp of the difficulties of adjudicating existing
rights on streams that were already over-appropriated, and in view of
the fact that many of those rights had been established, or "vested,"
at
6
a time when the riparian doctrine was alive and well in the state.
Once the court validated the constitutionality of the amended
Water Law, the state engineer's office proceeded to process
voluminous adjudications to administer pre-statutory vested rights.
Determining relative rights without impairing existing rights proved as

168. Id. at 811-12.
169. Id. (Talbot, C.J., concurring); id. at 818-19 (McCarran, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). McCarran insisted that this issue was before the court and
that the court should have found the offending provisions unconstitutional. Id.
170. Act of Mar. 29, 1915, ch. 278, 1915 Nev. Stat. 434.
171. Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 884 (D. Nev. 1917).
172. Id. at 906.
173. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Dist. Court, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918).
174. Id. at 168.
175. Vineyard, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918); Ormsby County, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914).
176. Vineyard, 171 P. at 174, 182-85; Ormsby County, 142 P. at 820-23.
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troublesome as McCarran predicted.'" Nonetheless, today more than
a hundred state decrees govern the rights of these surface users and
another sixty or so are in progress."'
The 1913 Water Law remains the framework of Nevada's statutes
governing water rights. The legislature has continued to refine the
law, however, particularly with respect to administrative matters. The
most significant substantive enactments modifying the law include
regulation of groundwater appropriations and recent changes
affecting the forfeiture of surface rights.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GROUNDWATER
APPROPRIATION
Laws applicable to groundwater rights in Nevada evolved on a
separate path from laws governing surface water rights. As discussed
below, these paths ultimately converged, but the disparate treatment
accorded groundwater survived in a confusing legacy.
Mosier v. Caldwelt 9 was the first Nevada decision to address the
right to appropriate groundwater. Beginning in May 1868, appellants
appropriated and used the waters of a spring running upon land they
occupied. The respondents dug wells on their own property in 1869,
and their use of these wells apparently dried up the appellants'
springs.'80 The question the court faced was whether one may "lawfully
dig a well upon his own land, though thereby he destroy the
subterranean, undefined sources of his neighbor's spring?"''
The
court immediately answered the question. "That he may do so, is
undoubtedly the settled law."' 82 The court noted, "there was no visible
connection between the wells and the spring-the flow of the water
being by percolation. '""" As to that water, the court stated "such water

is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the estate itself...
The
court apparently understood the relevant hydrology and recognized
the connection between the wells and the spring, but did not accord
this fact legal significance. Considering that the court decided Mosier
in the same year as Vansickle, the conclusion is not surprising. But for
the fact the case involved groundwater, the factual circumstances of
Mosier are similar to Vansickle, and the court employed similar
reasoning to reach its conclusion.
The Nevada Supreme Court distinguished "percolating" waters

177.

See infra text accompanying notes 257-272.

178. See Nevada Division of Water Resources, Adjudication Section,
http://ndwr.state.nv.us/Adjudications/adj-listing.htm (last visited July 7, 2001).
Added to the state adjudications are approximately twenty civil decrees and three

federal decrees.
179. Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872).

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 366.
Id
Id.
Id.

184. Mosier, 7 Nev. at 367.
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from spring waters forming a clearly defined subsurface channel in the
case Strait v. Brown.'85 The parties in this case disputed their relative
rights to waters flowing from springs into a large slough and from the
slough into a stream.
The appellants, plaintiffs below ("Strait"),
appropriated and made use of the waters of the stream for irrigation
beginning in 1867."7 In 1875, the respondents ("Brown") began
diverting waters directly from the springs, and Strait sued to restrain
this diversion."' The trial court found in favor of Brown. 8 9 On appeal,
Brown argued that if waters reached the creek, they did so by
"percolation," and thus the law of appropriation germane to
watercourses should not apply.' 90 The court apparently agreed the
appropriation doctrine did not apply to percolating waters; however, it
noted a jury finding that "subterranean channels" connected the
waters.1 9' Therefore, the water at issue was not "percolating" and laws
regulating water in defined channels should govern.'92 "No distinction
exists in the law between waters running under the surface in defined
channels and those running in distinct channels upon the surface.
The distinction is made between [such waters] ...and those oozing or

percolating through the soil in varying quantities and uncertain
directions."'9 3 The court found no uncertainty as to the amount of
water diverted from Strait, and Brown could not have been "ignorant
of the effect which their diversion of waters would produce upon the
plaintiffs lower down the creek."'94 Accordingly, the court applied the
appropriation doctrine, and reversed the judgment in favor of Strait,
the prior appropriator. '9'
The Mosier and Strait decisions illustrate a disconnection between
scientific and legal principles that has complicated the administration
of groundwater appropriation in Nevada. Mosier ignored sound
hydrology, while the court in Strait relied on an unrealistic hydrologic
distinction to reach results consistent with common law principles.
Nevada may have been better served had the court abandoned the
concept of sanctity of "soil" embodied in these decisions and decided
Strait on the straightforward principle that the appropriation doctrine
was the better rule for all Nevada waters. Nevadans today are still
struggling with the task of distinguishing oozing groundwater from
stygian streams. 9
185.

Id.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 319-21.
Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 320.
Strait v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 321 (1881).
Id.
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 321.
Id.

194.

Strait, 16 Nev. at 324.

195. Id.
196. As discussed infra notes 208 and 213, Nevada's statutory appropriation scheme
for groundwater still distinguishes "percolating" waters from "artesian" waters from
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A third pre-statutory groundwater case deserves mention here, if
only for historic interest. In Cardelli v. Comstock Tunnel Co.,'97 plaintiffs
below claimed a right to half the waters collected and discharged
through the Sutro tunnel, citing appropriation and adverse use.198 The
court found that waters from the tunnel, "developed" only through the
diligence of the constructors of the tunnel, were not subject to
appropriation, and "by such developing they become the property of
those engaged in the enterprise." 99 "Developed" mine water was
ultimately recognized as an appropriable resource."'
As discussed above, the earliest Nevada water laws (the acts of
1903, 1905, and 1907) made no reference to underground waters; in
the 1913 Water Law, however, the provision designating waters of the
state as property of the public expressly included waters "beneath the
surface of the ground.""' Such waters were thus impliedly subject to
the appropriation and application processes set forth in the statute.
Although not expressly discussed in the 1913 Water Law, the common
law right to "percolating" water was not affected by the statute, and the
statutory appropriation system applied only to springs and artesian
waters, or such subsurface waters resembling a "defined" watercourse.
The legislature first explicitly addressed regulation of groundwater
appropriations in 1915.
Significantly, this law expressed what had
only been implied in the 1913 Water Law: "[a]ll underground waters,
save and except percolating water, the course and boundaries of which
are incapable of determination, are hereby declared to be subject to
appropriation under the laws of the state relating to the appropriation
2 ° In effect, the law subjected all groundwater
and use of water.""
to the
1913 Water Law, 0with
the
exception
of
the
odd
category
of
"percolating water." 4 Modern practitioners tend to overlook this
legislation, assuming that regulation of groundwater appropriation was
not initiated until 1939, when the state legislature enacted a
comprehensive act governing appropriation and management of
groundwater. 205 This act restated the principle that underground

"defined aquifers."
197. Cardelli v. Comstock Tunnel Co., 66 P. 950 (Nev. 1901).
198. Id. at 952.
199. Id.
200. 331 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 69, 69-70 (1966).
201. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, § 1, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192 (codified at NEv. REV.
STAT. 533.025 (2000)).

202. Act of Mar. 24, 1915, ch. 210, 1915 Nev. Stat. 323 (repealed 1939).

203. Id. § 1. The law also law prohibited "waste" from artesian wells, provided for
casing and capping these, and authorized penalties for violations. Id. §§ 2-6.
204. "Percolating water" is still a recognized category of groundwater under Nevada
law and is defined as "underground waters, the course and boundaries of which are
incapable of determination." NEv. REv. STAT. 534.0135 (2000). Given modern
hydrologic methods, which are capable of determining the course and boundaries of
unconfined aquifers with as much validity as other subsurface waters, the utility of this

definition seems questionable.
205. The Underground Waters Act, ch. 178, 1939 Nev. Stat. 274 (codified as
amended at NEv. REv. STAT. ch. 534 (2000)).
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waters belong to the public.
All underground waters within the boundaries of the state belong to
the public, and subject to all existing rights to the use thereof, are
subject to appropriation for beneficial use only under the laws of the
state relating to the appropriation and use of water and not
otherwise, therefore it is the intention of the legislature, by this act, to
prevent the waste of underground waters and pollution and
contamination thereof and provide for the administration of the
provisions hereof by the state engineer, who is hereby empowered to
make such rules and regulations within the terms of this act as may be
necessary for the proper execution of the provisions of this act."'
The act did not expressly discuss percolating water, but repealed
the 1915 legislation,0 7 and added the following provision:
A legal right to appropriate underground water for beneficial use by
means of a well, tunnel or otherwise that was drilled, bored or
otherwise constructed subsequent to March 22, 1913, can only be
acquired by complying with the provisions of the general water law of
this state pertaining to the appropriation of water.
The act thus subjected all underground waters, with the exception
of domestic wells, 219 to the appropriation system.
As to wells drilled prior to March 22, 1913, the act provided that
the state engineer could not assert supervision over such diversions
until pre-statutory rights had been determined by an appropriate
adjudication and court decree. ° The act provided procedures for the

state engineer to supervise appropriations from artesian basins, giving
the state engineer comprehensive powers 2to regulate extractions and
prevent over appropriation of those basins. 1
provisions
governing
Subsequent
amendments
added
abandonment and forfeiture of groundwater 212 and clarified the
recognition of vested rights. 213 All groundwater in Nevada, with the
206. Id. § 1 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 534.020 (2000)).
207. Id. § 14 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. 534 (2000)).
208. Id. § 9. See NEv. REV. STAT. 534.080(1) (2000) which provides as follows:
A legal right to appropriate underground water for beneficial use from an
artesian or definable aquifer subsequent to March 22, 1913, or from
percolating water, the course and boundaries of which are incapable of
determination, subsequent to March 25, 1939, can only be acquired by
complying with the provisions of chapter 533 of NRS pertaining to the
appropriation of water.
Id.
209. The Underground Waters Act, ch. 178, § 3, 1939 Nev. Stat. 274, 275.
210. I& § 4.
211. Id.§5.
212. Act of Mar. 15, 1947, ch. 43, 1947 Nev. Stat. 52.
213. NEv. REv. STAT. 534.100(1) (2000) provides:
Existing water rights to the use of underground water are hereby recognized.
For the purpose of this chapter a vested right is a water right on
underground water acquired from an artesian or definable aquifer prior to
March 22, 1913, and an underground water right on percolating water, the
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exception of certain domestic wells, is now subject to the same
appropriation procedures as surface water. As discussed in the next
section, important distinctions in the treatment of surface and
groundwater remain, particularly with respect to recognition of vested
rights and laws pertaining to abandonment and forfeiture. 4
VI. LOSING WATER RIGHTS IN NEVADA
In addition to statutory regulation of groundwater appropriations,
the second major development of Nevada water law since the
enactment of the 1913 Water Law has been the evolution of laws
governing the loss of water rights. A corollary to the principle that
beneficial use is the basis and measure of the water right is the
principle that those who fail to make use of their right should lose it.
Other fundamental principles of the appropriation doctrine drive
competition among appropriators.
There is no "equitable
apportionment" of water; when water rights exceed water resources,
junior appropriators may go without water. Over-appropriation leads
to a dependence on deliveries from "dormant" rights and competing
appropriators seize any opportunity to divest passive holders of thier
water rights. The evolution of the legal framework governing the loss
of water rights in Nevada is not a question of simple academic interest,
but is critically important to present day allocations of water resources
in the state. Assertions of abandonment and of forfeiture have been
the springboard for voluminous litigation, prompting Ninth Circuit
Judge Fletcher's comment
that "[wiater litigation is a weed that
215
flowers in the arid West."

A. THE SHORT HISTORY OF PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS IN NEVADA

Loss of water rights in appropriation states generally occurs
through abandonment or forfeiture, and in some states, through
prescriptive use of water by an adverse appropriator.
Nevada
recognized prescriptive water rights only briefly.
The Nevada Supreme Court first discussed acquisition of a water
right through adverse possession or "prescription," in Vansickle v.
Haines.16 The court noted in dicta that adverse use of water is
governed by the same rules as adverse possession of land.2

17

The

factors required to establish a prescriptive right were set forth in

course and boundaries of which are incapable of determination, acquired
prior to March 25, 1939. The distinction as to whether water is in a definable

aquifer or whether it is percolating water, the course and boundaries of

which are incapable of determination, is a matter to be determined by the
state engineer.
Id.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 247-249.

215. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872).
217. Id. at 284.
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Authers v. Bryant,"' and include five years of uninterrupted adverse use,
assertion under a claim of tide with knowledge and acquiescence of
the person having the prior right.1 9
In 1949, the Nevada Supreme Court was confronted for the first
time with the issue whether an appropriator could acquire a
prescriptive right to water against the owner of a vested right when the
period of adverse use had commenced after the enactment of
Nevada's Water Law of 1913. In In re Filippini,2 Filippini applied to
the state engineer to appropriate a portion of Duff Creek.22 ' The state
engineer granted the application.222 The appellant protested the state
engineer's decision and argued he had acquired a prescriptive right to
the use of the waters of Duff Creek, which Filippini's appropriation
would impair. The appeal followed from the dismissal of appellant's
action in district court against Filippini and the state engineer.2 3 In
reaching its decision, the court considered the section of the act
providing all waters of the state "may be appropriated for a beneficial
use as provided in this act and not otherwise."
The court reasoned
that the methods of appropriation set forth in the 1913 statute applied
only to appropriations from the government, and had no application
to a water right acquired by adverse use from an existing owner. 22' The
court explained that the plain language of the law compelled its
conclusion, but urged the legislature to consider modifications to the
law to accommodate a better public policy:
[A]dverse use is wholly unwarranted, unnecessary and clearly

dangerous to the appropriation and distribution of public property.
The travail through which the Nevada water law of this state has
passed in the last forty-six years to bring order out of chaos will be of
no avail if the old rulc of "might makes right" in the appropriation of

water is to continue.
The court noted the forty-fourth session of the legislature had
convened and directed "the attention of the legislature to the
problem."22 7 The legislature took its instructions well; in that same
session, it amended the water laws to prohibit the acquisition of water
rights through prescriptive use.228
218. Authers v. Bryant, 38 P. 439 (Nev. 1894).
219. Id. at 440.

220. In re Filippini, 202 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1949).
221.

Id. at 536.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 537.
224. Id. at 538.
225. Filippini,202 P.2d at 539.
226. Id. at 540.
227. Id. at 541.
228. Act of Mar. 21, 1949, ch. 103, 1949 Nev. Stat. 128. (codified at NEv. REV. STAT.

533.060(5) (2000)).
A prescriptive right to the use of the water or any of the public water
appropriated or unappropriated may not be acquired by adverse possession.
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B. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF FORFEITURE AND ABANDONMENT

Considering the significance of the principles of abandonment
and forfeiture in the administration of Nevada's water rights, it is
surprising Nevada's legislature took so long to effectively articulate
well settled concepts of water loss inherent in the appropriation
doctrine. Section eight of the 1913 Water Law was Nevada's first
statutory provision governing the loss of water rights resulting from
failure to use the water beneficially.2 9 The language the legislature
employed was unfortunate, blurring the significant distinction between
common law abandonment and statutory forfeiture. The section
provided in pertinent part:
Rights to the use of water shall be limited and restricted to so much
thereof as may be necessary, ... and in case the owner or owners ...
shall fail to use the water therefrom for beneficial purposes for which
the right exists during any four successive years, the right to use shall
be considered as having been abandoned, and they shall forfeit all
230
water rights, easements and privileges appurtenant thereto ....
The most significant decision construing this law is the case In re
Manse Spring and its Tributaries .23' The appellant in that case
contended that water rights to irrigate about 300 acres, which had
vested through appropriation and beneficial use in 1910, were lost by
nonuse after the owner's death in 1929.232 The appellant argued that
for a period of about seven years the owner used the water only
passively for livestock watering and domestic use. 33 In deciding this
issue, the court set forth a series of significant principles. First, it
noted that while section eight uses both the terms "abandon" and
"forfeit," these terms "are entirely different in their operation." 23 4 The
court stated: "'While, upon the one hand, abandonment is the
relinquishment of the right by the owner with the intention to forsake
and desert it, forfeiture, upon the other hand, is the involuntary or
forced loss of the right ...required by the statute'."2 5 The court then
considered whether the statutory forfeiture provision of section eight
could apply to pre-statutory water rights in the face of section eighty-

Any such right to appropriate any of the water must be initiated by applying
to the state engineer for a permit to appropriate the water as provided in this
chapter.
Id.

229. Act of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 140, § 8, 1913 Nev. Stat. 192; see NEv. REv. STAT.
533.030 (2000)).
230. Id. (amended in 1917 to increase the forfeiture period to five years, and
repealed in 1999).
231. In reManse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311 (Nev. 1940).

232.
233.
234.
235.
1912)).

Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Id. (quoting

KINNEY ON IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS,

vol. 2, § 1118 (2d ed.
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four, the section of the 1913 Water Law protecting vested rights." 6
Although expressed in equivocal language, the court's essential
finding was that one could only lose pre-statutory rights by
abandonment. To apply the statutory forfeiture provisions to such
water rights would impair vested rights and contravene the intention
of section eighty-four.2"'
The court does not discuss the source of waters at issue in Manse
Spring in detail in the decision, but the court's discussion makes
apparent that artesian or spring waters would have been subject to the
1913 Water Law, except to the extent of pre-statutory vested rights.
In 1947, the legislature amended the 1939 Underground Waters
Act to provide for the forfeiture of groundwater rights:
Failure for five successive years on the part of the holder of any right,
whether it be an adjudicated right, an unadjudicated right, or
permitted right, and further whether such right be initiated after or
before the passage of this act, to use beneficially all or any part of the
underground water for the purpose for which such right shall be
acquired or claimed, shall work a forfeiture of undetermined rights
and an abandonment of determined rights of the right to the use of
such water to the extent of such nonuse. Upon the forfeiture of a
right to the use of ground water, such water shall revert to the public
and shall
238 be available for further appropriation, subject to existing
rights.
The legislature in this section again blurred the distinction
articulated in Manse Spring between forfeiture and abandonment. The
legislature based the difference upon whether a right was determined
or undetermined, and created "abandonment" by operation of law
regardless of intent. In contrast to the comparable section in the 1913
Water Law governing water in defined watercourses, this section
expressly applied to rights initiated prior to the act. In 1967, the
legislature clarified this section by removing the confusing reference
to abandonment and emphasizing its retroactive application. 2" The
legislature amended the law again in 1981 to limit the section's reach,
providing the period of non-use had to begin after April 15, 1967.240
236. See supratext accompanying note 160.
237. In reManse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311, 316 (Nev. 1940).
238. Act of Mar. 15, 1947, ch. 43, 1947 Nev. Stat. 52. See NEv. REv. STAT. 534.090
(2000), which now provides in pertinent part:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, failure for 5 successive years
after April 15, 1967, on the part of the holder of any right, whether it is an
adjudicated right, an unadjudicated right, or a permitted right, and further
whether the right is initiated after or before March 25, 1939, to use
beneficially all or any part of the underground water for the purpose for
which the right is acquired or claimed, works a forfeiture of both
undetermined rights and determined rights to the use of that water to the
extent of the nonuse.
239. Act of Apr. 15, 1967, ch. 383, 1967 Nev. Stat. 1052 (amended 1981).
240. Act ofJune 14, 1981, ch. 736, 1981 Nev. Stat. 1837 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT.
534.090(1) (2000)). This section of the law contains one of the significant distinctions
between surface rights and underground rights in that the state engineer can initiate
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Town of Eureka v. State Engineer"' affirmed the constitutionality of

retroactive application of the forfeiture statute for underground
waters:
The district court distinguished Manse Spring from the case at bar
because Manse Spring concerned the non-use of pre-statutory surface
water rights, while this case involves permitted groundwater rights.
Also, under the 1913 water law discussed in Manse Spring, the
legislature specifically included a provision that the act would not
impair vested rights created prior to 1913, while current Nevada
water law lacks a similar provision. Finally, contrary to the 1913 water
law, the legislature has affirmatively stated that the forfeiture
provision enacted in 1967 applies to all groundwater rights, even
those in existence at the time of enactment.
The court approved the district court's analysis and held that the
legislature's intent to apply the law retroactively was constitutional.243
The court's analysis distinguishing Manse Spring may deserve a
second look, considering that the water at issue was apparently from a
subsurface source, and considering that the same law that governed
surface water between 1913 and 1939 also governed most groundwater
appropriations. 44 By implication, groundwater appropriations enjoyed
pre-statutory vested surface
protection under the• provision
245
thshielding
fi
If the first factors in the analysis are
rights from forfeiture.
discounted, the court is left with the argument that retroactive
application of the law is constitutional solely because the legislature
intended the law to be retroactive.
C. RECENT CHANGES IN THE LAWS OF ABANDONMENT AND FORFEITURE

Contentious battles over the allocation of surface water rights in
Nevada marked the last decades of the twentieth century, particularly
on the Carson and Truckee Rivers, where increasing urbanization and
conversion of "dormant" agricultural rights to municipal use
threatened historic in-stream flows and new assertions of federal
an action for abandonment for underground rights. Id. NEV. REV. STAT. 534.090(4)
(2000) provides:
A right to use underground water whether it is vested or otherwise may be
lost by abandonment. If the state engineer, in investigating a ground water
source, upon which there has been a prior right, for the purpose of acting
upon an application to appropriate water from the same source, is of the
belief from his examination that an abandonment has taken place, he shall
so state in his ruling approving the application. If, upon notice by registered
or certified mail to the owner of record who had the prior right, the owner of
record of the prior right fails to appeal the ruling in the manner provided for
in NRS 533.450 and within the time provided for therein, the alleged
abandonment declaration as set forth by the state engineer becomes final.
Id.
241. Town of Eureka v. State Engineer, 826 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1992).
242. Id. at 951.
243. Id.
244. See supra text accompanying note 237.
245. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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reserved rights threatened the stability of historic decrees. In both
civil and administrative proceedings, contestants increasingly relied on
claims that competing water rights were abandoned or subject to
forfeiture as a means of protecting their own appropriations.' 6
Reacting to the uncertainty these assaults created on historic
allocations, the 1999 Nevada legislature enacted radical changes to the
provisions of Nevada's laws governing the forfeiture and abandonment
of surface waters. These changes mark significant departures from
established appropriation principles. The legislature modified Nevada
Revised Statutes section 533.060 by deleting subsection (2) and
substituting a new section, which provides: "[r]ights to the use of
surface water shall not be deemed to be lost or otherwise forfeited for
the failure to use the water therefrom for a beneficial purpose. ,,247
As a result of this provision, one can no longer lose a surface water
right by forfeiture. The legislature avoided the obvious key question as
to when this protection should be applied, stating in its preamble to
the legislation (not codified) that:
The amendatory provisions of sections 1, 2, and 3 of this act:
(1) Do not apply to water rights that are under challenge in any
legal or administrative proceeding which is pending on or before
April 1, 1999; and
(2) Do not constitute a legislative declaration that the law to be
applied in anyI such pending
proceeding is different from or the same
248
as set forth in this act.
'

Discarding the last century's development of common law, the
1999 legislature also drastically limited the conditions under which
one could abandon a surface water riht and set guidelines relating to
a presumption of non-abandonment.A
Given the importance of the protection against forfeiture and
abandonment these recent enactments afford "surface" water, it is

246. See generally United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2001).
247. NEv. REv. STAT. 533.060(2) (2000).
248. Act ofJune 8, 1999, 1999 Nev. Stat. 515.
249. NEXv. REv. STAT. 533.060(3) and (4) (2000) now provide in pertinent part:
3. A surface water right that is appurtenant to land formerly used primarily
for agricultural purposes is not subject to a determination of abandonment if
the surface water right: (a) Is appurtenant to land that has been converted to
urban use; or (b) Has been dedicated to or acquired by a water purveyor,
public utility or public body for municipal use. 4. In a determination of
whether a right to use surface water has been abandoned, a presumption that
the right to use the surface water has not been abandoned is created upon
the submission of records, photographs, receipts, contracts, affidavits or any
other proof of the occurrence of any of the following events or actions within
a 10-year period immediately preceding any claim that the right to use the
water has been abandoned: (a) The delivery of water; (b) The payment of
any costs of maintenance and other operational costs incurred in delivering
water; The payment of any costs for capital improvements, including works of
diversion and irrigation; or (c) The actual performance of maintenance
related to the delivery of water.
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likely that attempts will be made to apply the law broadly to all waters
historically appropriated under the 1913 Water Law, including artesian
and spring waters.
Should such attempts be successful, the
uncertainties attending the distinction between percolating waters and
other groundwater will assume renewed significance. The rule of
Town of Eureka is that all groundwater is subject to forfeiture; the rule
of Nevada Revised Statutes 533.060(2) is that all surface water is not.
Whether these rules are settled law is an open question, considering
the court's cursory analysis in the former and the ambiguous
application and uncertain effective date of the latter.
VII. DISCUSSION
The history of the development of statutes governing Nevada water
rights tells only an incomplete story of Nevada water law. In reality, a
complex landscape of federal and state decrees, reclamation contracts
and storage projects, irrigation districts and ditch companies, and
interstate compacts and agreements affect administration of water
rights.
The most significant "extra-statutory" influence on the
construction of Nevada water is the ubiquitous presence of the federal
government in Nevada water rights battles. To some extent, this
federal presence is a direct result of Francis Newlands' insistence on
federal management of reclamation projects. Undoubtedly, the
Bureau of Reclamation (formerly the Reclamation Service) has
profoundly impacted Nevada water resource management and water
allocation litigation. The Bureau of Reclamation has sought to clarify
the rights of irrigation project farmers25 ° and orchestrate monumental
reclamation projects like the Boulder Canyon Project.2 5' At the same

time, the federal government has tried to expand the boundaries in
Nevada of federal reserved rights under the "Winters Doctrine" 25 2 for
Indian reservations, 23 instream flows, 2 4 and stock-watering rights.2 5 5 It

should not be surprising that many significant legal doctrines
patrolling the boundaries of federal versus state sovereignty in water
rights matters have had their genesis in Nevada. 56 While a detailed
discussion of this aspect of Nevada water law is beyond the scope of
250. See, e.g., United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity, Docket No. A-3 (D.
Nev. Sept 4, 1944).
251. Boulder Canyon Project Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928)

(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).

252. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
253. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); United States v. Walker River Irr.
Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
254. In re Relative Rights In And To Monitor Valley, Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Nye, Order (April 28, 2000); State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev.

1988).
255. In re Relative Rights In And To Monitor Valley, Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Nye, Order (April 28, 2000).

256. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (determining state law does not govern federal reserved
water); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
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this paper, some examples are useful in illustrating current dynamics
of Nevada water rights administration.
Federal decrees administer water rights on the Carson, Truckee,
and Walker Rivers. The decrees are a result of litigation the federal
government initiated to obtain water rights for federal irrigation
projects and the Walker River Indian Tribe. In 1913, the United States
Reclamation Service initiated an action against the other water users
on the Truckee River to secure water rights for the Truckee-Carson
Irrigation Project.257 Intended as an amicable adjudication, the case
continued for more than thirty years, ultimately resulting in the 1944
Orr Ditch Decree.5
The Orr Ditch Decree provided only a brief
hiatus in the litigation. By the 1960s and 70s, numerous lawsuits were
pending regarding the rights of the Pyramid Paiute Tribe, which
occupies a reservation surrounding the Truckee's terminus, Pyramid
Lake, and the contractual obligations of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District.5 9 Litigation continued until 1990, when intense negotiations
among the affected parties along the Truckee resulted in the
"Negotiated Settlement."26 The Negotiated Settlement provides for
the purchase of water rights to restore wetlands and instream flows and
requires the implementation of water conservation measures. It also
requires preparation of an operating agreement to govern the
management of storage and stream flows on the river.21'
The
settlement is not yet fully implemented.
Adjudication of the Carson River has been equally protracted and
contentious. The United States initiated litigation in May 1925 to
secure water rights from the Carson for the Newlands Project and to
finally adjudicate water rights on the river.262 The case did not
conclude until fifty-five years later, with the issuance of the Alpine
Decree on October 28, 1980.3 The Alpine Decree was immediately
appealed, and since its issuance, various aspects of the case have
bounced back and forth among the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the district courts and the state engineer's office on a regular basis.
One issue of significance in these cases is whether the Newlands
project rights vested in 1902 for the purposes of state law (and thus
whether they are immune from the forfeiture provisions of the 1913
law), or whether they vested at the time the water actually became

257. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity, Docket No. A-3 (D. Nev. Sept.
4,1944).
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
260. Fallon Paiute Ahoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3294.
261. The Truckee River Operating Agreement is still in negotiation but nearing a
final draft.
262. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980),
affd as modified, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
263. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. at 877.
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appurtenant to a particular parcel of property within the project.2
Although the Ninth Circuit has written several opinions on the subject,
none has yet been conclusive. 65
The third major federal decree, which governs water rights
allocations on the Walker River, was the result of the federal
government's assertion of federal reserved rights for the Walker River
Indian Reservation. 6 Until this litigation, a prior federal decree
("Decree 731"), which the Federal District Court for the District of
Nevada issued in 1919, governed water rights on the Walker River. 67
In 1924, the United States filed an action on behalf of the Walker
River Indian Reservation to establish reserved rights pursuant to the
Winters Doctrine, which had been omitted from Decree 731.2 The
case continued until 1936, when the Federal District Court for Nevada
issued Decree C-125.269

Recent litigation has sought to reopen Decree C-125 to increase
federal reserved rights and to address environmental concerns.2 Like
the Truckee River, the Walker's terminus is a desert lake, and
upstream withdrawals for irrigation have led to declining water levels
and increasing salinity. Similar to the Truckee River System, the
Walker River and Walker Lake support an important fishery and
provide significant resources for water

fowl. 27 '

As a result, some

litigants have attempted to convince Nevada courts to recognize the
public trust doctrine as a means of protecting these resources.
What is apparent from this brief overview is that Nevada's
adjudication system, as codified under the 1913 Water Law, is not the
last word. Patrick McCarran's pessimism over the state's ability to
protect vested rights pursuant to this law has proved well founded.
Litigants are still testing the extent of federal reserved rights and
federal pronouncements regarding the "correct" interpretation of
Nevada's water laws continue to challenge the stability of those laws.

264. See generallyUnited States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (2001).
265. Id. (Noonan,J. dissenting) (arguing that majority misinterprets "Alpine III" and
departs from Supreme Court determination).
266. See United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158 (D. Nev. 1935), afrd
as modified, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
267. Pacific Livestock Co. v. Rickey, No. 731, Final Decree (D. Nev. 1919). This

decree settled years of litigation the Miller & Lux Cattle and Land Company
commenced regarding allocation of the Walker River. See Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v.
Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258 (1910); Miller & Lux v. Rickey, 146 F. 574 (D. Nev. 1906);
Miller & Lux v. Rickey, 127 F. 573 (D. Nev. 1904).

268. United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158, 159 (D. Nev. 1935),
affid as modified, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
269. Id.
270.

See Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 804 (Nev. 2001).

271.

Id. at 803.
Id. at 804. Petitioners in this case sought a writ of mandamus against the
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and the state engineer on the
272.

basis that the respondents had abrogated their public trust responsibilities. Id. The

court denied the writ, finding the federal court to be the appropriate forum to
consider this issue in conjunction with litigation pending in that court. Id. at 807.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Nevada's relative tardiness in regulating the rights of its water users
produced a quagmire of competing vested rights exempted from the
permit system and generated endless litigation and adjudications.
Federal management of the major reclamation projects as well as
emerging theories of federal reserved rights has led to the reopening
of apparently settled decrees, leaving Nevadans guessing about the
long term stability of their water rights. At the same time, the transfer
of water rights to municipalities, local governments, and local water
purveyors in exchange for service commitments is likely to result in
obviating the need for traditional water rights laws as water is
increasingly transformed into a commodity.
Meanwhile, the appropriation doctrine codified in Nevada's
statutes has come under increasing criticism, on the basis that its "use
it or lose it" principle is out of step with modern needs to conserve
water and discourage speculation. 3 Nevada's recent radical departure
from settled principles of appropriation law in its 1999 legislation
eliminating the possibility of forfeiture and abandonment for most
surface water274 may be a bellwether of future erosion of the
appropriation doctrine. It may only be a matter of time before Francis
Newlands' dual legacies of irrigation projects and codified
appropriative water laws are both viewed as relics of a distant and
disappearing Nevada landscape.

273. See, e.g., MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS 63-64 (1990).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
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A simple idea born of settlingthe West in the nineteenth century, "beneficial
use" has long sought to require active and actual use in order to maintain a
water right, although its on-the-ground implementation has not always ensured
water use efficiency. However, as fish runs decline, it might represent a
powerful tool to bringdown outmoded irrigationdams in the West, and meet the
conservation challenges of the twenty-first century. This article examines the
controversy surroundingthe proposed removal of Savage Rapids Dam on the
Rogue River in Oregon, a large diversion structure owned by Grants Pass
IrrigationDistrict. In 1982, afterfinding that the Districtput only about half
of its water permit to actual use, the Oregon Water Resources Department
("WRD") conditioned the continued use of its water right on resolution offish
passage issues. When the District failed to demonstrate sufficient progress,
WRD cancelled the right and dramatically changed the tone of the discussion
surrounding a charged dam removal debate. Ultimately, by requiring an
irrigation district to prove the efficient use of its original water right, VVRD
demonstrated the strength of the beneficial use doctrine to supply the water
neededfor imperiledfish in the rapidly growing West.

* Executive Director, Oregon Trout; J.D. 2000, Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis & Clark College; A.B. 1991, Dartmouth College. The author thanks Professor

Michael C. Blumm for a grueling last-paper-of-law-school experience and also thanks
his great wife, Elizabeth, for her patience.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 5

I. INTRODUCTION
Built in 1921, the Savage Rapids Dam ("SRD") rises thirty-nine feet

above the riverbed,' with a span of 456 feet.2 More than eighty years

later, it stands as a significant spawning barrier for the Southern
Oregon Coho salmon, listed as threatened 3 under the Endangered
Species Act4 in 1997.' Environmentalists have supported the removal
of the dam for several years, and the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") has called the dam the worst fish-killer on the Rogue. Due
to its poorly designed fish ladders and screens, the dam accounts for a
significant amount of fish passage problems.6 In 1929, the state of
Oregon originally permitted the dam to irrigate 18,400 acres of
agricultural land. Water diverted from the dam now irrigates less than
half of that, approximately 7,400 acres, mainly for the benefit of lawn
care in an increasingly
•
S
7 subdivided area, with many hobby farms of less
than one acre in size.
A long history of fish passage problems at SRD led to a late
twentieth century debate about removal as a way to lessen its negative
effect on the renowned Rogue River fishery. In the West, solutions to
such debates do not come easy. Despite a dam removal plan that
alleviated all fish passage problems-one which cost significantly less
than retaining the dam and held irrigators economically harmless
through an electric pumping scheme-the local irrigation district held
steadfast against removal. Only after the state cancelled part of its
permitted water right did the irrigation district vote to remove the
dam.
One can trace the fault lines underlying the conflict over the SRD
debate to the water policies of the nineteenth century, which sought to

1. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PLANNING REPORT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: FISH PASSAGE IMPROVEMENTS, SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM S-5

(1995) [hereinafter BUREAU EIS].
2. Bureau of Reclamation, Dataweb, Grants Pass Project, Oregon,
http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/grantspass.html (last modified Jan. 20, 2001).
3. A "threatened species" is defined under the Endangered Species Act as "any
species which is likely to become an 'endangered species' within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994). An "endangered species" faces extinction throughout all or
a large part of its range. Id. § 1532(6).
4. Id. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act in
1973 for the express purpose of providing for the conservation of threatened or
endangered species and the ecosystems upon which they depend. Id. § 1531(b).
5. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,607-08
(May 6, 1997) (codified in part at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1997)); see also ENDANGERED
INFORMATION,
AND
LISTING
Acr
STATUS
REVIEWS
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
6. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-4.
7. DAVIDJ. NEWTON, GRANTS PASS IRRIGATION DISTRIcT WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY
1-3 (1994) [hereinafter NEWTON STUDY]. Of the 5,700 lots the District irrigates, 4,030
(71%) are less than one acre in size, and only fifteen lots are greater than twenty acres
in size. Id. at 4.
SPECIES

Issue 1

SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM

settle and develop the West. The aridity of the western landscape, s the
immediate water needs to insure a productive landscape, and the
relative scarcity of people led to a water policy created to foster
settlement.9 The cobbled-together water use policies, stemming from
mining laws and customs, continually provided incentives to develop
the early West,10 but times have changed. With a growing number of
listed salmonids," a tradition of inefficient means of irrigation and a
rapidly increasing population, 3 the West finds itself at the frayed edges
of a commons once considered endless. 14 The legal and social culture
that so ably settled that dry land now arrives at a crossroads. It can
stand as a relic wedged between the early and the coming West, or it
can tap into latent strength and forge ahead to provide adequate water
for the emerging West of the twenty-first century.
This paper argues that where state water law lives up to its plain
language, it can provide a powerful legal handle to force removal of
outmoded dams that obstruct fish passage. Section II addresses the
issue that although western water use developed perhaps as an eraappropriate scheme, historically lax enforcement has served as an
obstacle to progressive water use. Section III traces the Savage Rapids
Dam conflict. The section illustrates how the historically under8. Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority Over
Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 363, 363 (1997). ("The average annual
precipitation in the seventeen western states is twenty-one inches, but in many places is
far less.").
9. See, e.g., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). The Court recognized early on
that the dryness of the region forced new ways of using water in order to develop the
West. The western states extensively altered the riparian rules of the East "because of
the totally different circumstances in which their inhabitants are placed... and
[because] such alterations have been made for the very purpose of thereby
contributing to the growth and prosperity of those [s]tates arising from mining and
the cultivation of an otherwise valueless soil, by means of irrigation." Id. at 370.
10. See Morton v. Solambo Copper Mining Co., 26 Cal. 527 (1864). The court
explained that
[t]hese customs... were few, plain and simple, and well understood by those
with whom they originated.... And it was a wise policy on the part of the
Legislature not only not to supplant them by legislative enactments, but on
the contrary to give them the additional weight of a legislative sanction.
These usages and customs were... demanded by the necessities of [the]
communities....
Id. at 532-34.
11. See ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT STATUS REVIEWS AND LISTING INFORMATION, Listing
Status Snapshot, http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/index.htm (visited Sept.
7, 2001). As of this writing, fourteen salmonids are listed as threatened or endangered
under the federal Endangered Species Act. Id.
12. See generallyJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient
Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L. 919, 987 (1998).
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION PROJECTIONS:
STATES 1995-2025, at 25-1131 (1997). The West is the fastest growing region in the

United States. By 2025, the population of the eleven westernmost contiguous states
will grow by nearly twenty-nine million. Id.
14. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SC., Dec. 1968, at 1243, 1243.
Hardin hypothesizes that when resources are finite, individually rational decisions lead
to collective deficiency and depletion of the resources in the long run, unless behavior
changes. Id.
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enforced state water law doctrines of beneficial use and waste
prohibition could provide legal means to remove outmoded, fishharming dams in the West. Section IV asserts that by rigorously
enforcing the plain language of the beneficial use doctrine, the West
can avert further declines in its once abundant salmon runs while
supplying the water needed to meet the region's present and future
demands.
I. THE WATER NEEDS OF SETTLING A DRY LAND
The seventeen contiguous states west of the 100th meridian 5
receive dramatically less rain than states east of the meridian. 6
Because all productive resource use depends on the availability of
water, a dry region growing with enterprising souls is a recipe for
adaptation. "[A] nation accustomed to plenty and impatient of
restrictions and led westward by pillars of fire and cloud"" must either
engineer around aridity or adapt to it." Growing crops required a
scheme for moving available water from its source to arable lands via
irrigation ditches. The scheme, adopted through the doctrine of prior
appropriation, arose originally from customs prevalent in mining
camps on public lands. 9 Under the prior appropriation doctrine, a
water appropriator, upon diverting water out of a stream and putting it
to a "beneficial use," such as agriculture, mining, or stock watering,
obtains a water right superior to all later users. This "first in time,
first in right" doctrine"'
rewarded industriousness and provided
stability to water development for economic purposes in the early
West. This firmly established and ascertainable hierarchy of water
rights furthered the development of the West. In this way, the western
water policy that developed in the mid-nineteenth century was born of
necessity. Courts formalized and affirmed the policy through their
decisions."
15. The seventeen western states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED
LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS i (1996).

AcREAGE

16. Benson, supra note 8, at 363.
17. WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS:
LIVING AND WRITING IN THE WEST 75 (1992). A common theme of Stegner's writing is

the feverish pace at which early westerners ran to fulfill their manifest destiny of
settling the West, despite the obstacle of its dryness.

18. Id.
19.

See, e.g.,
Morton v. Solambo Copper Mining Co., 26 Cal. 527, 532-33 (1864).

20. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3 (1890).
21.

See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).

Irwin arrived first on the South

Fork of Poor Man's Creek and diverted the entire stream out of its bed and into his
diversion canal. The court invoked the Latin phrase: "qui priorest in tempore, potiorest in
jure," or "first in time, first in right" to ratify the customs of the miners in gold country.
Phillips had the misfortune of arriving later and selecting the bank of the stream from
which Irwin had already diverted. The court forced Phillips to abide the disadvantages

of his own selection. See generally id.
22.

See, e.g., id.
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In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act ("Act").2'

The Act

aided the average family farmer in covering the substantial up-front
costs involved with damming and irrigation works, and manifested the
understanding of water's central role in the orderly development of
the West. 4 The Act also authorized the government to build dams,
ditches, and other facilities to insure water availability for the irrigation
of small family farms.2 5 The United States Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to approve, build, and then operate the projects on federal
lands. To fund the projects, the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau")
contracted with irrigation districts, which in turn delivered the project
water to its patrons. The new works vastly improved the usefulness of
the land, and their impact went far beyond the acres watered.26 Whole
communities grew up around the agricultural base; hundreds of acres
of alfalfa provided winter feed for thousands of acres of cattle
operations. Farm equipment supply companies, gas stations and
grocery stores followed the irrigation projects throughout the region.
Communities
based on ranching and farming quickly spread across
27
the West.

Working in concert with the prior appropriation doctrine, the
projects that the Act authorized established new limits on the extent
and location of the West's development. With over 25,000 miles of
canals, 37,000 miles of distribution ditches, and 17,000 miles of drains
allowing the dry land to bloom, the unmistakable imprint of the
Bureau's irrigation effort still exists today.28 Throughout the West,
more than a million artificial reservoirs, lakes, and ponds store 294
million acre-feet of water, 9 enough to put all of Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, and New Mexico under a foot of water.30
23. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
372 (1994)).
24. See Peterson v. United States Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-03 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1119 (9th Cir.
1976)). The court explained that the Reclamation Act of 1902 encompassed three

goals: " 'to create family-sized farms in areas irrigated by federal projects .... to secure
the wide distribution of the substantial subsidy involved in reclamation projects and
[to] limit private speculative gains resulting from the existence of such projects.' " Id.
25. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (1994)). The Act also provided that the right to the use of water

shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and that no more that 160 acres of irrigable
land be sold to any one person. By 1982, the number of acres irrigated by a qualified
recipient was 960. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 375, 390dd (1994).
26.

CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE

FUTURE OF THE WEST 248 (1992).

27.

Id.

28. Benson, supra note 8, at 365-66 (citing U.S.
RECLAMATION,

FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF

STATEMENT,

PROPOSED

ACREAGE

LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. 3, at 3 (1996)).

29. An acre-foot equals the water needed to cover one square acre under one foot
of water.
30. WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 259 (citing statistics from U.S. WATER RESOURCES
1975-2000, VOLUME 2: WATER QUANTITY,
QUALITY, AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 12-13 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU
COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES:
OF RECLAMATION,

1989
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Mindful of its scarcity, if unwilling to accept its natural limits,
western water users attempted to head off waste of water resources with
simple language. Beneficial use, without waste, is the basis, measure,
and limit of a water right." No water user may appropriate more than
is reasonably necessary to accomplish a specific beneficial use; to do so
is "waste" and could result in forfeiture of the right, either in whole or
in part.3 While this sounds as though the irrigator must use each drop
frugally to maintain an established right, the system tends towards one
of customary practice, rather than technologic advance, and the West
has generally tolerated considerable inefficiencies in delivering water
to dry land. 3 Historically, the concepts of beneficial use and waste
have served as an often mentioned but rarely enforced legal standard.34
The livelihoods that early western settlers carved from the
landscape stand as testimony to their resourcefulness, ingenuity, and
stubbornness. From this beginning, a distinctive western mindset
developed, imbued with the notion that one must never relinquish
even the slightest amount of production gained from the land.
Although the fabric of such thinking is beginning to fray under the
strain of population growth and declining species diversity, the
decades long saga surrounding the potential removal of the Savage
Rapids Dam demonstrates that the grip of this longstanding western
mindset remains strong.
In an irrigation district where encroaching population has caused
actual irrigation needs to plummet from historic levels, the
philosophical opposition to removing the unproductive dam has
provided fuel to avoid action for years. Despite benefits of removal,
such as lower costs, no loss of water delivery, improved species
protection, and increased fishery revenues, the irrigation district in
charge of the dam has worked hard to retain it. Only after a state
(1989)).
31. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610(1) (1999).
32. George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriersto Conservation
and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-10 (1979).
Under the beneficial use doctrine, a water right is conditional upon being put to
beneficial use-essentially, you use it or you lose it. Id.
33. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of the Deschutes River and its Tributaries, 36 P.2d
585, 586-89 (Or. 1934). The court determined that an irrigator whose irrigation
system lost 45 percent of its conveyance due to open canals in poor soil in the high
desert of Oregon did not violate the no-waste standard of the beneficial use doctrine.
Id.
34. Neuman, supra note 12, at 937.
In the 1920s and 1930s, it was both customary and acceptable to irrigate
poor soil with earthen ditches, losing half or more of the water in
conveyance, as long as the ditches were really ditches and were only
reasonably leaky. Even though competing water users made strenuous
arguments that such use was wasteful, and the reviewing courts grappled at
length with the issues, all the while decrying waste, in the end, the courts
refused to declare the practices legally wasteful because they were customary.
Very little changed over the next half century. Water use had to be
completely out of line with local custom or blatantly inefficient to merit an
actual finding of waste from a court.
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inquiry revealed the dam's wastefulness and threatened to deprive the
district of a portion of its water right did the irrigation district
genuinely consider removal as an option. Opening irrigator's minds
to the possibility of dam removal has taken prolonged effort35 and
ultimately, state enforcement of the beneficial use doctrine.
III. SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM: HOLDING ON TO THE OLD AND
HOLDING BACK THE NEW
A. REGIONAL HISTORY

Set aside in 1968 as one of the original eight waterways under the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 6 the Rogue River of Southwest Oregon
flows 215 miles from its Crater Lake headwaters through the Cascade,
Siskiyou, and Coastal Ranges before spilling into the Pacific Ocean. 7
Historically a strong steelhead and salmon fishery, the Rogue's
challenging whitewater, extraordinary wildlife viewing, and dramatic
cliffs 8 have made it a national treasure. The Rogue River Basin
supports the largest population of wild anadromous salmonids in
Oregon. 39
Agricultural settlers in the early 1900s, however, viewed the river
primarily as a potential source of irrigation water. In 1917, private
interests formed the Grants Pass Irrigation District ("GPID" or
"District") to provide irrigation water to its patrons in Jackson and40
Josephine Counties, Oregon. The District constructed Savage Rapids
Dam in 1921, and used the resulting reservoir to feed turbine and

35. WaterWatch of Oregon, a conservation group dedicated to taking action to
protect and restore Oregon's rivers by focusing on water quantity and use, has
participated in the Savage Rapids Dam issue since the early 1980s.
36. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
[C]ertain selected rivers of the Nation which, with their immediate
environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall be
preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate
environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations. The Congress declares that the established national
policy of dam and other construction at appropriate sections of the rivers of
the United States needs to be complemented by a policy that would preserve
other selected rivers or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition to
protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national
conservation purposes.
Id. § 1271; see also The Rogue National Wild and Scenic River,
http://www.nps.gov/rivers/index.html (last updated Apr. 3, 2001).
37. Nearly 85 miles of the river is designated under the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act as
follows: wild, 34 miles; scenic, 7.5 miles; and recreational, 43 miles. These designated
miles are below the Savage Rapids Dam but speak to the overall caliber of the Rogue
River. See http://www.rogueweb.com/river (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
38. Hellgate Canyon is reportedly the site for the historic jump in the movie Butch
Cassidy and the Sundance Kid. Id.
39. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-1 to S-2.
40. The rapids were named not for their savage character but rather for the Savage
Family, early settlers in the region.
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gravity diversions near Grants Pass, Oregon.1 In 1929, the Oregon
Water Resources Department ("WRD") issued GPID a permit to divert
water from the Rogue for the purpose of irrigating 18,400 acres of
land.42 GPID maintains and operates the dam, with occasional support
from the Bureau. 3
B. FISH PASSAGE PROBLEMS AT SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM

Although only recently a matter of legal significance, fish passage
at SRD has been an issue since the dam's construction in 1921. 4' The
District originally built the dam without fish screens, which serve the
important function of preventing fish from being diverted into the
canals. 46 Although GPID eventually had them installed, the screens
have continuing design problems. Because of high water diversion
velocities at the dam, juvenile salmon are often battered and pinned
against the screens (impingement), or sucked through the screens
(entrainment), into the pumps and out into the irrigation ditches
where they die.
In its final listing notice of the Southern
Oregon/Northern California Coho salmon, the NMFS noted that
impingement and entrainment ofjuveniles into unscreened, or poorly
screened diversions for irrigation contributed to the declining runs of
salmon.47

41. See Bureau of Reclamation, Dataweb, Grants Pass Project, Oregon,
http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/grantspass.html (last modified Jan. 20, 2001). There
are presently approximately 7,738 patrons in the District, with 1,500 having no other
source of water for irrigation. Roughly 200 of these are larger irrigators, many of
whom rely on irrigated crops as a primary source of income. Id.
42. NEWTON STUDY, supra note 7, at 1. The initial 18,400 acre estimate of
potentially irrigated agriculture land proved high. The maximum amount of land
subject to irrigation was approximately 10,000 acres, and the actual irrigated acreage
declined to 7,755 acres based on a final proof survey WRD began in the late 1970s. Id.
43. Bureau
of Reclamation,
Dataweb, Grants Pass Project, Oregon,
http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/grantspass.html (last modified Jan. 20, 2001).
Although originally built with private funds, the Bureau played a direct role in GPID
over its history. The Bureau rehabilitated the project in 1949-1955, upgraded fishways
on both the north and south side of the river, provided improvements to fish passage
facilities in 1978, and conducted studies on the improvement of fish passage in 1974
and 1995. Id.
44. After the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho salmon evolutionarily
significant unit ("ESU") declined from between 150,000 to 400,000 naturally spawning
fish in the 1940s to approximately 10,000 naturally produced adults in 1997, NMFS
listed this Rogue River Basin species as threatened under the Endangered Species Act
on May 6, 1997. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,607-08
(May 6, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1997); see also ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
STATUS

REVIEWS

AND

LISTING

INFORMATION,

LISTING

STATUS:

COHO,

http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
45. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-2.
46. Plaintiff's Complaint at 6, United States v. Grants Pass Irr. Dist. (D. Or. 1998)
(No. 6-98-03034) [hereinafter Take Brief].
47. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,592-93
(May 6, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 227 (1997)).
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GPID installed the first screens in 1934 to prevent entrainment. 48
In 1958, the Oregon State Game Commission ("OSCG") 49 measured
the approach velocities to the gravity diversion screens at SRD and
found that the velocities exceeded the minimum allowable to avoid
impingement of juvenile salmon."
Furthermore, owing to the
perpendicular orientation of the screens, water did not attain the
sweeping velocity5' necessary to help juveniles avoid them, resulting in
either entrainment or impingement. Today, mesh sizes that exceed
NMFS criteria also contribute to the velocity problem, consequently,
juveniles continue to perish in the irrigation ditches.52
Although substantial juvenile salmon loss regularly occurred on
the north bank, 3 the turbine intake pumps remained unscreened until
1958, after Congress appropriated the funds.54 But the fish passage
problems had only just begun. The screens, installed perpendicular to
the flow of the river in front of the turbine pump intake, resulted in
approach velocities of up to 3.3 feet per second, more than eight times
the NMFS maximum of 0.4 feet per second. 55 Unable to break free of
the water flowing through the screens, an estimated 38,000 juvenile
salmonids died in July 1959 alone. 6 In the early 1970s, the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife ("ODFW") tested several
configurations of the fish bypass system designed to reduce
impingement. Two of these options were installing boards in front of
the screens to create a velocity refuge, and using lights to attract
juveniles to the bypass ports. The most successful configuration-a
screen that shunts migrating fish down a ladder-yielded an
impingement rate of 10 percent, 57 and remains in use today. However,
the design of the bypass system includes several right angles, which
catch enough debris to continue to kill 2 percent of all juveniles that
enter. 58

48. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 7.
49. Now called Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife ("ODFW").
50. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 7. The velocities varied from 0.7 to 3.1 feet per
second when the dam was operating at 100 cfs. Current NMFS criteria for juvenile fish
screens set a maximum of 0.4 feet per second. Id.
51. "Sweeping velocity" is a term used to describe a flow and speed needed to
sweep a fish over an obstacle, much the way an inflatable raft would "sweep" over a
mostly submerged boulder in swift water.
52. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 7. NMFS criteria allow a maximum mesh size of
3/32 of an inch; the screens on the gravity diversion screens are 1/8 of an inch in size.
Id.
53. Id. A 1947 OSGC study estimated the losses of juvenile salmon at the turbine
intake at greater than 200,000 fish. Id.
54. Congress allocated funds for the construction of fish protective facilities at
Savage Rapids Dam on July 2, 1956. Public Works Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L.
No. 84-641, 70 Stat. 474, 476 (1956).
55. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 8. A 1959 OSGC study recorded the approach
velocities around the intake turbines. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. Id. at 10. The 1981 screen replacement did not affect the bypass system; the 2
percent mortality remains intact. Id.
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In an effort to decrease entrainment, GPID upgraded the screens
with better seals in 1981. The improved screen seals, however, came
with a larger mesh size, resulting in fewer juveniles entrained around
the seals, but more entrained through the screens themselves.59
Although formal statistics on escapement rates since installation of the
new screens do not exist, significant fish death has likely occurred. In
1991, a seal broke, sucking more than 100,000 juvenile salmonids from
the river and into the main irrigation canal, killing a significant
number of the fish. 0 NMFS investigated the incident in February 1998
and found many large gaps in the screen seals.6
The history of the SRD fish screens, diversion rates, and bypass
shortcomings compelled NMFS to file a civil suit in 1998 under the
ESA72 to enjoin GPID from taking 9 threatened Coho salmon. 4 NMFS
charged that GPID's manner of water diversion at the site had and
would continue to result in the death of the listed juvenile Coho.65 By
formally recognizing the seriousness of the fish passage issues, the
NMFS suit had a distinct effect on the tenor of the ongoing dam
removal debate, putting further pressure on the District to dismantle
the dam. Since GPID could not realistically afford to retrofit the dam
to improve fish passage, it became clear to stakeholders that the
District's options were closing in. Ultimately, NMFS' suit played an
integral role in the Water Commission's Final Order. The Commission
noted that compliance with the ESA would require dam removal for
any continued operation.67
59. Id. In 1981, GPID replaced the 1959 screen mesh size, 5/32 of an inch, with a
mesh size of 1/4 of an inch. Id.
60. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 10. Despite local efforts, an estimated 10,000 died
in the canal. Id.
61. Id.
62. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994). Of the ESA's legal
protections, one of the most significant is its provision prohibiting any person or entity
from engaging in activities that "take" threatened or endangered species. Id.
63. Id. § 1532(19). The term "take" means to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id.
Under the ESA, take of a species listed as either threatened or endangered is not
permitted. Id. § 1538(a).
64. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,607-08 (May
6, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1997)); see also ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT STATUS
REVIEWS

AND

LISTING

INFORMATION,

http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
After the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho salmon evolutionarily
significant unit (ESU) declined from between 150,000 to 400,000 naturally spawning
fish in the 1940s to approximately 10,000 naturally produced adults in 1997, NMFS
listed the Rogue River Basin species as threatened under the Endangered Species Act
on May 6, 1997. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. at 24,607-08.
65. Take Brief, supra note 46, at 1, 10.
66. Telephone Interview with Reed Benson, Executive Director, WaterWatch (Nov.
15, 2000).
67. Cancellation of Permit No. 50957, and the Denial of the Request for
Modification of Implementation Schedules, Oregon Water Resources Commission at
21 (Oregon Water Res. Comm'n Nov. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Final Order].
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C. CONSCIOUS IGNORANCE: REPORTS IDENTIFYING REMOVAL As BEST
AND ONLY OPTION

GPID has known of and grappled with fish passage problems for
But the inquiries have
better than three-quarters of a century.
centered on interim and incremental improvements to passage, rather
than permanent resolution of the problems. 8 That changed in 1988.
In response to requests from Josephine County69 and GPID, the
Bureau initiated a Water Management Improvement study to identify a
permanent solution to fish passage problems at SRD and to help
resolve conflicts over wasteful water use in Josephine County.70 The
Bureau's study focused on the probability of federal listing of
northwest salmonid stocks,7' the chronic fish passage problems at SRD,
the inadequacy of GPID's hydraulic works to operate at reduced
speeds to avoid take, and the reality that the existing diversion works
were near the end of their useful lives." The study then considered
two permanent alternatives for the dam.7" The two concepts pitted the
net value of installing electric pumps and removing SRD (the pumping
alternative) against the net value of retaining SRD and retrofitting the
dam to fix the fish passage problems (the retention alternative) . The
Water Resources Council provided planning guidelines requiring the
Bureau to select the plan with the greatest net economic benefits.75
Because it saved time, money, and fish, while ensuring delivery of
irrigators' water, the Bureau recommended removal of SRD, the
pumping alternative.76
The pumping alternative included installing electric powered
Savage Rapids Dam is a source of 'take' of threatened Coho salmon, which
constitutes a violation of the ESA. The NMFS.. .has consistently stated that
dam removal must be a feature of any incidental take permit.. .for continued
operation. The record does not show that further study, rather than dam
removal, is consistent with the ESA.
Id.
68. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-1. The Bureau completed detailed fish passage
studies in the 1970s, and made interim fish passage improvements between 1977 and
1981. Because hydropower development was then being considered for the dam, the
District and the Bureau put additional fish passage improvements on hold. Due to
costs and lack of interest, the District and the Bureau deferred studies of the irrigation
system improvements at that time. Id.
69. SRD is located on the county line separating Josephine and Jackson counties in
southwestern Oregon.
70. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-1.
71. Id. at S-2. At the time of the report, NMFS had proposed two ESUs for listing as
threatened under the ESA that would impact operations at SRD: Klamath Mountains
Province Steelhead and the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho salmon. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at S-2 to S-3.
74. Id. at S-3.
75. BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-3. The Water Resource Council's Economic and
EnvironmentalPrinciplesand Guidelinesfor Water andRelated Land Resources Implementation
Studies "requires Federal water agencies to select the plan with the '...greatest net
economic benefits compatible with protecting the Nation's environment. . .' as the
preferred alternative." Id.
76. Id at S-3, S-14.
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pumping plants on each bank just downstream from SRD, dam
removal, and forgiveness of the debt owed to the federal government
for the construction of SRD." The largest benefit the pumping
alternative provided was the elimination of all salmon and steelhead
passage problems. The Bureau expected the pumping alternative to
increase escapement" by 22 percent.
The Bureau projected the
increase in escapement to produce 26,700 new spawning fish once the
five-year construction concluded, a harvest increase of 87,900 fish, and
an annual monetary value of $4,998,600 to the sport and commercial
fisheries in the area.
The electric pumping plants required a diversion capacity of 1502
cubic feet per second ("cfs"") in order to achieve the desired result.
This flow would not only meet or exceed GPID's diversion needs,"3 but
also prevent harm to irrigators during and after the removal of the
dam. Although the study did not recognize the monetary irrigation
benefit, new electric pumping facilities would serve to extend the life
of GPID's aging diversion facilities."' Furthermore, the pumping
alternative placed the screens parallel to river flow, 5 decreasing risk of
impingement and entrainment.
The Bureau determined that the retention alternative would
require extensive modification to the SRD structure, equipment, and
the river channel itself.8 6 The construction costs associated with the
retention alternative totaled $17.6 million," while the five-year
pumping alternative costs stood at $11.2 million. 8 The retention
alternative would nearly eliminate salmon and steelhead passage
problems and increase escapement by 17 percent. As a result, 20,700
spawners would survive, leading to a projected harvest increase of

77. Id. at S-14.
78. Escapement is the number of adults that return to spawn.
79. BuREAu EIS, supranote 1, at S-4.
80. Id.
81. See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-014-0020 (1988). Water rights are limited to a certain
rate of diversion at a given point in time (a flow rate) and a total volume of water over
the length of the irrigation season (the total duty). The rate is usually expressed in
cubic feet per second ("cfs"). Cfs is a measure of the flow of water that would fill an
imaginary one-foot square cube that passes by a given point in a second (448.83
gallons of water per minute). The duty is expressed in acre-feet, a measurement of a
volume of water that would cover one acre of land one foot deep in water (325,900
gallons). Id.
82. BUREAU EIS, supranote 1, at S-4.
83. NEWTON STUDY, supra note 7, at 14. Average monthly flows in GPID canals
stand at 130 cfs, and never exceed 145 cfs. By irrigation season, month flows average:
May, 117 cfs;June, 137 cfs; July, 138 cfs; August, 145 cfs; September, 115 cfs. Id.
84. BUREAU EIS, supranote 1, at S-4.
85. Id. at S-5.
86. Id. at S-6 to S-7. Projected construction costs of the dam retention alternative
increase as a result. Id.
87. Id. at S-7. Note that assuming 8 percent interest over a six year construction
period would bring the total cost to $21,343,000. Id.
88. Id. at S-5. Note that assuming 8 percent interest over a five year construction
period would bring the total cost to $13,255,000. Id.
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With
69,100 fish, representing an annual value of $3.87 million.
construction costs two-thirds lower," fishery value benefits 1.3 times
greater, 91 and salmon and steelhead escapement increased by nearly 25
percent,"2 dam removal provided the greatest net economic benefit.
Thus, removal became the Bureau's preferred alternative. 93
D. FAILURE TO PROVE BENEFICIAL USE, MISSED TIMELINES AND No DUE
DILIGENCE: GPID'S CONTESTED CASE

WRD applies a proof survey regulation to guard against waste of
water.94 The regulation requires that after filing for and receiving a
water right permit from WRD, appropriators must then prove they will
apply the designated amount of water to the beneficial use indicated
in their permit. In order to gain a water right certificate under
Oregon law, users must prove actual application of their appropriated
water to the beneficial use through a WRD proof survey.'
In a WRD proof survey in the late 1970s, GPID was unable to prove
actual use of its full permitted water right. 96 The Water Resources

Commission ("Commission")9 7 consequently marked the unused
portion of GPIDs original rights for forfeiture. With an estimated
18,400 acres of irrigable land when formed, GPIDs initial 1929 permit
authorized diversion of 230 cfs from the Rogue River. 98 This diversion
rate overshot actual use in the basin by more than 8,000 acres;
diversions historically ranged between 180 and 190 cfs.99 Based on the
decreased number of actual acres irrigated, WRD issued GPID a water
right certificate for 96.94 cfs in 1982,T00 more than halving its historic
right.
The decreased water right proved difficult for the District to work
with. The District soon found it needed additional water to meet
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
issued

BUREAU EIS, supra note 1, at S-6.

Id. at S-8, S-11 to S-12.
Id. atS-9, S-11 toS-12.
Id.
Id. at S-11 to S-14.
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-330-0010 (1996). Proof surveys compare the water right
against the water actually put to beneficial use on irrigated land. If the actual

use varies from the use outlined in the original permit, the appropriator may only

retain the portion that he or she proves used. Id.
95. See id.
96. NEWrON STUDY, supra note 7, at 1.
the
Oregon
About
97. See

Water

Resources

Commission,

http://www.wrd.state.or.us/commission/about.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001).
The Water Resources Commission is a seven-member citizen board which
establishes water policy for the state and oversees the activities of the Water
Resources Department....

[T]he Commission sets statewide water policy

through Administrative Rules for the management and allocation of
Oregon's surface and ground waters.... [M]embers are appointed by the
Governor for four-year terms, subject to confirmation by the Oregon Senate.
Id.
98. NEWTON STUDY, supranote 7, at 1.

99. Id.
100.

Final Order, supranote 67, at 1.
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irrigation demands, some blamed the inefficiency of GPID's old and
poorly maintained delivery system.'0 ' In 1987, the District applied to
WRD for more water to irrigate the same lands." 2 Recognizing that
GPID could not immediately reduce its historical diversion without
significantly impacting patrons and local communities, WRD issued
another permit in 1990.103 This permit allowed GPID to continue
historical diversions, but only for the amount of time needed to
diligently study and develop plans to address concerns about the
inefficient use of water, and the adverse impacts of SRD on the Rogue
River fishery.10 4 This prompted GPID to commission the Grants Pass
Irrigation District Water Management Study ("Newton Study"), 105
which ran parallel to the Bureau EIS on fish passage improvements at
SRD.100
Satisfied with GPID's progress in October 1994, the
Commission extended the permit to October 1999, and required that
the permit be consistent with the State Scenic Waterway Act0 7 and the
public interest.' The 1994 order also authorized the Commission to
cancel the permit extension if GPID failed to comply with the
conditions of the permit. This included "failure to exercise due
diligence in implementing the approved conservation and fish passage
plans."'10 9
By the time the Bureau formally issued the 1995 Planning Report
and Final Environmental Statement on fish passage at the dam, NMFS,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"), the Oregon Department
of Fish and Wildlife ("ODFW"), and a number of environmental
groups had openly supported the removal alternative."0 In 1994,
acting on a report it commissioned naming dam removal as the least
expensive and best means of providing for fish passage, m the GPID
Board passed a resolution to remove the dam and install pumping

101. NEWTON STUDY, supra note 7, at 1.
102. Final Order, supranote 67, at 1.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Named for David J. Newton Associates, Inc.s' completion of the technical
report.
106. See generally BUREAU EIS, supra note 1.
107. Final Order, supra note 67, at 1; see OR. Rzv. STAT. §§ 390.805-390.925 (1985).
Downstream from GPID's diversion, the Rogue River is designated as a scenic river,
and the Department has set scenic waterway flows to protect fish and recreation values.
The river flows have never met these standards during irrigation season. Final Order,
supranote 67, at 7.
108. Final Order, supra note 67, at 1-2. ("The conditions placed on the permit
included the requirement that the District implement the conservation plan and plan
to resolve fish passage problems, including removal of Savage Rapids Dam, as
described in Chapters 7, 8, and 11 [of the NEWTON STUDY].").
109. Id.
110. BuaAuEIS, supra note 1, at S-3.
111. NEWTON STUDY, supra note 7, at 11. The report stated that, "if [GPID's]
responsibility to GPID patrons is to be fulfilled, they must work together with various
other agencies, elected officials, and groups to implement removal of Savage Rapids
Dam and installation in its place of pumps to supply adequate water to serve the
patrons." Id.
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plants in its place.12 After years of declining irrigated acreage, growing
awareness of the District's fish passage problems, studies
demonstrating the clear benefits of dam removal, and the introduction
of pumps that promised to maintain water delivery levels, progress
toward a permanent solution seemed at hand. This came just in time
to avert a "taking" under the anticipated ESA listings.1 13 This sense of
progress, however, merely appeared to be such. In 1998, a contested
case before the Commission found that GPID failed to exercise due
diligence in removing SRD, and that further delay would be
detrimental to the public interest, effectively canceling a significant
portion of GPID's water rights.'
In April 1998, the Commission determined that GPID had failed to
make any meaningful progress toward fulfillment of the permit
requirements, and proposed to deny any additional permit
modifications or extensions. Ultimately, the Commission sought to
cancel all but the 96.94 cfs granted in 1982.11 When GPID appealed,
the Commissioner " 6 presiding over the appeal faced two issues: (1)
whether GPID had exercised due diligence in accordance with the
October 1994 order; and (2) whether granting GPID's January 1998
request to extend the time allowed for progress toward removal would
be detrimental to the public interest " ' or was otherwise prohibited by
law." 8
Addressing the due diligence question, the Commissioner
reviewed the October 1994 order extending the time for completion
of the work required."9 She concluded that the Commission properly
and clearly conditioned the permit1° upon diligent progress toward
execution of the fish passage plan, which included dam removal by

112. BuREAu EIS, supra note 1, at S-3; see also Minutes and Memorandum of Board
(Jan. 1994) (on file with GPID).
113. Proposed Threatened Status for Three Contiguous ESUs of Coho Salmon
Ranging From Oregon Through Central California, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (July 25,
1995) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1995)). NMFS proposed the Southern Oregon

Northern California ESU of Coho as threatened under the ESA in July 1995. Id.; see
also

FEDERAL

REGISTER

ACrIONS

FOR

COHO

SALMON

at

http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/fractcoho.htm
(last visited Mar. 13,
2001).
114. Final Order, supranote 67, at 22.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Nancy Leonard, Chair of Oregon Water Resource Commission, presided over
the hearing.
117. See OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(5)(a) (1987). Among these highest uses are
"irrigation, domestic use, municipal water supply, power development, public
recreation, protection of commercial and game fishing and wildlife, fire protection,
mining, industrial purposes, navigation, [or] scenic attraction." Id.
118. Final Order, supra note 67, at 5-6.
119. See generally id.
120. Id. at 7-8. Condition four of the 1994 order laid out, " 'The District shall
implement the conservation plan and the plan to resolve fish passage problems,
including removal of Savage Rapids Dam, as described in Chapters 7, 8, and 11, Grants
Pass Irrigation District Water Management Study, March 1994, in accordance with the
schedule provided therein.' " (Emphasis in original). Id.
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2001. " The order left no doubt that the Commission
intended to
12 2
unconditionally require GPID to remove SRD.
The Commission Hearing Officer determined that, since GPID
had assented to the conditions of the 1994 order, thereby gaining the
permit extension, the District must comply with those conditions in
the order. However, the District demonstrated its contempt for the
conditions in three letters written within four months after WRD
issued the order. 213 On February 16, 1995, the GPID board chairman
wrote to U.S. Congressman Wes Cooley. The letter stated that WRD
had
"approved [the District's] water conservation plan and the Board's
decision to remove Savage Rapids Dam.. .

."

and that one of the

District's "tasks [was] to organize a working group of people in
Southern Oregon to support this move.... ." The Chair noted that
"[a]t that time, I hope we will beremoval
able to....ask124for your support in
obtaining federal funding for dam
Another letter followed on February 21, 1995.
In this
correspondence, marked "THIS CORRESPONDENCE IS PERSONAL
AND CONFIDENTIAL,"1 25 the District chairman told Congressman
Cooley that GPID had " 'made the above funding request to "remove
Savage Rapids Dam" due to one factor. It is the "due diligence" clause
in our current water permit.' "12' The letter also noted " '[State]
Senator Brady Adams and Congress [man] Bob Repine are working on
three bills in the Oregon Legislature to alleviate the situation of dam
removal,' and stated that the District has been under 'tremendous
pressure' to remove the dam."'127 The letter went on to state that
Jackson and Josephine County Commissions, the City of Grants Pass,
and the District's Board all wanted to "save the dam,"' but" 'unless we
receive help from all legislative areas, State and Federal, we will end up
with the electric pumps and not 'saving Savage Rapids Dam'. ""'
The board chairman of GPID penned the most telling
correspondence on February 20, 1995, to State Senator Brady
Adams-also marked "PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL." 130

The

letter noted:
"[w]e realize you and Bob Repine are both working to 'Save Savage
Rapids Dam.' [T] here is no question of this effort. We on the Board
of Directors are of the same opinion.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Final Order, supranote67, at 11-12.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Final Order, supranote 67, at 9.

127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

We are literally 'treading water'
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until the three bills introduced into legislation passes (sic) and are signed."
The letter refers to "a 'fraction of people' who want us to 'jump off
the cliff and challenge the Water Resource Commission 'head-on'.
However, as we earlier agreed, until we, GPID, are in a 'position of strength,'
we must maintain the 'due diligence' clause in the permits." 3'
The letters demonstrated that GPID's federal funding inquiry "was
merely a pro forma sideshow to its seeking to retain the dam."'32 From
this point on, GPID's argument that it had proceeded with due
diligence with regard to dam removal only fared worse.
The
Commissioner rejected the District's attempt to blame poor progress
on board member changes.'
The Commissioner similarly rejected
GPID's attempt to shift decision making authority concerning dam
removal to the District. 14 Despite GPID's alleged continued work
regarding consensus building, the Commission hearing officer ruled
that since the District had not initiated action in nearly three years, the
Commission could not consider their actions continuing.'
Finally,
the Commissioner quickly dispensed with GPID's argument that the

"diligence requirement was not cumulative," 36 stating "[a]s the ratio of
time-to-inaction increases, so do the reasons to find a lack of due
diligence.",3 7 She held GPID failed to act with due diligence
toward
3
implementing the fish passage plan and dam removal.

131. Final Order, supra note 67, at 9.
132. Id..
133. Id.at 11.
Despite the District's Board-of-the-moment history of recall elections and
fluctuating relationships with its patrons, the community, and the
Department, it has been and remains a single unit, an irrigation district,
acting through its Board. The October 1994 order requires the District to
proceed with due diligence to comply with the provisions of the order. It
does not require compliance only if the Board favors dam retention or
removal, it does not threaten cancellation only if the Board favors dam
retention or removal, and it does not require the Board to admire or despise
the order itself. It requires the District-that single entity-to do what it is
required to do, regardless of the makeup of its Board.

Id.
134. Id. at 13. These included the 1997 Annual Report and a January 15, 1997
internal handout for Board members.
Both documents speak in terms of
"responsibility to weigh all this information" rather than the District's continuing
obligation to work toward implementing the fish passage plan, including dam
removal. Id.
135. Id. at 14.
During the period after the ... order was issued, the District designed a
newspaper advertisement to help explain and bolster support for dam
removal, but then abandoned that educational component. It contracted
with the Rogue Valley Council of Governments to help develop a community
consensus, but then canceled the contract.... It consulted with a lobbyist but
failed to utilize any lobbyist's services to secure funding for dam removal. It
included some small discussion about dam removal in a few newsletters, but
[provided no context].

Id.
136. Final Order, supra note 67, at 15.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 22.
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The Commissioner then examined the second question-whether
GPID's January 1998 request to modify its permit would impair the
public interest, as defined by Oregon law 39 or was otherwise prohibited
by law. GPID's modification request consisted of one sentence:
Grants Pass Irrigation District requests modification of
implementation schedules in order to continue compliance with the
due diligence requirements, continue to attempt resolution of fish
passage issues, and continue to build community consensus regarding
passage goals. '0

The Commissioner noted that the request did not include a
specific statement about the changes GPID sought. Quoting Constable
Dogberry in Much Ado About Nothing, the Commissioner said the
request was simply" 'too cunning to be understood'. "..
The Commissioner concluded that to further delay or eliminate
the existing requirement to remove the dam for further study on fish
passage issues would impair the public interest.
In reaching that
conclusion, the Commissioner reviewed several factors. First, the
timing of the request-"year four of a five-year extension during which
the District was to have implemented the dam removal Yan "1 43-would
effectively send the process back to the beginning.
Second, the
Commission considered the public interest factors set out in the45
statute detailing determination of the highest use of Oregon waters.1
Under Oregon law, the Commission must consider and try to achieve
balance of uses to maximize economic development and prevent
"wasteful, uneconomic, impracticable or unreasonable use of the
waters involved." 4 6 The Commissioner examined the possible negative

effects of dam removal on irrigation and domestic use, public
recreation, fire protection, and property values. The Commissioner
found these effects either negligible or offset by gains created from
removal.4 7 The Commission further indicated that protection of the
Rogue River fishery outweighed the other public factors identified. To
retreat from dam removal when the record clearly showed it as the
least costly and best method of solving the fish passage problems at the
dam would impair the public interest.

4

§ 537.170(6) (1999).

139.

OR. REv. STAT.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Final Order, supra note 67, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 18.

144.
145.

Id.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(8) (a) (1999).

Among these highest uses are

"irrigation, domestic use, municipal water supply, power development, public
recreation, protection of commercial and game fishing and wildlife, fire protection,
mining, industrial purposes, navigation, [or] scenic attraction." Id.
146. Id. § 537.170(8)(e). "The prevention of wasteful, uneconomic, impracticable
or unreasonable use of the waters involved." Id.
147. Final Order, supra note 67, at 18-19.
148. Id. at 20-21.
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In examining NMFS' take suit against GPID,"' the final order
noted that operation of SRD resulted in an illegal take of threatened
Coho salmon.'50 The order also noted that NMFS consistently affirmed
that dam removal must occur before GPID could obtain any incidental
take permit for continued operation of the dam. 5 ' Pursuant to the
terms of the 1994 permit extension, the Commission cancelled the
additional water rights.'52 This forced GPID to make due with 96.94
cfs, about half of what it historically diverted, but the entire amount it
had proven put to use. GPID appealed, but the Oregon Court of
Appeals denied GPID's petition forjudicial review of the final order."3
E. THE BILL TO REMOVE THE SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM

The tenor and outcome of the final order sobered GPID's board of
directors.
Faced with growing opposition stemming from
environmental concerns,'54 the loss of half its diversion right , failed
state legislative fixes,' 56 and burgeoning litigation and administrative
hearing costs, the District had little room to maneuver away from dam
removal. Recognizing that federal funding was necessary to serve its
patrons, the District reluctantly began to discuss removal as a viable
option.
Strong congressional delegation support is central to securing
federal funding, and a unified voice from the local level asking for the
project is key to congressional support. Therefore, in January 2000,
GPID addressed the issue of federally funded dam removal with its
57
6,720 patrons. Removal won by a margin of more than 25 percent,

149. Take Brief, supra note 46. Both parties have filed briefs, but the court has not
rendered a decision as of this writing. In light of the volume of work the ESA has
created, the fact that NMFS took an aggressive stance against GPID is a strong
indicator of its commitment to rectifying the fish passage problems.
150. Final Order, supra note 67, at 21.
151. Id.
[SRD] is a source of 'take' of threatened coho salmon, which constitutes
a violation of the ESA. The NMFS ... has consistently stated that dam
removal must be a feature of any incidental take permit ... for continued
operation. The record does not show that further study, rather than dam
removal, is consistent with the ESA.
Id.
152. Id. at 22.
153. Grants Pass Irr. Dist. v. Water Res. Dep't, 1 P.3d 480 (Or. App. 2000).
154. Paul Fattig, GPDvoters: Remove the Dam, MAIL TRIB.,Jan. 19, 2000, at 1A, 4A.
155. See Final Order, supra note 67, at 22.
156. Peter Wong, Politics Looms Large in Debate, MAIL TRIB., Jan. 16, 2000, at 2A. In
1995, dam supporters asked the legislature to grant GPID 150 cfs in addition to its
existing 96.94 cfs right, but backed off after Governor Kitzhaber threatened to veto the
bill. In 1999, the Oregon Legislature passed a bill to grant an additional 71.79 cfs,
without tying the additional appropriation to dam removal. The bill also would have
required state legislature approval of dam removal, but Governor Kitzhaber vetoed the
bill.
157. Fattig, supranote 154. Of 6,720 patrons in the district, 2,940 patrons returned
their ballots (43%), while 31 ballots were ruled invalid, leaving 2,909 to decide the fate
of the dam. A majority--1,821 to 1,088---supported removal. Id.
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sending a DeVoto-esque"' message59 to Congress: "Remove Savage
Rapids Dam, but bring your wallet."1
On October 23, 2000, Oregon Senators Gordon Smith and Ron
Wyden introduced the Savage Rapids Dam Act of 2000.16° The Act
would provide $22.2 million in federal funding' to remove the aging
dam and replace it with modern irrigation pumps while still insuring
water delivery to district patrons.16 The proposal would authorize
$13.5 million for general
dam removal costs,'63 $3.7 million
for
161
6
acquisition of the dam, $2.5 million for riparian restoration,'65 and
$2.5 million for recreational improvements.
Although Senators
Smith and Wyden will have to reintroduce the bill 67 in the 107th
Congress, the bill's initial introduction may mark the beginning of the
end of the decades long struggle over the fate of the Savage Rapids
Dam. 68 In November, 2001, federal dollars aimed at removal began to
flow: some $500,000 for implementation studies on replacement
pumps at SRD. 169
IV. COMING FULL CIRCLE: MEANING WHAT WE SAID 150
YEARS AGO
A number of factors have played a role in bringing the removal of
SRD closer to hand. First, a dramatic river system, home to a storied
Oregon salmon fishery, set the stage for a high profile conflict.
Second, the listing of threatened and endangered salmon has
mushroomed in the last decade, and served to increase public
awareness of salmonid spawning and habitat needs. Third, a
conservation oriented governor was in office, willing to veto legislative
attempts to retain the dam despite the science and the costs. Fourth,
dam proponents botched backroom deals. Fifth, an exceptionally
committed not-for-profit staffer 7 ' spurred the charge. Sixth, studies
from both sides of the issue determined dam removal was the least
158. Bernard DeVoto is widely credited with the sharp-tongued adage about the
attitudes of westerners toward the federal government as it applies to resources: "Get
out and give us more money." See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 302 (1992).
159. Fattig, supra note 154.
160. Savage Rapids Dam Act of 2000, S. 3227, 106th Cong. (2000).
161. Id.§5.
162. Id. § 2.
163. Id. § 5(a).
164. Id. § 5(b).
165. Savage Rapids Dam Act of 2000, S. 3227, 106th Cong. § 5(c) (2000).
166. Id. § 5(d).
167. Oregon Trout, WaterWatch, and other conservation groups are currently
working to bring this about. In the meantime, NMFS will likely issue a temporary oneyear incidental take permit to give GPID a chance to get federal legislation for dam
removal passed.
168. Bill Kettler, Bill Could Solve Struggle Over Dam, MAILTRIB., Oct. 24, 2000, at IA.
169. Energy and Water Development Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-66, 115 Stat. 486.
170. Staff Attorney Bob Hunter has served for more than a decade as WaterWatch of
Oregon's point person in the effort to remove Savage Rapids Dam.
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costly, fastest, and most beneficial solution to the fish passage problem.
And finally, legislation offered the prospect of significant federal
funding, which would prevent harm to the irrigators during and after
removal. Nevertheless, after all this, the dam remains.
But at the bottom, WRD's enforcement of beneficial use through a
proof survey provided the relentless legal brush that painted the
District into a corner with no options left but removal.
By
conditioning the District's water right on progress made toward
improving fish passage, WRD insured removal of the dam.
Furthermore, WRD honored the simple original intent of beneficial
use-that beneficial use, without waste, is the basis, measure, and limit
of a water right.7
Water users in the West may possess vested property rights in
water, however, beneficial use limits attach to that right. This means
western states can squeeze current usage to reduce inefficient
practices. With dwindling salmon runs and a rapidly increasing
population in the West, western states must begin to squeeze water
efficiency earnestly in the years to come. Rigorously enforced,
beneficial use can make available the water needed to meet future
demands in the West. Only then will we carry what we have lifted; 172
only then will we begin to fulfill the promise of the West.

OR. REV. STAT. § 540.610(1) (1999).
172. Wallace Stegner, Water in the West: Growing Beyond Nature's Limits, L.A. TIMEs,
Dec. 29, 1985, at V3. Stegner, railing against development's ruination of the fragile
western habitat, asserted "[t] he West cannot carry what it has lifted." Id.
171.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Dams have served as important instruments throughout the history
of western water development. In 1902, the Reclamation Act ("Act")
created the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") to ensure water
resource development in the West. The Act authorized the Bureau to
administer dam and water projects in the seventeen designated
reclamation states west of the 100th meridian.' From 1902 until the
197 0s, the Bureau built dams and other western water projects at a
frantic pace. Following World War II, however, its influence waned as
public opposition to dam construction increased 2 Further, some
demanded destruction of already existing water projects.3 This paper
Magna cum laude, Gonzaga University School of Law. Admitted to practice law
in the state of Colorado. Special thanks to Amy K Kelley, professor of Water Law at
Gonzaga University School of Law.
1. The sixteen original Reclamation States are: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Reclamation Act of 1902,
ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1994)
(establishing reclamation fund from public land receipts); see also Act ofJune 12, 1906,

ch. 3288, 34 Stat. 259 (1907) (extending irrigation Act to the state of Texas, thus
becoming the seventeenth reclamation state).
2. See generally Peter A. A. Berle, The Audubon View: The PlatteImperative, AUDUBON,
May 1989; Brent Blackwelder, Dams: A Change of Course, NAT'L PARKS, July-Aug. 1984, at
8; Timothy Egan, Great Dam: Life Saver, Or a Big Boondoggle!, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 1996,
at 22; Joan Hamilton, Tough Talk From the Feds, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 36; Michael
Satchell, The Last Water Fight, A Dam that Won't Die Shows Power of Pork, U.S. NEWS, Oct.

23, 1995, at 50.
3. See generally Robert S. Devine, The Trouble with Dams, ATLANc MONTHLY, Aug.
1995, at 64; Patrick Joseph, The Battle of the Dams, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 1998, at 48; Ed
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proposes that this dramatic change in the public perception of dams is
primarily due to an evolution in political ideology, reflected in a
commensurate change in the law. As the dominant American theory
moved from liberalism to progressivism to post-materialism, natural
resource laws and public opinion towards dams changed accordingly.
Before considering their influence on the public's attitudes toward
dams, a brief explanation of these political theories and their
application to the evolution of law and public perception is in order.
First, under liberalism, the market champions individual rights, thus
state development is a result of individual economic pursuits.
Consequently, liberal society created the prior appropriation doctrine,
allowing water diversion necessary to develop the arid lands of the
American West.
Second, pro~ressivism supports governmental protection of
individual rights.
One could construe legislative actions such as
passage of the Act and creation of the Bureau as actions of a
progressive government because they supported water development
intended to safeguard individual rights by providing water to the
6
masses.
Third, post-materialism emphasizes individual self-fulfillment
rather than accumulation of material goods.7 Because one places
emphasis on individual self-fulfillment, one no longer considers nature
as a commodity appropriated and exploited for capitalistic gains.
Rather, post-material lifestyles emphasize the need for an environment
free from human manipulation.
The proliferation of numerous federal environmental protection
statutes in the late 1960s and early 1970s evidence a shift in public
perception of natural resources. Additionally, minimum stream flow
appropriation legislation supports the assertion that the public no
longer strictly construes water as a consumptive commodity applied to
a beneficial use. The evolution of political opinion from liberalism to
progressivism to post-materialism may explain the growth of the
American public's disenchantment with dams.

Marston, Dams & Democracy: Drain Debate Exhilarating,DENV. POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at
1G; Alexandra Ravinet, Rivers Get Over the Dam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 8, 1999,
at 14; Paul VanDevelder, Clinton, Salmon and the Dams: the Politics of Denial, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 24, 2000, at B1.
4. MATTHEW ALAN CAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTIONS: THE TENSION BETWEEN
LIBERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1995).
5. ROBERT C. PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
POLITICs 185 (1989).
6. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 111 (1993).

7.

PAEHLKE, supra note 5, at 173.
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II. RIPARIANISM AND THE EVOLUTION TOWARD PRIOR
APPROPRIATION
In order to understand changing public attitudes toward dams in
the twentieth century, it is important to understand the evolution of
water law. Originally, the English common law doctrine of riparianism
dominated water law.8 The riparian doctrine stems from the early
English concept of "the commons. " 9 In 1066, the Normans conquered
England, and William the Conqueror declared himself "the fee owner
of all lands in England." ° William deeded portions of land to highranking nobility loyal to his cause, insuring his control over the entire
country."
Subsequently, the high-ranking nobles conveyed these
grants of land to their lower-ranking counterparts. While this system
of land ownership allowed for the Crown's presence throughout the
country, these conveyances privatized much of England's land and
0
stifled non-nobles' ability to develop land."
The Crown adopted the Magna Carta in 1215, in part to combat
the total privatization of land. 4 Although the Magna Carta did not
specifically grant public rights in resources, it did "curb the Crown's
infringement of property rights by establishing the principle that the
Crown was subject to the people."' Furthermore, it protected "specific
,,16
public interests in watercourses.
As a result, the Magna Carta
prevented the Crown from restricting public use of English waterways,
recognizing "common or public rights." 7
Out of the notion of the commons arose the law of riparianism."8
Early legal scholars viewed water as "common property by 'natural
right." A riparian owner-any person who owned land adjacent to a
watercourse-could use water without interference from another.
Thus, riparian rights were incident to land ownership.20 However,
riparianism received little legal scrutiny due to England's sparse and

8. DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY AND THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 88-89 (1985).
9. Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept With Modern
Relevance, 23 WM. & MARYL. REV. 835, 840 (1981).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 854.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Butler, supra note 9, at 856.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 858.

18.

See generally T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the RiparianDoctrine, 28

Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963) (tracing the roots of riparianism from William the Conqueror
to American riparian doctrine adoption).
19. Id. at 66.
20. Id. at 67-69; DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16 (3d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter WATER LAw] ("Prior to the eighteenth century, most water cases involved
rights of navigation and fishing.").
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agrarian population, 2' as well as the fact that normal consumptive uses
seldom interfered with each other.22 This lack of conflict allowed
riparianism to develop gradually in the English courts from the time of
William the Conqueror until 1785."
The year 1785 saw the beginning of the Industrial Revolution's
effects on English water law.2 ' The riparian doctrine changed
significantly because of increased domestic and industrial
consumption. 2 In order to sustain industrial expansion, more water
was required to power existing mills and support new development.
Increased water demands created a situation where upstream riparian
owners received water in usable quantities but downstream users did
not.
While the English courts struggled to create a rule that balanced
26
the needs of industry with the common rights of riparian owners,26
American courts developed the concept of reasonable use.
Reasonable use principles assert that "each riparian proprietor has a
privilege to make a reasonable use of water for any purpose, provided28
that his use does not cause harm to the reasonable uses of others.,"
Accordingly, industry could use water provided that it did not interfere
with rights of other riparian owners. Furthermore, since riparianism
developed in the non-arid regions of the United States, the doctrine
prohibited diversion of water from its natural channel to benefit nonriparian land:
The supply of man's artificial wants is not essential to his existence;
it is not indispensable; he could live if water was not employed in
irrigating lands, or in propelling his machinery.
In countries
differently situated from ours, with a hot and arid climate water

21. Lauer, supra note 18, at 68; WATER LAW, supra note 20, at 16.
22. Lauer, supra note 18, at 63-98 (examining the development of riparianism in
the English common law from 1066 to 1785).
23. Lauer, supra note 18, at 99.
24. Id. at 99; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849 Introductory Note on
the Nature of Riparian Rights and Legal Theories for Determination of the Rights
(1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
25. RESTATEMENT, supranote 24, § 849.
26. Ultimately, English courts adopted the American doctrine of "reasonable use."
Yet, such adoption took time. English courts initially applied the riparian doctrine of
"ancient use." Under this doctrine, riparian owners who established use were entitled
to such use prior to others. By the 1700s, the "prior use" doctrine replaced ancient
use. Prior use doctrine provided that a riparian owner shall not use water if he would
"...deprive a prior user of water. This principle protected earlier mills from
interference with their water supplies by newer mills." Later, in the 1820s, the "natural
flow" theory replaced the prior use doctrine. All riparian owners, regardless of
seniority, were entitled to use water provided such use did not "diminish the quantity
of water otherwise flowing to proprietors lower on the stream." Within twenty to thirty
years, English courts abandoned natural flow theory in favor of the American doctrine
of reasonable use. WATER LAW, supranote 20, at 17-18.
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 849, at 209; Lauer, supra note 18, at 107; see also
T.E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 MO. L. REv. 1, 3 (1970) ("Riparianism is
reasonable use.").
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 849, at 208-11.
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doubtless is absolutely indispensable to the cultivation of the soil, and
in them, water for irrigation would be a natural want. Here it might
increase the products of the soil, but it is by no means essential, and
cannot therefore be considered a natural want of man.29

As a result, riparianism promoted equity among users by treating
water as a communal good, to be consumed only in quantities that did
not interfere with rights of other riparian owners. Thus, the riparian
system was well suited for non-arid lands."°
III. PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL
STATE
The riparian doctrine proved difficult to implement in the
American West, as the vast majority of land does not border on natural
waterways."1 In order to maximize the potential of the land and allow
for western development, water users had to divert water out of its
natural channel.
The final expansion of our Nation in the 19th century into the
arid lands beyond the hundredth meridian of longitude, which had
been shown on early maps as the "Great American Desert," brought
the participants in that expansion face to face with the necessity for
irrigation in a way that no previous territorial expansion had.
Because riparianism prohibited diversion from the natural stream,
water users were forced to develop a legal system allowing for such
diversion in order to irrigate non-riparian land. This served as the
impetus behind the prior appropriation doctrine."3
Although the concept of diverting water from its natural course in
the West is as old as its native inhabitants,34 the doctrine of prior
29. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Il1. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842).
30. Lauer, supra note 27, at 5 ("Fundamentally, the right is to the flow of water.
Since the earliest decisions it has been held that the riparian proprietor has no
ownership of the corpus of the water in the stream."); see DONALD J. PISANI, WATER,
LAND, AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE Limrrs Or PUBLIC POuCv, 1850-1920, at 1 (1996)
(stating that riparian rights "were 'correlative' rather than absolute.... Riparian
owners could ... not so diminish the flow or quality of water as to injure downstream
users.").
31. Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 343, 345 (1995) ("The western states emphatically rejected riparianism.
The passion accompanying this rejection can hardly be over-emphasized. Early courts
believed that any lingering traces of riparianism threatened the civilization of the
western United States.").
32. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978); see also J. W. POWELL,
LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (2d ed. 1879) ("[T]he lands [of

the West] have no value without water.").
33. In order to demonstrate a prior appropriation right, the user must have a
priority to use the water over other users, must divert the water from its natural course,
and must beneficially use the water. See GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L. GRANT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 24 (5th ed. 1995) [hereinafter GOULD AND GRANT].
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appropriation evolved primarily during the California gold rush.35
Gold mining was a water intensive venture; 36 miners used water to filter
lighter sediment away from the heavier gold particles. 37 Thus, water
was absolutely necessary to mine gold.3 As more people migrated
from the east in hopes of discovering gold in the California mountains,
the best claims were those that bordered natural waterways. 9 As a
result, only a limited number of claims were able to locate on natural
waterways." Based on this reality, "[t]he miners.., developed their
own water laws before any state or federal court or legislature spoke"
on the issue. 4' Time dictated a water user's ability to use water in
accordance with the general parameter of the mining rule.42 Whoever
was first to put the water to beneficial use was entitled to use that water
over all 1others
who subsequently arrived, regardless of point of
3
diversion. Hence, the mining rule simply stated that any person who
was "first in time, [was] first in right.""
In 1855, the informal "first in time, first in right" rule received its
first legal challenge. 3 The dispute asked the California Supreme
Court to consider whether a canal owner who supplied water to miners
with claims that did not border natural waterways could legally divert
34.
And the Mexican law, as well as the law of Indian tillers of the soil, who
preceded the Spaniards here, as it may be gathered from the ruins of their
irrigation systems, did but recognize the law of things as they are, declaring
that such must of necessity be the use of the waters of streams in this arid
region.
Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 113 P. 823, 825 (N.M. 1911); Michael Parfit,
When Humans Harness Nature's Forces, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. SPECIAL ED., Nov. 1993,
56, 57 ("The Hohokam devised the first irrigation systems in what is now the United
States, using stone and wood tools to dig canals from the Salt and Gila Rivers as early
as A.D. 300. Mats woven of brush, strategically placed, helped direct the water flow to
cornfields.").
35. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 232 (1992); see WATER IN THE WEST: A HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
READER 16-27 (Char Miller ed., 2000) (satirical look at the law of prior appropriation).
But see
[T]he afternoon of July 23, 1847, was the true date of the beginning of
modern irrigation. It was on that afternoon that the first band of Mormon
pioneers built a small dam across City Creek near the present site of the
Mormon Temple and diverted sufficient water to saturate some five acres of
exceedingly dry land. Before the day was over they had planted potatoes to
preserve the seed.
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648-49 (1978); GOULD AND GRANT, supranote
33, at 18 ("Seeds of prior appropriation have also been found in the Mormon
settlement of Utah in 1847, six months before the discovery of gold in California.").
36. WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 231.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 232.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
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water from its natural course.46 The court declared that "[c] ourts are
bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the
country in which they judicially rule." 7 Based on this statement, the
court examined the social treatment of water in the state of
California.
Reviewing the role of mining in California, the court noted that
the government "heartily encouraged [mining] by the expressed
legislative policy of [the government]. 9 The court declared that
miners had not only developed the land for mineral extraction, but
also had developed their own rule governing water use. 50 It held that
miners could divert water from its natural course based on the mining
industry's need to use water away from its source:
[H]owever much the policy of the State, as indicated by her
legislation, has conferred the privilege to work the mines, it has
equally conferred the right to divert the streams from their natural
channels, and as these two rights stand upon an equal footing, when
they conflict, they must be decided by the fact of priority, upon the
maxim of equity, qui priorest in tempore, potiorest injure.

In the landmark case, Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.,52 the Colorado
Supreme Court recognized the basic rule the California Supreme
Court had developed. In 1879, the St. Vrain Creek ran so low that it
could not meet all of the irrigation demands in the area. 3 Despite the
fact that Left Hand Ditch Company ("Left Hand"), a non-riparian, had
senior rights for irrigation purposes, Coffin, a junior riparian land
owner, tore out Left Hand's upstream diversion dam to get more
water. 4
Left Hand brought suit against Coffin for trespass.
Additionally, Left Hand sought injunctive relief to prevent further
damage to its diversion dam. Coffin argued that a non-riparian
use
56
was unlawful even though Left Hand put the water to use first.
The Colorado Supreme Court examined Colorado's water laws as
well as the function of water in an arid climate. First, the court noted
46. Id. at 145.
47. Id. at 146.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146-47.
51. Id. at 147 (translation: he who is first in time is first in right).
52. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). While Colorado follows a
pure form of prior appropriation, California applies a hybrid approach to water law.
Originally, California followed the law of riparianism as court decisions issued prior to
Irwin demonstrate. However, after the court's decision in Irwin, California "converted
to a system of [prior] appropriation while preserving existing riparian rights." WATER
LAW, supra note 20, at 7; see also Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886) (describing
California's hybrid system).
53. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 444.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 1 at 449.
57. Id. at 446.
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that Colorado had never recognized riparianism as a rule of law."
Rather, Colorado followed the doctrine of prior appropriation 59 "from
the date of the
earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries
6
of the state."
Next, the court examined the policy behind recognition of prior
appropriation as the rule of law in Colorado: 6 " [i] t has always been the
policy of the national, as well as the territorial and state governments,
to encourage the diversion and use of water in this country for
agriculture. 6 1 Moreover, to "[d]eny the doctrine of priority or
superiority of right by priority of appropriation" would contradict the
federal and state governments' express policies promoting water
diversion. 63 Accordingly, the court concluded "that the common law
doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its
natural channel. .. is inapplicable to Colorado., 64 In line with its
holding, the court determined that there was no merit to Coffin's
riparian claim. 65 Prior appropriation was the only rule of law
governing water in the state of Colorado.6
Following the Colorado Supreme Court's announcement in Coffin,
the vast majority of western states "extinguished riparian rights to the
use of water and adopted the 'Colorado doctrine'." While westerners
58. Coffin, 6 Colo.at 446.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 446-47.
62. Id. at 446.
63. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446. The Mining Act of 1866 and the Desert Lands Act of
1877 manifest the express policy of which the court speaks. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321, 661
(1994). According to the United States Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co.
v. BeaverPortland Cement Co.
[T]he effect of these acts is not limited to rights acquired before 1866. They
reach into the future as well, and approve and confirm the policy of
appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs,
and the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid land states, as the test
and measure of private rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the
public domain.
295 U.S. 142, 155 (1935). Since Colorado did not achieve statehood until 1876, the
state was never bound by riparian doctrine, thus acted consistently with federal policy
when it adopted the rule of prior appropriation.
64. Coffin, 6 Colo.at 447.
65. Id. at 446-52.
66. The roots of prior appropriation are even memorialized:
In the state capital building in Denver, Colorado, a room of cathedral-like
proportions has been dedicated to water. There, below the capital's golden
dome, an elaborate mural depicts the central role of water in pushing the
frontier westward and 'reclaiming' the arid landscape.
The mural is
accompanied by the simple words of poet Thomas Hornsby Ferril: 'Here is a
land where life is written in water.' Indeed, water is sacred in the western
United States, regarded with a reverence that approaches religious zeal.
Id. at 452; see Klein, supra note 31, at 343
67. GOULD AND GRANT, supra note 33, at 280 (citing Van Dyke v. Midnight Sun
Mining & Ditch Co., 177 F. 85 (9th Cir. 1910); Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453 (Ariz. 1888);
Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541 (Idaho 1890); Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885);
Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gutierrez, 61 P. 357 (N.M. 1900); Stowell v.
Johnson, 26 P. 290 (Utah 1891); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845 (Wyo. 1896)).
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did not invent the notion of prior appropriation, the West was the first
area of the country to use water far from the channel of a natural
stream

68

Prior appropriation led to western land development because it
allowed hard working individuals to divert water away from its natural
course to reclaim arid land for development.69 As such, prior
appropriation was a creation of liberal ideology. Liberalism hinges on
two principles: (1) self-interest in the consumer marketplace maintains
individual rights; and (2) individual self-interest drives the state in
search of "increased productivity and profit."70
First, unlike riparianism, prior appropriation placed little interest
on the needs of the community. Rather, prior appropriation was
fundamentally based on self-reliance as it rewarded those individuals
who arrived first in time and put water to beneficial use. "Prior
appropriation reflected the late nineteenth-century assumption that
self-seeking individuals and corporations could best serve economic
development. ...

,,71

Further, prior appropriation placed a great deal

of value on the work ethic of the individual to appropriate water and
reclaim arid land quickly. "The rationale of the prior appropriation
system is to protect the expectations of those who invest in water
diversions from interference by those who enter the picture later."72
Prior appropriation provided incentive to move west and develop the
land-water rights being the reward for hard work.
Second, distinct from the riparian doctrine, prior appropriation
treated water as a "commodity," and thus as a product of liberalism.
One treated water as if it were hard currency." Land was valuable if it
had water rights attached to it and valueless if it did not.75 Thus, land
reclamation drove physical and economic expansion of a western state.
This definition of public good justifies the creation of an infrastructure
which makes such protections possible. 7 ' Applying the concept of
liberalism to the prior appropriation doctrine, water as a commodity
expanded states physically and economically. As a result, community
rights to water became secondary to individuals' rights to appropriate
water. 7
While prior appropriation was instrumental in the initial
development of the West, it was not without faults. "Wherever
adopted, the doctrine of prior appropriation, like its parent, the

68.
69.
70.
71.

PISANI, supra note 30, at 1.
WORSTER, supra note 8, at 89.
CAHN, supra note 4, at 1.

PISANI, supra note 30, at 3.

72. MARc REISNER & SARAH
WESTERN WATER 64 (1990).

BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR

73. PISANI, supra note 30, at 1.
74. POwELL, supra note 32, at 40-41.
75. Id. at 40.
76. See generally PIsANI, supra note 30, at 180-194.
77.

WORSTER, supra note 8, at 96.
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78
economic culture of capitalism, created difficult problems for itself.
For example, the doctrine placed importance on time. As time
progressed, prior appropriation fundamentally disadvantaged settlers
who arrived later in time. 79 The system subjected future settlers to
existing settlers' priority dates, hence penalizing new settlers for
arriving later. Because of this inherent penalty settlers were less likely
to move west, stifling western land development.
Further, prior appropriation encouraged monopolization of
western water. Individuals who arrived later in time had no legal
standing to challenge senior users' water rights. Therefore, the few
settlers who were lucky enough to arrive first controlled most water
rights in the West. To help combat water monopolization, water users
built reservoirs to impound spring runoff for use in the dry summer
months." Originally, western settlers believed that private property
owners were capable of developing water storage. However, lack of
capital among private investors hampered widespread development."
Ultimately, in order to break the cycle of monopolization, the settlers
needed to take additional measures to combat the water monopoly.

IV. THE NATIONAL RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902 AND
PROGRESSIVE IDEOLOGY
The 1900 Census indicated that the West was far from fully
populated. Realizing that the lack of water development was a key
reason for slow population growth, western government was "forced to
admit that in order to sustain their population advance in the face of
an adverse climate, they needed irrigation-and on a big scale, bigger
than anything they had so far tried." As a result, Congress passed the
Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act")8 4 hoping that western land
development would continue if the United States built large-scale
water projects impounding water for consumptive use.85 According to
President Theodore Roosevelt, "'[I]n the arid region it is water, not
land, which measures production. The western half of the United
States would sustain a population greater than that of our whole
country to-day if the waters that now run to waste were saved and used
for irrigation.'""
78. Id. at 92.
79. PowELL, supra note 32, at 131.

80. Id. at 11.
81. Id.
82. WORSTER, supra note 8, at 131.
83. Id. at 132; see also POWELL, supra note 32, at 11 ("Small streams can be taken out
and distributed by individual enterprise, but co6perative labor or aggregated capital
must be employed in taking out the larger streams.").
84. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1994)).
85. 35 CONG. REc. 6728 (daily ed. June 13, 1902) (statement of Rep. Burkett).
86. 35 CONG. REc. 6739 (daily ed. June 13, 1902) (statement of Rep. Reeder)
(citing a message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the United States House of
Representatives).
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The Act set forth a comprehensive scheme for developing water
resources to accomplish its goal of irrigation expansion in the western
United States.87 It applied only to the sixteen identified reclamation
states," with Congress establishing the reclamation fund to build water
storage facilities and irrigation systems.8 9
According to the
Reclamation Fund:
all moneys received from the sale and disposal of public lands in [the
sixteen reclamation states] ... excepting the five per centum of the

proceeds of the sales of public lands in the above States set aside by
aw for educational and other purposes, shall be, and the same are
hereby, reserved, set aside, and appropriated as a special fund in the
Treasury to be known as the "reclamation fund," to be used in the
examination and survey for and the construction and maintenance of
irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters

for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands in the said States ....

90

In order to construct the necessary water projects, Congress
created the Reclamation Service, renamed the Bureau of Reclamation
in 1923 ("Bureau").' The Bureau "would withdraw dam and reservoir
sites along with adjacent lands, then sell off the land, complete with
irrigation water, to homesteaders."9 2 Finally, the Act stated that "[t]he
right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall
be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the
basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."93
Although Congress' desire to irrigate the West seemed boundless,
the Act did include an important limiting provision. Congress noted
87. See generally Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1994)).
88. The sixteen reclamation states were: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.; see also WILKINSON, supra note 35,
at 246-47 ("The whole west would participate: sixteen states on or west of the 100th
meridian (Texas was added in 1906) were eligible for reclamation projects.").
89. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 391 (1994)).
90. Id. Despite the federal government's conviction that reclamation could pay for
itself, it has not. It is estimated
that from 1902 to 1986 Bureau of Reclamation irrigation projects cost
taxpayers close to $20 billion in 1986 dollars. [T]he federal irrigation subsidy
for 1989 was about $2.2 billion. Most of this subsidy stems from the
repayment deal enjoyed by irrigators. Their payments for [Bureau of
Reclamation] water are supposed to reimburse the government for the
irrigators' share of the initial capital expenses and for operation-andmaintenance costs. But repayments have been drastically reduced, by
accounting stratagems and by congressional largesse-expressed most vividly
by the fact that irrigators are exempt from paying interest. [O]n average,
[Bureau of Reclamation] irrigators end up paying only 12-15 percent of the
construction costs allocated to irrigation.
Devine, supranote 3, at 68.
91. WORSTER, supranote 8, at 170.
92. WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 247.
93. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 372 (1994)).
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that water project development had the potential to benefit only a rich
minority, rather than the entire population:
[T] he very purpose of this bill is to guard against land monopoly
and to hold this land in small tracts for the people of the entire
country, to give each man only the amount of land that will be
necessary for the support of a family-not more than 80 acres in the
southern part of the arid region and not more than 160 acres in the
northern part, where cultivation is less intensified. Convey this land
to private corporations and doubtless this work would be done, but
we would have fastened upon this country all the evils of land
monopoly which produced the great French revolution which caused
the revolt against church monopoly in South America, and which in
recent times has caused the outbreak of the Filipinos against Spanish
authority.94
As a result, the Act specifically limited reclamation projects to
irrigation of lands settled under the homestead laws95 that did not
exceed 160 acres.9 6
Congress passed the Act to facilitate population growth by
preventing the domination of water resources in the West." It
intended for the Act to subvert water rights monopolization by
financing water projects that impounded the spring runoff for use in
dry months.
Further, the Act prevented land speculation and
monopolization by limiting irrigation benefits to parcels of land no
larger than 160 acres.98 Clearly, Congress intended the Act to benefit
the small agrarian farmer, rather than large agribusiness."
Based on Congress' desire to protect all members of the
population, passage of the Act and creation of the Bureau illustrates
an outgrowth of progressive government. ° Progressivism emphasizes
94. 35 CONG. REc. 6734 (daily ed. June 13, 1902) (statement of Rep, Newlands).
95. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 389 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 432 (1994)).
96. Id.; see REISNER, supra note 6, at 115 ("[A] man and a wife could jointly farm 320
acres."). Unfortunately, the federal government's acreage limitation to promote the
yeoman farmer ideal did not prevent land speculation. Rather,
collusion between agribusiness corporations, [the Bureau of] Reclamation
and politicians ensured that the limit was constantly subverted and ignored.
Under the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, the 160 acre limit was expanded
sixfold, the requirement that the "family" (often in fact a corporation) live on
the irrigated land was abolished, and farmers were allowed to lease unlimited
amounts of federally irrigated land beyond their new 960 acre ownership
limit. One Congressman denounced the Reform Act as a "bald-faced antifamily farm package of direct subsidies to the richest of America's
agribusiness interests."
PATRICK McCuLLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS

174-75 (1996).
97. See generally 35 CONG. REc. 6722-78 (daily ed. June 13, 1902) (topic of irrigation
of arid lands).
98. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 389 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 431 (1994)).
99. WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 247.
100. PISANI, supra note 30, at 195-96, WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 238; WORSTER,
supra note 8, at 161.
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safeguarding individual rights as a major tenet."' A progressive
government protects individual rights by becoming active in the
common sector.0 Thus, by financing the Bureau of Reclamation, the
federal government sought to ensure individual protection through
water development.'
In order to settle the West, the federal
government needed to construct dams to impound water for the
benefit of the entire population, not just individuals who were
fortunate enough to arrive first in time. °4 Settlement maximization
required increased governmental regulations and a subsidized
infrastructure.'
Therefore, Congress applied progressive policies
6
when passing the Reclamation Act and establishing the Bureau.
The Act and the Bureau also functioned within the liberalism
doctrine. 7
To ensure physical expansion, government enacted
mechanisms that appropriated and impounded water for consumptive
use. Each new dam the Bureau constructed realized greater western
land development. Further, the Act ensured economic growth of the
United States. As population increased in the West, the United States'
economy grew. Thus, development of western resources depended on
increasing the population base. Therefore, Congress employed both
liberal and progressive ideologies when passing the Act and
establishing the Bureau.
V. THE RISE AND FALL OF DAMS IN THE AMERICAN WEST
THROUGH POST-MATERIALISM
Following passage of the Act, the Bureau began constructing water
storage sites throughout the West. From 1902 until the beginning of
the Great Depression, "the Bureau built thirty-six dams and water
projects."'0 0
Federal irrigation led to the issuance of more
homesteading patents than ever before, fulfilling one of the main
purposes of the Act-to promote population growth through water
storage construction.' 0 However, these figures paled in comparison to
the future of federal dam building projects. The Great Depression
invigorated the Bureau's dam building craze throughout the West, the
construction of the Hoover Dam highlighting this trend."'

101.
102.

PAEHLKE, supranote 5, at 185.
Id; see Marc Reisner, The New Water Agenda: Restoration, Deconstruction, and the

Limits to Consensus, 20J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 1, 3 (explaining the Reclamation
Act of 1902, Reisner states "the U.S. government had never played such an intimate
and activist role in domestic affairs.").
103. WORSTER, supra note 8, at 166-67.
104. Id. at 166-69.
105. Id.
106. See REISNER, supra note 6, at 111 ("[H]istorians still ... argue over why [the
Reclamation Act] was passed. To some, it was America's first flirtation with socialism,

an outgrowth of the Populist and Progressive movements of the time.").
107. See id. ("To some, its roots were in Manifest Destiny...").
108. Christine A. Klein, On Dams andDemocracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641, 667 (1999).
109. WILKINSON, supranote 35, at 240-48.
110.

McCULLY, supra note 96, at 16.
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Following the construction of Hoover Dam, the Bureau engaged in
widespread dam construction for the next three decades."' During
this time, the Bureau was relatively
unfettered in its ability to construct
2
dams throughout the West.1

The astonishing thing... about the whole era-was that people just

went out and built it, built anything, without knowing exactly how to
do it or whether it could even be done. There were no task forces, no
special commissions, no proposed possible preliminary outlines of
conceivable tentative recommendations. Tremendous environmental
impacts, but no environmental impact statements.11

While the Bureau's dominance over western rivers lasted through
the 1970s," 4 American opposition to dams began after World War II. n'
Following the war, the United States experienced its first economic
boom since the 1920s." 6 The Allied victory in World War II had
resulted in a tremendous surge of economic growth." 7
The
population of the West began to shift from rural to urban
environments. As a consequence, most westerners live in large cities
today."8 The general r9
public developed and gained more technology
due to the war effort.' 9 Luxury goods, such as televisions and other
home appliances, were now common in most homes throughout the
United States."'
The swelling economy led to the rise of post-materialism ideology.
"Post-Materialism [is defined] as a greater emphasis on self-expression
and the quality of life. Being becomes more important than having,
quality more important than2 quantity, both in one's own life and in
one's assessments of others."
111. The Bureau of Reclamation built around 228 projects from 1931 to 1960.
While this note focuses on the Bureau of Reclamation's damming of the West, it
should be noted that the Army Corps of Engineers and the Tennessee Valley Authority
were doing much the same thing throughout the rest of the country. The Corps built
hundreds of water projects and the Tennessee Valley Authority "built more dams...
damming virtually every free-flowing segment of the Tennessee River until '[n]o river
in the entire world [had] as much of its course under reservoirs as the Tennessee.'
Together, the federal agencies erected more than one thousand large dams between
1930 and 1980." Klein, supra note 108, at 667; see also REISNER, supra note 102, at 2
("Simply put, the Twentieth Century has been the Hydraulic Century, the Age of
Dams. At least ninety-five percent of the world's significant dams (usually defined as
those more than fifteen meters high) were built [during this time].").
112. See generallyREISNER, supra note 6, at 145-68.
113. Id at 160.
114. Parfit, supra note 34, at 58 ("...the juggernaut was almost unstoppable..
115. SARAH F. BATES, ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 45 (1993) [hereinafter HEADWATERS].
116. See generally WORLD WAR II AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: How WARTIME BUILDING
CHANGED A NATION (Donald Albrecht ed., 1995) [hereinafter WORLD WAR II].
117. PAEHLKE, supranote 5, at 143.
118. HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 73.
119. See generallyWORLD WAR II, supra note 116.

120. Id at xx, xxi.
121. PAEHLKE, supranote 5, at 173.
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Since post-materialism emphasizes the self, it can only exist in an
economically secure society, as it is a movement away from capital
"' Economic security also gave many
gains. 22
Americans the opportunity
to leave their urban environment for the wilderness. The post-material
societal response inspired people to seek partial self-fulfillment on the
lakes and rivers throughout the West, This shift began a radical
change in public opinion toward the environment. 2 3 Post-materialism
proved to have a profound effect on the future of dams. Public
support for dams declined as people no longer perceived water as a
commodity to be taken out of its natural state and used for capital
gains.
Following World War II, the American public began to question
the necessity of additional dams.'24 In 1955, the Echo Park project, at
the confluence of the Green and Yampa rivers in Colorado's Dinosaur
National Monument, became the first dam to fall prey to post-material
society. "[Sierra Club President David] Brower and a handful of
conservationists managed to bring about the biggest defeat the western
water lobby had suffered until then: a denial of funds to build Echo
Park Dam." 2 ' Before the end of World War II, dams were a means of
survival, hardly questioned. Indeed, dams were objective symbols of
manifest destiny and America's dominance over nature.'
However,
after World War II, many Americans no longer perceived dams in this
light. Rather, many individuals, now economically secure, learned to
appreciate the environment. Therefore, the defeat at Echo Park
demonstrated the evolution of the American public away from a
subsistence, and towards a post-material lifestyle.
Echo Park marked the first time that the public successfully
challenged a dam in the West on the grounds that it would damage
the environment.'27 Those opposing the dam argued "that the
integrity of a national park was more important than additional
irrigation water."'28 This argument was fundamentally different from
the Bureau's previously unchallenged "total use for greater wealth"
philosophy.'29
Post-material ideology changed this attitude,
emphasizing self-fulfillment rather than material gratification.
Although the environmental movement "would not be full-fledged
until the 1970s," one of the first steps in the process toward an

122. Id. at 169.
123. HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 44.
124. Id. at 45.
125. REISNER, supranote 6, at 284.
126. Id. at 159.
127. HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 45. It is likely that the first challenge to the
construction of a dam in the western United States occurred in 1913, when John Muir
openly opposed the construction of the Hetch Hetchy dam in Yosemite National Park
on the grounds that it would destroy the wilderness character of the Park. Muir and
his colleagues lost the fight to stop the construction of Hetch Hetchy. Muir died the
following year. McCULL, supra note 96, at 283.
128. HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 45.
129. WORSTER, supra note 8, at 272.
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environmentally conscious public was the Echo Park Dam defeat."'
Environmentalism fit well within the philosophical guidelines of postmaterialism.
Instead of an obsession with capital gains,
environmentalism embraced an ideology that often times was
contradictory with liberal society.
Environmentalism ... emphasizes the necessity to forgo some
technological possibilities, even some that are economically
advantageous.
It challenges the business-as-usual outlook of
moderate and progressive regimes. Against interest group liberalism,
environmentalists actively promote moral argument as a part of
political and economic decisions, throwing into question the criteria
by which to measure progress.
Environmentalism often places moral judgment over capital
potential.
Moral judgment then translates into a heightened
awareness of the physical environment. Morality is more concerned
with the means by which one meets economic gains, rather than the
end gains of the market."2 The influence of post-materialism on the
environmental movement is evident as quality of life and selfexpression are ways in which progress is measured. "We are too
technologically able and too ignorant
to forgo anything that seems, in
33
the short-term view, easy to get.'
Economic security enabled individuals to question whether
environmental degradation was necessary for economic growth. In
addition, economically secure individuals were able to devise other
ways • to accomplish
the same goals without harming the
. 134
environment.
In contrast, environmentalism could not compete
with people's material needs in an economically insecure society.
Additionally, individuals intent solely3 on economic success would not
proscribe to environmental ideology.'
Adoption of numerous federal environmental statutes, beginning
in 1969, marked the birth of an environmentally conscious postmaterial society. Congress designed these statutes to promote a
balance between society's need for progress36 and consumption and the
desire to protect the natural environment. 1
130.
131.

HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 44-45.
PAEHLKE, supra note 5, at 212.

132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 150.

134. Id. at 169.
135. Id. at 7.
136. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) ("The purposes of
this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved..."); Clean Water Act of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.");
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1994) ("The purposes of this subchapter are: to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.. ."); see
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) ("The purposes of
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The rise of the post-modern populous has also greatly affected
western water law. Originally, the public viewed prior appropriation as
a tool used to develop the West by diverting and applying all water to a
beneficial use."'7
The doctrine deemed any unused water
consumptively wasted. Government built dams and other means of
water storage, in part, to ensure total water resource development.
Today, this is no longer the case, as many western states have
adopted measures seeking to preserve the natural water flow in rivers
and streams)" Two legal concepts modify the original rule of prior
appropriation in an attempt to preserve natural flow. The first is
instream appropriation, "9which leaves water in its natural watercourse
for benefits such as "recreation, aesthetics, fish and wildlife
maintenance, and general environmental preservation." 4 ' Further, it
accommodates both consumptive and non-consumptive water uses.141
The historical prior appropriation doctrine provided a difficult
hurdle for reclamation states to overcome while drafting legislation
designating instream flows as a beneficial use. 42 According to the
original prior appropriation scheme, a valid water right existed only if
one diverted water away from its natural source and used the water
beneficially in "municipal, domestic, irrigation, commercial and
industrial" settings.1 3
An instream appropriation, however, is
premised on leaving water in its natural course for non-consumptive
purposes.
Historically courts following the prior appropriation doctrine have
disfavored instream uses because of the beneficial use requirement.
Under a traditional interpretation of that requirement, instream uses
are inherently wasteful since they require water to remain in place
and therefore reduce the water available for consumptive uses ...
Courts in prior appropriation jurisdictions have also disfavored
instream uses because of the doctrine's actual diversion requirement.
Under this requirement, a user must physically divert water from a
watercourse in order to perfect an appropriation ... Under a strict

this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment.. ."); Federal Land Policy and

Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (8) (1994).
The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that-the
public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of the
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will
preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will

provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that
will provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.
Id.
137.

Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United

States, 1 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 177, 178 (1998).

138. See generally id.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 178.
GOULDAND GRANT, supra note 33, at 83.
Id. at 83-84.
Covell, supra note 137, at 178.

143. Id. at 178-79.

Issue I

RISE AND FALL OF WESTERN DAMS

interpretation of the actual diversion requirement, instream uses
would not be protected since they do not, by definition, involve a
diversion.
5
1 4
steps to protect instream flows; Arizona,
have taken
Manyi- states
5
4 .t .4
l
1
148 "
149
w150

Nebraska,"'
California,1 4 1 Colorado, 47 Idaho, IsKansas, 11Montana,-"
152155154
156
New Mexico," ' Nevada,
Oregon,
Utah,'5 5 Washington,
and
Wyoming'57 have all acted to specifically recognize the validity of such
appropriations.
The legal rule of instream appropriation is a form of post-material
political ideology because the law does not predicate beneficial use of
Rather, it enables specific
water upon absolute consumption.
appropriators to leave water instream, thus promoting post-material
environmental values.
The second legal concept to modify prior appropriation in an
attempt to preserve natural flows is minimum stream flow legislation.
Minimum flow legislation runs counter to the traditional doctrine of
prior appropriation, as water is again left instream for nonWhen reclamation states enact instream
consumptive use.
appropriation statutes, they establish minimum flow levels below which
"A minimum flow
the water flow in a watercourse cannot fall.
reservation does not withdraw a stream from appropriation; rather it
prevents subsequent appropriators from depleting the stream from

144. Lynda L. Butler, EnvironmentalWater Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property,

9VA.ENVTL. L.J. 323, 329-30 (1990).
145. Covell, supra note 137, at 188-89 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151.A (West
Supp. 1997)).
146. California enacted legislation in 1991 that recognized instream appropriation.
Id. at 184 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 1998)).
147. Colorado developed an instream flow program by statute in 1973. Id. (citing
Act of April 23, 1973, ch. 442, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 97).
148. Idaho enacted the first minimum stream flow and lake level legislation as early
as 1925. Id. at 180 (citing Act of February 25, 1925, ch. 83, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws 11718; Act ofJanuary 24, 1927, ch. 2, 1927 Idaho Sess. Laws 6-7).
149. Kansas provided a legislative method for instream flow reservation. Id. at 186
(citing Act of April 18, 1980, ch. 332, 1980 Kan. Sess. Laws 1334-35) (current version at
KAN. STAT. ANN. §

82a-703(c) (1997).

150. In 1969, Montana initiated efforts to protect instream flows. Covell, supra note
137, at 182 (citing Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 345, 1969 Mont. Laws 879-81).
151. Nebraska passed instream flow legislation in 1984. Id. at 186 (citing Act of
April 10, 1984, 1984 Neb. Laws 1341-68).
152. New Mexico only recently recognized instream flows as a beneficial use of
water. Id. at 190; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6, -7 (1997).
153. Id. at 189 (citing NEV. REv. STAT. § 533.030(1) (1995)).
154. Oregon enacted instream flow legislation in 1955. Id. at 180 (citing Act of May
26, 1955, ch. 707, 1955 Or. Laws 924-55).
155. Covell, supra note 137, at 188 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(11)(a) (Supp.
1997)).
156. In 1949, Washington began enacting legislation to protect instream flows. Id. at
182 (citing Act of March 16, 1949, ch. 112, 1949 Wash. Laws 272).
157. Id. at 185 (citing WYO. STAT. §§ 41-3-1001 (a), (b), (c), (d), -1002(e), -1003(b),
-1004(a), -1006(b) (1997)).
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below the minimum flows reserved." 58 Minimum flows are typically
based upon: (1) a "level required to sustain fish, vegetation, and other
aquatic wildlife;" or (2) a level that supports "recreational and
aesthetic interests.""' As such, the imposition of minimum flows seeks
to leave watercourses in their natural state for non-consumptive postmaterial purposes.
Minimum flow establishment and instream appropriation
contradict the notion of prior appropriation because water remains
instream without, in theory, application to a beneficial use. Mirroring
this legislative evolution, the Bureau initiated changes to its goals and
directives. Originally, the Bureau's objectives ensured appropriation
of all water in the West for beneficial use; achieving "total use for
greater wealth." 6 ° Today, however, the Bureau's mission "is to
manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an
environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the
American public."16 Indeed, even the Bureau acknowledged that
"'[t]he dam building era in the United States is now over.... The
opportunity ,,162
for any future projects is extremely remote, if not
nonexistent.
An environmentally conscious public has spoken and
the Bureau has listened.
,

VI. CONCLUSION
Post-material ideology directly affected the environmental
movement's emphasis on non-material wealth and personal well-being.
Without the support of a post-material society, it is unlikely that the
environmental movement would have had much influence in the West
in the 1950s. One may conclude that post-materialism created
environmentalism, because the foundational ideas for the
environmental movement are similar to post-material theory. The
defeat of Echo Park in favor of environmental protection symbolized
the concurrent rise of post-materialism and environmentalism.
The rise of a post-material society marked the demise of the once
dominant liberal political theory in the West. As stated earlier,
liberalism hinges on two principals: (1) the physical and economic
growth of the state; and (2) the maintenance of individual rights4
through the market."' Having fulfilled those goals in the West,1
liberalism is no longer applicable. There is very little left for recovery
in light of the Bureau's successful western reclamation.
The Bureau

158.
159.

GOULD AND GRANT, supra note 33, at 83.

Butler, supranote 144, at 349.

160. WORSTER, supranote 8, at 272.
161. Bureau
of
Reclamation,
Mission
Statement,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/what/mission-vision.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).

162. Klein, supra note 108, at 642 (citing the commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation).
163. CAHN, supra note 4, at 1.
164. Parfit, supranote 34, at 64.
165. Id.
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has already developed the majority of the best dam sites, and irrigation
projects line the countryside bringing water to everyone. 66 In fact, 91
percent of all river miles in the lower forty-eight have been
developed. 16 The West has reached its physical limits for expansion.
Further, the majority of westerners no longer live in rural settings,
rather, the population lives in urban environments. 6 Because
westerners can now afford to worry about the environment, the rise of
post-materialism and environmentalism illustrates the extent of the
West's economic development. Thus, the first tenet of liberalism has
fulfilled itself through the development of both land and economy in
the West.
However, the completion of the western infrastructure has caused
little change in the social order of the West, because the market still
defines individual rights:
This political system, some charge, is inefficient and inequitable,
favoring large users such as agriculture...
Large agricultural
interests and urban developers operating in some outlying areas have
been big winners. Losers have included federal taxpayers, inner city
urban interests, small farmers squeezed by concentration and
overproduction, and the environment.
Dams have not created more access to resources, as the
progressives had theorized. 7 ° Instead, large economic interests still
influence the majority of decisions in land reclamation and water
allocation. "[T]he recipients of the [water] were often the very
entities the [Reclamation] Act sought to exclude: speculators and
large corporate farms."''
Agriculture, not urban development,
accounts for up to 90 percent of water use throughout the West, 7 2 and
many agricultural interests in the region are very lare. Therefore, it is
clear that the large landowners use the most water. 1 The more water
an individual uses, the greater his or her influence with the Bureau
and the government. "[T] he modern domination of water becomes
most vividly and unmistakably translated into hierarchy."7 4 Thus,
dams failed to promote the rights of the majority, as envisioned under
progressivism. Instead, dams provided water to the benefit of only a
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. HEADWATERS, supra note 115, at 73.
169. WESTERN WATER MADE SIMPLE 29-30

(Ed Martson ed., 1987) [hereinafter

WESTERN WATER].

170. See generally 35 CONG. REC. 6722-78 (daily ed.June 13, 1902) (topic of irrigation
of arid lands).

171. Klein, supra note 108, at 676 (referring to the original guidelines of the
Reclamation Act which required that beneficiaries of federal water hold title to less
than 160 acres of land).
172. ATLAS OF THE NEW WEST: PORTRAIT OF
Riebsame et al. eds., 1997).
173. WESTERN WATER, supra note 169, at 29.
174. WORSTER, supranote 8, at 51.
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minority of the population.
Since the Reclamation Act of 1902, the federal government has
played a minimal role in the West regarding the rights of the
individual. Rather, liberalism's emphasis on allowing the market to
protect individual rights overcame the progressive theory that
government would safeguard these rights. Thus, liberalism resulted in
a pyramid structure of western society.
The Bureau and the
government were on top, large landowners and urban developers in
the middle, and finally the rest of the West's population lined the
bottom. Today, large agricultural interests still dominate those of the
urban majority.
However, financial security has enabled many individuals to
question the government, now that the infrastructure (dams, irrigation
canals, ditches, etc.) they built is in place. Through liberalism, the
government protected self-interests, thus fulfilling this ideology. Once
satisfied, this concept has little place in the New West.
Instead, post-materialism dominates the western political arena,
replacing both liberalism and progressivism. The 1955 opposition to
Echo Park Dam construction foreshadowed this shift in primary
ideology in the West. Today, "[e]ven in the West, far more people
75
belong to the Sierra Club than to the Cattlemen's Association."
Because most westerners are economically secure, they can afford to
adopt post-material philosophies and oppose new dam construction.
In addition they can demand dam destruction, for environmental
reasons, instead of economic reasons. The shift of the dominant
political theory in the West over time explains the dramatic change in
western attitudes toward dams in the twentieth century; from support,
to acceptance, to opposition.

175. DirkJohnson, West That Is No More Turns Back Land-Use Fees, N.Y. TIMES, April 4,
1993, at 22.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the American West and the world, one of the chief functions of
water law has been to promote the construction of large multiplepurpose reservoirs. This is especially true in the American West. Prior
appropriation detached water from its watershed and allowed
acquisition of rights for storage, as well as the transportation of water
The law of equitable
long distances to areas of demand.
apportionment followed the lead of prior appropriation and favored
the first state to put the water to beneficial use.' Downstream states'
fears that they would not be able to use interstate streams led to the
negotiation of interstate allocation compacts to facilitate the
construction of dams and carry-over storage reservoirs.2
International water law, which, in the United States, is based on
equitable apportionment, similarly promotes the construction of large
dams. The law's core principle of equitable use is not only a universal
norm, but also a functional doctrine intended to produce a specific
result. The guarantees that all riparian states have a right to a fair
share of international rivers functions either to support the unilateral
construction of upstream reservoirs or to produce treaties or
agreements to permit the construction of reservoirs and distribute the
benefits among the riparian states.3 Water rights and large dams are
t

Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Stanford

University
1. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
2. See CharlesJ. Myers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1966).
3. This function is carried over to the 1997 Convention of the Non-Navigation use
of Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). The Convention promotes dam

construction in two basic ways: (1) it allocates each riparian national an equitable
share of an international river and presumes that a nation may unilaterally define its
share and use it as she chooses; and (2) it provides a weak ineffective legal basis for
nations potentially adversely impacted by the construction of a dam to object. The
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further intertwined because they backstop water rights and
substantially reduce the risk of actual enforcement in times of
shortage.
During most of the past century, the need for large dams was an
article of faith among proponents of regional development
throughout the world. However, in the past four decades, the case for
large dams has eroded domestically, and to a lesser extent
internationally. Today, the future of existing and new dams is the
subject of intense debate within the global water community. The
recent Report of the World Commission on Dams4 ("Report") could
have a substantial influence on the outcome of this debate, both
nationally and internationally.
The Report is the most comprehensive global assessment of the
social, economic and environmental impacts of large dams. The
Report is a nuanced but powerful brief against the continued exclusive
reliance on large dams to meet the world's water supply demands.
Although the World Commission on Dams ("Commission") was a
privately funded organization with no official international standing or
legal status, the broad based composition of the Commission and the
timing of the Report's release make it an extremely significant
document for the water community. The Report is essential reading
for all students of water policy interested in the broader policy debate
about the future of large dams. Much of the Report addresses the
problems that large dams have caused in developing countries, but it is
relevant to the issues that the United States is now facing, with-thr
exception of post-September 11, 2001 security. These problems
include the re-operation of existing dams, the growing pressure to
decommission selected dams and the need to construct smarter,
smaller scale storage facilities in some areas.
The Report recommends the more rigorous, transparent
assessment of proposed new dams and urges focusing attention on the
re-operation of existing dams and irrigation systems as well as the
promotion of more sustainable water storage and use technologies
generally.
One can justifiably criticize the Report for paying
comparatively little attention to the role of law in promoting the
construction of large dams and its proposed reforms.5 However, it is of
interest to water lawyers not only for its recommendations about the
process of project assessment, but also because of the possible
International Court ofJustice recognized this right to object in (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997
I.J.C. 7 (Sept. 25), but the court held objection must be timely to be effective. Thus

the presumption is that the first state to put the water to use will be able to do so and
the future claims of other states to the water assume that risk. See Sandra L. Postel &
Aaron T. Wolf, DehydratingConflict, Foreign Affairs 2 (Sept.-Oct. 2001) for a discussion
of the relationship between unilateral dam construction and regional water conflicts.
4. WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEwORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING (2000) [hereinafter DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT].
5. The Report does have a brief discussion of the need to share international
rivers consistent with the principle of equitable use and the other principles reflected
in the United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses. Id. at 251-56.
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implications for the future of domestic and international water law
implicit in it.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF LARGE DAMS

After World War II, the progressive conservation-socialist vision of
large-multiple purpose dams as the engines of sustainable regional
development was exported by the United States and Russia to the rest
of the world. In 1949, there were 5000 large dams worldwide; by 2000,
there were over 45,000.6 The biggest dam builder was China, which
went from 22 to 22,000 after the Communist revolutionaries took
complete control of the country in 1949. The rapid increase in
construction fueled controversies that continue today. Each country,
depending on its geography and stage of development, has a different
dam story, but there are common elements to the debate. Worldwide,
many dams have under performed and have produced unacceptably
high social costs. Dams have transformed rivers from free-flowing to
regulated, and as a result there are growing threats to the ecological
integrity of watersheds worldwide. Additionally, dams have removed
large populations, often indigenous.
In the United States, we care about large dams primarily because
the environmental movement has changed our perception of the earth
and the value of unmodified landscapes.' As a result, we now value
free-flowing rivers, their connected corridors, and the ecosystem
services that they provide.
The debate about environmental
sustainability and the processes and standards used to make
construction and operation decisions helped facilitate the rise of
powerful environmental Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs").
The economic and social performance of large dams, especially as it
relates to the delivery of irrigation benefits, has long been questioned.
The failure of the 1944 Pick-Sloan Plan to deliver irrigation benefits to
the Upper Missouri Basin is a case in point.8
The above criticisms are the crux of the debate about the future of
large dams addressed by the Commission. After a survey of the
promised performance of a cross-section of dams and their social and
environmental impacts, in large measure, the Report endorses many
environmental and social critiques of large dams, especially in
developing countries.
The Commission's findings illustrate the
difficulties of generalizing about the performance of dams because of
the variety among functions and contexts.
But, this said, some
important general conclusions can be drawn with respect to both the
economic and social performance of dams.
Four conclusions about the economic performance stand out,
although they will be familiar to United States critics of many of the
6. Id. at 8.
7. Gilbert White, Reflections on ChangingPerceptions of the Earth, 19 ANNUAL REVIEW
OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1994).
8. JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING

THE MISSOURI RIVER 76-98 (1994).

Volume 5

WATER LAW REVIEW

large projects built on manipulated benefit-cost calculations. First,
dams with significant hydroelectric capacity, initially an add-on to pay
for the real benefits of the dam, flood control and irrigation, perform
the best. Second, the Commission found that irrigation dams "have
typically fallen short of physical targets, did not recover their costs and
have been less profitable in economic terms, " ' and they displace large
populations. Third, the story is more dismal and universal for
ecosystem effects. Dams inundate large areas and kill terrestrial plants
and displace fauna; reservoirs may account for between 1 percent and
28 percent of all green house gas emissions.'"
Large dams
"compromise the dynamic aspects of rivers that is fundamental to
maintaining the character of aquatic ecosystems."" Fourth, the flood
control benefits are at best mixed. The role of dams in preventing
flood damage has long been controversial because dams encourage
irresponsible flood plain behavior. The Report finds considerable
evidence that dams are moral hazards because they exacerbate rather
than alleviate the risks of flood damage. 2 In addition, the Report
notes that global climate change may increase the ineffectiveness of
flood control dams. Existing dams may not have the storage capacity
to reduce the projected increased flood levels.
Just as the economic performance of dams has caused speculation,
so has their social performance. The Report endorses the argument
that one should consider the social performance of dams equally with
their economic performance. Much of the Report deals with the welldocumented problems of the displacement of large numbers of local
populations and indigenous peoples.
Although population
displacement has occurred in the United States, it has been less of a
problem compared to countries such as China and India. However,
the displacement of Native American tribes along the Columbia and
the Upper Missouri to construct Grand Coulee Dam and the PickSloan Project continues to factor in the current politics of the future of
these rivers. Dams also have major off-setting benefits (quantified and
unquantified), but the Report identifies two problems to carefully
considered in any final accounting of the costs and benefits of a large
dam. First, the costs of the dam are often borne by those who do not
enjoy the benefits and are thus often inequitably distributed. Second,
the Report underlines, but unfortunately does not elaborate on, the
need to carefully consider the extra net welfare justifications for large
dams such as national flood security.
IIJ. THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS
What is the future of large dams? The Report projects two. One,
9. DAMs AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 68.
10. Id. at 75.
11. Id. at 77-78.
12. Id. at 60-62.
See also INTERAGENcy FLOODPLAIN MGMT.

REV.

COMM.,

ADMINISTRATION FLOODPLAIN MGMT. TASK FORCE, SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN

MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (1994).
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which is already in place in the United States, is to build fewer large3
new dams and decommission an increasing number of existing ones.
If fewer large-scale dams are constructed, alternative methods of
allocation such as the use of water markets, smaller-scale rain fall
harvesting and the reuse of irrigation drainage water become much
more important.14 Similarly, we will have to make greater use of nonstructural flood control alternatives. The second possibility, continued
construction of new dams, especially in developing countries, with
China and India leading the way. However, the Report recommends
that if countries continue to rely on dams for energy and water supply,
they must create a much more rigorous transparent and inclusive
assessment of procedure for new dams.
The Report's major relevance to the United States is to reinforce
the need to improve the processes of dam construction and operation
that have evolved since the 1960s. Dam planning was historically a
narrow, technical exercise dominated by engineers, s but this changed
in the 1960s and 1970s. The requirement of an environmental impact
statement, ("EIS"), mandated by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, ("NEPA"), has forced agencies to move beyond the
traditional technical considerations. NEPA came at the end of the
dam building era and helped to hasten its decline, but EIS
requirements tend to become rote exercises in data assembly and
seldom seriously consider alternatives that depart substantially from
existing management protocols. Environmental impact assessment
functions more as a procedural barrier than an actual review of viable
alternatives. The restriction of the EIS process to procedural rather
than substantive duties means that the most likely outcome of EIS
compliance is a minor modification in project design or operation to
overcome some of the worst environmental problems. This outcome,
as the Report notes, is not consistent with the principles of sustainable
development adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference and the protection
of human rights.
To address this problem, the Report recommends greater NGO
and local stakeholder participation, full transparency, and a new rights
and risks approach to facility planning. The last suggestion is intended
to force planners and decision makers to better understand and assess
more fully the social and economic impacts of dams on local
communities, including indigenous peoples, and the environment.
The Report specifically recommends a more comprehensive options
assessment to determine "whether a dam was the most appropriate
response to a development need or objective, and whether these were
correctly identified in the first place.' 6 The two most interesting
13.

See

WESTERN WATER PoLIcy ADVISORY REVIEW COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 2-35 (1998).

14. Id. at 157-60.
15. See Symposium, Reflections on a Centuy of Water Science and Policy, 116 WATER
RESOURCES (2000), for a collection of short essays by many of the key participants in

expanding the range of factors to be considered in water resources planning.
16.

DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 221.
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recommendations for the United States are the environmental
protection and reoperation recommendations. The Report endorses
the need for environmental baseline studies to more accurately
measure adverse environmental impacts and to establish restoration
targets."7 It also endorses the idea that there are large benefits
available from the re-operation of existing dams to improve their
efficiency, environmental, and social performance."8
The Report's reinforcement of the need for large-scale river
restoration experiments has important implications for the United
States. In the United States, we now recognize that one of the largest
unaccounted for costs of the Reclamation Era is the degraded
ecosystems on the Colorado, Columbia, Missouri," and many other
rivers. In addition, there is a growing scientific and political consensus
that restoration of these systems is the best option.
A series of influential studies in the United States, Europe and the
Middle Eas ° has recently led to a more radical ecological ideal of
managing river systems to maximize ecological functions. This vision
is less clearly articulated than multiple use because it rests on a more
complex view of the human role in the functioning of natural systems,
including floods. It starts from the premise that we must try to
integrate human uses of the entire river system with the maintenance
or restoration of the ecosystem services that the pre-dam or normative
river provided." The current focus is on river restoration because so
many large systems have undergone modification.
The newly
developing science of conservation biology furnishes the scientific
underpinnings for the vision. In brief, all river systems, modified and
"natural," are dynamic, ever-changing functioning ecosystems that
serve a variety of functions from the maintenance of consumptive uses
to the provision of valuable ecosystem services.22
IV. TLE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT
The Report does not directly suggest the legal changes necessary to
implement its recommendations, but several follow from its primary
17. Id. at 293.
18. Id. at 225.
19.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM (forthcoming

2002).
20. See, e.g.,

COMMITTEE ON SUSTAINABLE WATER SUPPLIES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST,
WATER FOR THE FUTURE: THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL ANDJORDAN (1999).

21. Jack A. Stanford et al., A General Protocolfor Restoration of Regulated Rivers, 12
REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT.

391 (1996).

22.

See Judy L. Meyer, Changing Concepts of System Management, in PROCEEDINGS:
SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78 (1994); Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New
Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 875 (1994). REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y.
COOPERIDER,

SAVING NATURE'S

LEGACY:

PROTECTING AND

RESTORING

BIODIVERSITY

(1994) is a good introduction to modern ecology and its influence on resource
management. The book discusses the legal implications of the substitution of a nonequilibrium for an equilibrium paradigm in ecology. See also A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1121 (1994).
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call for a comprehensive project rights and risk assessment, and the
desirability of a negotiated development and mitigation plan. The
Report reinforces the argument that all river basins are a shared
resource and should be managed and used cooperatively by a wide
range of stakeholders. This recommendation tracks the increasing use
of what the noted western water law observer David Getches has called
14
"outside-the-box"
water settlements. 23 In brief, these ad hoc solutions
substitute long term, monitored, management regimes for the
traditional enjoyment and enforcement of prior rights.
More
generally, they slouch toward the three centuries old dream of the
progressive water management community of comprehensive,
cooperative river basin management.
To date, these ad hoc settlements do not directly change the
underlying system of water rights. However, to be successful, these
bioregional solutions must produce some redistribution of the risks of
supply failure among water users and other stakeholders. Many of
these settlements involve the re-operation of existing projects. Reoperation will force the water community to recognize that all
entitlements contain a temporal risk element to insure that shortages
are absorbed fairly among co-riparian states.
International
entitlements vary from fixed amounts to percentages of a yearly flow.
Many of the proposed solutions build on the traditional idea that
water rights are correlative, and expand this idea to recognize that
water rights are both commodities and heritage resources that support
a variety of human consumptive and non-consumptive use that we now
characterize as ecosystem services. 4 This will not be easy because the
object of water law has always been to create firm, perpetual
entitlements. Firm entitlements are an essential element of any
allocation regime, but they mask the inevitable uncertainty of such
regimes. Both the traditional security enhancement purpose of water
rights as well as pre-dam river functions accord equal respect in
decisions about the use and management of these resources. But, it is
not impossible to do this. Water law provides the conceptual
foundation to promote new and fair reallocation regimes. The
inherent uncertainty of a water right makes it easier to expand the
category or risks such as those by new demands on the system. The
focus should be on the actual expectations that lie behind a use, rather
than the perpetual enforcement of the entitlement, in order to find
alternative ways of satisfying those expectations in ways that fairly
accommodate new uses. The more frank recognition that water rights
have always contained risks will make it easier for users to cooperate to
23. David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws
and Local DecisionsEclipsed the States'Role?, 20 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 3 (2001).
24. In the course of its discussion on the need for shared use of international
rivers, the Report concludes that "[a] more equitable and sustainable solution may be
possible by shifting from a primary focus on the allocation of the water resource, to a
focus on the benefits to be derived from the use of the water, encompassing
consideration of wider development objectives and the options available to meet
them." DAMs AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 254-55.
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devise creative solutions that promote both efficiency and equity and
produce acceptable compromises. In some cases, it will be necessary
to trade firm rights for a risk-based physical solution that provides an
adequate margin of safety in water-short years. These new regimes will
depend upon greater reliance on physical solutions, which include
adaptive management, and water markets, rather than the anticipated
enforcement of priorities.
Adaptive management came about in the late 197 0s as a criticism
of static or deterministic environmental assessment.
The basic
argument was that a fixed review of a policy designed independently2 5
was inconsistent with the experience of resource managers worldwide
and with what is now known as non-equilibrium ecology. The need for
rigorous but flexible decision making procedures under conditions of
uncertainty has a long intellectual pedigree including decision theory.
Many resource decisions include an experimental component as well
as monitoring procedures. Basically, adaptive management makes the
experimental nature of a decision and the need for information
collection the primary components of management.
While adaptive management requires a continuous process of
acquiring and evaluating scientific information, it also requires the
practice of regulatory science. Regulatory science is designed to
answer, to the best extent possible, causal questions about
management choices and a socially desired outcome such as the
preservation of a species from extinction, or an ecosystem that
functions more like it did prior to human intervention.
Once
baselines and targets are set, scientists must assess whether they are
being maintained.
This usually requires a high level of crossdisciplinary integration and informed speculation. It is not enough to
collect data and decide what inferences can be drawn form that data.
Scientists must often draw inferences about the likely impact of a
management policy from less than ideal data.
V. CONCLUSION
The Report helps to undermine the case for the continued
reliance on traditional multi-purpose large dams. It reinforces the
argument that existing dam operations require modification to redress
the adverse consequences of their construction.
More creative,
balanced methods to meet expanding demand and to serve the
original purpose of the dam will have to be found. These changes will
require more intensive, stakeholder-driven basin management.
Moreover, the Report underlines that managers must recognize the
need for the careful and fair incorporation of new temporal risk
elements into existing water entitlements to allow more flexible
management of river systems to accomplish these objectives. 6
25.

See generally ADAPTIvE

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 136

(C.S.

Holling ed., 1978).
26. I discuss these ideas at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation:
Rule, Principle,or Rhetoric , 76 N.D. L. REv. 881, 907-10 (2000).

BOOK NOTES
CYNTHIA F. COVELL, JOANNE HERLIHY, AND WILLIAM A. PADDOCK,
FUNDAMENTALS OF WATER LAW IN COLORADO: PROTECTING
WATER RIGHTS, USE AND QuALITY, National Business Institute,

Inc., Eau Claire, WI (2001); 1 2 9 pp; $63.00; 01S0705, softcover.
This book is designed to aid faculty teaching a Continuing Legal
Education Course on Colorado Water Law.
As such, it is
straightforward and easy to understand. Fundamentals of Water Law in
Colorado is divided into five sections, leading the reader from a
description of Colorado's approach to water law to recent cases and
statutory amendments.
Section I on HistoricalDevelopmentof Colorado Water Law is written by
Ms. Herlihy, and reviews the fundamental principles of water law in
the state. These include; (1) Colorado follows the prior appropriation
system; (2) water rights are property interests and the use of water may
be changed; and (3) water rights in Colorado are protected through a
variety of legislative and judicial measures. The prior appropriation
doctrine (known as "First in Time, First in Right") states that
acquisition of a water right takes place through diversion of water and
the application of that water to a beneficial use. This right can be lost
through non-use or abandonment. The applicability of the doctrine is
found in the Colorado Constitution, which guarantees the right to
appropriate unappropriated waters and place them to beneficial use.
Beneficial use is an evolving standard. The concept is defined broadly,
allowing for change over time and providing for optimal use of the
state's scarce water resources.
Determining the right to use
groundwater (as opposed to surface water) begins with a
determination as to whether the groundwater is tributary or nontributary to a body of surface water. Tributary groundwater is
allocated through the prior appropriation doctrine as protected by the
Colorado Constitution. The right to use non-tributary groundwater is
determined by statute. Colorado has seven water divisions, correlating
to the seven river basins originating in the state. Each division has a
designated Water Court with a presiding waterjudge. Any change in a
water right, other than a change of ownership, must be adjudicated in
the proper water court. A right may be acquired or changed in place
of use, time, or type of use, as long as the change does not injure other
vested water rights. Senior water rights are always protected.
Section II, Water Rights Acquisition and Protection, written by Mr.
Paddock and Ms. Covell, discusses the nature of the property interest
acquired through a water right and protection of that interest. Water
rights in tributary water are described by statute as "a right to use in
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accordance with its priority a certain portion of the waters of the state
by reason of the appropriation of the same." A water right may be
bought, sold, or transferred separate from the land on which the water
is used. Water rights are entitled to protection from any injury
incident to changes in other's water rights. Abandonment of a water
right consists of the non-use of the right combined with the intent to
permanently discontinue its use. Abandonment results in the loss of
the water right. Section II includes pointers on evaluating the title and
usefulness of a water right, followed by a discussion on when and how
to change a water right. Non-use of water leads to the loss of the water
right or a reduction in the amount of water allowed under the right.
To protect the right, the amount necessary under the right should
consistently be diverted and applied to beneficial use. In times of
drought, junior rights are curtailed in favor of senior rights.
Section III, Issues Affecting Water Availability, written by Ms. Herlihy,
addresses federal reserved rights, interstate compacts, instream uses,
and access to water. The federal government has a reserved right to
water on federal lands reserved from the public domain. This right is
to previously unappropriated water, and is for the minimum amount
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the federal reservation. State
courts have the authority to determine the validity of these federal
claims. Compacts between states equitably apportion the right to
rivers flowing between the states. The Colorado Water Conservation
Board is vested by statute with the power to appropriate water to
maintain minimum instream flows. Section III ends with a discussion
of the right to access water bodies for recreation or other uses.
Section IV, Water Quality Regulation - An Overview of State and Federal
Water Quality Control Programs,by Mr. Paddock, takes a brief look at the
regulatory controls over water quality. The federal law governing
water quality is the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA uses two
basic methods to control discharges into water sources: water quality
controls and technology-based controls. Colorado uses the Colorado
Water Quality Control Act to implement the requirements of the
CWA. The section goes on to describe the various forms of regulation
under the CWA and discusses key terms used in this area. Section IV
closes with a look at discharge permits issued under the regulatory
structure, and discusses whether compliance with a permit by an
upstream user is proof that the water returned to the stream flow is
acceptable for the needs of a downstream water right holder.
The final section of the book, Section V, Recent Developments and
Decisions, by Mr. Paddock and Ms. Covell, contains brief descriptions of
relevant cases decided in 2000, as well as synopses of legislative
changes enacted during the year.
The book is a quick and easy introduction to water law in
Colorado. It provides an understanding of the law and concepts at
play in the field without overwhelming the reader.
John P. Wood
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TERENCE RICHARD LEE, WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
THE ALLOCATION IMPERATIVE, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.,

Cheltenham, United Kingdom (1999); 206pp; $80.00; ISBN 184064-080-4, hardcover.
Water is a necessary resource. As society develops and progresses
through the 21st century, it is imperative that all people in the world
have access to adequate supplies of water. In Water Management in the
21st Century, Terence Richard Lee takes a look at the current
perception that there is a scarcity of usable water in the world, and
explores how to adequately plan for the world's future water needs.
Lee provides the hypothesis that water itself is not scarce, although it
seems this is a result of mismanagement of water resources. Lee puts
forth compelling arguments in support of his hypothesis, and offers
various solutions that he believes will correct what he sees as the
problem of misallocation.
Chapter One addresses the issue of whether or not the world's
water supply is actually as scarce as many believe. In particular, the
author discusses how economic forces have led to the belief that the
world is running out of usable water. The chapter begins with a brief
history of the development of water management systems, from
Mesopotamia to the 20th Century. The chapter then looks at the
effects that population growth has on the availability of water as a
resource, and tries to anticipate future population growth. The author
addresses the issue of forecasting future water demand. It is here that
Lee presents what he feels is the core issue in the debate over water
allocation-is the demand for water actually increasing? Lee argues
that demand for water is currently so high because it is priced well
below its market value. He states that the failure to use the free
market to correctly price water leads to problems in its distribution,
which in turn creates the perception that demand is increasing. Lee
then discusses his belief that if the free market were used to price
water, the efficiency of water distribution would increase, and the
increased efficiency would act as a counterbalance to the effects of any
future population growth on water scarcity.
Chapter Two discusses institutional approaches to water
management. It begins by surveying "top-down" (centrally controlled)
and "bottom-up" (user controlled) approaches. Lee looks at examples
of management approaches in the Mekong River Basin, Elqui Valley,
Chile, and the Ruhr Valley, in Germany. Lee notes that over the past
hundred years, a top-down system has dominated water management,
but that the current trend is towards the private sector becoming more
involved. Chapter Two then discusses what considerations need to be
taken into account when designing a water resource allocation
institution. The author argues that governments should be wary of
establishing complex systems, especially in environments that lack
strong traditions of public service. Lee feels that due to bureaucratic
and political considerations, governments are not always "disinterested
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champions of the public interest."
In the third chapter, Lee turns to the issue of allocating water
among competing users. The author restates his belief that the failure
to efficiently allocate water is responsible for the perception that the
scarcity of water is reaching crisis levels. The author argues that
markets are the most efficient way to allocate resources, and therefore
if efficiency is desired with regards to water allocation, administrative
allocation should be kept to a minimum. Lee gives examples of
market systems used in the western United States and Chile. He then
moves on to the issue of how to introduce water markets into regions
where water was previously allocated administratively, and discusses
Chile's 1981 implementation of a water code as an example. Lee looks
at various ways to determine initial allocations, such as grandfathering,
historic water use, auctions, and land ownership. Chapter Three then
discusses the desired characteristics of water markets (fair, flexible,
and predictable) and how to best go about regulating markets. The
author concludes the chapter by reiterating that in his view, markets
work.
Chapter Four addresses private participation in water
management.
The chapter begins by dealing with the issues
governments must confront when dealing with natural monopolies
such as water. The author argues that private managers are more
efficient than government managers because private ownership
provides protection against undue political influences. The chapter
then takes an in-depth look at alternatives for private participation,
such as divestiture, concessions, and contracting. Chapter Four ends
with a brief look at factors to be considered in opening services to the
private sector, and the limitations on private participation in the
provision of water services.
The fifth chapter discusses regulation of water markets. Lee
argues that the key to regulatory design is to minimize government
intervention. The chapter begins by discussing the goals of regulatory
systems, and then moves on to discuss the regulation of water
monopolies. The author discusses various ways to restructure a
monopoly, with in-depth assessments of horizontal and vertical
restructuring. Chapter Five goes on to address the issue of how to
regulate all aspects of a private firm's conduct, looking at the rate-ofreturn and price-cap systems of price regulation. The chapter ends
with a discussion of the problem of regulatory commitment. The
author argues that in order to attract investors to a water market, the
investors must be confident that over the long run the government will
respect their property rights and the rules and regulations that
accompany the water markets.
The book concludes with Chapter Six. It looks ahead to the
challenges of the 21st century, and how effective resource allocation
can help deal with those challenges. The author begins this chapter by
stating that because of our current misallocation and inefficient use of
water, we are not in a position to know if our water resources are
becoming scarcer. The author then goes on to recap some of his
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points of contention.
In particular, Lee reiterates the need to
accurately price water through regulated markets, and the need to
increase private participation in water resource management. Chapter
Six discusses the contribution that water management might have on
the problems facing society in the 21st century. Lee identifies and
discusses solutions for several issues, such as the need to increase
productivity, the need to eliminate poverty, and the need to minimize
the impact of economic activities on the environment.
David M. Jacob
STEPHEN A. THOMPSON, WATER USE, MANAGEMENT, AND PLANNING IN

Academic Press, San Diego, California
(1998); 3 7 1pp; $74.00; ISBN No. 0-12-689340-3, hardcover.

THE UNITED STATES,

Written as a textbook for a one-semester course on water resources
and targeted to upper division undergraduate and first-year graduate
students, Water Use, Management, and Planningin the United States gives a
broad overview of water related issues in the United States.
In Chapter One, Thompson examines "the physical system" that
produces and controls water, such as weather, climate, water cycles,
geology, and water balance. In Chapter Two, he delves into specific
periods of history in the United States concerning water development
and the societal changes it created and fostered.
Water issues associated with the legal system, both state and
federal, are the focal point of Chapter Three. The state discussion
rotates around doctrines associated with both surface water and
groundwater, including the two major doctrines, riparian and prior
appropriation, as well as absolute ownership versus reasonable use.
The federal discussion addresses federal powers, reserved and
expressed, including a discussion of Native American water rights.
Chapters Four through Six cover water use, economics, and water
supply planning. The water use discussion centers around water
supply and demand on an international, national, regional, and state
level. At the close of Chapter Four, the author includes a brief
summary on Geographic Information Systems ("GIS"), a computerized
method of collecting raw data and producing information outputs
such as maps and charts. Chapter Five, the economics chapter,
discusses price theory, or supply and demand, and includes an
extensive discussion of cost-benefit analysis. Chapter Six examines
water supply planning, including a view of urban demand planning
and process, and dams and reservoirs.
Thompson discusses off-stream and instream uses in Chapters
Seven and Eight. The off-stream discussion includes urban related
usage such as drinking and household water, and a thorough review of
agricultural uses including irrigation.
Instream uses, such as
hydroelectric power and federally owned recreation water make up the
remainder of the chapters.
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Thompson covers Water quality and ecosystem health in Chapter
Nine. The book looks extensively at common pollutants, including
man-made and organic contaminants that can taint water quality. The
chapter also includes a discussion of the methods used to institute
change to improve overall ecosystem health.
Finally, Chapter Ten centers on natural water disasters: floods and
droughts. The chapter discusses human reaction and interaction
within these disasters; that is how people manage, modify, and mitigate
the consequences of when nature's water supply goes awry.
This book applied as a text includes many sample illustrations,
examples, and well-designed tables and graphs. As a handbook for the
legal practitioner, it provides a comprehensive, overall summary of
water related issues in the United States, legal and otherwise.
Anne P. Francis

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding Palazzolo's
claims asserting the application of Rhode Island's wetlands regulations
took his property without compensation were ripe; the acquisition of
title did not bar the claims; and Palazzolo failed to establish a
deprivation of all economic value).
Palazzolo owned land in Rhode Island and Rhode Island law
designated most of his property as coastal wetlands. In 1983, Palazzolo
applied to the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council
("Council") for permission to construct a wooden bulkhead and fill his
The Council rejected the application,
entire marshland area.
concluding it would conflict with the Coastal Resource Management
Program ("CRMP"). In 1985, Palazzolo applied to the Council for
permission to fill part of the property's wetlands in order to build a
private beach club. The Council rejected this application as well,
ruling that the proposal did not satisfy the standards for obtaining a
"special exception" to fill salt marsh, whereby the proposed activity
must serve a compelling public purpose.
In response, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action
asserting that the state's wetlands regulation, as applied by the Council
to his parcel, had taken the property without compensation in
violation of the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Palazzolo sought
review by the United States Supreme Court, contending the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island erred in rejecting his takings claims.
A takings claim challenging application of land-use regulations is
not ripe unless the agency charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding their application to the
property as issue. A final decision does not occur until the acting
agency determines the extent of permitted development on the land.
The Supreme Court held that the Council made a final decision when
it denied Palazzolo's 1983 and 1985 applications. Thus, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court erred in ruling that, notwithstanding those
denials, doubt remained as to the extent of development the Council
would allow on Palazzolo's parcel due to his failure to explore other
uses for the property that would involve filling substantially less
wetlands.
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A landowner may not establish a taking before the land-use
authority has the opportunity to decide and explain the reach of a
challenged regulation. Yet, once it becomes clear that the permissible
uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a
takings claim is likely to have ripened. Here, the Council's decisions
make plain that it interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from
engaging in any filling or development on the wetlands.
Contrary to the state supreme court's ruling, Palazzolo's claim
could not fail under the government's ripeness claim by virtue of his
failure to seek permission for a use of the property that would involve
development only of its upland portion. The Supreme Court's
ripeness jurisprudence required Palazzolo to explore development
opportunities on his upland parcel only if there was uncertainty as to
the land's permitted use. There was no genuine ambiguity in the
record as to the extent of permitted development on Palazzolo's
property, either on the wetlands or the uplands and the record stated
that the uplands were worth $200,000. Thus, Rhode Island could not
contest ripeness by stating that the value of the non-wetland parcels
was unknown.
Further, Palazzolo's takings claim was not rendered unripe by his
failure to apply for permission to develop the seventy-four lot
subdivision, which was the basis for the damages sought in his inverse
condemnation suit. The Council informed Palazzolo that he could
not fill and then build seventy-four single-family dwellings there.
Palazzolo's submission of this proposal would not have clarified the
extent of development permitted by the wetlands regulations, which
was the inquiry required under the Supreme Court's ripeness
decisions.
When a taking has occurred, under accepted
condemnation principles, the owner's damages are based upon the
property's fair market value.
Next, Palazzolo's acquisition of title after the regulations' effective
date did not bar his takings claims. The Supreme Court rejected the
state court's sweeping rule that a purchaser or a successive title holder
like Palazzolo is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted
restriction and is therefore barred from claiming that it effects a
taking. Were the Court to accept that rule, the post-enactment
transfer of title would absolve the state of its obligation to defend any
action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.
The state supreme court's rule was furthermore capricious in effect.
Finally, the state supreme court did not err in finding that
Palazzolo failed to establish a deprivation of all economic use because
it was undisputed that his parcel retains significant value. Thus, the
Supreme Court remanded this case for further consideration of the
claim under the principles set forth in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v.
New York City.
Nicole C. Anderson
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Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (holding that although the
default rule is that land under navigable waters passes from the United
States to a newly admitted state upon statehood, an exception to this
rule existed where Congress created a reservation, post-dating Idaho's
statehood, for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in Idaho because Congress
intended to reserve submerged lands in the reservation and intended
to defeat the future state of Idaho's title to the submerged lands with
the reservation).
On June 7, 1890, following years of negotiations and various
agreements, the United States Senate passed a bill ratifying 1887 and
1889 agreements between the United States Government and the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe ("Tribe") for a reservation of land in northern
Idaho and northeastern Washington. This reservation encompassed
all of Lake Coeur d'Alene and part of the St. Joe River. On July 3,
1890, while the House of Representatives was considering the Senate
Bill, Congress passed the Idaho Statehood Act. This act admitted
Idaho into the Union and ratified Idaho's Constitution, which
disclaimed all right and title to land within its borders owned by
Indians and left such land under the jurisdiction of the United States.
On March 3, 1891, Congress ratified both the 1887 and 1889
agreements with the Tribe.
In 1998, the United States initiated an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho against the state of Idaho to
quiet title to the submerged lands within the boundaries of the Tribe's
reservation. This issue arose when Idaho issued permits for the
construction of docks, piers, floats, pilings, breakwaters, boat ramps,
and other navigation aids in the southern part of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
The Tribe intervened to assert its interest in the lands and Idaho
counterclaimed to quiet title in its favor. The district court quieted
title to the bed and banks of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River
within the boundaries of the Tribe's reservation in favor of the United
States, as trustee, and to the Tribe, as the beneficiary. In 2000, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In
2001, the United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed.
According to the Supreme Court, the default rule is that land
under navigable waters passes from the United States to a newly
admitted state upon statehood. There is a strong presumption against
defeat of a state's title when evaluating Congress' intent and resolving
conflicts over submerged lands. However, the Supreme Court noted
that when submerged lands are located within a tract that the United
States has dealt with in some special way before statehood, such as
reserving lands for a particular national purpose like an Indian
reservation, the evaluation of congressional intent is refined
somewhat. According to the Court, the proper inquiry is whether
Congress intended to reserve submerged lands in the reservation, and,
if so, whether Congress intended to defeat the future state's title to
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those submerged lands.
Turning to the first question, the Supreme Court recognized that
Idaho had conceded that its earlier agreements with the Tribe
included submerged lands. In addition, the Supreme Court agreed
with the findings of the district court, and noted that the right to
control the lake bed and adjacent waters was traditionally important to
the Tribe because their livelihood depended on fishing. Thus, an
acreage determination of the reserved area in 1883 necessarily
included the area of the lake bed. Given Idaho's concession and the
district court's findings, the Supreme Court found that Congress
clearly intended to include the submerged lands in the reservation to
the Tribe.
Turning to the second question, the Supreme Court recognized
that Idaho had conceded that an 1888 report by the Secretary of the
Interior regarding the scope of the reservation included all the
navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene. In addition, the Supreme
Court noted that: (1) the United States could avoid hostilities between
white settlers and the Tribe only by agreeing to a reservation that
included submerged lands, (2) Congress dealt and negotiated in a fair
manner with the Tribe to fulfill that objective, (3) that Congress
ratified the agreements without any language indicating the
submerged lands had passed to Idaho upon its statehood, and (4) such
agreements included the sale of lands within the reservation to others
with the compensation going directly to the Tribe. Given Idaho's
concession and the district court's findings, the Supreme Court found
that Congress clearly intended to defeat the future state of Idaho's title
to the submerged lands.
Matthewj Costinett
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (holding that Colorado is liable
to Kansas for monetary damages and prejudgment interest dating back
to 1985 for Colorado's violation of the Arkansas River Compact).
Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact ("Compact")
between Colorado and Kansas in 1949. The Compact provided, inter
alia, that future development in the river basin could not materially
deplete the usable quantity or availability of water to other users. In
1986, Kansas invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. The Court granted
Kansas leave to file a complaint and appointed a Special Master.. The
Special Master's first report recommended the Court find that
Colorado's post-Compact groundwater pumping had materially
depleted the waters in violation of Compact Article lV-D. The Court
remanded the case to the Special Master to determine the appropriate
remedy. The Special Master's second report recommended an award
of damages, to which Colorado filed exceptions. The Court overruled
Colorado's exceptions without prejudice and remanded the case to the
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Special Master for a more specific remedy.
The Special Master's third report recommended that damages be
measured by Kansas' losses, rather than by Colorado's profits, that the
damages be paid in money rather than water, and that damages
include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of the judgment.
The initial estimate of damages totaled $62,369,173. Of that amount,
approximately $9.2 million represented direct and indirect losses, $12
million was attributable to inflation, and $41 million comprised
interest. Colorado filed four objections and Kansas filed one objection
to the report. Colorado contended: (1) the Eleventh Amendment
barred an award of damages; (2) the damages award should not
include prejudgment interest; (3) the amount of interest awarded was
excessive; and (4) Kansas improperly calculated crop production
losses. Kansas objected that prejudgment interest should be paid from
1950, the date of the first Compact violation, rather than 1969.
The Court overruled Colorado's first objection and held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude recovery of damages when a
State acts in its own interest rather than as an agent or trustee for its
citizens. Furthermore, when a state properly invokes the Court's
jurisdiction, neither the measure of damages, the method for
calculating damages, nor the state's post-judgment decisions regarding
the use of the money can retrospectively negate the Court's
jurisdiction.
The Court dismissed Colorado's second objection, that
prejudgment interest could not be applied to an unliquidated claim, as
an unsound common-law distinction between liquidated and
unliquidated claims. The Court pointed out that since 1933, they have
consistently held that an injured party is not fully compensated for
damages without adding interest for the delay in obtaining the award.
They agreed with the Special Master that the unliquidated nature of
Kansas' damages, in and of itself, does not bar an award of prejudgment interest.
Next, Colorado objected to both the interest rate adopted and the
date from which it accrued. Colorado argued that the Special Master
improperly used the higher rates available to individual farmers, rather
than the lower interest rates available to the state. However, the Court
felt the rates available to individual farmers provided a better remedy
for the economic consequences of Colorado's breach because it
reflected the farmers' cost of borrowing. The Court also agreed with
the Special Master that the equities of the case did not support
awarding pre-judgment interest from 1950. Furthermore, given the
uncertain scope of damages between 1968 and 1985, and the fact that
it was up to Kansas to initiate proceedings to quantify damages, the
Court agreed with Colorado that denying pre-judgment interest for
that period was reasonable. Thus, the Court overruled Kansas'
exception that interest should accrue from 1950 and Colorado's
exception challenging the recommended interest rates; however the
Court sustained Colorado's objection to the award of interest prior to
1985.
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Colorado's final objection challenged the value of crop losses
attributable to the Compact violations. The parties disagreed over how
much additional yield the missing water would have produced.
Kansas' experts relied on a hypothesis of a linear relationship between
water and crop yields, with an estimated reduction in yield due to
environmental factors. Colorado's expert proposed a competing
model, but had to withdraw it when confronted with flaws in his data.
Thus, the Court overruled Colorado's objection because Colorado was
unable to successfully challenge Kansas' experts and provide a
plausible alternative cost estimate.
The Court remanded the case to the Special Master for
preparation of a final judgment specifying the amount of damages that
Colorado must pay.
John A. Helfrich
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Pepperell Assoc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 246 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the Environmental Appeals Board's
decision unreviewable, based on the record's substantial evidence).
Pepperell Associates ("Pepperell") operated a small business,
which accidentally released 350 gallons of oil into United States
navigable waterways. After the spill, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") brought a three-count administrative penalty action.
Both parties appealed the Administrative LawJudges' ("ALJ") decision
to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"). Pepperell petitioned
for judicial review of the EAB's decision in the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. However, the court refused the petition
because EAB based its decision on the records' substantial evidence.
Pepperell asserted four issues for review. First, Pepperell argued its
facility was not subject to the Clean Water Act's ("CWA") Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasures ("SPCC") regulations
because the location made it unreasonable to foresee a discharge into
navigable waters. Second, Pepperell argued that between November 1,
1996 and July 14, 1997, SPCC regulations did not apply to it because its
underground oil capacity was less than SPCC'sjurisdictional threshold.
Third, Pepperell argued that its 20,000 gallon, aboveground storage
tank created a new feature, and thus was not a modification. Finally,
Pepperell claimed EAB miscalculated the penalty.
The court explained that EAB was entitled to substantial deference
if it followed its own procedures and met statutory requirements. The
court would only set aside EAB's findings if the record, taken as a
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whole, failed to support a violation. The court examined the facts and
concluded that EAB had based its decision on substantial evidence.
SPCC regulations apply to owners and operators of nontransportation-related on-shore and offshore facilities storing oil and
oil products which, because of their location, might discharge oil in
harmful quantities into navigable waters.
Thus, EAB correctly
concluded SPCC regulations applied to Pepperell's facility. EAB
affirmed the existence of a reasonably foreseeable discharge based on
Pepperell's location. In response, Pepperell argued that the facility's
location in a dense, urban area, removed from navigable waters,
resulted in unforeseeable discharge. Nonetheless, the court affirmed
EAB's decision, which not only refuted Pepperell's narrowly construed
location test, but also confirmed that it was reasonably foreseeable the
facility, taken as whole, could discharge into navigable waters.
EAB also correctly concluded that SPCC regulations governed
Pepperell's facility between November 1, 1996 and July 14, 1997. The
CWA exempts facilities otherwise subject to SPCC jurisdiction if their
storage capacity is below a specified level. Pepperell argued it was
exempt under the capacity exception because some storage tanks were
disconnected and other tanks lacked a foreseeable path for oil to
reach navigable waters. Pepperell also argued that the regulations did
not define the storage capacity. EAB asserted that a tank must be
taken out of service, cleaned, capped, and altered, and the
foreseeability test does not determine capacity. The court deferred to
EAB's expertise and its interpretation of its own agency regulations,
and rejected Pepperell's argument.
Pepperell also argued that its newly constructed aboveground
storage tank was a new construction, not a modification, because it
removed old storage tanks in July and did not complete the new tank
until October. However, EAB said such a in gap time, particularly
when the owners and operators controlled the time period, did not
convert an existing facility into a new one. Pepperell asserted that this
determination was arbitrary. However, the court agreed with EAB, and
held that Pepperell had modified the facility.
Finally, Pepperell challenged EAB's penalty decision. Pepperell
maintained that EAB failed to consider its reimbursement to the state
of Maine for part of the cleanup costs. Pepperell argued that EAB
must consider this factor because the statute required the penalty
assessor to consider other matters, as justice required. The court
reviewed the penalties under the CWA for abuse of discretion, and
concluded that although Pepperell had a reasonable argument, it
failed to show EAB's actions met such a threshold. Thus, the court
denied Pepperell's petition for review on all points.
KirstinE. McMillan
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THIRD CIRCUIT
W.R. Grace & Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 261 F.3d
330 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency's
order, issued pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act, arbitrary and
capricious due to the agency's failure to provide a rational basis for its
order).
W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace") filed a petition for review, in the
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, which claimed the
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") order, issued pursuant to
the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") was arbitrary and capricious.
Grace owned a fertilizer plant that polluted the Saginaw aquifer with a
plume of ammonia. The Saginaw aquifer supplies drinking water to
Lansing, Michigan. The Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality notified the Safe Drinking Water Branch of the EPA about the
problem, and the EPA issued an initial order requiring Grace to clean
up the aquifer. Grace challenged the order, suggesting instead that a
technical committee determine the extent of cleanup necessary. EPA
agreed and withdrew its initial order. However, EPA released a new
order based upon the Saginaw Aquifer Technical Evaluation Team's
("SATET") findings. EPA's new order required Grace to reduce the
aquifer's ammonia concentration to 1.2mg/I, using a specific cleanup
technique. In response, Grace claimed the order was arbitrary and
capricious. The court agreed with Grace.
The court had jurisdiction to review EPA's final actions pursuant to
The court determined EPA acted
SDWA section 1448(a) (2).
arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to consider the relevant
factors, and failed to articulate a rational connection between the facts
found and the choices made. Specifically, EPA neglected to provide a
rational basis for its conclusion that 1.2mg/l ensured the health of
persons who drink water from the Saginaw aquifer. EPA also failed to
provide a rational basis for its conclusion that capturing the ammonia
plume and removing it before it entered the aquifer was the best
method to protect the health of those who consumed water from the
aquifer.
EPA argued its requirements were rational based on SATET's
SATET's technical studies maintained that
recommendations.
cleanup to a concentration of 1.2 mg/l was required to protect human
health. However, the court found SATET did not derive this number
from technical studies, but instead used it as an unquestioned
baseline. SATET also failed to determine if the aquifer could tolerate
more than 1.2 mg/1 and remain safe for human consumption. Thus,
EPA's required concentration level was not based on a technical study
and lacked a rational basis.
EPA also explained that it required the specific removal technique
because SATET concluded this method presented the only way to
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ensure the aquifer would produce safe water. The court examined
SATET's recommendations and concluded that SATET supported this
methodology because of the City of Lansing's opposition to other
approaches, not because this constituted the only scientifically sound
method. The court found that the EPA's technical recommendation
was rooted in Lansing's preference, not in sound science. Also,
because EPA based the numeric concentration on an unquestioned
baseline, not a technical study, the EPA's order lacked a rational basis.
Thus, the court vacated the EPA's order as arbitrary and capricious.
Kirstin E. McMillan

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment and holding the protections of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 inapplicable to groundwater, because
groundwater is not "navigable water" under the Act).
D.E. and Karen Rice ("Rices") sued Harken Exploration Company
("Harken"), alleging Harken discharged oil into or upon "navigable
waters" in violation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted
Harken's motion for summary judgment because according to the
court's interpretation of OPA and the facts of the case, the Rices could
not sustain a cause of action under OPA. The Rices appealed and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Rices were trustees for the Rice Family Living Trust ("Trust"),
which owned the Big Creek Ranch ("Ranch") in Texas. Harken leased
property on the Ranch, upon which it owned and operated facilities
for exploration, pumping, processing, transporting, and drilling oil.
The Rices alleged Harken discharged hydrocarbons and other
pollutants onto the Ranch and into Big Creek, tributaries of Big Creek,
and other independent ground and surface waters, contaminating or
threatening 9,265.24 acre-feet of groundwater and over ninety
noncontiguous surface acres of the ranch. The Rices alleged Harken
damaged their land through a series of small discharges that occurred
over a long period. Furthermore, they maintained a $38,537,500
clean-up cost for the contaminated soil and groundwater.
The Rices sought application of OPA because it imposes strict
liability for cleanup costs and damages on parties that discharge or
threaten to discharge oil into or upon navigable waters. OPA defines
"navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial sea."
The Rices argued that the district court's interpretation of
"navigable waters" in OPA was erroneous. They claimed the court
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erred by refusing to apply OPA to inland areas. Since Congress used
the same language in both OPA and the Clean Water Act, the Rices
believed the scope of both scts should be similar. Thus, OPA should
apply to discharges into "waters of the United States," regardless of the
distance of those waters from an ocean or similar body of water. The
Rices also maintained the district court improperly excluded
groundwater from "waters of the United States." They claimed that
Congress, through OPA, intended to regulate all waters that could
affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Rices argued that OPA
should impose liability on facilities that discharge oil and related
wastes into any body of water, including groundwater, that affects
interstate commerce. The Rices contended that under the proper
interpretation of "navigable waters," they had a viable OPA claim since
Harken's discharges of oil affected surface water and groundwater
under the Ranch.
The Fifth Circuit stated OPA would have provided the Rices with a
remedy if they could have demonstrated that Harken discharged oil
into a navigable body of water or water adjacent to an open body of
navigable water. Nothing, however, in the record linked Big Creek or
any of the other creeks on the ranch to navigable water as to qualify
for protection under OPA. No evidence existed of any oil discharge
directly into Big Creek or any other intermittent creek containing
above ground water. Rather, the facts demonstrated Harken's various
discharges of oil were all onto dry land, some of which, over time, may
have seeped into groundwater and into Big Creek or another creek.
The court held a generalized assertion that gradual, natural seepage
from contaminated groundwater that will eventually affect covered
surface waters did not establish liability under OPA. Accordingly, the
Rices had no cause of action under OPA for discharges of oil that
contaminated only the groundwater under the Ranch, and the court
deemed summary judgment appropriate.
Kevin R. Rohnstock

NINTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding water rights can either be forfeited through five successive
years of nonuse, commencing with initiation of appropriation, or
abandoned due to proof of actual intent via indirect and
circumstantial evidence).
The town of Fernley ("Fernley") applied to the Nevada State
Engineer ("Engineer") to change the manner and place of use of
rights to roughly 280 acre-feet of water from the federal Newlands
Reclamation Project ("Project"). The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians ("Tribe") and the federal government opposed the proposed
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transfers, contending Fernley had forfeited or abandoned the water
rights at issue. The district court, affirming the decision of the
Engineer, held none of the water rights had been forfeited or
abandoned. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
The Project diverts the flow of the Truckee and Carson Rivers to
supply the needs of water users in Nevada. The federal government
operates the Project, but individual landowners hold water rights in
the Project pursuant to contracts between the land-owners and the
Department of the Interior. The nature and extent of those water
rights are determined, in large part, by Nevada state law.
Fernley sought to satisfy its growing water needs by acquiring water
rights from the Project. Thus, Fernley filed an application with the
Engineer to change the manner and place of use of twenty-six separate
water use permits it had acquired. The Tribe resides on a half-million
acre reservation surrounding Pyramid Lake, which is dependent on
the flow of the Truckee River. Thus, the Tribe's economy, culture,
and heritage are linked to the size of the flow of the Truckee River and
to the health of Pyramid Lake. As such, the Tribe and the federal
government filed opposition to Fernley's application, contending the
water rights sought were either forfeited or abandoned.
The Engineer approved the transfer of all but a few of the water
rights at issue, maintaining Fernley was the bona fide owner of the
water rights, and the town paid the operation and maintenance fees
for those rights. Furthermore, the Engineer ruled all of the water
rights at issue were exempt from forfeiture, rejecting the argument the
non-forfeited water rights were abandoned.
Water rights can be lost either through forfeiture or abandonment,
with both established via a "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
In most cases, it is easier to establish forfeiture than abandonment
because forfeiture requires only a showing of five successive years of
non-use. However, forfeiture does not apply to water rights vested
prior to, or for which appropriations were initiated before 1913. The
Tribe and the federal government argued some of the water rights in
question were subject to forfeiture while Fernley claimed none of the
water rights were subject to forfeiture. The Ninth Circuit held the
Engineer erred in concluding all water rights were initiated when land
for the Project was withdrawn from public entry by the federal
government in 1902. Further, the court held the district court made
the same error when, in affirming the Engineer, it concluded that
because each individual Project water right has a priority date ofJuly 2,
1902, it was therefore initiated on that same date. Thus, the Engineer
was to determine "when the individual landowner took the 'first steps'
to appropriate the water appurtenant to his land, and not [to] rely on
the 1902 priority date." Failure to do so is deemed an abuse of
discretion.
If a water right is exempted from forfeiture, it may be lost only
through abandonment. Abandonment is the "relinquishment of the
right by the owner with the intention to forsake and desert it." Thus,
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abandonment requires a showing of actual intent, on the part of the
holder of a water right, to abdicate. Non-use can provide "some
evidence" of intent, but it is not by itself sufficient to establish
abandonment. Therefore, indirect and circumstantial evidence are
generally necessary to show abandonment. The Tribe asserted the
Engineer was wrong to consider payment of operation and
maintenance fees as sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
particular water rights had not been abandoned.
However,
abandonment is determined from all surrounding circumstancesincluding the payment of assessments and taxes. Other important
influences include non-use of the water right as well as the
construction of structures incompatible with irrigation. Thus, the
court concluded the Tribe failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment.
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. As such, the district court was ordered to review the
Engineer's forfeiture findings on a parcel-by-parcel basis, and to
incorporate into the record the evidence submitted to the Engineer
relevant to those findings.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
Mohave Valley Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Norton, 244 F.3d 1164
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Department of the Interior allotted
the correct amount of water to the Mohave Valley Irrigation and
Drainage District, and landowners who held present perfected rights
not only constituted parties to the contract, but also factored into the
water delivery calculation).
The Mohave Valley Irrigation and Drainage District ("District")
appealed a grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior ("Department"), Gale Norton. The
District alleged the Department breached a 1968 contract allotting it
41,000 annual acre-feet of water. In response, the Department argued
ambiguity within the contract due to a lack of language explicitly
mentioning the entitlement received by landowners who held present
perfected rights ("PPRs").
The Department allotted water to the District by subtracting it, as
provided by the PPRs located within the District, from the amount
fixed by the contract. The district court agreed with the Department's
allotment system. The District appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, seeking the full allotment, as well as a
separate calculation for the PPRs. The court defined the contract
broadly, and held the omission of PPRs from the contract had the
effect of including those landowners as parties to the contract.
The District, under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
argued that the contract was ambiguous. Courts will only review
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contracts involving mutual conduct, trade usage, or performance for
ambiguous terms. The first individual PPR contract contained
language expressly prohibiting an increased water delivery to the
District. Although the individual contract constituted trade usage, the
court reasoned the contract did not increase the District's water
entitlement. The court also rejected the Board of Directors' meeting
minutes, which suggested the PPRs delivery amount would add to the
annual allotment. Thus, the minutes did not factor into a UCC
ambiguity argument. In conclusion, the court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the Department.
Jon Hyman
TENTH CIRCUIT
American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding: (1) the Environmental Protection Agency's approval of
Montana's water quality standard, which exempted nonpoint source
pollution from antidegradation review, was permissible because
nothing in the Clean Water Act demanded that a state regulate
nonpoint sources, or give the EPA the authority to regulate such
sources; and (2) the EPA's approval of Montana's policies and
procedures, which exempted areas within the mixing zone from
antidegradation review, was permissible because the use of mixing
zones was widespread and a practical necessity for meeting water
quality criteria at a discharge pipe).
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("Act"), the State of Montana
adopted water quality standards and submitted such standards to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for review.
In 1998,
American Wildlands filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado alleging that the EPA failed to take timely
action to approve or disapprove of Montana's standards, and failed to
promptly promulgate replacement standards for those failing to meet
the Act's requirements. In October 1998, American Wildlands moved
for summary judgment. The parties agreed to postpone that motion
when the EPA stipulated that it would complete its review of
Montana's standards by January 15, 1999. On January 26, 1999, the
EPA completed its review of Montana's standards, disapproving some
and approving others.
On March 31, 1999, American Wildlands amended its original
complaint and challenged the EPA's approval of several of Montana's
standards. The district court affirmed each of the EPA's actions.
American Wildlands appealed the district court's ruling to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Specifically, American
Wildlands disagreed with the district court's conclusions that: (1) the
EPA properly approved Montana's water quality standards that
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exempted nonpoint source pollution from antidegradation review;
and (2) the EPA properly approved Montana's mixing zone policies
and procedures, which exempted areas within the mixing zone from
antidegradation review.
Dealing with the threshold issue of the appropriate standard of
review, the appellate court disagreed with American Wildlands'
assertions that the EPA's determinations involved purely legal
questions and that the court should not defer to the EPA. According
to the appellate court, Congress had clearly delegated authority to the
EPA to make determinations as to when water quality standards were
consistent with the Act. As such, the appellate court invoked the twostep approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of
congressional acts announced in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council Under that approach, if the statute is clear and unambiguous,
the plain language controls. However, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous on the issue, the court must decide whether the agency's
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
According to the appellate court, the Act was silent on the specific
questions raised by the case. Thus, the appellate court deferred to the
EPA's determinations, and asked only if such determinations were
permissible constructions of the Act.
Turning to the EPA's approval of Montana's standard exempting
nonpoint source pollution from antidegradation review, the appellate
court agreed with the district court and concluded that nothing in the
Act demanded a state adopt a regulatory system for nonpoint sources,
or gave the EPA the authority to regulate such sources. Thus, the
appellate court found that the EPA's approval of this standard was a
permissible construction of the Act. Second, regarding the EPA's
approval of Montana's policies and procedures exempting areas within
the mixing zone from antidegradation review, the appellate court
noted that the use of mixing zones was a practical necessity for
meeting water quality criteria at a discharge pipe and was a widespread
practice. The appellate court agreed with the EPA that the Act's
antidegradation requirements applied to the waterbody as a whole,
and not specifically to the mixing zone. Therefore, the appellate court
found the EPA's approval of Montana's mixing zone policies and
procedures a permissible construction of the Act.
MatthewJ Costinett

FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (holding that water restrictions imposed pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act amounted to a physical taking under the Fifth
Amendment and were compensable).
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The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (collectively "the government") determined
that delta smelt and winter-run chinook salmon were in danger of
extinction. In fulfillment of their duties under the Endangered
Species Act, the government issued biological opinions that the
proposed operations of the State Water Project ("SWP") and the
Central Valley Project ("CVP") were likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of these species. The opinions included Reasonable and
Prudent Alternatives ("RPAs") that limited the amount of water
available for distribution to users.
The SWP and CVP capture water from the Feather and
Sacramento Rivers and distribute it through canals to users in
southern California. The State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") grants water use permits to the managers of the SWP and
CVP. One of the managers, the Department of Water Resources
("DWR"), in turn, contracts with county water districts for the right to
withdraw prescribed quantities of water. The water use restrictions
impaired contracts held by Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
("Tulare").
Consequently, Tulare sued for compensation under
Article V of the Constitution for loss of their water rights.
The government offered three lines of defense.
First, the
implementation of the RPAs merely frustrated the contract's purpose
and did not effectuate a taking. Second, the restrictions did not meet
the criteria for a regulatory taking. Third, the government cannot be
held liable for a taking when it does no more than impose a limit on
Tulare's title that background principles of state law would otherwise
require.
The United States Court of Federal Claims felt the government
misapplied the legal authority supporting their first argument, Omnia
Commercial Co. v. United States. The court distinguished Omnia on the
basis that Omnia could claim only a contract expectancy, not
ownership, while Tulare had an identifiable right to a stipulated
volume of water. Thus, while under California law, the title to water
remained with the state; the contracts in question created a property
interest sufficiently mature to remove it from the realm of an Omnia
analysis.
Next, the government argued the water use restrictions did not
meet the criteria of a regulatory taking. Applying the Penn Central
balancing test, Tulare's claim must fail because regulatory concern
over fish and the de minimis economic loss limited Tulare's
reasonable contract expectations. However, Tulare argued the action
was a physical taking. Under that theory, Tulare possessed contract
rights to a specified amount of water, which the government prevented
them from using and thereby deprived them of the entire value of
their contract right. The court agreed with Tulare, describing water
rights as a special form of property where the mere restriction of use
eviscerated the right itself since the sole entitlement was to the use of
the water. Thus, the court held that the government's denial of the
right to use all the water to which Tulare was entitled accomplished a
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complete extinction of all value and effectuated a physical taking.
The government's third argument insisted that both the terms of
Tulare's contract and the background principles of state law imposed
limits on Tulare's titles that rendered their water loss noncompensable. The government contended that Tulare's contracts
entitled them to only the amount of water made available to the DWR.
Because the water was not available to the DWR, Tulare had no claim
to the foregone flow. However, the court dismissed the government's
legal authority as inapposite. The court pointed out the government
lacked the contractual immunity from liability they relied on in their
arguments.
Finally, the government offered a common law justification for
limiting the scope of Tulare's property right. Specifically, Tulare
could not have a vested right in a use or method of diverting water that
was unreasonable or violated the public trust. The court rejected the
government's assertion.
The SWRCB defined a comprehensive
scheme that balanced and allocated water rights among users in the
decision D-1484 ("decision"). Once the SWRCB made an allocation
under the decision, that determination defined the scope of Tulare's
property and contract rights. Therefore, the decision protected
Tulare's right to divert water, notwithstanding the SWRCB's
compliance with the RPAs.
Thus, the court held that the federal government was free to
preserve fish; however, it must pay for the water it takes to do so.
John A. Helfrich

Klump v. United States, 50 Fed. C1. 268 (2001) (holding the United
States Bureau of Land Management asserted water rights through the
same legal channels applicable to individuals, and thus it did not
violate the Fifth Amendment takings clause).
Luther Klump ("Klump") alleged the United States violated the
Fifth Amendment by taking his property without providing just
compensation. Klump made various earlier claims, which the United
States Court of Federal Claims addressed in prior orders. Klump's loss
of water rights remained the only issue, on which the United States
moved for summary judgment.
Klump had water rights associated with cattle grazing permits on
land in southeastern Arizona owned by the United States Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"). During the term of the permits, Klump
and the BLM disputed over Klump's alleged failure to comply with
some of the inherent conditions, such as allowing his cattle to graze in
prohibited areas. As a result, the BLM cancelled Klump's permit,
ordered him to remove his cattle from the land, and impounded some
of his cattle. These legal developments prompted the Arizona
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Department of Water Resources to transfer Klump's water rights,
associated with the now cancelled permit, to the BLM. Klump alleged
the BLM's actions constituted a taking of his property, including water
and grazing rights, livestock, and entitlement to use his ranch.
However, the court found BLM did not obtain the water rights by
exercising its sovereign power under the Fifth Amendment to take
private property.
The BLM argued it obtained the rights through normal state
procedures, not by exercising sovereign power. Klump, conversely,
maintained that the BLM did utilize such power without providing just
compensation, and, as such, violated the Fifth Amendment. When the
government "takes" property, it exercises its sovereign right to acquire
property from its rightful owner for the public good and must provide
just compensation. However, in this case, the United States did not
exercise such sovereign power. Instead, the United States claimed
rightful ownership of the property via water rights. Thus, the BLM did
not act unilaterally to affect its claim through the exercise of sovereign
powers, but, instead, applied to a state agency to have the water rights
transfer authorized. By doing so, the BLM acted as an individual
landowner, not as a sovereign. It therefore submitted itself to the
same laws governing individuals, and removed itself from the ambit of
Fifth Amendment takings claims. Thus, this case involved conflicting
claims of rightful ownership between two private parties, and not a
sovereign acquisition of property. Accordingly, the court held the
taking claim invalid.
Willow Arnold

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
California v. California Coastal Comm'n, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (holding oil and gas lease suspensions are federal activities
requiring a determination of consistency with state coastal
management programs, and an explanation of categorical exclusions
under the National Environmental Policy Act is necessary).
This case involved oil and gas lease suspensions governed by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("Act"). Under the Act, there are
four required steps to receive an oil and gas lease. The final step
requires the filing and review of a development and production plan
("DPP"). The DPP must be submitted along with a certification that
each activity was consistent with the state's coastal management
program. Between 1968 and 1984, the Mineral Management Service
("MMS"), a division of the Department of the Interior, conducted four
sales of oil and gas leases for the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") off
the coast of California, which resulted in it issuing forty leases. Until
1992, MMS had granted suspensions on the leases. In that year,
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several elected officials from California wrote letters to the MMS
opposing further lease suspensions. They requested the California
Coastal Commission ("CCC") to determine whether it had authority,
under the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA"), to review the
pending lease suspensions for consistency with the state's California
Coastal Management Program ("CCMP"). On July 27, 1999, the CCC
told MMS it was asserting its authority to review the lease suspensions.
It stated it was concerned about the age of the leases, the poor quality
of the oil, the proximity of the leases to marine sanctuaries, and
changed environmental circumstances, such as the expansion of the
territory of the threatened southern sea otter into the area. On
August 13, 1999, former Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, indicated
that the lessee's suspension requests did not trigger the CCC's
consistency review authority because the requested suspensions did
not have any effect on California's coastal zone. The CCC claimed this
was in error and that the MMS had also failed to follow the
requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").
The district court held that pursuant to section 1456(c) (1) of the
CZMA, the MMS must provide California with a determination that its
grant of the lease suspensions at issue is consistent with California's
coastal management program. In addition, pursuant to NEPA, the
MMS must provide a reasoned explanation for its reliance on the
categorical exclusion and the inapplicability of the extraordinary
circumstances exceptions.
CZMA requires federal agencies to determine that any activities
affecting the coastal zones are consistent with the state's coastal
management program. The issue here was whether a lease suspension,
like the sale of oil and gas leases, was considered a "federal activity."
Congress amended Section 1456 (c) (1) (A) of CZMA after the Supreme
Court decision in Secretary of the Interiorv. California. That section now
states that a federal activity within or outside the coastal zone must be
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with state management
programs. Since the 1990 amendment, the sale of oil and gas leases
has been determined a federal activity. This court held that lease
suspensions were also federal activities because they extend to the
primary term of the leases, and since oil and gas leases must now be
consistent with the state's coastal management program at the time
they are sold, so must lease suspensions.
MMS must also comply with NEPA requirements. Over the years,
MMS categorically excluded the grant of lease suspensions from
NEPA. NEPA allows categorical exclusions if they "do not individually
or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment."
While the court held that MMS was not wrong in placing the lease
suspensions in this category under NEPA, it stated MMS must still
provide some explanation for their reliance on the categorical
exclusion. This holding comes from Jones v. Gordon, where the Ninth
Circuit stated that an agency must discuss whether an exception to the
categorical exclusions applies.
Shandra Dobrovolny
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Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fisherman's Ass'ns v. United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding the
Bureau of Reclamation failed to follow the procedural guidelines of
the Endangered Species Act when it implemented its 2000 operations
plan for the Klamath Project, and enjoining the Bureau from
continuing with that plan until it complied with such guidelines).
The Klamath Project ("Project") is actually a series of water
diversion projects, including a number of dams, located in Oregon
and California within the Upper Klamath and Lost River Basins. The
Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") manages water usage, including
flow rates, throughout the Project. The Iron Gate Dam in California is
the furthest downstream dam in the Project. The stretch of the
Klamath River below Iron Gate Dam is a critical habitat for Coho
salmon, a species listed as "threatened" under the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").
Under the terms of the ESA, the Bureau must prepare a biological
assessment if it learns a threatened species is present in an area where
it proposes an action. The purpose of this assessment is to determine
the effect of the proposed action on the threatened species. Should
the Bureau find the threatened species would not be affected, the
Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") must concur with this finding.
Should the Bureau find the proposed action would affect the
threatened species, it must request formal consultation from the
Secretary, who must then prepare a biological opinion, stating
whether, in its opinion, the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the
threatened species. With respect to Coho salmon, the Secretary's
authority has been delegated to the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS-).
On April 26, 2000, the Bureau implemented its operations plan for
the Project for the year 2000. Although it was engaged in discussions
with the NMFS, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's
Associations ("Pacific Coast") filed a motion for relief based on the
Bureau's alleged violations of the ESA. Pacific Coast charged the
Bureau had not followed the above procedure in implementing its
operations plan, and, thus, had taken irrevocable action resulting in
Pacific Coast, the Bureau, and an
harm to Coho salmon.
interpleading party then each filed a motion for summary judgment.
The court granted Pacific Coast's motion, and granted in part and
denied in part the (nearly identical) motions of the Bureau and the
interpleader. As such, the court enjoined the Bureau from sending
certain deliveries of irrigation water down the Klamath.
No material facts were disputed in the case. The Bureau knew the
Coho salmon was a threatened species, and it knew its regulation of
flow rates from the Iron Gate Dam would affect those species.
Therefore, under the ESA, it was required to request formal
consultation from the NMFS on any plan that affected those flow rates.
Yet, the Bureau never prepared a biological assessment, let alone
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requested formal consultation. Although it was engaged in discussions
with the NMFS on April 26, 2000, these discussions were about the
future flow rates on the Klamath River in general; they did not afford
the NMFS the opportunity to approve or evaluate the operations plan
for the year 2000. The court held these actions were clearly in
violation of the ESA, and granted Pacific Coast's motion for summary
judgment. The judge granted the Bureau's and the interpleader's
motions as to Pacific Coast's second charge maintaining the Bureau
had taken irrevocable action before completing the formal
consultation. The court held the issue not yet reviewable since the
formal consultation had not begun.
In light of these judgments, the court enjoined the Bureau from
making water deliveries when the flow rates below Iron Gate Dam were
below scientific estimates of levels needed for restoration and
maintenance of Coho salmon habitats on the Kalmath River.
James Siegesmund
Caprio v. Upjohn Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding
under the Connecticut Clean Water Act ("CCWA"), which states that
"pollution of the waters of the state is inimical to the public health,
safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the state" and that "no persons
or municipality shall cause pollution of any of the waters of the state or
maintain a discharge of any treated or untreated wastes," residents who
have suffered injury due to pollution or hazardous waste discharged
into the waters of Connecticut may bring a negligence per se action
against the polluters).
The plaintiff ("Caprio") brought this action against the Upjohn
Company ("Upjohn") claiming that Upjohn had exposed him to
hazardous chemical substances contained in toxic sludge, which led to
his developing bladder cancer. Upjohn filed a motion to dismiss
Caprio's second cause of action, which alleged that Upjohn violated
the Connecticut Clean Water Act ("CCWA").
Upjohn's manufacturing of chemicals generated industrial toxic
waste in the form of sludge. Upjohn transported the toxic sludge by
truck and railroad car to open ponds to release the waste into the
environment. Caprio alleged in his second cause of action that he
suffered injury as a result of Upjohn releasing these hazardous
chemical substances.
Caprio further alleged that Upjohn was
negligent, in that releasing the harmful sludge caused the cancer.
Upjohn filed a motion to dismiss the second and third counts for
failing to state a claim and further argued that the statute of
limitations had run on Caprio's negligence claim. The trial court
dismissed the second count based on the fact that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act ("CERCLA")
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only covers hazardous substances that are considered "waste." Caprio
failed to state that the sludge that Upjohn was releasing into the
environment was "waste" or that the expulsion of the sludge was a
"release into the environment." The court also dismissed the third
negligence count against Upjohn, finding that under section 52-577 of
the Connecticut General Statutes ("C.G.S."), Upjohn's activities "did
not involve the release of hazardous material from industrial waste
streams or toxic waste dumps in the ambient environment that would
potentially affect groundwater and drinking water."
Caprio then filed a motion seeking relief from the dismissal of
counts two and three based on newly discovered evidence supporting
allegations that the hazardous material was in "waste" form. The
district court granted Caprio's motion and ordered Caprio to file an
amended complaint stating that Caprio brought the action under
C.G.S. section 52-577 of CCWA. The amended complaint alleged that
Upjohn violated the CCWA by "releasing into the environment the
sludge from an industrial waste stream or toxic waste dump in a
manner that would potentially affect ground water and drinking water
as well as ambient air, land surfaces and surface waters."
Upjohn claimed that this amended complaint failed to identify a
legal basis and that there was no right to a private action under C.G.S.
section 52-577 of the CCWA. Caprio countered that his second cause
of action alleged negligence per se based on Upjohn's violation of the
standards set forth under the Connecticut Water Pollution Control Act
("CWPCA"). CWPCA states that the "pollution of the waters of the
state is inimical to the public health, safety and welfare of the
inhabitants of the state" and that "no person or municipality shall
cause pollution of any of the waters of the state or maintain a
discharge of any treated or untreated wastes."
The court found that Caprio, as a resident of Connecticut, was
within the class of persons that the statute was intended to protect and
that Caprio's allegations established that he was a potential victim of
pollution or hazardous waste discharged into the water of Connecticut.
Therefore, this court dismissed Upjohn's motion to dismiss the second
cause of action.
Colleen M. Cooley

Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001)
(holding that "navigable waters" as defined in the Clean Water Act
("CWA") include non-navigable waters that are tributary to navigable
waters and that the CWA extends federal jurisdiction over
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are
themselves waters of the United States).
The Idaho Rural Council ("IRC") brought this action againstJacob
and Henry Bosma ("Bosmas"), owners and operators of Grand View
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Dairy ("Dairy"), for violating provisions of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Dairy's National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit, by polluting waters of the United States.
To establish a viable claim based on CWA requirements, the claimant
must allege that the adverse party discharged or added a pollutant to
navigable waters from a point source. The parties stipulated that the
Dairy constituted a point source under the CWA.
The Bosmas moved for summary judgment based on three factors:
(1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the IRC was
unable to establish a viable claim under the CWA because the Butler
and Walker Springs were not waters of the United States as there
defined; and (3) the "diligent prosecution defense," and the doctrine
of "unclean hands."
The Bosmas challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction
claiming that the IRC did not have standing and the case was moot. In
addition, the Bosmas argued that Butler and Walker Springs were not
waters of the United States as defined by the CWA. The court held
that the IRC had standing because the pollution of the water directly
affected members of the IRC. The court further held the case was not
moot because the voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not
deprive a federal court of its right to determine the legality of the
practice and the Bosmas were free to resume the behavior in the
future if the court did not rule.
The court addressed the subject matter jurisdiction issue and
whether the IRC stated a claim under the CWA with the same
reasoning. The court followed the Supreme Court's decisions in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers and InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette. In these cases, the
Supreme Court held that the term "navigable waters," as referred to in
the CWA, and defined therein includes "almost any body of surface
water that might affect interstate commerce," as well as "at least some
waters that are not navigable in the classical sense, such as nonnavigable tributaries and streams." The court reasoned that Butler
and Walker Springs were sufficiently connected through surface water
to Clover Creek, a navigable stream, as to fall within the definition of
waters of the United States.
The Bosmas also protested the IRC's inclusion of pollution
resulting from the hydrological connection between Butler and
Walker Springs and groundwater. The Bosmas argued that such a
connection cannot lead to a violation of the CWA. After examining
the legislative history and intent behind the enactment of the CWA,
the court held that Congress did not intend to exclude regulation
discharges into hydrologically connected groundwater which adversely
affect surface water. Using this reasoning, the court held that the
CWA extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater that was
hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves waters
of the United States. The court emphasized that it would not be
sufficient for the IRC to only allege groundwater pollution and then to
assert a general hydrological connection between all waters. The court
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held that the IRC must trace the pollutants from their source to
surface waters in order to state a claim under the CWA.
Finally, the court held that the affirmative defenses of diligent
prosecution and the doctrine of unclean hands were inapplicable for
the Bosmas.
Sarah A. Hubbard

United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. I., 2001) (holding
Krilich's ultra vires arguments, as well as other decree modification
arguments were insufficient to warrant a motion to vacate or modify a
consensual decree).
In 1992, the parties to the case entered into a consent decree
regarding violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Following this,
the United States contended that Krilich violated decree provisions on
part of the property subject to the decree. The government presented
the violation on stipulated and asserted facts. The trial court held that
Krilich violated decree mitigation plan deadlines on the Royce
Property. The court issued a penalty, which was upheld in a 1997
appeal. In 1998, Krilich moved to bar enforcement of the penalty
pursuant to Federal 'Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In so doing,
Krilich argued the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the mitigation
plan deadlines. The court denied relief. Krilich appealed, but the
court held that Krilich consented to the jurisdiction of the court by
entering the 1992 decree.
Krilich brought this motion in February 2001 on two bases. First,
Krilich argued that the Supreme Court opinion in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers warranted
vacation of the decree. Second, Krilich asserted that, in light of the
change of law represented in Solid Waste, the decree should have been
modified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5) which
provides relief from judgment or order made in mistake.
In Solid Waste, the United States Supreme Court held the Army
Corps' "Migratory Bird Rule" unenforceable because it exceeded the
authority granted to the Corps under the CWA. Krilich contended
that Solid Waste made clear that none of the waters on the Royce
property were navigable waters subject to the CWA. Krilich argued
that because those waters were not under federal jurisdiction, the
United States had no authority to enter into the decree.
The court denied Krilich's motion to vacate the consent decree.
The argument that the decree was ultra vires, or void as beyond the
United States authority failed for four reasons. First, the government
agreement was not outside its authority because part of the property at
issue in the decree, the Sullivan Lake area, contains wetlands subject to
the CWA, even if Krilich's contentions regarding the Royce property
were correct. Second, if the government had gone beyond its
authority, that would not void the judgment as it would void a
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contract. Third, Krilich was bound by the stipulated facts used in
forming the decree, specifically the stipulation that the wetlands then
at issue were "waters of the United States." Finally, the court held that
the motion was not timely. Each of these four failures was adequate on
its own for the court to deny Krilich's motion to vacate the decree.
Krilich next argued for modification of the decree pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5). This rule provides that a
judgment may be modified or vacated if "a priorjudgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."
The court held that this provision was not applicable here. The
provision was limited only to judgments that were the basis of issue or
claim preclusion, and not to cases relied upon as precedent.
Furthermore, the law had not been so changed by Solid Waste that
equity demanded the opening of the decree; Krilich's motion was
therefore denied.
Erika Delaney-Lew
Mississippi River Revival, Inc. v. Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul,
MN, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding a violation of the
Clean Water Act would compel no further action and do nothing to
redress injuries given the improbability of future violations, and a
statutory bar against recovering retroactive penalties in citizen suits).
In an effort to improve the natural environment of the Mississippi
River, a group of environmental organizations ("Organizations"), sued
the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis ("Cities"). The Organizations
alleged the Cities' discharge of storm water without a permit violated
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Cities owned storm drains, which
dated back to the nineteenth century and could not be shut off. The
drains prevented surface water from building up by directing rain and
melted snow through a series of channels into the Mississippi River.
Along the way, the water picked up pollutants such as lawn fertilizer,
petroleum byproducts, animal waste, and garbage, which in turn
impaired aesthetic and recreational interests on the Mississippi.
In order to comply with the CWA, the Cities needed a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for their
discharges. The Cities submitted timely applications to the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") for their NPDES permits in
November 1992. Despite federal regulations requiring action on such
application within one year, the MPCA did not take action for several
years. While the applications languished, the Organizations filed suit
against the Cities for discharging without a permit. The Organizations
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief along with the assessment
of civil penalties and an award of attorney's fees. However, before
judgment on that case, the MPCA issued the Cities NPDES permits
and, thus, rendered the Organizations' claim for injunctive relief
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moot.

Nevertheless, the Organizations sought civil penalties against the
Cities for past violations of the CWA. The Minnesota District Court
then faced the question of whether citizens could rightfully file suit for
such retroactive civil penalties as well as whether assessing penalties
retroactively could possibly redress the Organizations' injuries or
prevent further violations of the CWA.
The court first considered whether civil penalties could redress the
Organizations' injuries or deter future violations. A request for civil
penalties becomes moot if the court can no longer grant relief that will
redress the injury claimed. Because the CWA makes all civil penalties
assessed pursuant to citizen suits payable to the United States Treasury,
assessing penalties would not result in awards to the Organizations.
Therefore, the court held, such penalties did nothing to redress their
injuries. Furthermore, the assessment of civil penalties is warranted
only when they "encourage defendants to discontinue current
violations and deter them from committing future ones." Here, the
court held since the Cities had permits, they did not continue to
violate the CWA.
Next, the court considered the power to sue for retroactive
penalties. It held such power fell outside the purview of citizen suits
and, thus, belonged only to the government. Citizen suits, at most,
allowed for civil penalties only if commenced during ongoing
violations. Here, the eventual issuance of the NPDES permits stopped
the violations, thus barring the Organizations' right to sue for civil
penalties.
Lacking any proof that penalties would redress injuries or deter
violation, and lacking the power to bring a citizen suit for retroactive
penalties in the first place, the Organizations' claims failed and the
court accordingly dismissed the suit.
Dan Wennogle

United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (holding
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers did not overrule the Clean Water Act protections of
tributaries of navigable waters, and such protections were
constitutional).
On August 11, 1996, Mr. Buday dug ponds and created burns near
Fred Burr Creek in Granite County, Montana. Fred Burr Creek
flooded in the spring of 1997, destroying the bums, and draining the
ponds. This sent dirt and debris into the surrounding wetlands and
downstream into Flint Creek. Mr. Buday was indicted, and pled guilty
to violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by releasing pollutants into
navigable waters, including wetlands.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court limited the definition of
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"navigable waters" in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Core of Engineers. In light of this decision, Buday submitted
a brief claiming Fred Burr Creek and the surrounding wetlands were
no longer navigable waters, and the United States thus lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him. The court construed this brief as a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion, and
in so doing, found the holding in Solid Waste inapplicable.
In Solid Waste, the Supreme Court held seasonal ponds or wetlands
that were entirely within one state's borders and not adjacent to any
navigable steams or tributaries were not navigable waters within the
meaning of the CWA. However, the district court found that this
definition did not apply to the wetlands surrounding Fred Burr Creek.
Although Fred Burr Creek was not navigable, it drained into Flint
Creek, which in turn flowed into the Clark Fork of the Columbia River.
The Clark Fork was navigable-in-fact; thus Fred Burr Creek was a
tributary of a tributary of a navigable waterway. The CWA specifically
covers such tributaries, and the court cited numerous cases, including
United States v. Texas Pipe Line, which found tributaries such as Fred
Burr Creek within the scope of the CWA envisioned by Congress.
Furthermore, the court held the inclusion of tributaries in the
CWA fell within the boundaries of congressional power dictated by the
Commerce Clause, authorizing Congress to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce. By definition, navigable waters are channels of
interstate commerce. The court reasoned that although Fred Burr
Creek's effect on interstate commerce was minimal, the effect of
tributaries as a whole was not. Thus, in protecting tributaries in the
CWA, Congress was protecting the interests of interstate commerce.
Since Fred Burr Creek was a tributary of a navigable waterway, it
was protected by the CWA even after Solid Waste. Since this protection
is within the powers constitutionally granted to Congress, Mr. Buday's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied.
James Siegesmund

Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001) (holding
lack of entitlement prevented citizens either from enjoining the
implementation of the Bureau of Reclamation's annual plan for a
water project, or from forcing releases for irrigation without a showing
of probable chance of success on the merits.)
The Upper Klamath Lake ("Lake") provided primary storage for a
limited-capacity water project ("Project") established in 1905. It also
served as a valuable resource to Indian tribes as well as a source of
nourishment and life for endangered and threatened fish and birds.
This suit arose out of problems concerning the allocation of water to
irrigators holding contracts for water from the Project.
The project allowed the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") to
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form contracts with irrigators along both the Klamath and Lost Rivers
in Oregon. The Lake was listed as "critical habitat" for two types of
endangered suckerfish under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
These fish provided food, employment opportunities, and a basis for
culture and tradition among the Yurok Indian Tribes. The Yurok and
Klamath Tribes held treaty rights dating back to "time immemorial,"
which secured the Tribes' water and fisheries in the Klamath River
Basin. Furthermore, the river below the terminal dam in the project
provided "critical habitat" for threatened Coho salmon. Finally, two
wildlife refuges far below the Lake depended on water to provide
habitat for waterfowl, a primary food source for threatened bald
eagles.
All of these interests came into conflict when a 2001 Natural
Resources Conservation Service forecast predicted critically dry
conditions that would lead to the lowest inflows to the Lake on record.
This forced the Bureau to severely curtail releases for irrigation in
order to protect fish habitat in the lake and river below the Iron Gate
Dam. Irrigators dependent on such releases protested the Bureau's
2001 plans because they provided little or no water for irrigation.
Kandra sued on behalf of the irrigators for the Bureau, alleging
breach of contract. Kandra further claimed the Bureau's 2001 plan
constituted an arbitrary and capricious use of administrative power
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and was a violation
of both the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the ESA.
The Oregon District Court faced the decision of whether Kandra
could bar implementation of the plan by injunction and obtain an
order to release 262,000 acre-feet from the Lake, dropping its
elevation one foot below minimum recommended levels. The Bureau
insisted its plan complied with NEPA and ESA requirements and that
Indian treaty rights antedated irrigators' rights. The Wilderness
Society intervened, arguing the needs of wildlife refuges presented an
even greater challenge to irrigators' claims.
The court decided Kandra could neither bar the plan's
implementation nor order releases because he could not show
probable success on the merits of his case or demonstrate that the
balance of hardships tipped sharply in his direction. Kandra's claims
did not show the requisite "fair chance" at success because they arose
from unfounded assumptions about priority of the Bureau's
responsibilities and incorrect analysis of ESA, APA and NEPA
requirements.
First, the contract between irrigators and the Bureau subjected
water allowances to availability. After satisfying the superceding
environmental demands of the ESA, and the superior Indian treaty
rights, the Bureau had little or no available water remaining for
irrigators.
Second, the court addressed Kandra's claim that the Bureau
violated NEPA by failing to produce an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"). The court held an EIS was not required because
the Bureau's 2001 plan comprised only part of an ongoing process,
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and, thus, the Bureau could not feasibly complete an EIS before
critical deadlines for the delivery of irrigation water had passed.
Therefore, to impose impossible duties on the Bureau made "no
sense."
Lastly, the court challenged Kandra's notion that, because the Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") provided the Bureau with contestable
expert opinions, implementing the 2001 plan violated the ESA and
APA. The ESA prevents the Bureau from engaging in any action likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened
species. It also requires certain due diligence procedures in forming
water plans, such as including reasonable and prudent alternatives
("RPAs") in those plans. The Bureau relied on experts in the FWS
who formulated RPAs. While Kandra claimed the Bureau's experts
failed to use or correctly interpret the best information available, the
court found this insufficient to prove the Bureau acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the APA.
The court further held the Bureau's ability to choose and rely on
expert opinions allowed for reasonable discretion, not omniscience.
The ESA simply requires expert opinions not ignore biological
information. Kandra had merely argued certain experts disagreed on
the significance of biological information used by the FWS. Thus, the
court held Kandra's ESA claim sought to impose a standard
inconsistent with the standard actually imposed by law.
Considering all of these factors, the court concluded Kandra's
claim failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or an
entitlement to the relief sought. Accordingly, the court denied
Kandra's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Dan Wennogle
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 144 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.P.R. 2001) (holding that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico lacked
jurisdiction over the United States Navy to compel adherence to local
regulations, due to the sovereign immunity of the United States).
The United States moved for a declaratory judgment that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth") and its Secretary
of the Department of Natural and Environmental Resources could not
compel the United States' participation in local administrative
proceedings regarding the adjudication of stream water for use on a
Naval base. The Commonwealth relied on the McCarran Amendment
("Amendment") of 1952, which waived the United States' sovereign
immunity for administrative
proceedings regarding stream
adjudication.
The United States obtained permits granting the
adjudication of stream waters for use on a Navy base in 1942 and 1944,
and thus contended that the permits are not subject to the
Amendment. The court granted declaratory relief.
Congress' purpose in ratifying the Amendment was "allowing states
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to adjudicate collectively all of the conflicting water rights claims on a
source of water, without being hindered by the United States'
invocation of its sovereign immunity." The Commonwealth asserted
that the Amendment of 1952 applied retroactively to proceedings
surrounding the 1942 and 1944 permits. The Amendment "allow[ed]
the United States to be joined as a defendant in any proceeding for
the adjudication or administration of water rights 'where it appears
that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights."' The United States asserted the court could not apply
the Amendment retroactively, nor had Congress intended to apply it
in such a way.
The court relied on Landgrafv. USI Film Products and E. Enters. v.
Apfel to determine whether the court could apply a statute or
amendment retroactively.
The general rule called for strict
interpretation and application according to the precise terms of such
legislation. "The natural extension of this maxim of interpretation was
that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are not to be applied
retroactively." The specific rule of Landgraf required a court to
determine whether a piece of legislation "'attaches new legal
consequences"' to prior events. The court found that in the instant
case, application of the Amendment would impair the rights of the
Navy allowed by the 1944 permit and would impose additional duties
upon the Navy. As the retroactive application would have an effect on
the 1944 permit, the court resolved not to retroactively apply the
Amendment in this case.
Since the Commonwealth could not prove clear congressional
intent favoring the retroactive application of the Amendment, the
court held that the Amendment did not apply to the Navy's permits
held before 1952. The court granted declaratory relief, allowing the
United States to use its sovereign immunity to avoid local
administrative proceedings regarding the 1944 permit.
KatharineJEllison
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins.
Co., 145 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding a decrease in
downstream water was the natural and foreseeable result of diverting a
creek that could conceivably harm downstream users, and neither a
duty to defend nor indemnify existed on behalf of the insurer).
Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd. ("Marock") owned a
facility near Big Sandy Creek ("Creek"). St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.
("St. Paul") provided Marock with primary general liability coverage.
Trinity Materials, Inc. ("Trinity"), located downstream of Marock and
holding senior water rights to the creek, alleged Marock diverted the
creek for construction purposes without a valid water permit and,
therefore, deprived Trinity of the water it needed to operate. Trinity
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sued Marock for negligence. Marock sought a declaratory judgment
maintaining St. Paul had a duty both to defend and to indemnify
Marock in the suit. Marock and St. Paul both moved for summary
judgment.
As the determinative issue in this case, the court looked to whether
Trinity's injuries resulted from an accident. The court agreed with
Trinity and found foreseeability, not intent, as the threshold at bar.
The court maintained Marock intentionally diverted the creek while
simultaneously lacking specific intent to cause injury. However, the
court did not deem the natural and predictable consequences of such
acts accidental. Thus, Trinity's injuries were not the result of an
accident.
Furthermore, Trinity argued a decrease in available downstream
water was a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek. The
court agreed and found the very presence of a water permit system
reflects the finite nature of water resources, such as this creek.
Therefore, although Marock may have lacked knowledge as to the
identity of the downstream users, a decrease in downstream water was
a natural and foreseeable result of diverting the creek, which harmed
downstream users.
In order to indemnify St. Paul, Marock argued Trinity's negligence
allegations proved the accidental nature of the harm. The court
disagreed, finding that the diversion was intentional, but not
negligent. Therefore, St. Paul did not have a duty to defend or
indemnify Marock. Finally, Marock argued it did not intend to inflict
harm on Trinity, however, the court reiterated it found foreseeability,
not intent, as the issue in this case.
Willow Arnold

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., No. 2991351, 20001 Ala. Civ.
App. LEXIS 313 (Ala. Civ. App. June 15, 2001) (holding the "common
enemy rule" entitles a property owner to construct a dam on his
property to fend off oncoming surface water).
The City of Dothan ("Dothan") appealed a trial court order that
found a landowner, Flowers, was authorized to construct a dam on his
property pursuant to the "common-enemy" rule. Flowers owned
property over which an easement ran to allow drainage of surface
water from his property through adjacent property. In 1997, Flowers
applied for a permit from Dothan to build an earthen dam on his
property to prevent surface water from an upper property not owned
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by him from flowing onto his property. Dothan alleged it conditioned
granting the permit to Flowers on his designing a system that adhered
to local ordinance. Dothan claimed Flowers refused to design such a
system because the easement on Flowers' land did not limit the
amount of water that flowed through it so the need for the dam did
not exist. Flowers disagreed. Dothan did not grant the permit but
instead filed a complaint for declaratory judgment on the questions of
the amount of water the easement could allow to pass and whether it
had to grant the permit to Flowers that would allow him to build an
earthen dam. Flowers asserted the "common-enemy" rule entitled him
to build a dam to prevent surface water runoff from coming onto, and
damaging his land. The trial court ruled in favor of Flowers. Dothan
appealed and argued the trial court erred in applying the "commonenemy" rule in determining Flowers was entitled to construct a dam.
The "common-enemy" rule is an exception to a civil law rule. The
civil law rule states, as to lands outside a municipality, the lower surface
is doomed by nature to bear servitude to the superior in that it must
receive the water that falls on, and flows from higher land. The
Alabama courts recognize and adhere to the "common-enemy"
exception to the civil law rule, which applies to city lots. The
"common-enemy" rule entitles the owner of urban property to fight off
oncoming surface waters by building walls or dams to prevent water
flowing from the higher property onto his land. A critical requirement
of the rule is a determination of whether the water at issue is surface
water or an intermittent stream. The test for determining into which
category water falls consists of two factors; whether the water is
channeled in well defined banks, and what source provides the water.
Each party to the suit presented witnesses in the trial court who
testified and gave their opinions of into which category the water in
question on Flowers' land fit. Dothan's witnesses concluded it was an
intermittent stream. One expert based his opinion on the fact that the
watercourse lacked vegetation and contained alluvial soils, although he
admitted rainwater provided the only source for the stream. He stated
an intermittent stream did not necessarily have to be fed by
groundwater. Flowers' expert concluded the water was surface water.
He asserted an intermittent stream, by definition, is fed by
groundwater at least some of the time and that this area did not
contain a headwater outcropping.
The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
considering Flowers' rights under the "common-enemy" rule. Thus,
the court affirmed the trial court's holding that Flowers was entitled to
construct a dam on his property to fend off oncoming surface water
pursuant to the rule.
Rachel Sobrero
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CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 105 Cal Rptr.
2d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the trial court erred in granting
nonsuit where lost profits could potentially be considered in
determining costs of restoring damaged pistachio groves, and error in
a summary judgment ruling for failure to provide a sufficient basis for
the decision).
Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch and Maple Leaf Pistachio Ranch
(collectively "Santa Barbara") alleged Chowchilla Water District
("Chowchilla") provided contaminated irrigation water, that killed
Santa Barbara's pistachio trees.
Santa Barbara's trees, which
traditionally take seventeen years to reach maturity and produce a full
crop, started to die from verticillium wilt-a fungal disease. Santa
Barbara subsequently learned the contaminant responsible likely came
from tailwater drains dispensing Chowchilla irrigation water back into
the canal and downstream to other growers.
Tests confirmed
verticillium contamination within Chowchilla's water.
Santa Barbara filed suit asserting three causes of action: (1)
negligence with resulting property damage; (2) nuisance; and (3) an
untitled claim for additional damages suffered by Santa Barbara
Pistachio Ranch in the 1997-1998 crop year. Chowchilla filed a motion
for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion on all
claims but Santa Barbara's claim for negligence. At trial, Chowchilla
moved to exclude testimony regarding lost profits in determining
damages. The trial court held the proper measure of damages
included the cost of restoring the pistachio groves, and the difference
in the value of Santa Barbara's land before and after the restoration,
but not lost future profits. Absent consideration of lost future profits,
Santa Barbara's damages were minimal. Thus, the court granted
nonsuit in favor of Chowchilla.
In response, Santa Barbara filed suit with the California Court of
Appeals charging the trial court erred in granting nonsuit by
improperly limiting the means of measuring damages. Under the
appropriate standard of review, a court may grant nonsuit, as a matter
of law, if the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to permit the trier of
fact to find for the plaintiff. Therefore, the court must accept the
evidence most favorable to the plaintiff as true and must disregard
conflicting evidence. A modicum of varying evidence is not a conflict;
a legitimate conflict arises only where substantial evidence exists.
In its analysis, the court reasoned that it could conceivably
consider lost profits in valuing the lost pistachio trees, particularly
where mature trees could not replace injured trees. The court
explained the cost of replacing the pistachio trees or restoring the
groves to their original condition was dependent on the value of the
trees. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's decision, holding it
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erred in automatically precluding evidence of lost future profits in
determining the applicable restoration costs. The court considered
several options to determine damages in a tort action. Ultimately, the
court found the means of measuring damages flexible, and one that
would vary with the particular circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, the court remanded the case back to the trial court, not
to require consideration of lost future profits, but because the trial
court could not automatically preclude review of lost future profits.
The court also reviewed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Chowchilla on Santa Barbara's negligence claim. In
reversing the summary judgment decision, the court cited the trial
court's failure to give a sufficient statement of reasons for granting the
motion. The Code of Civil Procedure required the trial court to
specify the reasons for its determination in a written or oral order, and
to specifically refer to the applicable supporting and opposing
evidence. Here, although the trial court identified contradictions
between the declarations prepared for the motion and the testimony
given in disposition, it failed to give written or oral documentation.
Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment pertaining to the negligence claim.
ChristineEllison

COLORADO
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Water Co.,
No. 00SA229 (Colo. Oct. 15, 2001) (holding historic consumptive use
determinations non-reviewable under the retained jurisdiction
provision unless the case comes on appeal).
Consolidated Mutual Water Co. ("Consolidated Mutual") originally
diverted water for irrigation purposes, but in the 1960s they began
using the water for domestic and municipal purposes. They did not
apply for a change of use application until 1991. This was Priority 12
water transferred from the Lee, Stewart & Eskins Ditch ("LSE Ditch").
In the 1960s, the Water Court allocated 287 acre-feet annually to
Golden from the LSE Ditch. In 1993 proceedings before the Water
Court, Golden relied on its expert Gary Thompson. He testified that
Consolidated Mutual received 124 acre-feet annually from the LSE
Ditch and an additional 302 acre-feet annually from the LSE junior
rights. The Water Court adopted the expert's calculations. No one
appealed the decision. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. ("Farmers")
brought a second suit claiming that Golden consumed more water
than allowed. The Water Court held and the Colorado Supreme
Court agreed that claim preclusion prohibited volumetric limits of the
1960s change decrees. Finally, Farmers Reservoir filed petitions
requesting the Water Court extend or invoke the period of retained
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jurisdiction.
The Colorado Supreme Court in reviewing the Water Court's
decision, looked to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-304(6) and determined
that the General Assembly intended to preclude review of consumptive
use determinations of the Water Court except through an appeal, and
further intended the retained jurisdiction provision to address only
injurious effects resulting from placing the change of water rights or
augmentation plan into operation. The General assembly did not
intend the retained jurisdiction provision to re-determine water court
historic use determinations.
This court looked to legislative history to determine the General
Assembly's intent. First, they looked to changes of water rights and
augmentation plans, and determined the retained jurisdiction
provision only applies to the Water Court's role in predicting future
injurious effect and the measures to prevent injury, not to their factfinding role for historic uses. Next, the court looked at the 1969 Act
and its amendments. Initially, the Act allowed, but did not require the
water judge to include a two-year period for reconsideration. The
1977 amendment required a retained jurisdiction provision, but
The 1981
allowed the water judge to determine its length.
inclusion
to
retained
amendment extended the mandatory
jurisdiction. Because the legislative history of the two amendments
pointed to potential conflicts and ambiguity, the court looked to
legislative hearings for further clarification. Based on these hearings,
it was clear that the period of retained jurisdiction did not apply to
historic consumptive use because evidentiary resolution was possible.
The court then looked to case precedent and concluded that it was
consistent with their construction of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-304(6).
Finally, the court looked to the burdens of establishing non-injury and
The court held that initially the persons seeking
injury.
reconsideration bear the burden of proving injury, and then the
burden shifts to the decree holder to prove non-injury.
The court determined that because Consolidated Mutual did apply
for a change in use, did subject itself to volumetric limitations and did
obtain a final judgment, the Water Court did not abuse its discretion
in determining the amount of Priority 12 water allocated to
Consolidated Mutual. Since no appeal was taken, the judgment
cannot be reviewed because the General Assembly did not create a
context for reviewing the adjudicated merits of consumptive use
determinations the Water Court established. Farmers also contested
Golden's allocation. However, the court found the allocation to
Golden non-reviewable because no one had appealed the decision. In
the future, the Water Court must give effect to the methodology it
used, based on the expert's testimony, to determine changes to the
LSE Ditch based upon injury-producing effects in order to prevent an
owner from enlarging its share of historic consumptive use.
Staci A. McComb
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Baseline Farms Two, LLP v. Hennings, 26 P.3d 1209 (Colo. Ct. App.
2001) (holding no immediate and irreparable injury was shown, and,
thus, the motion for preliminary injunction failed).
Baseline Farms Two, LLP ("Baseline Farms") appealed to Adams
County District Court to contest the dismissal of its motion for
preliminary injunction against Steven and Chris Hennings
("Hennings"). Baseline Farms sought to bar the Hennings from
discharging wastewater onto their property. Baseline Farms sued for
slander of tile, trespass, improper lien, and nuisance abatement.
The Hennings owned a campground across the street from the
Baseline Farms property. Developing Equities Group ("DEG") sought
to develop the Baseline Farms property into a residential area. The
Hennings' campground had a licensed wastewater treatment facility
that flowed underneath the street and onto the land owned by
Baseline Farms. The Hennings claimed a prescriptive easement
allowed their wastewater to flow through the ditch on Baseline Farms'
property. The predecessors of both properties recognized the
easement, and the Hennings recorded it in 1998. Baseline Farms
claimed the Hennings easement must be revoked due to the health
hazard posed by the Hennings' wastewater, and the fact that the
wastewater interfered with Baseline Farms' use of their property.
Baseline Farms introduced expert testimony from an
environmental engineer to illustrate the need for a preliminary
injunction. The expert testified that on three days on which the water
was tested, it appeared to be standing still, and was in excess of
permitted levels of pollutants. In particular, the expert testified the
fecal coliform count was consistently much higher than allowed under
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment ("CDPHE")
standards.
On cross examination the expert admitted that with the aid of
ground and surface water, the water in question could be put into
motion. Also, the expert admitted, since CDPHE standards are to be
measured over thirty day averages, to characterize the quality levels
here based on three days of data would be inaccurate. Finally, the
expert admitted contaminants might be entering the ditch from other
sources.
The Hennings' cross-examination of Baseline Farms' expert
helped establish the testimony as inconclusive as to the correct
operation of the wastewater treatment plant. The Hennings also
pointed out Baseline Farms refused their request to enter Baseline
Farms' land to clean out the ditch, which Baseline Farms had never
done in the ten years it has owned the property. Baseline Farms also
revealed that no impact on DEG's plans for development would result
for at least one year.
Following the presentation of Henning's evidence, the court
granted their motion to dismiss Baseline Farm's case. The court held
Baseline Farms had failed to show a real, immediate, and irreparable
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injury. Baseline Farms asserted this legal standard was inapplicable
where private parties were acting as private attorneys to enforce state
water and health control standards.
The court disagreed, holding that the applicable water quality
statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-8-611 and 25-8-612, did not specifically
dispense with the irreparable injury requirement and that this case did
not involve an action undertaken by a government agency pursuant to
a special statutory procedure. The articles here were not intended to
create new rights or to enlarge existing private rights. The provisions
of the articles also did not authorize injunctions or create a private
cause of action to proceed in the public interest. The articles did
recognize, however, that no private rights have been lost by enactment
of the Water Quality Control Act, and water violation determination
should not benefit anyone other than the state. Through this statutory
analysis, it was clear that based on the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, there must be a showing of a real, irreparable injury in
order to support a preliminary injunction. Thus, this court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the case.
MichaelSheehan

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Jubilee Hous., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 774
A.2d 281 (D.C. 2001) (holding the Water and Sewer Authority was not
exempt from following the specific statutory requirement that all rate
changes be preceded by notice and public hearing).
Jubilee Housing, Inc. ("Jubilee"), a non-profit housing
organization, brought this action against the District of Columbia
Water and Sewer Authority ("Authority") following the Authority's
termination of preferential water rates for non-profit housing
organizations. The Authority did not provide a public hearing and
only provided notice to some, but not all, organizations affected by the
termination.
Under section 43-1686 (a) and (b) of the District of Columbia
Code ("DCC"), the Authority was allowed to collect and abate fees and
establish and adjust retail water and sewer rates "following notice and
public hearing." The only issue the Authority raised in defense was
whether the temporary termination of preferential water rates
constituted "establishing" water and sewer rates for purposes of
section 43-1686 (b) of the DCC.
The court held that the termination of the preferential rates did
constitute establishing water and sewer rates under the code and
therefore, the Authority was required to provide notice and public
hearing prior to the termination of the rates. The court reasoned that
the termination of the rates would impose a new obligation on Jubilee
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and others similarly affected, and therefore, the statute required a
public hearing before any change could take place.
Sarah A. Hubbard

FLORIDA
VEX Properties v. S. States Utilities, Inc., 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding the grantee, VLX Properties, acquired property
subject to a flowage easement, to which its grantor agreed by way of a
joinder agreement and, thus, VLX's action for inverse condemnation
must fail).
This case arose out of an inverse condemnation action between the
possessor of a certain property interest and the holder of a flowage
easement across the property. Appellant VLX Properties, Inc. ("VLX")
owned the property, which included a portion of James Pond-the
property at issue in this case. VLX obtained its interest from Lawyers
Title Investment Fund ("LTIF"). However, prior to granting a portion
of the pond to VLX, LTIF conveyed a portion to Glen Abbey Golf
Course, Inc. ("Glen Abbey"). LTIF and other adjacent landowners
retained ownership of the remaining portion of the pond.
For many years Glen Abbey used wells to irrigate the golf course.
However, once reclaimed water became available, Glen Abbey was
administratively prohibited from continuing to draw groundwater and
thus was required to use reclaimed water to irrigate its golf course.
Glen Abbey contracted with Appellee Southern States Utilities, Inc.
("Southern Utilities") to provide the irrigation services. Subsequently,
LTIF conveyed its remaining portion of the pond to VLX.
The reclaimed water flowed over both the portion of the pond
LTIF conveyed to Glen Abbey and that portion which LTIF later
conveyed to VLX. Thus, VLX sought compensation by way of inverse
condemnation because the water was permitted to flow over its portion
of the pond. In essence, VLX contended a dam should have restricted
the water's flow. The primary issue was whether VLX's grantor, LTIF,
agreed to the flowage easement into James Pond. The Florida Court
of Appeals held the facts were sufficient to find LTIF joined in the
agreement between Glen Abbey and Southern Utilities and, thus,
consented to the flowage easement into James Pond. In order to make
this determination the court examined the agreement between Glen
Abbey and Southern Utilities and its effect on contiguous property
owners.
Since Glen Abbey only owned a portion of James Pond, it was
essential LTIF joined in the agreement between Glen Abbey and
Southern Utilities. LTIF also had to obtain flowage easements from all
the other owners of James Pond who were not involved in the
LTIF/Glen Abbey sales agreement. These two requirements were
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accomplished, and the parties recorded the joinder agreement and
flowage easements in the public records. The joinder agreement
between LTIF and Glen Abbey explicitly acknowledged the pond's
designated use as storage for the reclaimed water "on and/or
adjacent" to the property subject to the agreement.
VLX contended Glen Abbey should have obtained a separate
flowage easement from LTIF. The court disagreed, finding the
joinder agreement clearly illustrated that LTIF consented to the
flowage easement across the entire pond. The court stated, "[i]t is
simply too fanciful to imagine that [LTIF] intended that water be
placed into the pond yet not flow beyond the golf course's invisible
boundary." The court also emphasized that if LTIF intended to sell a
flowage easement over its adjacent portion of the pond, it would have
included this in the joinder agreement with Glen Abbey. VLX further
argued that since Glen Abbey did not own portions of the property
included in the Delivery Agreement between itself and Southern
Utilities, Glen Abbey did not have the right to grant an easement over
the additional property. The court agreed Glen Abbey could not grant
an easement over property it did not own, but stated, "Glen Abbey
could agree by contract to provide storage over unowned contiguous
lands if the owners of the contiguous lands agreed." Here the owners
of the contiguous lands consented to the agreement between Glen
Abbey and Southern Utilities and "by its terms the Delivery Agreement
contemplated that ponds contiguous to the golf course would be
utilized to provide storage for the water to be used in the irrigation."
In conclusion, the court held LTIF owned a sufficient interest in
the contiguous property to subject it to storage of reclaimed water.
LTIF's subsequent conveyance to VLX was subject to such previous
grant and as such VLX's inverse condemnation action must fail.
Lucia Padilla
IDAHO
United States v. Idaho, 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001) (affirming the Snake
River Basin Adjudication District Court's summary judgment denying
the United States an implied reserved water right within the Deer Flat
National Wildlife Refuge).
In 1937, the United States created the Deer Flat Migratory
Waterfowl Refuge and the Snake River Migratory Waterfowl Refuge
along the Snake River in Idaho. Contained within both refuges were
several islands along the Snake River that provided habitat for native
birds. In 1963, the United States consolidated the two refuges into the
Snake River National Wildlife Refuge. In 1992, the United States filed
claims for reserved water rights. Amended claims followed in 1994
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and 1997. The state of Idaho ("Idaho") and other parties objected.
The Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court ("SRBA") granted
Idaho's motion for summary judgment and denied the United States
had reserved water rights. The United States appealed to the Supreme
Court of Idaho.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho listed three elements
necessary to determine the existence of a federal reserved water right:
(1) whether there had been a reservation of land; (2) whether the acts
reserving the land contained an express reservation of water; and (3) if
not, whether the acts implied a reservation of water. As neither party
disputed the existence of the land reservation or the absence of an
express water reservation, the Idaho Supreme Court' only addressed
the question of whether an implied reservation of water existed.
An implied reservation of water existed if the court could infer that
the executive body intended to reserve unappropriated waters. This
court would infer this intent if water was necessary for the primary
purposes of the reservation and if the lack of water would entirely
defeat the purposes of the reservation. If water was necessary only for
a secondary purpose, the United States would have to reserve water in
the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
The court then determined the primary purpose of the refuge.
Since the reservation did not specify the primary purpose, the court
considered relevant acts, enabling legislation and surrounding history
to make this determination. The relevant act was the Migratory Bird
Conservation Act ("Act"); the purpose of reserving the lands was to
further effectuate the goals of the Act. The Act protected threatened
and endangered birds by establishing sanctuaries and prohibiting
hunting within them. Ultimately, the Act benefited farmers by
promoting an increase in the populations of the birds that prey on
insects harmful to the crops. The court concluded the primary
purpose of the Act was to prohibit hunting on reserved lands, and that
the United States had not proven water was necessary for this purpose.
Next, the court looked to the history of the reservations. At the
time of the reservations, the lands and surrounding waters were part of
reclamation projects. The projects' dams created reservoirs and the
resulting islands that became the bird sanctuaries. Therefore, these
reclamation uses had priority over the lands so reserved. Since the
reservations were secondary to reclamation, the court concluded that
implied water reservations could not exist due to the direct conflict
with the reclamation use of providing irrigation water to local farmers.
Finally, the court ruled that an implied water reservation was
incompatible with the original intent of the reservation. The refuges
protected insectivorous birds from extinction, which is inconsistent
with the claim that the reservations contained implied water
reservations at the expense of the farmers for whom the birds provided
benefit. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Idaho by affirming the
district court's decision and denying the United States' claim to a
reserved water right.
Brian L. Martin
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INDIANA
Change to Established Water Level of Lake of the Woods v. Ralston,
748 N.E.2d 396 (hid. 2001) (interpreting Indiana Code § 14-26-8 as
affording appellant procedural due process and instructing the trial
court to (1) vacate its order dismissing appellant's petition; (2) allow
all interested parties reasonable time to present written evidence; and
(3) schedule a hearing, if appellant so requested it, to voice any
objections).
Appellants are the members of Lake of the Woods Property
Owners Association ("Association"). They own real property abutting
or within Lake of the Woods, a natural public freshwater lake in
Marshall County, Indiana. As a result of a settlement agreement in
1992, the court ordered the lake's water level to remain at 803.85'
mean sea level datum ("MSLD") from May 15 to September 15 and to
be drawn a foot from September 15 through May 15. In 1999, the
Association, under Indiana Code § 14-26-8 ("Code"), filed a petition
requesting a change in the lake's present water level. The petition
alleged significant changes had occurred since the 1992 settlement,
which no longer justified the periodical lowering of the water level.
Various landowners and other individuals with agricultural
interests filed a remonstrance in opposition to the petition. The trial
court then appointed two government viewers and two citizen viewers
(collectively, "Viewers") to inspect the lake and adjoining property and
prepare a report of their findings. The Viewers concluded that
maintaining a permanent water level of 803.85' MSLD would not only
injure farmers and other area landowners, but also would negatively
affect nearby roads. The Viewers could not determine if maintaining
the higher water level throughout the year would have positive
ecological benefits because they lacked adequate information. Based
on the Viewers' report, the trial court dismissed the petition. The
Association appealed arguing the trial court's procedure denied it due
process of law because it failed to provide an opportunity to present
written evidence in support of its petition, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, or voice any objections.
The issue in this case was whether the Association was entitled to
procedural due process under Indiana Code § 14-26-8 prior to the trial
court's dismissal of the petition. The court of appeals held the Code
did not explicitly deprive the Association of its due process right, and
ordered the trial court to vacate its order dismissing the Association's
petition, allow all interested parties reasonable time to present written
evidence, and schedule a hearing, if the Association so requested it,
where it could voice its objections to the viewers.
The law requires a plaintiff claiming a violation of due process to
show (1) there was a state action, i.e., government involvement in the
alleged deprivation; and (2) the action caused the deprivation of a
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protected interest. The Association showed there was "state action"
insofar as the trial court appointed two government representatives to
act as viewers. In addition, the riparian Association members had a
"protected interest" arising from their ownership of land; the Code
afforded riparian owners the statutory right to file a petition to
stabilize, raise, or establish and maintain the level of the lake by
various means. The court concluded such a recognized protected
right could not be impinged upon absent procedural due process.
After establishing that the Association had shown a violation of due
process, the court then examined the Code's general procedure to
determine if it caused the alleged deprivation. The court outlined the
procedure as follows: after the landowners filed their petition, the
clerk was to schedule a hearing and designate the government and
citizen viewers; the trial court would dismiss the petition if defective. If
not, the viewers were to inspect the project and file a final written
report. If the viewers found the proposed work was not practicable
and of public need, the trial court would dismiss the petition.
Otherwise, the county surveyor would draft the requisite plans and
submit a preliminary report. Before submitting the final report, the
surveyor was to hear all objections at a hearing scheduled by the trial
court.
Based on its examination of the Code, the court concluded the
procedure did not explicitly deprive the Association of its due process
right to present written evidence or to have a hearing on its petition.
However, the question remained as to what process was due to the
Association. To establish the dictates of due process, the court needed
to balance three factors: (1) the private interest that would be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneously depriving an interest
through the procedures used, along with the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.
Applying the balancing test to the facts before it, the court made
the following findings. First, the Association members had an interest
in the court's determination concerning the petition, changing the
water level could potentially benefit their real property. Second,
because the Code's procedure provided for reliance upon the findings
of viewers who may or may not have an expertise in water level matters,
there was great risk of arriving at an erroneous decision, which could
cause the deprivation of the Association's property interests. In fact,
the trial court's denial of the petition did deprive the Association of
such interests, as the court had relied solely on the Viewers' findings.
Third, the government's interest was to protect the riparian owner's
rights, as well as the public's right, to use the lake. The government
also had an interest to insure the state exercised its public trust duty to
maintain all public freshwater lakes.
The court concluded that the final report was incomplete in that it
lacked information necessary to establish the ecological benefits of
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maintaining a higher water level year-around. The court reasoned that
a more appropriate procedure would be one that insured the viewers
were well informed by allowing all concerned parties to submit written
evidence before the viewers' investigation. This would satisfy the
government's interests and increase the accuracy of the report. Thus,
the court proposed additional procedural safeguards giving petitioners
the opportunity to request a hearing and object to the report before its
dismissal. After such a hearing, the viewers could either request that
the trial court dismiss the petition, or simply file an amended petition.
Because the Association did not have the opportunity to present
evidence in support of its petition, cross-examine adverse witnesses,
nor voice its objections before the dismissal of its petition, the
appellate court remanded with instructions that the trial court vacate
its order of dismissal, allow reasonable time to provide written
evidence, and schedule a hearing if the Association desired to voice
any objections.
Gloria M. Soto
MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi Sierra Club, Inc. v. Mississippi Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No.
1999-SA-02035-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. Apr. 19, 2001)
(holding that a state agency, when approving a project, must make
adequate findings of fact and explain how it evaluated the competing
interests before it so as not to usurp courts of their power of review).
The Mississippi Sierra Club and Green Baggett ("Sierra Club")
filed this action in the Mississippi Supreme Court to appeal a decision
by the Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners ("Commission")
approving the Big Sunflower Maintenance Project.
The Big Sunflower Maintenance Project ("Project") was a
channeling project proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") to alleviate seasonal flooding in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta.
The project included the dredging of approximately 104.8 miles of
stream, as well as the clearing and snagging of an additional 28.3 miles
of the Big Sunflower River and several tributaries and bayous. The
project would render approximately 443 acres completely unfit for
current use. Further, the project would negatively impact both plant
and animal life. The project was expected to cost $62,485,000 and
take between seven and eight years to complete.
When the Corps presented the project to the Commission, the
Commission was also reviewing an environmentally friendly
alternative. This alternative was non-structural and included the
acquisition of flowage easements in combination with the traditional
excavation of critical reaches. Several government agencies endorsed
the alternative project, including the Environmental Protection
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Agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The Corps estimated this
alternative project would cost approximately $120 million while the
Sierra Club predicted a cost of $52.5 million.
The Commission chose the Big Sunflower project, stating, "(t)he
Corps evaluated the purchase of flowage easements and determined
that not only was this alternative cost prohibitive, but also the option
would not accomplish the purpose of the project." The Commission
did not provide any further reasoning to substantiate its decision
between the chosen and the proposed alternative.
In McGowan v. Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held that if an agency does not disclose the reason
upon which its decision is based, the courts would be usurped of their
power of review over questions of law. The court also noted that
among those questions of law were whether board action was arbitrary
and capricious and whether it was supported by substantial evidence.
Since the court was unable to determine if the Commission's
decision was arbitrary or capricious, it remanded the case to the
Commission for reconsideration and further fact finding and analysis.
Michael Barry

NEW YORK
Town of Bellmont v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 726
N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding the town of Bellmont
failed to prove administrative remedies futile or would have caused
irreparable harm).
The Town of Bellmont ("Town") brought this action after the
Department of Environmental Conservation ("Department") granted a
permit, along with certain conditions, to operate a dam located at the
northern end of Mountain View Lake. The Town took title to the dam
in 1962, and conducted drawdowns every year to lower the water level
of the lake. Recently, the dam fell into disrepair and the Town filed
for a permit to repair it in 1998. The Department issued a permit for
the repairs and renewed it several times until it expired on June 15,
1999. On August 24 of the same year, the Town applied for renewal of
the permit. The Department treated the application as a new
application and taking public concerns into consideration, issued a
new permit containing certain conditions on its use.
The conditions on the permit caused the Town to file the action
against the Department, asking the court to enjoin and prohibit any
such enforcement and to remove the conditions from the permit. The
Department filed a preanswer motion stating the Town had failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies by failing to seek an adjudicatory
hearing. The trial court granted the Department's motion and
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dismissed the action.
The court determined a petitioner must exhaust all administrative
remedies unless an agency's action is unconstitutional, wholly beyond
the scope of the agency's power, when relying on an administrative
remedy would prove futile, or when pursuing an administrative
remedy would cause irreparable harm. The court determined the
complaint raised no constitutional issue.
The court further
determined the permit and conditions were squarely within the
agency's power. Relying on the agency's granted power, the court
determined the agency may require conditions as necessary to protect
the population and the environment. Finally, the court agreed with
the trial court that administrative relief would not have been futile or
resulted in irreparable harm. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Lynne Stadjuhar
People v. Grucci, 729 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the state
lacked jurisdiction to regulate shellfish within privately owned lands).
New York Environmental Conservation Law section 13-0311 allows
the state to regulate public shellfish taking by requiring a permit to
take shellfish. Joseph J. Grucci ("Grucci") was caught catching clams
with a revoked clamming permit. Grucci sought to dismiss the taking
charge, arguing a permit was not required.
The violation occurred within the Town of Brookhaven. Through
private patents, Brookhaven had received underwater land rights. The
court questioned whether the state or the underlying owner had the
right to take shellfish on privately owned land. The court examined
the state's right to regulate an activity related to both the tidal waters
and the underlying land. Furthermore, the court examined the
relationships between shellfish taking on both the navigable water and
the underlying land. The court ruled a state could control and
regulate an activity closely related to the use of public waters.
However, the underlying land ownership determined the private or
public character of the activity.
The court maintained that clams, by nature, live in the land, and
thus the landowner has more than nominal control over them. As a
result, the court found shellfish taking more closely related to the
underlying land. Thus, the court held that since the state had invested
Brookhaven with private ownership of the tidal lands, Grucci was
exempted from state regulation and control. The state did not own
the shellfish under section 13-0311 and the court dismissed the
charges against Grucci.
Jon Hyman
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NEVADA
Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800 (Nev. 2001) (denying petitioners'
request for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and a writ of
prohibition holding that the federal court, not the state supreme
court, is the proper forum for the redress petitioners seek).
Petitioners, Mineral County and the Walker Lake Working Group,
("Mineral County"), filed an original proceeding against Respondents,
the state of Nevada, the Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources, and the State Engineer ("Nevada").
Mineral County
claimed Nevada had abrogated their public trust obligations and
petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus
compelling Nevada to protect and maintain state waters for the benefit
of the public. Mineral County also asked the court to issue a writ of
prohibition preventing Nevada from granting additional water rights,
which could possibly decrease the availability of water in the lake.
Nevada argued Mineral County should have filed their claim before
the federal court because "substantially similar" litigation involving
almost the same parties was already pending before that court. Nevada
asserted the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over water
disputes concerning the Walker River system, as set forth in the
language of the court's 1986 decree, which provided, in part: "This
decree shall be deemed to determine all of the rights of the parties to
this suit ...The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose
of changing the duty of water or for correcting or modifying this
decree; also for regulatory purposes." In response, Mineral County
asserted even if the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction, it did only
over private appropriators, not the state-as in the present case.
Mineral County further argued the federal court's decree had not
covered the applicability of the public trust doctrine-an issue it was
"ill-suited" to address. Mineral County contended, therefore, the
Nevada Supreme Court should consider their request for relief and
issue the writs.
The issue was whether Petitioners had sought the proper forum
wherein relief could be granted. In other words, should the Nevada
Supreme Court override the district court's jurisdiction to interpret
previously adjudicated water rights involving the Walker River system?
After considering the applicable law, the court concluded it would be
illogical and counterproductive if it were to override the federal
court's exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own decisions
by attempting to construe what the federal court had meant in its
judgment in the first place. The court added that because the decree
involved the allocation of interstate waters between California and
Nevada, the federal court had an interest in retaining exclusive
jurisdiction to ensure consistency in the application of its ruling.
The court held as follows. First, actions seeking the allocation of
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water involve the disposition of property. Moreover, the first court
(federal or state), that assumes jurisdiction over real property, will be
the one to have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over that
property. Thus, because Nevada law treats water rights as real
property, and the federal decree court was the first to adjudicate the
subject water rights in 1936, the Nevada Supreme Court held the
federal decree court had "exclusive" jurisdiction. The federal decree
court also had "continuing" jurisdiction because a lawsuit covering
substantially the same issues and parties as the ones in the present case
was currently pending before it. Next, although the Nevada Supreme
Court recognizes it has original jurisdiction to issue the writ of
mandamus, such relief will only be available when the action to be
compelled is one that the law already requires. However, if a
petitioner shows that writ relief is urgent and necessary, the court may,
nevertheless, grant the same.
A writ of prohibition is "the
counterpart" of the writ of mandate. It does not correct any errors,
but its purpose is to prevent courts from over-extending the limits of
their judicial power. In short, both writs are a form of extraordinary
remedy that will not be issued if petitioner has at his disposal a "plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The
court is not obligated to issue such writs because they are purely
discretionary.
Because
Petitioners
failed
to
demonstrate
extenuating
circumstances existed to warrant the issuance of the writs, and because
they had a more appropriate forum in which to seek remedy-the
federal decree court-the Nevada Supreme Court denied Mineral
County's request for relief.
Gloria M. Soto
United States v. State Eng'r, 27 P.3d 51 (Nev. 2001) (holding that
judicial review was warranted when the State Engineer went beyond
the "plain meaning" of a statute when he denied stockwater permits to
the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management).
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") filed nine stockwater
permit applications for public lands in Douglas County, Nevada. The
State Engineer for the state of Nevada denied these applications on
the grounds that the BLM was not a qualified applicant under the
terms of a Nevada statute. Section 533.503 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes regulates state water appropriation permits that allow livestock
watering on public lands. The BLM petitioned the Ninth Judicial
District Court, Douglas County, Nevada, for judicial review of the nine
denied permit applications. The court denied judicial review, and the
BLM then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The supreme court examined the scope and constitutionality of
the statute at issue. Section 533.503 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
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provides "the state engineer shall not issue a permit to appropriate
water for the purpose of watering livestock on public lands unless the
applicant for the permit is legally entitled to place the livestock on the
public lands for which the permit is sought."
Argument centered over the meaning of "legally entitled." The
BLM contended that the plain language of the statute authorizes the
State Engineer to issue stockwater permits to the United States as
landowner of public lands. The BLM argued the plain meaning of
"legally entitled" meant that either the landowner, or a person with the
landowner's permission to use the land, was legally entitled to place
livestock on the land.
The State Engineer contended that "legally entitled to place
livestock on the land for which the permit is sought" excluded the
United States because it does not possess either a grazing permit or
lease through the BLM. The State Engineer argued that the United
States, as owner of public land, must issue itself a BLM permit to place
livestock on its land.
The standard of review applied in cases of statutory construction is
de novo. Because statute authorized the State Engineer to administer
the stockwater permits, the court gave statutory interpretations of that
office "great deference." Though the decision of the State Engineer
was not controlling, it was presumed correct and the burden or
proving error fell on the challenging party, The BLM.
In evaluating these conflicting interpretations, the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that for a statute to be considered ambiguous it must
be capable of two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations.
However, the State Engineer's interpretation, that the United States,
the owner of public land must issue itself a permit or lease to graze
livestock upon the land that it owns was an "illogical and unreasonable
construction of statutory language." With this interpretation the State
Engineer exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain meaning of the
statute. On those grounds, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the
order of the district court and remanded the matter with directions to
grant the petition forjudicial review.
ErikaDelaney-Lew

OHIO
City of Hudson v. County of Sununit, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2601
(Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 2001) (holding that a water system does not
pass by operation of law at the merger of townships, and a county may
only sell a water system to the municipality that the water system
services).
Subsequent to the creation of Hudson Township, developers
created and conveyed a water system to Summit County ("County") for

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

the public good, Hudson Township and the Village of Hudson merged
creating the City of Hudson ("Hudson"). Hudson, five years later,
sought declaratory relief seeking control over the water system. A few
months later, the County inquired about possible buyers of the water
system. The City of Akron ("Akron") responded, but Hudson did not.
Soon after, Hudson moved for an emergency restraining order and a
preliminary injunction preventing the sale of the water system they
believed passed by the operation of law to them at the creation of
Hudson. The trial court, the Summit County Common Pleas Court,
determined the water system did not pass to Hudson by the operation
of law, and the County was free to sell the water system.
This court addressed whether a water system held in public trust in
a township is incorporated into a city at its creation, and whether a
county may sell a water system in one municipality to another
municipality. The Ohio Constitution art. XVII, § 4 provides that any
municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or
without its corporate limits, any public utility. Further, the Ohio
Revised Code § 6103.22 provides that a water works system may be
acquired by mutual agreement or conveyance. Hudson allowed the
County to operate the water system for five years without objection.
Moreover, the language of the Ohio Constitution suggests the water
system may be acquired only by an affirmative act. Hudson could have
obtained control over the water system by eminent domain. The
Revised Code suggests Hudson also could have gained control through
an agreement with the County or through a conveyance. No language
suggested the water system passed by the operation of law. Thus, the
court held the water system remained in the County's control.
Regarding the second issue, the court again looked to the Ohio
Revised Code. Sections 6103.21 and 6103.22 are interrelated. The
former addresses the contractual and payment responsibilities, as well
as the party's rights. The latter relates to the transfer of a completed
water system. The court found a county may only transfer ownership
to the municipality the water facility serves. Therefore, the County
could only transfer the water system to Hudson, but remained in
control of the water system because no agreement or affirmative act
transferred the water system from the County to Hudson.
Staci A. McComb

PENNSYLVANIA
Segal v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 771 A.2d 90 (Pa. Conunw.Ct. 2001)
(holding the filling of wetlands and waters of the United States did not
constitute a dimensional variance, and the filling of wetlands based on
a self-imposed hardship was not authorized).
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Allen and Gary Segal ("Segals") appealed the denial by the Zoning
Hearing Board of Buckingham Township ("Board") of two of their
variance requests for their property. The Court of Common Pleas of
Bucks County ("Common Pleas Court") affirmed the Board's decision,
as did this court. The Segals owned property in an AG-1 Agricultural
District, where they operated a life care facility. The property
contained 15.5 acres of wetlands. The Segals wished to expand their
life care facility, and build two roads, one that connected the existing
building to the expansion and another that provided access to the
expansion without crossing the existing parking lots. Both proposed
roads crossed the wetlands.
A Buckingham Township Zoning
Ordinance prohibits the filling of wetlands and the waters of
Pennsylvania.
The Board heard the Segals' requests on March 15, 1995. An
engineer with project design experience testified on behalf of the
Segals. He stressed the importance of the road for safety reasons, but
admitted the expansion would occur even without the new road. The
Board granted the request for the road connecting the expansion to
the existing building thus allowing the Segals to fill 0.02 acres of
wetlands, but denied the request for the other road that would cross
the wetlands because the construction of the second road did not
affect the project.
On appeal, the Segals contended that the fact that the
construction of the new buildings would occur without the new road
was irrelevant. They asserted a dimensional variance is different from
a use variance, and the physical condition of their land was unique and
resulted in difficulties that could not be remedied without expending
substantial money to construct a bridge to span the wetlands. Since
the court determined the variance was not dimensional, the Segals
needed to meet the five criteria laid out in 53 P.A. § 910.2 in order to
obtain a variance. The third criterion required that the applicant not
create unnecessary hardship. Unnecessary hardship is established if
the applicant proves either the physical characteristics of the property
are such that the property cannot be used for any permitted purpose
or only for a permitted purpose at prohibitive expense; or the
characteristics of the property are such that it would have no value or
only distress value for any use approved by the zoning ordinance.
Here, the Segals would continue to use the property in the same
permitted manner. Therefore, the Board determined the Segals failed
to prove unnecessary hardship and further, the hardship was selfimposed.
The court found substantial evidence supported the
decision of the Board, and therefore the Board had not abused its
discretion or commited an error of law.
Staci A. McComb
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RHODE ISLAND
Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001)
(holding that the government could obtain a prescriptive easement or
title over privately-held property by establishing all statutory
requirements of adverse possession, and a property owner's failure to
protest hostile use is acquiescence, not permission).
Since 1860, Pascoag Reservoir and Dam, LLC ("Pascoag"), or its
predecessors in title owned Echo Lake, an artificial body of water in
Glocester, Rhode Island. In 1964, the Department of Environmental
Management ("State") acquired waterfront property on Echo Lake. In
1965, the State constructed a boat ramp and erected signs purporting
to regulate public use of the lot, the ramp and the lake. The State
maintained and operated the property for thirty-two years, and allowed
public access to Echo Lake for boating, fishing and other recreational
activities. In 1997, Pascoag posted a "no trespassing" sign on the
property. Then, on July 30, 1997, Pascoag notified the State in writing
that it withdrew any express or implied permission to use the reservoir.
Further, Pascoag advised the State that it withdrew its permission for
public access to Echo Lake via the boat ramp. Prior to these actions,
Pascoag had not objected to public use of the lake.
As a result, the State brought suit, which alleged violation of the
Freshwater Wetlands Act, claimed a prescriptive easement for public
recreational use of the lake, and claimed adverse possession of the lake
bottom supporting the boat ramp. The State also sought an injunction
against further action by Pascoag. Pascoag filed a counterclaim,
alleging inverse condemnation, trespass, and violations of substantive
due process rights held under state and federal constitutions. The
Rhode Island Superior Court voluntarily dismissed Pascoag's inverse
condemnation claim without prejudice. Further, at the request of the
State and over Pascoag's objection, the court severed allegations
relating to violation of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the case.
Finally, the court found that construction of the ramp and use of Echo
Lake all took place within full view of Pascoag, which acquiesced to
these uses from 1964 to 1997. The State's use of the lake was
permissive, rather than adverse, thus preventing creation of a
prescriptive easement.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The
Court found no evidence to support the lower court's finding that the
State's use of Echo Lake was permissive. The State never sought or
received permission to build or maintain the boat ramp, nor to
regulate public use of the lake. Both acts were hostile to Pascoag's
possessory interests; thus the State's use of Echo Lake was adverse, not
permissive. This adverse use continued for thirty-two years, far beyond
the ten-year statutory period required for adverse possession and
prescriptive easement. Thus, the State acquired a portion of the lake
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bottom by adverse possession, and a prescriptive easement for public
access to Echo Lake via the boat ramp. In addition, Pascoag failed to
assert an inverse condemnation claim within the six-year statute of
limitations, which barred any consideration of whether the State's
actions constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property.
Alan Curtis

TEXAS
Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Conm'n, 52
S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the trial court erred in
dismissing suit for want ofjurisdiction for injuries to property resulting
from failure of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
to carry out its statutory duties).
A number of wells that drew water from the Gulf Coast Aquifer
tested positive for benzene at levels that exceeded the Environmental
Protection Agency's fixed safe level. As a result, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development refused to provide new mortgage
insurance to a subdivision in which Larry Koch, Inc. ("Koch") owned
property.
Koch filed suit against the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission ("TNRCC") for violations of statutory duties
imposed on TNRCC by the Texas Health and Safety Code and the
Texas Water Code ("TWC"). Koch alleged failure of the TNRCC to
publish an annual registry identifying sites contaminated by hazardous
substances, failure to issue notices to persons suspected of
contamination of a site and failure to perform duties in a reasonable
time. The trial court dismissed all of Koch's causes of action without
stating grounds on which it made its decision. Koch appealed.
The Texas Court of Appeals stated sovereign immunity barred
Koch's actions unless it came within the class of cases of which the
legislature had consented to suit. A person affected by inaction of the
Commission is authorized to file petition to compel the commission to
show cause why it should not be directed to take immediate action.
The court stated the legislative intent and purpose of this statute
clearly waives immunity to suit brought by persons adversely affected
by failure of TNRCC to perform duties. The court also stated the
statute established a remedy for such suits by empowering the courts of
Travis County to issue orders compelling TNRCC to show cause why it
should not be directed to take immediate action to perform a required
duty. Koch's allegations, according to the court, brought its actions
within this class, and therefore sovereign immunity did not deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction.
TNRCC asserted that the administrative process of considering
Koch's petition requesting the agency list the contaminated area on
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the state registry was not complete, therefore the court lacked
jurisdiction pursuant to the exhaustion rule. The exhaustion rule
deprives a court of jurisdiction if a plaintiff has not pursued all
available remedies in the administrative process. The court dismissed
the doctrine and stated Koch's only remedy for TNRCC's violation of
Texas statute existed in not in administrative but in judicial
proceedings. The court held the exhaustion rule did not preclude
jurisdiction.
TNRCC's final attempt to support lack of subject matter
jurisdiction rested upon the mootness doctrine. It alleged Koch's
petition, asking the court to order TNRCC to consider listing the
contaminated area on the state registry, was moot because TNRCC was
considering Koch's request. The court explained the mootness
doctrine prohibits a court form exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy no longer in existence, and stated Koch's petition alleged
an ongoing controversy in that TNRCC had not made a decision on
the issue in a timely manner. The court held mootness did not
deprive the trial court ofjurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court held the trial court erred in dismissing
Koch's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, it reversed
the decision of the trial court and remanded the action.
Rachel Sobrero
Mendez v. San Benito/Cameron County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 45
S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that sovereign immunity denies
citizens standing in a case of flood damage caused by a defective
drainage ditch).
Mendez and several other residents (collectively, "Residents") of
the La Palma subdivision brought this action against Cameron County
Drainage District and San Benito (collectively, "Drainage District")
seeking damages resulting from an ineffective drainage ditch.
On April 5, 1991, an extremely heavy rain fell in San Benito and
flooded the La Palma subdivision.
The flooding affected
approximately 700 individuals.
The Residents claimed that the
occurrence of rising water was due to the negligent conduct of the City
of San Benito and Cameron County Drainage District by the design,
placement and maintenance of a drainage ditch. Pursuant to the
Texas Water Code, the Residents claimed that the City of San Benito
and Cameron County Drainage District altered the natural water flow
and diverted impounded surface waters near their homes and
properties. The Residents further asserted that the Drainage District
was negligent in the maintenance and cleaning of its drainage ditches
and other permanent structures. The Drainage District denied the
Residents' allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses
including sovereign immunity.
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Texas law provides that a person whose property is injured by an
overflow of water caused by an unlawful diversion or impounding has
remedies at law and in equity and may recover damages occasioned by
the overflow. Texas law also provides that government units are
generally immune from tort liability except where the legislature has
specifically waived that immunity. In order to prevail against a
government entity, an action must fit into one of the exceptions
provided or it fails as a matter of law.
The Texas Court of Appeals held that because the Residents did
not meet an exception to the defense of sovereign immunity, the
Drainage District was immune from liability as a matter of law.
MichaelBarry

Raburn v. KJI Bluechip Inv., 50 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment due to inability to establish a duty of
reasonable care in the event of a flash flood that renders a highway
impassible).
While traveling Texas Highway 114, a flash flood swept John and
Janet Raburn's ("Raburns") vehicle off of the highway. At the moment
the vehicle was washed off of the road, it was on a stretch of highway
running through land owned by KJI and leased to Ed and Tom Strader
("Straders").
The Raburns' vehicle quickly became submerged.
Rescuers successfully freed Janet and one of her sons. Janet's other
son, Justin, was swept away in the current, and was later found dead.
In an action for personal injuries and wrongful death, the Raburns
alleged that as owners of the abutting property, KJI and the Straders
had a duty to put into place a system that would safely facilitate the
flow and drainage of water. KJI and the Straders moved for summary
judgment. They alleged the state of Texas had an exclusive, nondelegable duty to control storm and flood waters, and therefore they
were immune from the Raburn's negligence claim. The trial court
granted these motions and the Raburns appealed.
The applicable legal standard is such that if at least one element of
the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment. Evidence in summary judgment
motions must be reflected in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If the non-moving party can establish more than a
scintilla of probative evidence that there is a genuine issue of material
fact, then a no evidence summary judgment is improper. To establish
more than a scintilla of evidence, the nonmovant's evidence must
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different
conclusions. A scintilla is not established when evidence only creates a
mere surmise or suspicion of a fact.
On appeal, the Raburns alleged there was a general rule in Texas
that the owner and occupier of land abutting a highway has a duty to
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exercise reasonable care to avoid endangering those using the highway
as a means of travel, and is liable for any injuries resulting from such
negligence. This duty was limited to cases where a landowner
negligently released upon the highway an "agency that becomes
dangerous by its very nature once upon the highway." The Raburns
alleged KJI and the Straders diverted water into the culvert by putting
crushed concrete on the property, and thus owed a duty to those
traveling on that highway.
The court found this allegation to be conclusory, and not
supported by more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raised a
genuine issue of material fact. Even if the Raburns could put forth
sufficient evidence, the court held their claim would fail on alternate
grounds. The Texas Water Code states that one who diverts the
natural flow of surface waters may be liable for any property damage
suffered as a result of the diversion. The code does not include
liability for survival actions, personal injuries, or wrongful death.
Additionally, the state of Texas' responsibility over water covering a
stretch of highway pertained only to flood water. The court found the
trial court accurately held the water discussed here was floodwater,
rather than surface water, as a matter of law. This finding was largely
due to the admissions of the Raburns themselves, as well as on the
clear and unambiguous definitions of surface and floodwaters found
in Texas case law.
Since the state of Texas had an exclusive, non-delegable duty
pertaining to flood control, the trial court was correct in holding KJI
and the Straders did not have a duty of reasonable care pertaining to
the highway adjacent to their land. The Raburns failed to produce
more than a scintilla of evidence pursuant to one of the elements of a
negligence claim, and, thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to KJI and the Straders.
Michael Sheehan

VERMONT
Town of Groton v. Agency of Natural Res., 772 A.2d 1103 (Vt. 2001)
(affirming the Water Resource Board's denial of the Town of Groton's
stream alteration permit application).
In July of 1996, the Town of Groton ("Town") filed an application
with the Agency of Natural Resources ("ANR") to alter the Wells River
so that the Town could repair a dam. The ANR requested more
information, as the Town's application was not complete. Before the
Town provided the requested information, ice and high water
destroyed the dam. Since the dam's destruction, the Wells River below
the dam is considered one of the few high quality habitats for sculpin,
trout, and salmon.
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As a result of the river returning to its natural state and thereby
improving fish habitat, the ANR denied the Town's application to alter
the Wells River under Vermont statute 10 V.S.A. § 1023. This statute
mandates the denial of any application proposing a change in a
watercourse which would "significantly damage fish life." The Town
appealed this denial to the Water Resource Board ("Board"), who after
a de novo review, also determined that the proposed alteration would
"significantly damage fish life" and thus denied the application. The
Town appealed the Board's decision to the Caledonia Superior Court,
claiming that the Board erred in upholding the denial by refusing to
admit evidence regarding the use of the water for fire safety, and by
utilizing an improper river baseline which resulted in a determination
of significant fish damage. The court affirmed the Board's decision.
The town appealed to the Supreme Court of Vermont, renewing the
aforementioned arguments.
The supreme court reviewed this appeal of the Board's decision
under criteria set forth in their decisions of In re Town of Sherburneand
In re Wal Mart Stores, Inc. Specifically, the supreme court asked if the
board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or contrary to the law as viewed
by a "reasonable person." It also questioned whether the board used
its wide discretion within legislative and agency policy in making its
findings and conclusions.
The supreme court denied the Town's first claim that the Board
erred by failing to consider fire safety as an element relating to the
general public interest and welfare. The supreme court disagreed,
stating that the Board was bound by statute and could not consider fire
safety evidence because it is outside the general public interest and
welfare factors identified in 10 V.S.A. § 1023. Next, the supreme court
denied the Town's second claim, which urged the supreme court to
review the Board's historical practice. The Town claimed the Board
erred in utilizing the condition of the river after the destruction of the
dam because the Board historically utilized the condition of the river
with the dam in place. However, the Board decided previous cases this
way because no evidence existed showing the condition of the river
prior to the dam. In this case, the supreme court determined the issue
was reversed. The Town did not have any reliable information as to
the river condition and the fish habitat while the dam was in place,
while the ANR had reliable information as to the river condition and
the fish habitat after the destruction of the dam. Therefore, the court
determined the Board followed its historical practices in refusing to
engage in speculation, and looked to the stream in its natural
condition as the baseline.
The supreme court concluded the Board acted consistently with its
previous decisions and that this decision was not arbitrary,
unreasonable or contrary to law.
William H. Fronczak
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WASHINGTON
Price v. Seattle, 24 P.3d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding city of
Seattle not liable for failing to prevent landslide that destroyed several
homes, because landslide was caused by natural conditions).
Landslides damaged the Burg and Heil-Hartnegel's ("Burg")
homes on Magnolia Bluff in Seattle, from an upper slope owned by the
city of Seattle ("City"), in February 1996. The bluff was made of dense
glacial till, which has been naturally eroding for thousands of years.
Studies performed by a consulting firm concluded unprecedented
rainfall built up the water pressure in the till cliff to a critical level,
triggering the slides. The report recommended that the City upgrade
the falling bluff and install groundwater pumps. The City installed
some pumps in November 1996, but more were needed to prevent
danger. The City posted orders on several houses on Perkins Lane
warning of imminent danger and requiring the residents to vacate.
After a season of heavy rain and snow, all of the residents' homes were
eventually destroyed in 1997 and rendered uninhabitable. The Burgs
brought suit against the City, alleging negligence, inverse
condemnation and trespass. The trial court held the action failed for
lack of a duty owed to the Burgs.
The Burg's negligence theory was based on the idea that the City
owed a duty to take reasonable measures to stabilize the slope and that
an alteration on the City's property caused the bluff to become
unnaturally vulnerable to the natural forces at work. This court held
that the City, as possessor of land, owed no duty to the Burgs to take
measures to stabilize the slope above Perkins Lane. They also held
that this conclusion was consistent with the surface water doctrine,
invoked by the Burgs as an alternate theory of liability, where a
landowner is liable for damage caused by errant surface water flows
only where the landowner has engaged in activities that alter the flow.
The court's holding stems from a previous case, Albin v. National
Bank of Commerce where a tree killed a motorist during a windstorm and
the bank was not held liable because the injury stemmed from a
natural condition. This court reasoned that under Albin, to establish a
duty owed by a landowner to prevent harm to others outside the land,
it was not enough to establish that the landowner had actual or
constructive notice of a dangerous natural condition, but must also
have notice of an alteration to the land that makes it more dangerous
than if it had remained in its natural condition. The bank in Albin was
not aware of the heightened risk of the logging operations on its land.
In the present case, the Burgs needed to show that an alteration on the
City's property caused the bluff to become unnaturally vulnerable to
the natural forces. The City's landscaping was not a sufficient
alteration, because the land remained in a natural state.
The inverse condemnation claim was based on the theory that the
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City took the Burg's property by artificially channeling water from its
own property onto the bluff and thereby undermining its stability.
This court held that this claim failed for the same reasons the
negligence claim failed, lack of evidence that the City artificially
channeled water onto the bluff.
Finally, the Burgs argued the City had trespassed on their property
because the City knew that a landslide was a substantially certain
consequence of its failure to take preventive measures. The court did
not accept the Burg's argument because they failed to show authority,
which stated that an "act," as used in defining the elements of trespass,
means a failure to act, and the Burg's negligence and trespass claims
were therefore the same.
ShandraDobrovolny

WISCONSIN
Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., 633
N.W.2d 720 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the Department of
Natural Resources has the authority to regulate off-site manure
spreading).
Maple Leaf Farms, Inc, ("Maple Leaf") appealed an order
upholding the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") authority
to regulate Maple Leafs spreading of manure. Maple Leaf is the
largest producer and processor of ducks in the state of Wisconsin. The
Maple Leaf duck facilities created a significant amount of manure
through production. Maple Leaf routinely applied a portion of this
manure to the fields located on company property and sold the
Maple Leaf
remaining manure to area farmers for fertilizer.
transported and applied the manure to the farmers' fields. According
to expert testimony at the administrative hearing, the spreading of
manure on fields resulted in the release of pollutants into both surface
and groundwater. The DNR issued wastewater permits to Maple Leaf
requiring them to maintain runoff control structures and to
implement procedures for the storage and disposal of animal wastes.
Under the Wisconsin Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permit program, the DNR asserted that they had the authority to
regulate spreading of manure that took place on property that was not
owned by Maple Leaf ("off-site"). DNR also asserted that they could
condition the issuance of permits on compliance with groundwater
protection standards. Maple Leaf claimed that the DNR had no
authority to regulate manure spreading off-site because the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") does not regulate off-site manure spreading. The
CWA prohibits the "discharge" of any pollutant by any person into
navigable waters from any point source, but it does not regulate
manure spreading once the manure leaves the property where it was

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

generated. However, the CWA authorizes states to implement their
own permit programs as long as the state programs impose standards
at least as stringent as those of the federal program. The Wisconsin
program, unlike the CWA, includes groundwater as a subject to
regulatory protection and allows the DNR to establish more stringent
effluent limitations if necessary to meet water quality needs.
The DNR asserted that their authority to regulate the off-site
spreading came from section 283.001 of the Wisconsin Statutes and
condition the issuance of permits under section 283.310 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin found that
section 283.001 of the Wisconsin Statutes clearly and unambiguously
empowered the DNR to regulate where groundwater may be affected
by the discharge of pollutants. Additionally, the court found that even
though off-site land was used to dispose of waste from the facility, this
disposal was considered a "discharge" from the facility and could be
regulated by the DNR under section 243.140 of the Wisconsin
Administrative Code. The court reasoned that although there was no
distinction made in the Wisconsin statutes or code regarding on-site
versus off-site disposal, the purpose behind the legislation was
protection of the waters and to prevent the discharge of pollutants into
the waters of the state.
Colleen M. Cooley

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
ARAPAHOE DISTRICT COURT
APPLICATIONS OF THOMAS H. BRADBURY, ET AL. FOR A

DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW DESIGNATED GROUND

WATER PURSUANT TO CRS § 37-90-107(7). Case No. 2001CV1652
(Arapahoe District Court,June 27, 2001). Applicant: Thomas H.
Bradbury, et al. (Atty. Hill and Robbins, P.C.)
1. Applications
On October 27, 1998, Thomas H. Bradbury, et al. ("Applicant")
submitted forty applications to the Colorado Groundwater
Commission ("Commission") to appropriate all the Denver Basin
groundwater underlying approximately 19,650 acres within the KiowaBijou designated groundwater basin. These applications sought the
maximum amount of groundwater from the Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers underlying fourteen separate parcels of
land within Adams and Arapahoe counties. The first application,
associated with a land area of 7553 acres within Adams County, sought
the maximum amount of Laramie-Fox Hills groundwater, which is
approximately 158,600 acre-feet.
The remaining thirty-nine
applications sought, in various combinations, the maximum amount of
Denver, Arapahoe and Laramie-Fox Hills groundwater underlying
thirteen separate parcels of land, and consisting of approximately
12,097 acres within Arapahoe county.
The total quantity of
groundwater underlying the thirteen parcels was calculated to be
547,100 acre-feet. The first application was published pursuant to
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-90-107(7) and 37-90-112 on November 4 and
November 11, 1999, after the Commission Staff gave the application
favorable consideration. However, due to complications and the
inability of the Commission staff to give favorable consideration, the
remaining applications were not published until March 30, and April
6, 2000.
2. Opposition
The North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Management District
("District") objected to the first application on November 5, 1999.
The District asserted seven claims against this application. These
claims were: (1) the subject matter of the application was within the
District boundaries and was in violation of the District rules and
regulations; (2) the applications, notice, and procedure of the
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commission staff were improper and not in conformity with the
statutes, rules and regulations of the District; (3) granting these
applications would adversely affect the right of the appropriators,
ground water users and taxpayers within the District; (4) the
Applicant's claim of ownership and control of groundwater underlying
the property was specifically denied and any such claim was contrary to
state law and the state constitution; (5) the Applicant's claim of
beneficial use was speculative; (6) any attempt to determine the
maximum allowable annual amount of groundwater would be
speculative; and (7) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(7), and the designated
On April 30, 2000, after the
basin rules are unconstitutional.
publication on March 30, and April 6, 2000, the District objected to
the remaining thirty-nine applications associated with the thirteen
parcels of land within Arapahoe county asserting the same objections
as above.
3. Commission Actions
The Commission assigned these applications to its hearing officer
to conduct a hearing on the fourteen separate publications (forty
applications). On May 31, 2000, the hearing officer, upon agreement
from all the parties, consolidated all fourteen publications into one
case and then assigned case number 99GW15 (A-N consolidated).
Prior to the hearing, the Applicant filed a motion for summary
judgment on three issues: (1) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(7) is
constitutional; (2) the applications were properly filed with the
Commission and not with the District; and (3) the anti-speculation
doctrine did not apply to the Denver Basin aquifers within the
designated basins. The District also filed a pre-trial motion requesting
that the hearing officer strike the Commission staffs responses and
prohibit the Commission staff from participating in the hearing. On
December 4, 2000, the hearing officer granted the Applicant's first two
issues, stating that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(7) was constitutional,
and that the applications in this case were properly before the
Commission. The hearing officer denied the Applicant's third issue,
stating that the anti-speculation doctrine applies within the Denver
Basin aquifers in the designated groundwater basins, and that the facts
were still in dispute over whether these applications were speculative.
Finally, the hearing officer denied the District's motion to strike the
Commission staffs responses, and denied the request to prohibit the
Commission staff from participating in the hearing.
On January 16, 2001, a hearing was held over the only remaining
issue, whether these applications were speculative. On February 1,
2001, the hearing officer, after listening to testimony and reviewing all
the evidence, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
Initial Order of the Commission. The Initial Order stated that the
applications in this case were not speculative, and that the
determination of water rights may be issued.
On March 2, 2001, the District appealed the hearing officer's
initial decision to the Commission. On May 29, 2001, the Commission,
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after oral argument and review of the hearing officer's initial decision
at their regularly scheduled meeting on May 18, 2001, upheld the
hearing officer's initial decision, which constituted a final agency
action. In their Order, the Commission determined they do not have
authority to pass on the constitutionality of state statutes, that the
applications were properly before the Commission and not the
District, and that the applications in this case were not speculative.
4. District Court Proceedings
On June 27, 2001, the District filed a complaint and appeal of the
Commission's decision to Arapahoe District Court. In its complaint,
the District claimed that the Commission's decision was: (1) arbitrary
and capricious; (2) denied them of a statutory right; (3) was contrary
to the Colorado Constitution; (4) in excess of its statutory jurisdiction
and authority as against the jurisdiction and authority of the District;
(5) not in accordance with procedures, procedural limitations, and
due process as required by law; (6) based upon findings of fact that
were clearly erroneous on the record and unsupported by substantial
evidence when the record is considered as a whole; and (7) was
contrary to law.
On July 2, 2001, the Applicant filed a motion to dismiss in part,
stating that the Arapahoe District Court did not have jurisdiction over
a part of these water right applications because some of them were
located in Adams County. The basis of this motion was the provisions
of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-115(1) (a), which require the District to
make an appeal to the district court in the county where the water
rights or wells are located. On August 17, 2001, the Applicant filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to CRCP 12(b), or in the alternative, a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to CRCP 56 for the following
determinations: (1) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(7) is constitutional;
(2) the applicable law did not require determination of water right
applications to be submitted to the District prior to the Commission;
and (3) that determination of water right applications were not subject
to the anti-speculation doctrine.
On July 19, 2001, the Commission also filed a motion pursuant to
CRCP 12(b). The Commission's motion was based upon the fact that
the District was asking the court to review the record under the
Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, when Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90115 (1) (b) (III) requires that the district court conduct a de novo review.
On July 19, 2001, the Commission filed an alternative motion for a
more definite statement pursuant to CRCP 12(e). In this motion, the
Commission asked the court to require that the District provide
definiteness and particularity to the averments listed in the District's
complaint.
On July 27, 2001, the District filed a motion to strike the
Commission's motions and responses, and for a default judgment
against the Commission. The basis of the District's motion was that
the specific attorney general representing the Commission staff
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throughout the Commission's proceedings was now the Commission's
attorney in the action in district court.
On August 15, 2001, the Arapahoe District Court granted the
Applicant's motion to dismiss in part, stating that they had no
jurisdiction under § 37-90-115(1) (a) to review rights to designated
groundwater in Adams county. Also on August 15, 2001, the Arapahoe
District Court denied the District's motion to strike the Commission's
motions and responses, and denied both the Applicant's and
Commission's motions to dismiss. However, on August 15, 2001, the
Arapahoe District Court granted the Commission's motion for a more
definite statement. On August 16, 2001, the Arapahoe District Court
granted partial summary judgment to the issues requested by the
Applicant. The Arapahoe District Court found that Colo. Rev. Stat. §
37-90-107(7) is constitutional and that the legislature has plenary
authority to enact legislation for the management and control of
designated groundwater. Furthermore the Arapahoe District Court
ordered that the since Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(7) is constitutional,
the statute clearly indicates that the applications must be made to the
Commission, and that there is no statutory authority supporting the
claim that the applications first be submitted to the District. The
Arapahoe District Court also denied the Applicant's motion claiming
that the anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to determination of
water right applications within the designated groundwater basins.
Finally, the Arapahoe District Court ordered that the anti-speculation
doctrine applies to Denver Basin groundwater within the designated
groundwater basins.
On August 21, 2001, the District filed an amended compliant and
on September 10, 2001, the Commission filed its answer to the original
complaint and the amended complaint. Currently, motion has been
made to the Arapahoe District Court to vacate all aforementioned
orders because of lack of jurisdiction. This new motion is based upon
the reading of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-115, which states that all
designated groundwater issues shall be heard by the designated
groundwater judge as appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court, not
the Arapahoe District Courtjudge. The Arapahoe District Court is still
reviewing this motion as of the writing of this case summary.
William H. Fronczak
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION FOR UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHT

FROM THE LOWER DAWSON AQUIFER IN THE DENVER BASIN.

Case No.

98CW377 (Water Division 1, May 31, 2001). Applicant: City and
County of Denver (Atty. Michael D. Shimmin, Vranesh & Raisch, LLP).
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AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION FOR UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHT
FROM THE DENVER AQUIFER IN THE DENVER BASIN. Case No. 98CW378

(Water Division 1, May 31, 2001). Applicants: City and County of

Denver and Waste Management of Colorado, Inc. (Atty. Michael D.
Shimmin, Vranesh & Raisch, LLP).
AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION FOR UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHT
FROM THE LARAMIE-FOx HILLS AQUIFER IN THE DENVER BASIN. Case

No. 98CW379 (Water Division 1, May 31, 2001). Applicants: City and
County of Denver and Waste Management of Colorado, Inc. (Atty.
Michael D. Shimmin, Vranesh & Raisch, LLP).
AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION FOR UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHT
FROM THE UPPER AND LOWER ARAPAHOE AQUIFERS IN THE DENVER

BASIN. Case No. 98CW380 (Water Division 1, May 31, 2001).
Applicants: City and County of Denver and Waste Management of
Colorado, Inc. (Atty. Michael D. Shimmin, Vranesh & Raisch, LLP).
1. Applications
In September of 1998, the City and County of Denver ("Denver")
submitted four applications for underground water rights. The
applications covered the lower Dawson Aquifer in the Denver Basin
(98CW377), the Denver Aquifer in the Denver Basin (98CW378), the
Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifer in the Denver Basin (98CW379), and the
Upper and Lower Arapahoe Aquifers in the Denver Basin (98CW380).
In May 2001, Denver filed amendments to each of these applications.
The property concerned in this case consists of 1598.4 acres bounded
by East Yale Avenue to the north, East Quincy Avenue to the south,
and Gun Club Road to the west.
In the first application ("377"), Denver claimed all of the
groundwater in the Lower Dawson Aquifer beneath its property.
Denver estimated this annual amount at twenty-two acre-feet. Denver
requested a right to use the water for environmental remediation,
industrial, commercial, irrigation, livestock watering, recreational, fish
and wildlife, fire protection, or any other beneficial use. In addition,
Denver asked for the right to withdraw more than the estimated
twenty-two acre-feet per year pursuant to rule 8A of the Statewide
Rules, 2 C.C.R. 402-7, as well as the right to revise the estimated
amount based on better or revised data. Finally, Denver stated that it
did not seek to adjudicate a plan for augmentation, but only to
adjudicate its right to use the requested groundwater.
The second application, ("378"), addressed the water in the
Denver Aquifer beneath the same property. The application was
identical to 377 except that it estimated the annual average amount
available from the Denver Aquifer at 980 acre-feet. 378 also addressed
not nontributary water.
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The third application, ("379"), addressed the Laramie-Fox Hills
Aquifer, and proposed an estimated average annual amount available
at 360 acre-feet. In addition, 379 did not include the paragraph
stating that Denver would not submit a plan for augmentation.
The final application, ("380"), pertained to the Upper and Lower
Arapahoe Aquifers. Well Permit No. 37665-F had already been issued
for an annual amount of eighty acre-feet on the property. Denver
claimed an estimated average annual amount of 411 acre-feet for the
Upper Arapahoe, and 307 acre-feet for the Lower Arapahoe. These
amounts included the eighty acre-feet previously permitted under the
well permit. 380 was otherwise identical to 379, also pertaining to
nontributary water.
In May 2001, Denver submitted its amended applications. Denver
amended 377 to account for the fact that it had sold approximately
35.8 acres of its property to Waste Management of Colorado, Inc.
("WMC"). Since no water in the Lower Dawson Aquifer underlies the
property conveyed to WMC, Denver amended the application to
change the legal description of the property. In addition, Denver
amended the estimated average amount available from twenty-two
acre-feet to 30.5 acre-feet. Denver also asked for the right to revise this
estimated average annual amount without the necessity of
republishing or amending the application.
In the remaining three applications, the parcel conveyed did
overlie water in the subject aquifers. These applications all asked to
amend the original application to recognize Denver and WMC as coapplicants, and accordingly, requested separate decrees. In addition,
the three applications all amended the legal description of the
property to reflect the transfer of land. Amended application 378,
applying the State Engineer's Determination of Facts, divided the
property overlying the Denver Aquifer into two parts. Part One was
that portion closer than one mile to any point of contact between any
natural surface stream, including alluvium, and the Denver Aquifer.
Part Two contained the remaining land. The amended application
determined the average annual amount of water available from Part
One lands to be 61.0 acre-feet, and the average amount available from
Part Two lands as 751.5 acre-feet. WMC's property does not overlie
any area in Part One; accordingly, Denver claims the full 61.0 acrefeet. Of Part Two lands, Denver claims 727.7 acre-feet and WMC
claims 23.8 acre-feet.
Amended application 379 changed the average annual amount of
water available from the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer to 347.7 acre-feet
from 360 acre-feet. Of this amount, Denver claimed 340.0 acre-feet
and WMC claimed 7.7 acre-feet. Amended application 380, which
addressed both the Upper and Lower Arapahoe Aquifers, changed the
estimated average annual amount in the Upper Arapahoe Aquifer
from 411 acre-feet to 380.4 acre-feet. Of this amount, Denver claimed
370.9 acre-feet and WMC claimed 9.5 acre-feet. The amounts include
the eighty acre-feet already permitted in the aquifer. The amended
application also changed the estimated annual average amount of
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water available in the Lower Arapahoe from 307 acre-feet to 296.2
acre-feet. Of this amount, Denver claimed 290.1 acre-feet and WMC
claimed 6.1 acre-feet.
All of the amended applications include a provision that all
previously filed statements of opposition apply to the amended
applications without the necessity of further filing.
2. Opposition
Both the City of Aurora ("Aurora") and the United States filed
statements of opposition to the applications. In objecting to 377 and
378, Aurora stated that it is the owner and claimant of numerous water
rights in the Lower Dawson and Denver Aquifers and that Denver's
proposed use may adversely affect its rights. Aurora asked that Denver
be placed on strict proof concerning its ownership or permission for
its requested rights and for the subject property. Aurora next stated
that Denver must show compliance with applicable statutes and
regulations controlling the Denver Basin. Finally, Aurora asked that
no decree issue until Denver has an approved plan for augmentation.
Aurora's opposition to 379 and 380 was identical, for the Laramie-Fox
Hills and the Upper and Lower Arapahoe Aquifers, excluding the
provision requesting a plan for augmentation.
The United States submitted the same statement of opposition for
all four applications. The United States stated that the applications
requested a right to withdraw water underlying the Lowry Superfund
site. The United States objected because it has a lien on that property
and thus has an interest in how the water is used. The United States
asked that the applications not be granted unless the applicants
comply with terms and conditions necessary to protect the interests of
other water users, as well as the public. Finally, the United States
asked that the applicants be placed on strict proof of each element of
the claimed appropriations.
Rebekah King
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION INCLUDING

EXCHANGE, INJEFFERSON COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 01CW140

(Water Division 1, August 2001) (Original decree:July 19, 1977).
Applicant: Scott A. Wilson ("Wilson") (Atty. Douglas M. Sinor, Trout,
Witwer & Freeman, P.C.).
1. Application
Scott A. Wilson ("Wilson") seeks to construct eight wells on
individually owned ten acre lots, limited to household and domestic
use. Total consumptive use for the eight wells is estimated at 0.2512
acre-feet per year, not to exceed 0.02 c.f.s. Water rights through direct
exchange or releases from Cold Springs Reservoir ("Reservoir") will
provide the required volume for augmentation.
Although an approved subdivision plat is necessary to determine
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the exact location of the wells, the lots are located within the S1/2
SW1/4 of Section 25 and the NW1/4 of Section 36, T.4 S., R. 71 W.,
6th P.M., Jefferson County, Colorado ("Kerr Gulch Highlands"). The
Reservoir is located on Cold Springs Gulch upstream of the proposed
Kerr Gulch Highlands development in the SW1/4 SW1/4 of Section
14, T.4 S., R. 71 W., 6th P.M.,Jefferson County, Colorado.
Wilson's plan for augmentation was dependent on the Spring
Ranch Augmentation Plan decreed on July 19, 1977 ("Decree"). The
Decree states that 11.76 acre-feet of annual consumptive use credits
may be stored in the Reservoir or used by direct exchange to replace
consumptive depletions from proposed wells serving up to seventy-four
residences in the Spring Ranch Subdivision. The Decree specifically
allowed for the sale of water not required for augmentation of the
Spring Ranch Subdivision. Pursuant to the Decree, Wilson will acquire
a pro rata interest and the right to use a portion of the 11.76 acre-feet
of annual consumptive use credits determined associated with eight
shares in the Hodgson Ditch Operating Association.
Wilson seeks judicial confirmation that 0.2512 acre-feet of the
annual consumptive use credits, available by direct exchange or stored
in the Reservoir, can be utilized for replacement and augmentation
purposes to replace consumptive depletions of the eight wells as
described herein. Wilson also requested that the water court approve
his plan for augmentation, specifically determining that the source
and location for delivery of augmentation water are sufficient to
prevent material injury to vested water rights, and that the eight wells
can be operated without curtailment so long as out-of-priority stream
depletions are replaced.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Kiowa K Engwis
WATER COURT DIVISION 5
APPLICATION FOR A FINDING OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND TO
MAKE WATER RIGHT ABSOLUTE (IN PART), IN EAGLE COUNTY,

COLORADO. Case No. 01CW142 (Water Division 5, May 30, 2001)
(Original decree: May 30, 1995, Case No. 94CW288). Applicants: Bear
Gulch Homeowners Association, Inc., Richard E. Delia and Melinda
Delia, and Vail Associates, Inc. (Attys. LoriJ.M. Satterfield, Balcomb &
Green, P.C. and Glenn E. Porzak, Porzak Browning & Bushong,
L.L.P.)
1. Application
The Applicants are the successors in interest of George Jouflas, the
claimant in Case No. 94CW288. Bear Gulch Homeowners Association,
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Inc. ("Bear Gulch") owns an undivided 29.3 percent interest in Spring
No. 39 and Vail Associates, Inc. ("Vail Associates") owns an undivided
65.7 percent interest in the spring. Bear Gulch and Richard and
Melinda Delia are co-owners of the remaining 5 percent interest. A
tributary to the Eagle River and Colorado River forms spring No. 39.
The spring is located in SW1/4 NE1/4, Section 27, Township 4 South,
Range 83 West, 6th P.M. at a point 3,100 feet from the South Section
line, and 4,200 feet from the East Section line. The applicants seek a
finding of reasonable diligence regarding the beneficial use of Spring
No. 39.
A decree was issued on May 30, 1995 granting Applicants a
conditional water right for Spring No. 39 in the amount of 3.0 c.f.s.
The rights were granted on the condition that the Applicants use the
spring to fill the Jan Jouflas Pond ("Pond") for domestic, irrigation,
fire protection, commercial, recreation, piscatorial and storage
purposes. Irrigation was for 100 acres located in Section 22, Township
4 South, Range 83 West, 6th P.M.
Spring No. 39 is part of an integrated water supply for the
Applicants' respective projects. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92301(4)(b), "[w]hen a project or integrated system is comprised of
several features, work on one feature of the project shall be considered
in finding that reasonable diligence has been shown in the
development of water rights for all features of the entire project or
system." Since Spring No. 39 includes several features, work on any
one of these features may be taken into account to determine the
existence of reasonable diligence for the entire project.
Applicants assert that they have diligently pursued development of
the conditional water rights. In support of this assertion, Bear Gulch
stated that they own the portion of the Pond right that was decreed to
augment Bear Gulch Subdivision's ("Subdivision") wells in Case No.
94CW83, Water Division No. 5, and is obligated to administer the
augmentation plan and account for the diversions and depletions
made under the plan, as required by the Office of the Division
Engineer. In addition, Bear Gulch improved and maintained the
Pond, which is filled by Spring No. 39, and was granted an easement
for the Pond and the associated access easement. In further support
of a finding of reasonable diligence, Bear Gulch asserted it contracted
to construct and install roads, utilities and other infrastructure in the
Subdivision. Also, the developers of the Subdivision marketed the lots,
and, with the exception of two lots owned by Heidi Palmer Jouflas,
sold all of the lots to third parties. Furthermore, Heidi PalmerJouflas
constructed a residence on Lot 1 (Filing 1), drilled Bear Gulch Well
No. 1., which is augmented by the Pond, and placed the well to
beneficial use for the decreed purposes. Bear Gulch further submitted
that a diligence decree for the Pond was entered in Case No. 98CW29
and that Palmer Well Nos. 1 through 4 had been drilled. Additionally,
Bear Gulch regularly monitored the filings of other water users to
protect its water rights as evidenced by Bear Gulch's recent opposition
to the application of Bellyache Ridge Metropolitan District, Case No.
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00CW306. Lastly, Bear Gulch argued that it continues to rely on the
water right and has no intention of abandoning it.
In support of a finding of reasonable diligence, Vail Associates
emphasized that in Case No. 97CW298, the court decreed to it a
comprehensive water supply plan for a development project, which will
be served by the Pond and Spring No. 39. In addition, Vail Associates
obtained the necessary approval from Eagle County to develop a
residential and golf course project, for which the water supply plan was
adjudicated in Case No. 97CW298. Furthermore, Vail Associates spent
in excess of $17,000,000 in the planning and developing of the
residential and golf course project. Additionally, Vail Associates has
monitored the filings of other water users and filed statements of
opposition in numerous cases in order to protect its water rights.
Finally, Vail Associates asserted that it continues to rely on the water
right and has no intention of abandoning it.
The Applicants request that the Water Court determine they have
each exercised reasonable diligence concerning the beneficial use of
the water supply.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.

Lucia Padilla
APPLICATION FROM THE TowN OF EAGLE, COLORADO, FOR FINDING OF
REASONABLE DILIGENCE FOR CONDITIONAL WATER RIGHTS, IN EAGLE

COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 01CW165 (95CW017) (Water Division
5,June 2001) (Original decree: October 27, 1980). Applicant: Town
of Eagle, Colorado (Atty. Sherry A. Caloia, Esq., Caloia & Houpt, P.C.).
1. Application
The Town of Eagle ("Town") seeks a finding of reasonable
diligence in the development of conditional water rights ("Water
Rights"). On October 27, 1980, Water Court Division 5 decreed
conditional water rights for an undivided one-half interest in 720 acrefeet of Confluence Reservoir and an undivided one-half interest in 10
c.f.s. of East Brush Creek Confluence Ditch ("Confluence Ditch").
The Water Rights were appropriated on December 1, 1977 and
became an integral part of the Town's water supply system ("Water
Supply System").
Confluence Reservoir receives its water from West Brush Creek
and East Brush Creek traveling through Confluence Ditch.
Confluence Ditch is a tributary to both Brush Creek and the Eagle
River. The right abutment of the dam for Confluence Reservoir is
located in the SW1/4, NW1/4 of Section 18, T.6 S., R. 83 W. of the 6th
P.M., where the Northeast Corner of Section 18 bears North 72o30 ,
East 6100 feet.
East Brush Creek, a tributary to both Brush Creek and the Eagle
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River, is the source of water for Confluence Ditch. The point of
diversion for Confluence Ditch is located on East Brush Creek where
the Northeast Corner of Section 18, T.6 S., R. 83 W. of the 6th P.M.
bears North 7900 , East 3340 feet.
The Town. intends to use the Water Rights for the following
beneficial purposes in its Water Supply System: irrigation, recreation,
commercial,
snowmaking,
propagation,
and
wildlife
fish
manufacturing, and all municipal uses including domestic, industrial,
mechanical, fire protection, fish and wildlife propagation, power
generation and recreational purposes.
The Town has performed work on developing their Water Supply
System through the following activities, including but not limited to:
(1) maintaining its contract for a water release from Green Mountain
Reservoir to augment depletions under Water Rights; (2) completing a
study regarding installation of a second water treatment plant to
expand its water service; (3) annexing land, including a large parcel
designated for residential and golf course development, and agreeing
to provide water service; (4) filing Statements of Opposition, filing and
obtaining decrees, and obtaining diligence in cases to protect the
Water Rights; (5) maintaining an agreement with the Colorado
Department of Natural Resources to use a portion of Sylvan Lake for
Water Supply System storage; (6) hiring consultants to evaluate the
water supply; (7) contracting with land owners for provision of water
service; (8) maintaining, repairing and upgrading the water intake and
sewer treatment plant; (9) installing new water storage tanks, analyzing
water loss improvements, replacing distribution lines and upgrading
the water intake plan; (10) re-designing, upgrading and enlarging the
sewer treatment plant; (11) negotiating with out-of-district applicants
for water service; and (12) defending against proposed construction of
additional water and sewer treatment plants in the Brush Creek Basin.
The Town reserves the right to prove additional activities toward
the development of the Water Rights and requests entry of a decree
finding reasonable diligence in the development of the Water Rights.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Kiowa K. Engwis

CONFERENCE REPORT
TWO DECADES OF WATER LAW AND POLICY REFORM: A
RETROSPECTIVE AND AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
Boulder, Colorado, June 13-15, 2001

DAY ONE
DECADES OF REFORM PROPOSALS: AN

OPENING ADDRESS-TWO
OVERVIEW
LARRY MACDONNELL, LAWRENCE MACDONNELL, P.C.

(Due to time constraints, representatives of the Water Law Review
were unable to attend the Opening Address).
SESSION ONE-USING WATER MORE EFFICIENTLY
BARTON H. "Buzz" THOMPSON, JR., PROFESSOR
RESOURCES LAW, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

OF NATURAL

Barton "Buzz" Thompson, the Robert E. Paradise Professor of
Natural Resources Law and Vice-Dean at Stanford Law School, opened
the conference with a discussion on ways to encourage water users to
conserve water and use it more efficiently.
In particular, Mr.
Thompson discussed the different forms of conservation programs,
the advantages and disadvantages of each, the degree to which
governments and agencies have used the approaches, and the
successes they have had.
Mr. Thompson pointed out that traditional water policies in the
western United States have actually encouraged increased water use.
Historic pricing systems have not reflected the true cost of water; thus
users were encouraged to consume more water even when the cost far
outweighed the value to the consumer. Additionally, no monitoring
system was in place to bring instances of water waste to the attention of
courts or administrative agencies. Waste issues were only addressed in
stream adjudications or when a water user complained of wasteful
upstream diversions. In most cases, courts and administrative agencies
have been reluctant to find water uses unreasonable, except where
appropriators were using extreme methods, such as flood irrigation.
Finally, the prior appropriation system encouraged cities and other
water users to use as much water as possible so that another user could
not appropriate it. Cities faced with expanding populations would not
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encourage conservation, but instead used growth to justify additional
appropriations.
Mr. Thompson explained that although most everyone agrees that
historic water polices have led to "waste," it is difficult to determine the
amount of that waste. Most estimates of "waste" are unreliable because
it is not clear how the estimates were calculated, nor is it clear what
definition of "waste" was used. Courts generally define "waste"
narrowly, encompassing only the most flagrant use of water. Mr.
Thompson suggested the following definition, which he used to
evaluate various conservation measures in his discussion: "waste" is any
consumption or irretrievable loss of water that could be eliminated or
reduced at a cost that is lower than the value of the water in alternative
uses. Waste does not focus on the amount of water diverted or
efficiency of use, but on the total amount of water consumed or
irretrievably lost. This definition recognizes that water can be wasted
either in the amount that is used or in the purpose it is put to, and
acknowledges that cost must be a factor. Determinations of waste and
proposed conservation policies must take return flows into account;
otherwise, current instream flows might decrease, and other
appropriators may be hurt.
Next, Mr. Thompson discussed the various mechanisms for
encouraging conservation. The approaches fall into four categories:
appeals to conscious, new technological frontiers, revising price
signals, and governmental mandate.
The least intrusive method is to appeal to the public's conscience
and encourage voluntary changes in behavior. This approach has
been particularly successful during periods of draught. Governments
generally use a combination of education, marketing, information,
self-evaluation, and direct communication to achieve this goal. Studies
show that arousing altruistic and other nonegotistical motives engage
the consumer's attention, and lead to a higher level of conservation
than mere economic considerations.
This approach does have
problems, however. Agricultural and industrial water users are less
likely to voluntarily conserve water, and the effort was less effective as
income levels increased. Thus voluntary conservation can place a
greater burden on poorer households.
Additionally, voluntary
campaigns do not appear effective in the long run because consumers
tend to revert back to their pre-campaign level of use.
Technological approaches to conservation have been both popular
and successful.
For example, installing a low-flow showerhead
decreases a household's water demand from 6.4 to 9.7 percent. A
growing number of governments and water suppliers have adopted
programs in which they provide water-saving devises to domestic
consumers, or subsidize their purchase. These types of programs have
proved to be very cost effective.
It is interesting to note that
conservation levels are lower than engineering models predicted; it
appears that users typically respond to water-saving technology by
using more water elsewhere, by taking longer showers, for example.
Implementing new technologies in the farming sector is more
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complicated. First, government programs must ensure that farmers
are adequately trained to use complex technologies. Second, because
crop yields are uncertain, farmers balk at significant up-front costs,
especially where the changes are irreversible. Finally, increasing
irrigation efficiency does not always lead to reductions in use. Some
farmers view the water saved as a "new" supply, and thus grow higher
water-using crops.
Revising pricing signals may encourage water conservation. In
districts where users are charged a flat rate regardless of the amount
used, reformers have suggested metering water and quantity-based
rates. Metering water use can encourage conservation in at least two
ways. First, many consumers are unaware of their level of use, and will
voluntarily decrease their use when presented with the information.
Second, when combined with a quantity-based rating system,
consumers are provided with an economic incentive to conserve.
Studies suggest that the combination of metering and quantity-based
rates reduce water use by approximately a third. Although metering is
more expensive than flat charges, the water saved makes up the cost.
In districts where quantity-based rates are already used, reformers urge
that prices should be increased to reflect the actual marginal costs.
Otherwise, consumers will not appreciate the value of water, and will
use more than justified. Finally, in districts where rates are the same
regardless of the amount of water used, reformers have proposed
tiered pricing, where the price of water increases as the level of use
increases. Tiered systems give the greatest incentive to conserve to
large water users, thus allocating conservation more fairly.
Water markets are another way to encourage conservation by
giving consumers the option to sell they water they save. Markets have
several advantages over pricing schemes. First, markets encourage
conservation through positive means, rather than penalties such as
higher prices. Second, markets provide the incentive and funding
necessary to implement conservation techniques. Water markets
automatically adjust since the price of water will depend upon its
current value to others. Finally, markets have proven effective in
increasing the amount of water returned to rivers and streams, because
water can be purchased purely for conservation and environmental
goals. There are numerous problems in implementing water markets,
however. Markets face significant political opposition. They often
benefit large water users who have been profligate in the past. Markets
only work where a market exists, and often do not behave as
economists predict.
Bounties and subsidy programs, such as paying consumers who are
able to reduce their use by a specified percentage, are often more
politically feasible than price increases. However these types of
programs pose significant disadvantages. For example, subsidies
appear to benefit large water users who were wasteful in the past, or
are "wasted" on users who would have conserved without the subsidy.
Often, the source of funding for subsidies is general tax revenue or
surcharges on use.
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Finally, governments can encourage water conservation by
mandating it through regulations and enforcement mechanisms. This
method appears to be effective; studies show that most people comply
with the mandates. However, regulation can defeat altruistic motives
and discourage users who would have conserved voluntarily.
LUNCHEON ADDRESS-THE ROAD TO WATER POLICY REFORM: WHERE
WE'VE BEEN AND CAN WE AVOID GOING THERE AGAIN?
JOHN D. LESHY, FORMER INTERIOR DEPARTMENT SOLICITOR

John D. Leshy, former Interior Department Solicitor, Professor of
Law at Arizona State University and Distinguished Visiting Professor of
Law at the University of California, Hastings, gave a discussion on
water policy reform that focused on water allocation issues. Many
agree that water law and policy need to improve in several important
areas. Some of these areas include curbing waste, promoting efficient
use, effectively dealing with water transfers while aiming to promote
water use from lower to higher valued uses, identifying, protecting, or
restoring instream flows to promote environmental goals, and
addressing groundwater issues.
Mr. Leshy discussed some of the major shifts in national policy
during the last decade. The primary impetus for these changes has
been the Endangered Species Act, especially in the west. The Act not
only promotes, but demands water management for the benefit of
endangered species. Mr. Leshy pointed out that most of the changes
were not in the form of sweeping legislation, and thus may shift under
the Bush administration.
Water policy reform at the state level has moved much slower,
except in the area of groundwater storage and recovery. Most of the
improvements were made at the suggestion of the federal government.
While most states recognize instream flow rights, the flows are
protected haphazardly.
Mr. Leshy suggested that one way to protect instream flows is to
allow buyers to purchase and convert water rights perfected under
state law for consumptive use to instream flows. Federal agencies and
private parties alike have shown an interest in acquiring consumptive
use rights for that purpose. While the transactions seem to be win-win,
First, converting consumptive rights to
several problems arise.
instream flows may negatively affect other existing water users. State
law may not recognize instream flows, or may not allow a government
agency or private entity to hold the right. The transfer might impair
other users, or be contrary to the "public interest." Finally, a special
water district or other entity may claim veto power.
Mr. Leshy offered several possible cures for these problems. He
argued that if the acquisition and restoration of instream flows
promotes important federal goals, state law is preempted. A buyer
could condition the acquisition on obtaining state approval, thereby
protecting his investment, although doing little for instream flows.
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Finally, states could amend their laws to provide for this situation. For
example, the law could include a strong presumption in favor of
environmentally protective transfers.
Mr. Leshy concluded his discussion by suggesting that the time has
come for more radical action. He suggested that we seriously consider
implementing a federal grant program to induce the state to adopt
reforms. For a modest cost, the federal government could provide a
financial "carrot" to underwrite the costs of improvements in state
water law and administration. In addition to receiving money for
agreeing to undertake improvements, the state would be assured that
they would retain control over water management. Although Mr.
Leshy acknowledged that there are many crucial details to determine,
nothing else has seemed to work so far.
SESSION TWO-GETrING WATER FOR CHANGING FEDERAL WATER
POLICY OBJECTIVES
DICK DANIEL, SENIOR PROJECT MANAGER, CH2MHILL

(Due to time constraints, representatives of the Water Law Review
were unable to attend Session Two).
SESSION THREE-ACQUIRING WATER FOR THE TRIBES
SUSAN WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS, JANOV & COONEY

Ms. Williams reviewed a number of existing and pending Indian
water right settlements regarding a myriad of issues. In reference to
on-reservation water supplies, there are pending settlements for
surface water, groundwater, Bureau of Reclamation Reservoir water,
and retired state water rights.
The Lummi Nation settlement
negotiation is of particular interest. Off-site sources would provide
approximately five million gallons per day ("mgpd") to achieve .5
mgpd non-tribal use, 2 mgpd tribal use, and 2.5 mgpd enabling
instream fishery enhancement of the Nooksack Basin. In order for
this settlement to work, the outside supply must be a reliable source of
all five mgpd that will not diminish. When Congress enacts this
settlement, on-reservation non-tribal groundwater users will substitute
the off-site water for the current groundwater use, halting groundwater
use completely with no future groundwater development prospects.
Thus, the groundwater will be available for tribal use under the Tribe's
reserved rights.
In reference to off-reservation water supplies, there are pending
settlements for Bureau of Reclamation Reservoir water, City or
Regional Water System water, Exchange Water, Purchased State Water
Rights, State water rights, effluent, conserved water and new storage
water. The Zuni is another pending settlement to watch. The Zuni
tribe's settlement will be enforceable after the tribe purchases 3,600
acre-feet per year from willing upstream sellers in the Norviel Decree
Area. Once purchased, the rights will carry a decree date of the
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Norviel Decree. Further, state law will not apply to these rights once
severed from the willing seller, thus not subject to forfeiture or
abandonment. Finally, the tribe will have the right to utilize the water
in any way it sees fit.
There are many legal issues surrounding water sources for tribal
water rights. While there have been decisions reflecting an implied
reserved right for maintaining a tribe's fishing right, the Nez Perce
Instream flow decision rejected their claim to off-reservation water
rights for instream flows to protect Nez Perce's fishing rights.
Considering groundwater, the Gila River case has had an important
impact on Indian reserved rights. This decision details federal
reserved rights to groundwater. Further, it affirms that the Winters
Doctrine applies to ground water. Finally, the decision was rendered
by a state court, thus being contrary to past historical treatment of
reserved rights in state court.
The Aamodt case quantified the amount of water rights for the
Pueblos in New Mexico. The United States District Court of New
Mexico rejected the State of New Mexico's assertion that the Pueblo
could only use the water for irrigation purposes. Instead, the court
held that the Pueblo could use the water however they deemed fit, so
long as they use only the amount of water quantified by the court.
In order to effect successful tribal rights settlements, all parties
need a realistic sense of what their rights should be. Indian reserved
rights present much risk to litigation due to the unique issues involved
such as reserved water rights seniority due to early reservation date,
tribal sovereignty, and complex jurisdictional elements. Indian water
rights advocates need excellent negotiating skills because there are a
number of parties that need to be considered.
Tribal rights settlement negotiations take a lot of time and money,
thus presenting a large obstacle. Further, the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") and reserved rights early appropriation dates could present
unique problems in the future when creating conservation plans in
compliance with the ESA. Additionally, groundwater issues will
continue to compound negotiation problems because each state has
different laws regarding regulation of groundwater where it may or
may not be conjunctive use. Lastly, religious and cultural tribal uses
for water must be contemplated and accounted for during water rights
negotiations.
In conclusion, the Zuni and the Lummi settlements contemplate
interesting issues that will provide for a unique outcome. Each
settlement tends to provide creative means to accomplish the
important ends of water for Indian Reservations.
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DAY TWO
SESSION FOUR-WATER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A CALIFORNIAN'S
RETROSPECTIVE
THOMASJ. GRAFF, CALIFORNIA REGIONAL DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE

The National Water Commission's report provided a basis for
water law and policy reform in the 1970s. One member, Charley
Meyers, opined that the basis for reform rose out of a misallocation of
federal subsidies, and the solution was more reliance on water markets.
Another member, Joe Sax, believed the need for reform emanated
from a total disregard of environmental issues throughout western
water development, and a solution lay in focusing on the public trust
doctrine as a mechanism to equalize environmental values with
traditional consumptive uses.
The 1970s brought three opportunities for policy reform
dominated by the Sax approach. The first two, New Melones Dam and
Auburn Dam, dealt with the federal government requesting water
rights through the State Water Resources Control Board of California.
California required the Auburn Project to maintain instream flows,
and restricted the New Melones project's ability to store water until the
federal government had a better picture of the proposed stored water
uses. These two projects resulted in the decisive case United States v.
Califo'rnia, where the Supreme Court held that the Reclamation Act
deferred to the states when dealing with water law issues, absent a clear
preemption by Congress. Finally, Environmental Defense Fund's
("EDF") suit against the East Bay Municipal Utility District ("EBMUD")
supplied the third opportunity for policy reform in the 70's. EDF
challenged EBMUD's contract with the federal government for
supplemental supply produced from the Auburn-Folsom Project based
on waste, unreasonable use and unreasonable diversion. Here again,
the Court deferred to state law, thus after twenty-nine years the case is
still pending in county court. This case spurred an interesting
relationship between federalists and environmentalists, usually on
opposing sides, because both parties argued to maintain state power

over intrastate activities.
In the wake of California's 1982 referendum defeat of the
Peripheral canal, the Meyers policy reform approach surfaced in EDF's

publication TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER: A
PROPOSAL FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COLORADO RIVER WATER BY
FINANCING WATER CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR THE IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT. EDF proposed an end to public subsidies for

water development through water markets where there were voluntary
exchanges of water between willing sellers and buyers. However, the
'80s were most characterized by President Reagan's lack of water
project funding, thus forcing creativity in water users' approaches.
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During Carter's 1980-campaign trail, Rosalyn Carter raised many
funds in Fresno, and three days later, the Secretary of Interior offered
a generous permanent contract to the Westlands Water District
("Westlands").
Remarkably, Westlands refused the offer in
anticipation of a changing political atmosphere. Reagan's Secretary of
Interior withdrew the offer on the table for a much less generous
ultimatum. Westlands sued the United States and ultimately settled on
terms exceedingly favorable to Westlands such that it committed
inflated water deliveries ("Barcellos Settlement").
The Barcellos Settlement, compounded by a late '80s drought and
subsequent aquatic habitat destruction laid the foundation for the
most significant water policy reform in California: the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA") also known as the Miller-Bradley
bill. CVPIA combined elements of both Sax's and Meyers' approaches
through authorizing resale of federal development water, setting
ground rules for federal water marketing, creating a habitat
restoration fund, and rededicating water under federal control to
refuges, fisheries and the Trinity River.
The '90s seemed to be a decade of multiple agreements such as the
Bay-Delta Accord, authorization of many ecosystem restoration
projects, and most recently the 2000 CALFED record of decision. The
future of reformation is difficult to predict. There seems to be a rise of
counter reformation as well as water takings on the rise. To balance
the future, a solution may lie within new innovative approaches to
water markets and less governmental subsidies.
SESSION FIVE-STRATEGIES TO FACILITATE CHANGES IN WATER USE
BONNIE G. COLBY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE
ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

In session five, Bonnie Colby addressed the various entities that
commonly facilitate changes in water use, as well as the process
through which these stakeholders accomplish such transactions. Colby
noted that the three most prominent players are agricultural interests,
tribal governments, and most recently, NGOs and government
agencies with environmental stewardship agendas.
Of these interested parties, those in the agricultural field have
traditionally been the most vocal in opposing changes in water use.
This resistance, Colby says, is the result of the continuing movement of
water away from local agricultural uses. Many farmers perceive this
trend as a threat to local economies, business activities, and property
values. According to Colby, this perception may have some merit.
However, the negative impacts of these changes should not be
considered without also taking notice of the positive impacts of moving
water away from agriculture.
Colby offered six negative impacts of transferring water out of
agricultural regions: (1) reduced profits for "backward-linked"
businesses, which sell products and services to farmers; (2) reduced
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profits for "forward-linked" businesses, which purchase crops from
affected farmers, and must turn to more distant, costly supplies; (3)
reduced profits for general businesses that sell goods and services to
households (assuming water sellers exist in the area, reducing the
number of households); (4) reduced jobs in all of the types of
businesses referred to above; (5) reduced property values associated
with a decline in business activity; and (6) reduced tax revenues
collected by state and local governments on business sales and
property values. These impacts, Colby asserted, assume that the
revenues earned from water transfers are not reinvested in the
economy of the affected area.
The positive impacts of water transfers out of agricultural regions
include the following: (1) increased economic activity in the sectors
acquiring water; (2) increased property values associated with new
economic activities; (3) increased tax revenues collected by state and
local governments or property values and sales; and (4) increased
recreation benefits to local residents associated with improved streams,
wetlands and wildlife habitat. Accompanying these beneficial impacts,
Colby noted, is the fact that the economic impacts created by transfers
out of agriculture are small relative to the amount of irrigated land
affected. A number of economic studies support the assertion that this
is true even when the water is moved away from the area of origin.
Local and state governments have implemented a number of
strategies to prevent negative third party effects of water transfers.
Agricultural bases have been preserved, Colby said, by making
transfers contingent on drought conditions. With these restrictions in
place, farming occurs as usual in normal years, and farmers are
compensated in dry years. Other strategies include subsidizing water
conservation practices on farms, rotating acreage fallowed among
landowners, and partial buyouts of water used in farming.
Colby recognized that solving the economic disadvantages of water
transfers does not necessarily resolve the concerns of all affected
parties. Many feel that these transfers away from rural, agricultural
communities represent "a change in society's priorities and values for
farms, cities, fish and wetlands."
Compensation schemes and
restructuring transfers do not necessarily remedy these objections to
changes in water use.
Colby next outlined the number of different ways to reallocate
water. The most fundamental distinction that may be drawn is
between voluntary and involuntary arrangements. Voluntary changes
in use include: (1) negotiated purchases; (2) auctions; (3) standing
offers; (4) water banks; and (5) contingent transfers for drought
protection. Federal agencies, she said, often encourage the use of
these mechanisms by offering technical assistance and cost sharing in
order to induce improvement of management practices by farmers
and ranchers. Resource pricing is another tool used to accomplish
this goal. Some urban water providers penalize excessive use through
incentive pricing in their water rate structures. However, agriculture
generally enjoys very low water costs.
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Compulsory changes in water use are primarily induced in one of
three ways: (1) litigation; (2) administrative action; or (3)
congressional mandate. While the Mono Lake decision in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court offers a good example of water
reallocation brought about by litigation, the Secretary of Interior's
order to modify the operations of Glen Canyon Dam 1991
demonstrates how such changes can be accomplished administratively.
Finally, the Central Valley Improvement Act, passed by Congress in
1992, is a prime example of a congressionally-ordered compulsory
change in water use.
While voluntary and compulsory mechanisms have proven effective
- employed both individually, and in concert with each other - Colby

believes some policy changes are necessary regarding water transfers
by western states and by the federal government. She suggested ten
specific improvements to the present water reallocation system: (1)
restructuring municipal water rates paid by irrigated agriculture; (2)
redefining the conditions under which western states define water as
"conserved" and available for transfer; (3) revising policies so that
those seeking water for instream flows as well as wetlands and species
recovery can compete on the same bases as those seeking water for
urban growth; (4) integrating water quality into the policies that
govern changes in water use; (5) modernizing state and federal
policies to recognize the interconnections between surface water and
groundwater, accounting for these linkages in evaluating proposed
water transfers; (6) establishing interstate mechanisms as a way to
respond to basin-wide challenges such as drought, species restoration,
and water quality; (7) the Corps of Engineers, Department of
Agriculture, and Bureau of Reclamation using common sense
economics as a "litmus test" for water-related activities; (8) creating
inter-jurisdictional arrangements that would allow tribal governments
to more fully participate in water transfer negotiations and regional
water management; (9) utilizing the resources and experience of
federal farm programs to accomplish on-farm water conservation,
water quality improvements, and river and wetland restoration; and
(10) designing innovative and cost-effective compensation schemes for
area-of-origin interests affected by proposed transfers.
SESSION SIX-CLARIFYING STATE WATER RIGHTS AND ADJUDICATIONS

JOHN E. THORSON, ATrORNEY-AT-LAW & WATER POLICY CONSULTANT,
FORMERLY SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE ARIZONA GENERAL STREAM
ADJUDICATION

Mr. Thorson defined general stream adjudications as legal
proceedings involving multiple users brought to determine ownership
and characteristics of water rights to a river system or other common
source of water.
Prior to general stream adjudications, Spanish and common law
influenced water law.
Spanish law developed extensive water
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management in order to govern from a distance, and decentralized
Spanish authority among the local authorities. The system honored
legal title and prior use, however these factors did not defeat claims of
the needy, needs of the crown, common good and 3rd party
beneficiaries. Common Law established actions at law for damages or
actions in equity for injunctive relief. Further, bills in equity allowed
jurisdiction over all parties to solve disputes all at once. Conversely,
quiet title actions adjudicated a single party's rights, but no others.
Due to the nature of this process, there was no certainly or finality of
water rights.
The western water law structure lent itself to adjudication of
streams. The Colorado adjudicatory system exemplified this through
pure adjudication, where all water rights claims must be heard in the
water court.
The Wyoming system established a complete
administrative process where the state engineer and Board of Control
managed all quantities and priorities. Finally, the hybrid approaches
as illustrated through the Model State Irrigation Code and Oregon
system combined the administrative and adjudicatory systems.
In the late 1800s, brokerage houses and banks required some
adjudications before irrigation companies could issue stock or get
loans.
The progressive era spurred the scientific management
movement, applying science to business, and the progressive
conservation movement, applying multi-disciplinary science theory to
natural resource management. The culmination of the progressive
conservation era provided a context for improved water management
for public benefit. The west manifested this movement through
adjudications that resulted in the federal reclamation program and
riparian and appropriative integration.
After World War II, western states became concerned about federal
dominance over water rights as a result of the New Deal programs. In
order to assuage such concerns, Congress adopted the McCarran
Amendment, which waives federal sovereign immunity in certain
situations. The Friat Dam and Santa Margarita conflict led to the
adoption of this amendment. The amendment extended to federal
reserved rights through the Eagle County case, the Akins case, and the
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe case.
The McCarran Amendment applied when there was a suit dealing
with a comprehensive adjudication of the river system where the
federal government was a party via joinder. The comprehensive
component suggested a meaningful opportunity to contest other
rights that would affect a certain party's rights. There were three
aspects to comprehensiveness. First, hydraulic comprehensiveness
begged the question of how much water should be adjudicated and
should the adjudication include groundwater as well as surface water.
Second, use comprehensiveness begged the question of what types of
uses should be included in the adjudication.
Third, temporal
comprehensiveness -contemplated which priority dates must be joined
in the adjudication.
The 1970s brought numerous stream adjudications throughout the
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west in order to provide clarity, recognition of federal reserved rights,
and better data records. There were increased state and federal
tensions, as illustrated through Arizona v. Californiaand Cappaert. The

'70s saw a re-emergence of tribal self-government and advocacy as
illustrated by the Native American Rights Fund and American Indian
Lawyer Training Program.
Rapid growth throughout the West
resulted in need for additional water management, and created an
atmosphere of increased competition for water.
The main reason to embark upon present-day general stream
adjudication is to ascertain water usage data for a centralized
inventory. In addition, there is a desire to confirm state water rights,
while also striving to adjudicate tribal rights. Theoretically, one could
say that general stream adjudications are close to halfway complete,
however the more difficult issues have yet to be resolved such as
groundwater, large senior claims, and federal rights. Adjudications
sometimes deliberately avoid difficult issues such as the
interrelationship of groundwater and surface water, water quality
aspects and reasonable use and conservation. Adjudications have a
tendency to be isolated and not comprehensive. The process is
extremely costily and irrelevant in some instances. Further, the
McCarran Amendment and other influences have complicated
jurisdiction issues. Depending on the adjudication instigator, there is
a great potential for disturbing community relations. Finally, the
public has historically perceived exclusion from the water law process,
and water is a public resource. Therefore, there are issues of public
distrust for general stream adjudications.
Thorson proposed reform. First, the federal government should
assess their water needs for the next forty years and create an
administrative inventory of federal rights. Second, Congress should
explicitly quantify water needs when reserving future lands. Third, the
McCarran Amendment should be modified to eliminate the suit
requirement. Finally, Indian reserved right adjudication should occur
in a focused fashion in federal court.
Thorson set forth recommendations. There should be "hot-spot"
adjudications instead of all encompassing adjudications. There should
be better coordination between the state and federal government.
There should be two steps in an adjudication: first, re-evaluate state law
rights, and second examine the federal rights (reserved and nonreserved) against the state-law rights. Mediation and arbitration are
good tools that can be introduced into the adjudication process.
Finally, internet technologies need to be considered in reference to
adjudications for its ease of communication.
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SESSION
SEVEN-TOWARD
ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE
WATER
MANAGEMENT: THE ROLES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
BRIAN D. RICHTER, DIRECTOR, FRESHWATER INITIATIVE, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY

Noting the current trend of sustaining freshwater resources
primarily for human uses, Richter focused on the correlative neglect of
freshwater species and ecosystems this tendency creates. The needs of
both humans and freshwater ecosystems must be simultaneously
addressed he asserted. Failing this, "the trend in our quality of life will
continue to slide toward impoverishment rather than sustainability."
Richter expressed his belief that both needs could be met, alluding
to a number of studies conducted throughout the world
demonstrating that human needs can be met while sustaining the
necessary volume and timing of water flows to support affected
freshwater ecosystems. These needs are not mutually exclusive,
however, as the value to society of freshwater ecosystems is estimated at
$9 trillion annually worldwide.
According to Richter, success may be achieved only through the
concerted effort of policy makers and inter-disciplinary scientists.
Richter is not optimistic that these scientists' attempts to develop a
harmonious balance between human and ecological needs will
succeed initially. However, he believes that absent this opportunity,
ecologically sustainable water management can never be achieved.
The Nature Conservancy has suggested six basic steps that need to
be taken by the entities in charge of developing water management
policy: (1) define ecosystem flow requirements; (2) determine
influence of human activities; (3) identify areas of potential
incompatibility; (4) foster collaborative dialogue; (5) conduct water
management experiments to resolve uncertainty; and (6) design and
implement an adaptive management plan. Decision makers should
take these steps, Richter suggests, while making use of the best
available technology to achieve a balance between natural and human
water needs.
Richter opined that computer-aided tools such as simulation
models and "decision support systems" are two such valuable
technologies that can and should be utilized by those charged with
establishing water management strategies. Simulation models are able
to predict both the hydrological and ecological effects of proposed
water management strategies. The use of these models, Richter
believes, will help eliminate the uncertainties associated with complex
hydrological systems.
Decision support systems are "software packages that facilitate the
management and display of data and computer-based tools-a virtual
'commons' that provides access to information and ways of analyzing
that information." These tools are important, Richter said, because
they allow for all stakeholders in a system to gain access to data that
will ultimately support or foreclose water management decisions. They
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also enable decisionmakers to rapidly evaluate alternative scenarios.

DAY THREE
SESSION EIGHT-CREATING BErTER GOVERNANCE
DENISE D. FORT, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF NEw MEXICO SCHOOL OF
LAW

Denise Fort, Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico
School of Law, discussed how the federal government functions in
western rivers, and the effect of congressional politics. Western policy
makers confront important issues regarding how to balance local
interests with national interests, how river management purposes can
be broadened to include environmental protection, how citizens can
participate in decision-making, and how discordant federal policies
can be reconciled. During the past two decades, policy changes have
come about through the creation of consensus processes, rather than
formal institutions. For example, the Interior Department and the
Bureau of Reclamation policies were changed from within during
Secretary Bruce Babbit's tenure, despite opposition from a hostile
Congress. However, the Corps of Engineers has stayed out of the fray,
and only recently has it become clear that the Executive branch has
little control over the Corps. In her discussion, Ms. Fort argues that
the direct Congressional relationship to the Corps challenges the
viability of many reform initiatives at the regional and local level.
The topic of governance continues to effect water policy because
the physical dimension of improving water management is far less
daunting than the questions presented by how society organizes itself
to address our water challenges. There are examples of basins where
water problems are being addressed constructively, where parties are
communicating, restoration is occurring, and water management is
improving. However experimentation with different mechanisms has
not resulted in a consensus as to the best way of governance.
Continued experimentation indicates a widespread belief that no one
has gotten it right yet.
The initiation of ad hoc groups has forced the incorporation of
For example, although
certain goals of better governance.
environmental concerns were not part of the western prior
appropriation scheme, federal environmental laws have empowered
environmentalist to successfully lobby changes in western river
operations.
Likewise, tribal governments are recognized and
acknowledged in a way that was inconceivable a generation ago. While
this type of greater participation has been the recent trend in the
West, Ms. Fort discussed why it so difficult to change formal
governance structures, and looked to the Corps of Engineers in
particular for an answer.
Ms. Fort observed a great belief that agencies are redundant, but
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there is little attention focused on how agency structure affects the
agency's efficiency. The relationship between the Corps and the
Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") seems particularly redundant.
Although the Corps operates across the nation and BOR is restricted
to seventeen western states, the agencies often compete over the best
dam sites. In the west, whether a particular basin is labeled as
belonging the Corps or BOR is arbitrary in character. While debates
rage over the appropriate role of the federal agencies, with Westerners
united in their demand for state control over all water resources, there
is no call for an end to the Corps' programs in the West. The federal
funding for environmental controls rarely equals the perceived burden
on the states, and the dependence on those funds tempers the
demand that the federal government withdraw from the west.
So far, the Corps has managed to escape the scrutiny the Interior
Department and the Environmental Protection Agency has
undergone. While there is no strong movement to reform the Corps,
members of both houses of Congress have introduced legislation
aimed at its reform, and a coalition of environmental groups recently
released a report calling for Corps reform. However, the Corps is
different from other Executive agencies, where the President is
responsible for the successes or failures of management, and thus a
more fundamental cure for the Corps may be required. The use of
federal dollars has a powerful effect on what is or is not built on
western rivers, and the practical effect of subsidies is well understood.
If cities and municipalities are forced to pay for the full cost of water,
or the structures built by the Corps, different solutions would be
sought. When nonstructural solutions make better sense, they would
be used instead. After some experimentation, we can judge whether
using federal funds to address Western needs would remedy distortion
of public policy choices.
SESSION NINE-WATER POLICY REFORM: PROMISES, REALITIES, AND
THE AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
DAVID GETCHES, RAPHAEL J. MOSES PROFESSOR OF NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW

(Due to time constraints, representatives of the Water Law Review
were unable to attend Session Nine).
Holly Kirsner,Makayla Shannon, andJason S. Wells

